{"operation":"document","citation":"0900006480e8a888","title":"U.S. DOT/RSPA - Environmental Assessment-Revised August 2003, Final Rule, Pipeline Integrity Management in High Consequence Areas (Gas Transmission Pipelines)","source_type":"rulemaking","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"current","official":true,"published_on":null,"effective_on":null,"summary":"- Research and Special Programs Administration U.S. Department of Transportation Environmental Assessment - Revised August 2003 Final Rule Pipeline Integrity Management in High Consequence Areas (Gas Transmission Pipelines) Docket: RSPA-00-7666; Amendment 192-95 RIN 2137-AD54 Table of Contents Summary A. Purpose and Need for Action B. Description of Action C. Alternatives Considered D. Affected Environment E. Environmental Consequences of Action and Alternatives E. 1 Enviroiiinental Consequences of Action E.2 Environmental Consequences of Alternatives F. Environmental Justice Considerations...","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/regulations-gov-attachment-0900006480e8a888.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/regulations-gov-attachment-0900006480e8a888.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/regulations-gov-attachment-0900006480e8a888","source_url":"https://downloads.regulations.gov/PHMSA-RSPA-2000-7666-0355/attachment_1.pdf","body":"<<<PAGE 1>>>\n\n-\nResearch and Special Programs Administration\nU.S. Department of Transportation\nEnvironmental Assessment - Revised August 2003\nFinal Rule\nPipeline Integrity Management in High Consequence Areas\n(Gas Transmission Pipelines)\nDocket: RSPA-00-7666; Amendment 192-95\nRIN 2137-AD54\n\n<<<PAGE 2>>>\n\nTable of Contents\nSummary\nA.\nPurpose and Need for Action\nB.\nDescription of Action\nC.\nAlternatives Considered\nD.\nAffected Environment\nE.\nEnvironmental Consequences of Action and Alternatives\nE. 1\nEnviroiiinental Consequences of Action\nE.2\nEnvironmental Consequences of Alternatives\nF.\nEnvironmental Justice Considerations\nG .\nInformation Made Available to States, Local Governments, and Individuals\nH.\nList of Agencies and Persons Consulted\nI.\nConclusion\n..\n11\n...\n111\n1\n1\n3\n4\n5\n5\n6\n6\n7\n8\n9\n\n<<<PAGE 3>>>\n\nSummary\nThis document is an update of the Environmental Assessment prepared in support of the\nproposed rule to establish integrity management program requirements for operators of natural\ngas transmission pipelines (68 FR 4278: January 28,2003). The document was modified to\nreflect changes that were made to the proposed requirements in response to public comments.\nThis document has been prepared in accordance with section 102(2)(c) of the National\nEnvironniental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. Section 4332)’ the Couiicil on Environmental Quality\nregulations (40 CFR Sections 1500-1 508), and Department of Transportation Order 5610. IC,\nProcedures for Considering Environmental Impacts. It was prepared to assist in thc agency’s\nplanning and decision-making. This document describes the Research and Special Programs\nAdministration’s (RSPA) final nile to establish integrity management program requirements for\noperators of natural gas transmission pipelines, the alternative requirements considered, the\nenvironment affected by this action, the consequences to the environment of the action and the\nalternatives, and a list of the agencies and organizations consulted. This document, along with\nthe Environmental Assessment prepared in June 2002, provides sufficient evidence to determine\nthat the provisions of the final rule are expected to have no significant impact on the\nenvironment.\n...\n111\n\n<<<PAGE 4>>>\n\nA. Purpose and Need for Action\nThe purpose and need for this action was described in the Environmental Assessment that\naccompanied the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking proposing to define requirements for gas\npipeline integrity management program in high consequence areas’. The Environmental\nAssessment’ is available in the Docket (#7666). This document updates the earlier analysis to\nreflect the changed provisions in the final rule.\nA number of individuals and organizations provided comment on the proposed rule described in\nthe NPRM. These comments are available in the Docket and summarized in the preamble to the\nfinal rule. In response to comments, RSPA modified the proposed rule language, altering the\ndefinition of high consequence areas, the allowable intervals for integrity reassessments, the\nallowable assessment intervals for direct assessment, requirements for preventive and mitigative\nmeasures, and requirements for confirmatory direct assessment. The provisions of the final rule\nare described in Section B.\nB. Description of Action\nRSPA is adding a new section to 49 CFR 192 to establish integrity management program\nrequirements for operators of natural gas transmission pipelines. The rule requires each operator\nto develop and implement an integrity management program that provides for continual\nassessment of the integrity of all pipeline segments located in high consequence areas. The\nproposed rule further requires that the program evaluate the entire range of threats to each\npipeline segment’s integrity through comprehensive information analysis and ensure additional\nprotection to a pipeline segment’s integrity though remedial actions and preventive and\nmitigative measures.\nThe nile applies to all gas transmission pipelines, as defined in Section 192.3. This includes\ntransmission pipelines transporting petroleum gas, hydrogen, and other gas products covered\nunder Part 192.\nThe rule requires that no later than one year from the rule effective date, an operator of a covered\npipeline segment must develop and follow a written integrity management program that contains\nall the elements listed below and that addresses the risks on each covered segment. The initial\nintegrity management program must consist, at a minimum, of a framework describing how each\nI “Pipeline Safety: Integrity Management in High Consequence Areas (Gas\nTransmission Pipelines),” Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 68 FR 4278, January\n28, 2003.\n2 “Environmental Assessment: Proposed Rulemaking Integrity Management in\nHigh Consequence Areas (Gas Transmission Pipelines),” Docket: RSPA-OO-\n7666, June, 2002.\n1\n\n<<<PAGE 5>>>\n\nelement will be implemented, how relevant decisions will be made, and what near-term\nimprovements are planned. As an operator further develops the integrity management program,\nthe operator must document all actions the operator will take to implement each element. An\noperator’s initial integrity management program framework and subsequent integrity\nmanagement program must, at minimum, contain the following elements:\n(a) An identification of all high consequence areas that define segments - covered by the rule. The\nrule has added to the definition of high consequence areas from the previously issued rule on\nhigh consequence areas for gas transmission pipelines’ and has changed the definition in the\nproposed rulc. The rule includes, as a high consequence area, any area outside a Class 3 or Class\n4 location where the potential impact radius4 is greater than 660 feet and the area within a\npotential impact circle contains 20 or more buildings intended for human occupancy. The\ndefinition of high consequence areas in the rule includes “identified sites”: locations where\npeople congregate and locations occupied by persons of limited mobility. The rule involves the\nuse of local public safety or emergency planning organizations to provide information on the\nlocations of identified sites.\n(b) A baseline integrity assessnient plan including all covered segments. This plan must include\nthe assessment method, the schedule for completion of assessments, and explanation of the\nchoice of assessment methods and the risk factors considered in establishing the assessment\nschedule. The assessment method used could be an internal inspection tool or tools, pressure test,\nDirect Assessment, or other technology that the operator demonstrates can provide an equivalent\nunderstanding of the condition of the line pipe. The required completion date for all baseline\nassessments is the same whether or not direct assessment is used as the assessment method.\n(c) An identification of threats to each covered pipeline segment, which must include a risk\nassessment to evaluate the failure likelihood of each covered segment. An operator must use the\nthreat identification and risk assessment to prioritize covered segments for assessment and to\nevaluate the merits of additional preventive and mitigative measures for each covered segment.\n(d) A direct assessment plan, if direct assessment is used as an integrity assessment method.\n(e) Provisions for remediating conditions found during an integrity assessment.\n(9 A process for continual evaluation and assessment. Unlike the proposed rule, the required\ninterval for completing integrity reassessments is the same whether or not direct assessment is\nused as the assessment method. The reassessment intervals now required by the rule are seven\n3 “Pipeline Safety: High Consequence Areas for Gas Transmission Pipelines,’’ Final\nRule, 67 FR 50824, August 6, 2002.\n4 A distance that represents the extent of the area that could be impacted by a\npipeline leak, calculated based on pipeline characteristics.\n2\n\n<<<PAGE 6>>>\n\nyears by one of the allowed assessment methods, unless the operator establishes that a longer\ninterval is sufficient. However, if under one of the methods, an operator establishes an interval\nlonger than seven years, a reassessment by confirmatory direct assessment must be done by the\nseventh year. If a pipeline operates above 50% SMYS, the maximum interval is ten years with a\nconfirmatory direct assessment by the seventh year. For pipelines operating between 30% and\n50% SMYS, the maximum interval is fifteen years, with confirmatory direct assessment in the\nseventh and 14“’ years. And for pipelines operating below 30% SMYS, the maximum is twenty\nyears, with either a confirmatory direct assessment, or a low-stress reassessment in the seventh\nand 14‘” years. A low stress reassessment involves electrical surveys.\n(g) A plan for confirmatorv direct assessment, if this assessment method is used as part of the\noperator’s process for continual evaluation and assessment.\n(h) Provisions for evaluating and carrying - out additional preventive and mitigative measures to\nprotect high consequence areas. The rule requirks these evaluations for all covered segments,\nregardless of operating pressure.\n(i) A performance plan that includes performance measures.\n(j) Record keeping provisions.\n(k ) A management of change process.\n(1) A quality assurance process.\n(m) A communication plan that includes procedures for addressing safety concerns raised by\nOPS and State or local pipeline safety authorities.\n(n) Procedures for providing (when requested), by electronic or other means, a copy of the\noperator’s risk analysis or integrity management program to OPS or State or local pipeline safety\nauthorities with which OPS has an interstate agent agreement.\n(0) Procedures for ensuring that each integrity assessment is being conducted in a manner that\nminimizes environmental and safety risks.\n(p) A process for identification and assessment of newly-identified high consequence areas.\nFurther definition of requirements for these integrity management program elements is found in\nsections of the rule and in ASME/ANSI Standard B31.8S.\nC. Alternatives Considered\n3\n\n<<<PAGE 7>>>\n\nRSPA considered alternatives in the decision process that led to the high consequence area\ndefinition given in Section B above. These alternatives are summarized below:\n1, Take No Action. In this alternative, RSPA would not propose new integrity management\nrequirements for high consequence areas but would rely on the existing regulatory requirements\nto protect all areas. This alternative would not be responsive to Congressional mandates or NTSB\nrecommendations. This alternative would not provide the protection provided by the rule of\nrequired integrity assessment and repair of detected defects or the consideration of additional\npreventive and mitigative measures to protect high consequence areas.\n2. Use the Same Provisions as in the Hazardous Liquids Integritv Management Rule ( I 92.452).\nThe main differences between the rule and the requirements of 192.452 are:\nA. the time limits for completing the baseline integrity assessment and reassessment\nof pipeline segments that could affect high consequence areas and\nB. the option of using direct assessment as an assessment method (not allowed in\n192.452).\nThe time limit for baseline assessment under the liquid rule is seven years, while the limit for\nbaseline assessments under the gas rule is ten years. The liquid pipeline rule requires\nreassessment every five years, while the gas rule allows a maximum interval for reassessment of\nten years (for pipelines operating above 50% SMYS), fifteen years (for pipelines operating\nbetween 30% and 50% SMYS), or twenty years (for pipelines operating below 30% SMYS), if\nconfirmatory direct assessment is done every seven years. OPS believes that requiring the shorter\nperiods for completing baseline assessments and reassessments would cause negative impacts on\ngas supply, the cost of gas to consumers, and the quality of integrity assessment services. In\naddition, gas transmission pipelines in high population areas generally operate at lower stresses\nthan liquid pipelines in populated areas, which lowers the risk from allowing longer intervals to\ncomplete baseline assessments and longer intervals between reassessments.\nStudies indicate that internal inspection is not possible for a substantial percentage of gas\ntransmission lines, except at high cost. Pressure testing all these lines could impose negative\neffects on the supply of gas to consumers. Direct assessment is the only assessment method that\ncould be employed in these lines to avoid these negative impacts. Hence, it is important for the\ngas rule to allow direct assessnient as an assessment method.\nBecause of the significant differences between gas transmission and hazardous liquid pipelines,\nOPS has defined different provisions for the gas integrity management rule than the provisions\nfor liquid pipelines under 195.452.\nD. Affected Environment\n4\n\n<<<PAGE 8>>>\n\nThe purpose of the rule is to provide additional protection to high consequence areas in the\nvicinity of gas transmission pipelines throughout the United States. The baseline integrity\nassessment, periodic reassessments, and additional preventive and mitigative activities apply to\nsegments on the operator’s pipeline that could affect high consequence areas. Thus the primary\nareas of the environment impacted by this rule are high consequence areas, as defined in the rule\nfor defining high consequence areas for gas transmission pipelines’ and further defined in the\nintegrity management rule (see Section B above).\nThe actions that operators take to comply with the integrity management rule are likely to affect\nareas of the environment beyond the defined high consequence areas. For example, some\noperators will choose to use internal inspection to fulfill certain rule requirements. Because the\nlaunchers and receivers used to insert and remove internal inspection tools can be located many\nmiles apart, a large extent of pipe may be inspected beyond the portion of the pipe located in high\nconsequence areas. Thus, in addition to the information about the condition of the line segment\nthat could affect a high consequence area, the operator may obtain integrity data about a much\nlarger section of pipe.\nSimilarly, the evaluation and potential implementation of additional preventive and mitigative\nmeasures can affect additional areas beyond the boundaries of high consequence areas. For\nexample, if Remove Control Valves (RCVs) are installed to mitigate the release of gas following\na line rupture or leak, then this mitigation extends along the full length of the section of the pipe\nbetween valves. This may include both pipe segments that could affect high consequence areas\nand segments that do not affect high consequence areas.\nThe changes to the rule that have been included since the NPRM do not change the type of\nenvironment affected by the rule.\nE. Environmental Consequences of Action and Alternatives\nThis section describes the expected impact to the environment from the action (Section E.l) and\nthe alternatives (Section E.2).\nE. 1 Environmental Consequences of Action\nThe baseline integrity assessment (pressure testing, internal inspection, or direct assessment), the\nsubsequent integrity reassessments, the integrated and continuous evaluation of line integrity,\nadditional preventive and mitigative measures that may be implemented for pipeline segments\naffecting high consequence areas, and performance measurement of the integrity management\nprogram will result in positive environmental impacts. The number of incidents and the\n5\n67 FR 50824.\n5\n\n<<<PAGE 9>>>\n\ncnvironniental damage from failures of segments that are in high consequence areas are likely to\nbe reduccd. However, from a national perspective, the impact is not expected to be significant.\nThe overall result of the changes to the rule since the NPRM is to reduce the number of pipeline\nsegments that are covered by the rule (due to changes to the definition of a high consequence\narea), to reduce the frequency of reassessments for some pipelines, and to reduce the frequency\nof direct assessments. This somewhat reduces the positive effects of the rule on the likelihood of\nincidents. Because integrity assessments will be required for fewer pipeline segments and\nrequired to be less frequent, the discovery of pipeline conditions during assessments and\nremediation of those conditions will likely occur less frequently. The net effect of the rule,\nhowever, is still expected to be a reduction in incidents and environmental damage.\nE.2 Environmental Consequences of the Alternatives\nE.2.1 Tuke No Action\nUnder this alternative, RSPA would not require additional operator programs for integrity\nmanagement of gas pipelines in high consequence areas. This alternative would have no\nadditional impact on the environment.\nE.2.2 Use the Same Provisions as in the Hazurdozw Liquids Integrity Matzagement Rule\n( 1 92.452)\nUnder this alternative, the integrity management rule for gas transmission pipelines would adopt\nthe sanie provisions as the integrity management rule for hazardous liquid pipelines. As stated in\nSection C, the primary differences between the gas rule and the liquid rule are that the gas rule\nallows longer intervals to complete the baseline integrity assessments and reassessments and that\nthe gas rule allows the use of direct assessment as an integrity assessment method. This\nalternative would have the same overall effect on the environment that would be provided by the\nrule. Shorter intervals for completing the baseline integrity assessments and reassessments might\nprovide a small degree of additional reduction in the failure rate of pipeline segments that could\naffect high consequence areas, but this additional protection would be small, while the practical\ndifficulties of accelerating the schedule of baseline assessments (see Section C) could result in\nreduccd quality of assessment information. Without the option of direct assessment, gas\noperators would have to conduct pressure tests on a much larger portion of the pipe segments for\nwhich pigging is not feasible, with potential negative impacts on gas supply and price to the\nconsumer, but without additional protection of the population or environment.\nF. Environmental Justice Considerations\nIn accordance with Executive Order 12898 (Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in\nMinority and Low-Income Populations), RSPA has considered the effects on minority and\nG\n\n<<<PAGE 10>>>\n\nlow-income populations of the provisions of this rule. This mlemaking action proposes to define\nnew requirements for integrity management for gas transmission pipelines in high consequence\nareas. These requirements provide additional protection for those areas. The requirements apply\nnation-wide and do not specifically target any community, based on the income or economic\nstatus of the community.\nThe additional protection afforded by the requirements will benefit all citizens in proximity to\ngas transmission pipelines, regardless of a person’s economic or minority status. Therefore, the\naction does not have disproportionately high or adverse health or environmental effects on any\nminority or low-income populations near gas transmission pipelines.\nG. Information Made AvaiIable to States, Local Governments, and Individuals\nRSPA has made the following documents publicly available, and incorporates them by reference\ninto this environmental assessment:\n“Pipeline Safety: Integrity Management in High Consequence Areas (Gas Transmission\nPipelines),” Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 68 FR 4278, January 28, 2003.\n“Pipeline Safety: High Consequence Areas for Gas Transmission Pipelines,” Final Rule,\n67 FR 50824, August 6,2002.\n“Environmental Assessment-Revised August 2002 Final Rule High Consequence Areas\nfor Gas Transmission Pipelines,” Docket: RSPA-00-7666, August, 2002.\n“Environmental Assessment: Proposed Rulemaking Integrity Management in High\nConsequence Areas (Gas Transmission Pipelines),” Docket: RSPA-00-7666, June, 2002.\n“Pipeline Safety: High Consequence Areas for Gas Transmission Pipelines,” Notice of\nProposed Rulemaking, 67 FR 1108, January 9, 2002.\n“Environmental Assessment: Proposed Rulemaking High Consequence Areas for Gas\nTransmission Pipelines,” Docket: RSPA-00-7666, January, 2002.\n“Pipeline Safety: Pipeline Integrity Management in High Consequence Areas (Gas\nTransmission Pipelines),” Notice of Request for Comnients, 66 FR 343 18, June 27, 2001.\n“Pipeline Safety: Pipeline Integrity Management in High Consequence Areas (Hazardous\nLiquid Operators With Less Than 500 Miles of Pipelines),” Final Rule, 67 FR 2136,\nJanuary 16, 2002.\n“Pipeline Safety: Pipeline Integrity Management in High Consequence Areas (Hazardous\n7\n\n<<<PAGE 11>>>\n\na\na\na\na\n0\nLiquid Operators With Less Than 500 Miles of Pipelines),” Notice of Proposed\nRulemaking, 66 FR 15821, March 21, 2001.\n“Pipeline Safety: Pipeline Integrity Management in High Consequence Areas,” Final\nRule, 65 FR 75378, December I , 2000.\n“Environmental Assessment: Final Rule Pipeline Integrity Management in High\nConsequence Areas for Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Operators Operating 500 or More\nMiles of Pipe,” Docket: RSPA 99-6355, November 13, 2000.\n“Pipeline Safety: Pipeline Integrity Management in High Consequence Areas,” Notice of\nProposed Rulemaking, 65 FR 21695, April 24, 2000.\n“Environmental Assessment: Proposed Rulemaking Pipeline Integrity Management in\nHigh Consequence Areas for Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Operators Operating 500 or\nMore Miles of Pipe,” Docket: RSPA 99-6355, April 2000.\n“Pipeline Safety: Enhanced Safety and Environmental Protection for Gas Transmission\nand Hazardous Liquid Pipelines in High-Consequence Areas,” Notice Extending\nComment Period and Establishing Electronic Public Discussion Forum, 64 FR 7171 3,\nDecember 22, 1999.\na\n“Pipeline Safety: Enhanced Safety and Environmental Protection for Gas Transmission\nand Hazardous Liquid Pipelines in High Consequence Areas,” 64 FR 56725, October 21,\n1999.\nH.\nList of Agencies and Persons Consulted\nDuring the process of developing the integrity management rule, RSPA interacted and consulted\nwith numerous organizations. These participants included:\na\nInterstate Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA)\na American Gas Association (AGA)\na Battelle Memorial Institute\na Gas Technology Institute (GTI)\na Western States Land Commissioners\na National Governors Association\n8\n\n<<<PAGE 12>>>\n\ne National League of Cities\nNational Council of State Legislators\nEnvironmental Defense Fund\n0 Public Interest Reform Group\ne Working Group on Communities Right-To-Know\nI. Conclusion\nGas pipeline failures that impact human health or the environment occur infrequently.\nNonetheless, RSPA believes additional assurance of a pipeline system’s integrity is important for\nareas where the consequences of a gas pipeline failure could be significant. The iule defines\nintegrity management requirements to provide additional assurance. This Environmental\nAssessment has determined that the effect of the rule should be reduced risk associated with\npipelines operating in the vicinity of high consequence areas. However, because the\nenvironniental consequences of gas pipeline failures are limited and some pipeline operators are\ncurrently carrying out activities similar to what the rule proposes, the impact is expected to be\nlimited. Therefore, RSPA has concluded that the rule’s requirements for gas pipeline integrity\nmanagement in high consequence areas will not have a significant environmental impact.\n9","truncated":false,"body_characters":23584}