{"operation":"document","citation":"0900006480e8a8d5","title":"U.S. DOT/RSPA - Environmental Assessment - Proposed Rulemaking - High Consequence Areas for Gas Transmission Pipelines","source_type":"rulemaking","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"current","official":true,"published_on":null,"effective_on":null,"summary":"DRAFT Research and Special Programs Administration U.S. Department of Transportation Environmental Assessment Proposed Rulemaking High Consequence Areas for Gas Transmission Pipelines Docket: RSPA-00-7666 DRAFT Table of Contents Preliminary Finding of No Significant Impact A. Purpose and Need for Action A. 1 A.2 A.3 A.4 Recent RSPA Pipeline Safety and Environmental Protection Programs Legislative History and National Transportation Safety Board Recommendations Interactions with Industry, Other Agencies, and Stakeholders...","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/regulations-gov-attachment-0900006480e8a8d5.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/regulations-gov-attachment-0900006480e8a8d5.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/regulations-gov-attachment-0900006480e8a8d5","source_url":"https://downloads.regulations.gov/PHMSA-RSPA-2000-7666-0157/attachment_1.pdf","body":"<<<PAGE 1>>>\n\nDRAFT\nResearch and Special Programs Administration\nU.S. Department of Transportation\nEnvironmental Assessment\nProposed Rulemaking\nHigh Consequence Areas for Gas Transmission Pipelines\nDocket: RSPA-00-7666\n\n<<<PAGE 2>>>\n\nDRAFT\nTable of Contents\nPreliminary Finding of No Significant Impact\nA.\nPurpose and Need for Action\nA. 1\nA.2\nA.3\nA.4\nRecent RSPA Pipeline Safety and Environmental Protection Programs\nLegislative History and National Transportation Safety Board Recommendations\nInteractions with Industry, Other Agencies, and Stakeholders\nFuture RSPA Integrity Management Initiatives\nB.\nDescription of Proposed Action\nC.\nA1 tern a tives Considered\nD.\nAffected Environment\nE.\nE. 1\nEnvironmental Consequences of Proposed Action and Alternatives\nEnvironmental Impact of Proposed Integrity Management Rule\nE.2\nEnvironmental Impacts of the Alternatives\nE.2.1\nE.2.2 Take No Action\nDefine HCAs as Class 3 and Class 4 Areas\nE.2.3 Define HCAs according to the Definition of High Population Areas from 9195.450\nF. Environmental Justice Considerations\nG . Information Made Available to States, Local Governments, and Individuals\nH. List of Agencies and Persons Consulted\nI. Conclusion\n..\n11\n...\n111\n1\n1\n3\n5\n8\n8\n10\n11\n12\n13\n16\n16\n16\n16\n17\n17\n19\n19\n\n<<<PAGE 3>>>\n\nDRAFT\nPreliminary Finding of No Significant Impact\nThis Environmental Assessment is prepared in accordance with section 102(2)(c) of the National\nEnvironmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. Section 4332), the Council on Environmental Quality\nregulations (40 CFR Sections 1500-1 508), and Department of Transportation Order 561 0.1 c,\nProcedures for Considering Environmental Impacts. It was prepared to assist in the agency’s\nplanning and decision-making. This document concisely describes the Research and Special\nPrograms Administration’s (RSPA) proposed rulemaking to define high consequence areas for\ngas transmission pipelines. This Environmental Assessment also addresses the need for the\nproposed action, the alternative definitions considered, the environment affected by this action,\nthe consequences to the environment of the proposed action and the alternatives, and a list of the\nagencies and organizations consulted. This Environmental Assessment provides sufficient\nevidence to determine that the provisions of the proposed rule are expected to have no significant\nimpact on the environment.\n...\n111\n\n<<<PAGE 4>>>\n\nDRAFT\nA. Purpose and Need for Action\nThe Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) believes that pipeline safety\nregulations address the most important risks to the nation’s pipelines, and have served the\nindustry and the nation well. The gas pipeline industry has a good safety record compared to\nother modes of transportation. However, pipeline incidents still occur and, on rare occasions,\nresult in serious consequences. Continued improvement in safety and environmental performance\nis still RSPA’s highest objective. RSPA believes that safety programs based only on compliance\nwith the regulations can result in a piecemeal approach to identifying and controlling risks,\nsometimes neglecting the interrelationships among failure causes and the benefits of coordinated\nrisk control activities. Having operators implement more systematic and integrated approaches\nto assure pipeline integrity in areas where pipeline incidents have the greatest potential\nconsequences to people and property offers the greatest opportunity to better control risks and\nimprove industry’s performance.\nPipeline operators also have strong incentives to ensure the integrity of their pipelines. Ensuring\nintegrity has obvious positive safety and environmental benefits. In addition, operators seek to\navoid the lost product and unscheduled downtime for repairs following a major incident, which\ncan significantly impact the company’s financial performance and its ability to satisfy customer\ncommitments. Operators cannot afford to have these critical transportation assets out of service\nfor lengthy periods of time in today’s competitive business environment. In addition, the\ndamage to the company’s public image and reputation, as well as the legal implications of\nserious incidents, can pose an even broader and longer term negative impact on the company’s\nbusiness operations. For these and other reasons, some pipeline operators have implemented and\nare continuing to improve more systematic safety and environmental management processes,\nfocusing on areas where incidents have the greatest potential impact.\nA. 1 Recent RSPA Pipeline Safetv and Environmental Protection Programs\nTo better understand and promote more comprehensive and integrated approaches to safety and\nenvironmental protection, RSPA created the Risk Management Demonstration Program and the\nSystem Integrity Inspection (SII) Pilot Program. These programs encourage and evaluate\noperator-developed safety and environmental management processes that incorporate operator-\nand pipeline-specific information and data to identify, assess, and address pipeline risks. These\nprograms are helping RSPA’s Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) refine its regulatory oversight\nprocesses. These programs help to ensure that pipeline operators have effective processes in\nplace to identify the most important risks to the public and the environment, and to develop and\nimplement cost-effective preventive and mitigative actions to manage these risks. Many of these\ninitiatives have validated the importance of focusing resources and establishing higher levels of\nprotection in areas where a pipeline failure could have significant consequences.\n1\n\n<<<PAGE 5>>>\n\nDRAFT\nThrough the Risk Management Demonstration Program and the System Integrity Inspection Pilot\nProgram, OPS has improved its understanding of pipeline operator integrity management\nsystems and activities. This experience has shown that some gas pipeline operators have\nformalized management systems to identify and address the most significant integrity threats to\ntheir pipeline systems. In the Risk Management Program, participants perform systematic and\ncomprehensive risk assessments to identify the specific nature and location of the most\nsignificant risks posed by operation of their pipeline system. An essential feature of these risk\nassessments is the integration of information from many diverse sources to fully understand the\nintegrity threats at specific locations on the pipeline. Environmental consequences and the impact\non nearby populations are explicitly considered in these risk assessments. Through formal, risk-\nbased decision making processes, these companies use the risk assessment results to identify\nprojects and activities that address potential system integrity threats, thereby helping to prevent\npipeline failures. The risk management process also examines the consequences of potential\nreleases and explores opportunities to minimize the environmental and public safety and health\nimpacts should a failure occur. These investigative risk management programs, and the\npreventive and mitigative risk control activities that evolve from them, supplement the minimum\nregulatory requirements established in 49 CFR 192 to protect the public and the environment.\nThe System Integrity Inspection Program is focused on developing a more integrity-based\napproach to OPS inspections. Instead of using a solely compliance-based approach, OPS is\nfocusing the inspection process on an operator’s integrity management processes and activities.\nBy working with the operator, OPS is able to understand and influence the methods and\napproaches used to assess pipeline integrity, and the approaches to integrating integrity\nassessment data with other pipeline specific information to identify the most significant integrity\nthreats to the system. Specifically, OPS has observed how operators examine internal inspection\ndata in conjunction with other surveillance and operating data, expected population growth, land\nuse, construction activity along the pipeline, and other information relevant to assuring the\nintegrity of the pipeline in high population areas and in environmentally sensitive areas.\nThrough this interaction OPS is acquiring a broader understanding and a greater confidence that\neffective programs are in place to address the most significant risks. Similar to the Risk\nManagement Program, the SI1 Program is emphasizing how operators evaluate their system\ncondition and its risks, and use this information to make sound integrity management decisions.\nWhile these two programs only involve a limited number of operators, OPS discussions with\nother companies in industry forums and working groups has indicated that formal integrity\nmanagement programs are becoming more common. OPS found that many companies are\ndeveloping more sophisticated and mature integrity management systems and diagnostic tools.\nOPS believes the next step is to require all operators to develop and follow at least minimum\nlevel integrity management programs focused on areas of significant potential consequences\nfrom pipeline incidents.\n2\n\n<<<PAGE 6>>>\n\nDRAFT\nA.2 Legislative Histow and National Transportation Safety Board Recommendations\nCongress has directed DOT to consider several initiatives that could improve safety and\nenvironmental protection, especially in locations where pipeline failures might have significant\nimpacts to human health and safety and the environment. Specifically Congress has directed\nDOT to:\n0 Prescribe standards establishing criteria for identifying gas pipeline facilities located in\nhigh-density population areas, and hazardous liquid pipelines that cross waters where a\nsubstantial likelihood of commercial navigation exists, are located in high-density\npopulation area, or are located in an area unusually sensitive to environmental damage\n(USA) [49 U.S.C. 0 60109(a)(2)].\n0 Prescribe additional standards requiring the periodic inspection of pipelines in US As and\nin high-density population areas. The regulations are to prescribe when an instrumented\ninternal inspection device, or similarly effective inspection method, should be used to\ninspect the pipeline [49 U.S.C. 0 60102(f)(2)].\n0 Survey and assess the effectiveness of emergency flow restricting devices (EFRDs) and\nother procedures, systems, and equipment used to detect and locate hazardous liquid\npipeline ruptures and to prescribe regulations on the circumstances under which an\noperator of a hazardous liquid pipeline facility must use an EFRD or such other\nprocedure, system, or equipment [49 U.S.C. 3 60102(j)].\n0 Survey and assess the effectiveness of remotely controlled valves to shut off the flow of\nnatural gas in the event of a rupture and determine whether the use of remotely controlled\nvalves is technically and economically feasible and would reduce the risks associated\nwith a rupture, and, if the use of valves is feasible and would reduce risks, to prescribe\nstandards for the use of these valves, including requirements for their use in densely\npopulated areas [49 U.S.C. 3 601026)(3)].\nIn addition to these Congressional directives, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)\nhas made several recommendations addressing improved protection for high population and\nenvironmentally sensitive areas. These recommendations include:\n0 Requiring periodic testing and inspection to identify corrosion and other time-dependent\npipeline damage.\n0 Establishing criteria to determine appropriate intervals for inspections and tests, including\nsafe service intervals between pressure testing.\n3\n\n<<<PAGE 7>>>\n\nDRAFT\ne Determining hazards to public safety from electric resistance welded (ERW) pipe and\nestablishing standards for leak detection systems.\ne Establishing requirements for installing automatic or remote-operated mainline valves on\nhigh-pressure lines in urban and environmentally sensitive areas to provide for rapid\nshutdown of failed pipeline segments.\nRSPA has initiated several programs and activities in response to these legislative mandates and\nNTSB recommendations. As summarized in Section A. 1 , the Risk Management and SI1 Pilot\nPrograms have provided an understanding of how these issues can be effectively addressed\nwithin the context of a comprehensive and systematic integrity management program that\nconsiders the total spectrum of risks from pipeline operation, including those risks in locations\nwhere the consequences to public health and safety and the environment may be elevated. RSPA\nhas also undertaken a rigorous and thorough process for developing the criteria to define USAs.\nThis multi-year process involved numerous interactions with other Federal and State agencies,\nrepresentatives of the hazardous liquid pipeline industry, environmental organizations, and other\nstakeholders. RSPA published for public comment proposed criteria to define USAs on\nDecember 30, 1999 (64 FR 73464). Numerous public comments were received on the proposed\ncriteria (available in Docket # 99-5455).\nThe proposed USA criteria were also pilot tested to confirm that the proposed USA definition\ncan be used to identi% and locate unusually sensitive drinking water and ecological resources\nusing available data from government agencies and environmental organizations. The pilot test\nidentified USAs in Texas, California, and Louisiana - states with a large number of hazardous\nliquid pipelines, as well as considerable drinking water and ecological resources. The results of\nthe pilot test, as well as the criteria in the proposed USA definition, were reviewed by a team of\nnationally recognized experts on drinking water and ecological resources. In late 2000, RSPA\ncompleted its evaluation of the feedback fi-om the technical peer review, public comments, and\nthe pilot test results. After extensive consultation with other Federal agencies, a final rule\ndefining USAs was issued on December 21,2000 (65 FR 80530).\nRSPA has performed an evaluation of the potential benefits of EFRDs in limiting the volume of\nproduct released following a hazardous liquid pipeline failure. The results were published in\n\"Emergency Flow Restricting Devices Study\" in 1991 (available in Docket # PS-133). This\nstudy recommended that OPS seek public input on the placement of EFRDs in urban areas, at\nwater crossings, at other critical areas affected by commodity release, and in areas in close\nproximity to the public outside of urban areas. This study also concluded that remote control and\ncheck valves are the only effective EFRDs.\n4\n\n<<<PAGE 8>>>\n\nDRAFT\nIn January 1994, RSPA issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) (59 FR\n2802) to solicit data from the public through a series of questions primarily concerning the\nperformance of leak detection equipment and location of EFRDs. A public workshop was held\nin October 1995 to further address the issues associated with requiring EFRDs. These forums\nraised important concerns about the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of these mitigative\nfeatures. It was suggested that the need for EFRDs should evolve from an integrated evaluation\nof the site-specific conditions and risks facing a particular pipeline location. This evaluation\nwould include assessing the effectiveness of the existing preventive and mitigative activities, as\nwell as considering the need for additional preventive or mitigative risk control activities.\nEspecially when considering mitigative actions like EFRDs, the environmental sensitivity of the\nlocation is an important factor that must be considered to make the best overall risk reduction\ndecisions. Thus, RSPA deferred proposing regulations requiring EFRD installation until USAs\nwere defined.\nRSPA believes that the experience obtained through the Risk Management Demonstration\nProgram, the SI1 Pilot Program, the USA definition process, and other initiatives has provided a\nfoundation for moving forward with a rule that addresses these Congressional mandates and\nNTSB recommendations in a comprehensive and integrated manner.\nA.3 Interaction with Industry. Other Agencies. and Stakeholders\nOn October 21, 1999, RSPA issued a Notice (64 FR 56725) announcing a public meeting to\ndiscuss the need for additional regulations for natural gas and hazardous liquid transmission lines\nin high population areas, commercially navigable waters, and areas of the environment that are\nunusually sensitive to the environment damage. Areas fitting one or more of these three criteria\nwere referred to as “high consequence areas” or HCAs. The October 2 1, 1999 Notice included a\nconceptual approach to providing improved protection in high consequence areas, and solicited\nfeedback on a number of specific questions relative to this approach. In the Notice, RSPA stated\nthat any process for protecting high consequence areas should include:\nPipeline-specific assessments in determining the need for additional preventive and\nmi ti gat ive activities;\nAn assessment approach that considers all risk factors and risk reduction activities in an\nintegrated manner; and\nIncreased assurance that high consequence areas are being protected.\nThe public meeting was held on November 18 and 19, 1999, in Hemdon, Virginia. The primary\ndiscussion topics included: the key elements of an effective integrity management program, the\n5\n\n<<<PAGE 9>>>\n\nDRAFT\nextent to which operators now have integrity management programs, and how to validate the\neffectiveness of such programs. In addition, RSPA obtained feedback and input on a broad array\nof integrity management issues, including:\n0 How to characterize and define high consequence areas,\nKey elements of operator integrity management programs,\n0 Types of information that should be integrated to assure pipeline integrity; and\n0 OPS review of integrity management programs, including what elements to review and\nin spec t .\nA synopsis of the feedback obtained at this meeting, as well as complete transcripts of the formal\npresentations are available in the Docket and on the OPS home page at http://ops.dot.gov.\nOn December 22, 1999, RSPA issued a Notice in the Federal Register (64 FR 71 7 13)\nannouncing an extension of the public comment period to January 17,2000. The availability of a\nnew electronic discussion forum was announced to allow interested parties to express their views\non integrity management program issues and the need for improved protection in high\nconsequence areas. The December 22, 1999 Notice also referenced a draft conceptual model for\nassuring pipeline integrity in high consequence areas, and solicited comments on the draft\napproach. RSPA received comments from several organizations and individuals. These are\navailable in the Docket (RSPA 99-6355), and are summarized in the preamble of the NPRM\nannouncing the proposed rule (65 FR 21695) that resulted.\nFollowing the public meeting, OPS hosted a number of smaller meetings and conference calls to\nmake sure the broadest range of comments and information were considered in drafting the\nNPRM. Discussion items included the areas that should be considered high consequence areas,\nreasonable milestones for completing benchmark testing, developing industry standards to\nsupport a rule, how a rule should acknowledge differences between the gas and liquid pipeline\nindustries as well as among individual operators, and how best to involve affected communities.\nThese topics were discussed with Interstate Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA)\nrepresentatives on January 12, American Petroleum Institute (API) representatives on January 13,\nNational Association of Pipeline Safety Representatives (NAPSR) on January 14, February 15,\nand March 3, public interest representatives on January 19 and February 29, and NTSB on\nFebruary 8. Minutes from each of these sessions are in the Docket.\nOPS also initiated dialog with industry and various public interest representatives to explore\napproaches to improve communication between OPS, pipeline operators, and the communities in\n6\n\n<<<PAGE 10>>>\n\nDRAFT\nwhich pipeline facilities are located. Initial discussions have focused on strengthening the liaison\nbetween public officials and pipeline companies, testing the usefulness of pipeline data provided\nto public officials, and developing concepts for restructuring the respective roles of federal, state,\nand local officials, emphasizing the distinction between participation and communication.\nMeetings were conducted on February 28 and 29,2000 to begin addressing the multi-faceted\ncommunication issue.\nAfter considering the feedback from the public meeting, comments to the Docket, and experience\nin the Risk Management and SI1 programs, RSPA elected to implement integrity management\nrequirements for the pipeline industry in several steps. In the first rulemaking, OPS focused on\nthe hazardous liquid industry operators with 500 or more miles of pipeline. A final rule for\nintegrity management for these pipeline operators was published on December 1,2000 (65 FR\n75378). This rule applies to pipelines that can affect high consequence areas (HCAs). HCAs for\nhazardous liquid pipelines are defined in the rule as populated areas, USAs, and commercially\nnavigable waterways.\nRSPA next proposed a similar rule covering integrity management for hazardous liquid operators\nwith fewer than 500 miles of pipeline (66 FR 15821; March 21,2001). RSPA received a small\nnumber of public comments on the NPRM. After reviewing this input, as well as discussions\nwith other Federal agencies, RSPA decided that the same requirements for protection of high\nconsequence areas and the development of integrity management programs should apply to all\nhazardous liquid pipeline operators. RSPA is completing resolution of comments on the\nproposed rule and expects to issue a final rule in late 2001.\nRSPA is now beginning rulemaking for integrity management for operators of gas transmission\npipelines. The first proposed rule covers the definition of high consequence areas (HCAs). Future\nrulemaking will cover the integrity management requirements for gas transmission pipelines that\naffect the defined HCAs.\nOPS has been meeting with representatives of the gas pipeline industry, research institutions,\nState pipeline safety agencies and public interest groups, to gather the information needed to\npropose an integrity management program (IMP) rulemaking pertaining to gas operators. Since\nJanuary 2000, OPS has held nine meetings with State agencies, representatives of the Interstate\nNatural Gas Association of America (INGAA), the American Gas Association (AGA), Battelle\nMemorial Institute, the Gas Technology Institute (GTI), Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and\nInsurance Company, and operators covered under 49 CFR Part 192. (See DOT Docket No.\n7666 for summaries of the meetings.) OPS also has met separately with Western States Land\nCommissioners, National Governors Association, National League of Cities, National Council of\nState Legislators, Environmental Defense Fund, Public Interest Reform Group, and Working\nGroup on Communities Right-To-Know.\n7\n\n<<<PAGE 11>>>\n\nDRAFT\nOn February 12 -14,2001, OPS held a public meeting in Arlington, VA, on integrity\nmanagement in high consequence areas for natural gas pipelines and enhanced communications\nregarding hazardous liquid and gas pipelines. At this meeting, reports on the status of industry\nand govemment activities to maintain and improve the integrity of gas pipelines were featured\nand meeting attendees participated in in-depth discussions on the integrity of gas pipelines. The\nreports can be found in the DOT docket (#7666) and the OPS web site under InitiativesPipeline\nIntegrity Management P r o g r d G a s Transmission Operators Rule. At the meeting, industry and\nstate repregentatives and members of the public presented their perspectives on a number of\nissues related to integrity management, including considerations for defining HCAs affected by\ngas pipelines. Presentations from the public meeting may be viewed on the OPS web site under\nInitiativesPipeline Integrity Management ProgradGas Transmission Operators Rule.\nA Notice was published in the Federal Register on June 27,2001 (66 FR 343 18) requesting\nfurther information and clarification and inviting hrther public comment on integrity\nmanagement concepts as they relate to gas pipelines. The Notice also announced the\nestablishment of an electronic public discussion forum for gas pipeline integrity management\nissues on OPS’s internet home page. In this notice, OPS invited comment on seven elements it\nconsidered important to include in the integrity management rule and hypotheses related to these\nelements. The first of the seven elements was the definition of HCAs. OPS received numerous\ncomments on the issues related to the definition of HCAs, which are included in the docket along\nwith the transcript of the electronic discussion forum. These comments were taken into\nconsideration in development of the HCA definition included in this proposed rule.\nIn addition to the proposed rules RSPA has issued and plans to issue addressing integrity\nassurance in high consequence areas, there are many other Federal, state, and local government\nregulations in place to protect sensitive resources. These include regulations to protect drinking\nwater resources, threatened and endangered species, critical habitats for various species, and\nspawning areas. Areas have been created and designated to protect and maintain aquatic life,\nwildlife, and various other natural and water resources. Permits, environmental assessments, and\nconsultations with resource experts are required by various Federal, state, and local agencies\nbefore a pipeline can be installed or construction to modify or repair an existing line can take\nplace. RSPA’s existing and planned future regulations complement and enhance these other\nFederal, state, and local government regulations on sensitive drinking water or ecological\nresources.\nA.4 Future RSPA Integrity Management Initiatives\nRSPA plans to propose rules on pipeline integrity management for interstate and intrastate\nnatural gas operators in the near future. The specific requirements of those rules and the\n8\n\n<<<PAGE 12>>>\n\nDRAFT\nenvironmental impacts associated with those requirements will be considered in the rulemaking\nprocess.\nB. Description of Proposed Action\nRSPA proposes to add a new section to 49 CFR 192 defining high consequence areas (HCAs) for\ngas transmission pipelines. The proposed definition of a HCA is:\nW Any Class 3 area as specified in $192.5(b)(3)(i) and $192.5(b)(3)(ii) (Note: limits apply\nas specified in $192.5(c))\nW Any Class 4 area as specified in $192.5(b)(4) (Note: limits apply as specified in\n4 1 92.5(c))\n0 Any area out to 660 feet where there are hospitals, schools, day-care centers, retirement\nhomes, prisons or other hard to evacuate places occupied by 20 or more persons,\nW Any area beyond 660 feet out to 1000 feet where there are hospitals, schools, day-care\ncenters, retirement homes, prisons or other hard to evacuate places occupied by 20 or\nmore persons, where the pipeline is greater than 30 inches in diameter and operates at a\nmaximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP) of 1000 psig or greater.\nW Any area out to 660 feet (or out to 1000 feet where the pipeline is greater than 30 inches\nin diameter and operates at MAOP of 1000 psig) where people congregate (such as\nbeaches, recreational facilities, campgrounds, museums, etc.) that are occupied by 20 or\nmore persons at least 50 days in any 12 month period. (The days need not be\nconsecutive.)\nClass 3 locations have 46 or more buildings intended for human occupancy within an area that\nextends 220 yards on either side of the centerline of any continuous one mile length of pipeline,\nor are areas where the pipeline lies within 100 yards of either a building or small, well-defined\noutside area (such as a playground, recreation area, outdoor theater, or other place of public\nassembly) that is occupied by 20 or more persons on at least 5 days a week for 10 weeks in any\n12 month period. Class 4 locations are any class location unit where buildings with four or more\nstories above ground are prevalent (e.g., large office buildings).\nThe proposed rule imposes no requirement for action by gas pipeline operators. Future\nrulemaking will define the requirements for gas pipeline operator integrity management\nprograms for those pipeline segments covered by HCAs as defined here. Although the specific\nprovisions of integrity management requirements are not yet defined, it is expected that these\nprovisions will include the following elements beyond the operator definition of HCAs:\n9\n\n<<<PAGE 13>>>\n\n.\nDRAFT\n1. Identification and evaluation of the threats to pipeline integrity in each HCA.\n2. Selection of assessment technologies best suited to effectively determine the\nsusceptibility of failure of each pipe segment that could affect a HCA.\n3. Determination of time fiames to conduct a baseline integrity assessment and to make any\nneeded repair, using a graded approach under which priorities for assessment and repair\nare set according to risk.\n4. Identification and implementation of additional preventive and mitigative measures\nappropriate to manage significant threats.\n5 . Continual evaluation and reassessment at the specified interval of each pipeline segment\nthat could affect a HCA using a risk-based approach. The evaluation considers the\ninformation the operator has about the entire pipeline to determine what might be relevant\nto the pipeline segment.\n6. Monitoring the effectiveness of the management process designed to provide additional\nassurance of integrity in areas where the consequences of potential pipeline accidents are\ngreatest.\nC. Alternatives Considered\nRSPA considered alternatives in the decision process that led to the proposed HCA definition\ngiven in Section B above. These alternatives are summarized below:\n1. Take No Action. In this alternative, RSPA would rely on the existing regulatory requirements\nto provide protection for high consequence areas. No additional definition of HCAs would be\nperformed in anticipation of new rules for integrity management by gas pipelixie operators. By\nselecting this alternative, RSPA would not be responsive to the Congressional mandates to\nconsider internal inspection and other protective measures for high population areas (see Section\nA.2).\n2. Define HCAs as any Class 3 o c l a s s 4 Area. In this alternative, new requirements on\noperators of gas pipelines for integrity management would be confined to those pipeline\nsegments adjacent to Class 3 or Class 4 areas. An HCA would be defined as:\nAny Class 3 area as specified in 0 192.5@)(3)(i) and 0 192S(b)(3)(ii)\nAny Class 4 area as specified in $192.5(b)(4) (Note: limits apply as specified in\n10\n\n<<<PAGE 14>>>\n\nDRAFT\nThis option uses the first two parts of the proposed definition of HCAs, but excludes hard to\nevacuate locations such as hospitals, schools, day-care centers, retirement homes, and prisons. It\nalso excludes areas where people congregate that are 660- 1000 feet away from pipelines\nexceeding 30 inches in diameter and 1000 psig MAOP. This alternative definition would result in\nnew requirements for integrity management programs potentially being applied to fewer miles of\ngas pipeline. This would occur, for example, if a pipeline segment were adjacent to hard to\nevacuate facilities, but not within a Class 3 or Class 4 area.\n3. Define HCAs according to the definition of high population areas from 6195.450\nThe HCAs for hazardous liquid pipeline integrity management in 49 CFR 195.450 include “high\npopulation areas.” 49 CFR 195.450 defines a high population area as “...an urbanized area, as\ndefined and delineated by the U.S. Census Bureau, that contains 50,000 or more people and has a\npopulation density of at least 1,000 people per square mile.” Under this alternative, HCAs for gas\npipeline integrity management would use the Census Bureau definition of “high population\nareas.” This would capture pipelines within the boundaries of larger towns and cities. Such\npipelines have the possibility of being situated near areas of high population density and\nresidential or other development. Under this definition, therefore, HCAs would capture many\nareas where gas pipeline failures could have high consequences. Some of the areas included\nwithin the HCA definition under this alternative, however, would not necessarily be areas of high\npopulation density or heavy development, because the boundaries of the high population areas\ndefined by the Census Bureau might include some areas of low population density, even though\nthe overall average population density within the boundaries of the areas exceeds 1,000 per\nsquare mile. Also, some Class 3 or Class 4 areas may be excluded by this alternative, if the Class\n3 or Class 4 locations do not lie within the boundaries of Census Bureau units defined as high\npopulation areas.\nAlthough, this alternative definition of HCAs would likely include many of the same high\npopulation density areas as the proposed definition, RSPA believes the proposed definition has\ncertain features that make it superior. By using the class location scheme contained in 49 CFR\n192.5 to identify HCAs, gas pipeline operators utilize information they are already required to\nobtain and maintain regarding the degree of development and population density near pipelines.\nIncluding Class 3 and Class 4 locations as HCAs ensures that areas of high population density\nand high degrees of development are included, focusing on the specific conditions in the vicinity\nof pipeline in the zone where pipeline accidents might have an impact, rather than within the\nboundaries of an area that has an overall high population density. In addition, the proposed\ndefinition would specifically include hard to evacuate areas and areas where people congregate,\nwhile this alternative would not.\n11\n\n<<<PAGE 15>>>\n\nDRAFT\nD. Affected Environment\nThe purpose of the proposed rule is to define high consequence areas (HCAs) that may be\naffected by gas pipelines throughout the United States. The intent is that future rules will define\nrequirements for integrity management on pipeline segments that might affect those HCAs.\nThus, the areas of the environment potentially impacted by the rule are those that fall within the\nproposed HCA definition given in Section B above.\nAfter they are initially established, high consequence areas will be updated on a periodic basis to\nincorporate new information and data. For example, as communities and populations grow, the\nextent of Class 3 locations (as defined in 9 192S(b)(3)(i) and 9 192S(b)(3)(ii)) may expand. If so,\nthe operator will need to apply any integrity management requirements to the expanded HCA.\nThe frequency at which these updates will be necessary has not been determined.\nIn addition to the HCAs, the provisions of the proposed rule will also impact areas of the\nenvironment outside of HCAs. For example, it is expected that some operators will elect to use\ninternal inspection devices to fulfill integrity assessment and management requirements. Due to\neconomic and operational considerations, the launchers and receivers used to insert and remove\ninternal inspection devices are typically located at compressor stations, which can be many miles\napart. Even though a high consequence area may exist for only a short distance along the line,\nbecause of the location of inspection device launchers and receivers, operators will likely inspect\nthe entire compressor station-to-compressor station segment of the line. Thus, in addition to the\ninformation about the condition of the line in a high consequence area, the operator will obtain\nintegrity data about a much larger segment of pipe. Any significant threats identified in these\nadditional areas will also be remediated, thus providing additional protection for the regions\nadjacent to high consequence areas.\nE. Environmental Consequences of Proposed Action and Alternatives\nThis section describes the expected impact to the environment of the proposed definition of high\nconsequence areas (Section E. 1) and the alternatives (Section E.2).\nGas transmission pipelines transport pressurized natural gas, which is lighter than air and\nflammable. If released as a result of a pipeline leak or rupture, natural gas can potentially ignite,\ncausing fires or explosions. Industry experience demonstrates that environmental consequences\nof pipeline rupture-initiated fires are almost always limited to localized damage to the vegetation\nand animal life immediately adjacent to the failure site. A review of recent ruptures for one\npipeline operator showed that the area impacted by fire is less than seven acres. It is possible\nthat a rupture occurring in a heavily forested area in the dry season could result in a forest fire,\n12\n\n<<<PAGE 16>>>\n\nDRAFT\nwhich would have a more extensive impact on wildlife and vegetation. However, the likelihood\nof such an occurrence is believed to be very low. Other than localized vegetation damage in the\nevent of a fire or explosion, there are no significant environmental impacts from natural gas\npipeline leaks or ruptures. Unlike hazardous liquid pipelines, ruptures of gas pipelines would not\nresult in releases to bodies of surface water or impact groundwater.\nThis rule proposes a definition of high consequence areas (HCAs) to be applied to integrity\nmanagement requirements for natural gas transmission pipelines. These requirements will be\nproposed in upcoming rulemaking. OPS is now considering which integrity management\napproaches are most appropriate for the protection of the HCAs defined in this rule (see Section\nB). Because the actions to be required of pipeline operators have not yet been specified, the\nprecise environmental consequences of the rule on the HCAs and other areas cannot be assessed.\nOPS’s intent for new requirements for integrity management is to reduce the likelihood of\npipeline failures in the vicinity of HCAs. The reduction of pipeline failures will reduce the\nimpacts of pipelines on the environment in HCAs and nearby, but because of the limited extent\nof environmental impacts of releases from gas pipelines, this reduction in environmental risk is\nexpected to be small.\nE. 1 Environmental Consequences of Proposed Action\nAs presented in the June 27,2001 Notice on gas pipeline integrity management (66 FR 343 1 S),\nthe rules under consideration consist of seven elements. The first element, definition of HCAs, is\nthe proposed action covered here. The other six elements (See Section B) encompass the\nadditional actions pipeline operators will take for those pipeline segments that could potentially\nimpact HCAs. This section considers the potential general environmental effects of actions that\nmay be taken under OPS’s proposed approaches for gas integrity management requirements:\n1. Identification and evaluation of the threats to pipeline integrity in each HCA.\nThis element encompasses comprehensive and integrated analysis of threats to HCAs\nfrom pipelines in the vicinity. Pipeline operators would be required to assess and evaluate\nrisk factors. RSPA believes such analysis is a prerequisite for definition of optimal\nintegrity management programs and actions that protect HCAs. Consequently, it is\nexpected that operator performance of this analysis will lead to more effective protection\nof HCAs and reduce risks to the environment within HCAs and adjacent areas from\npotential pipeline integrity failures.\n2. Selection of assessment technologies best suited to effectively determine the\nsusceptibility of failure of each pipe segment that could affect a HCA.\n13\n\n<<<PAGE 17>>>\n\n3. 4. DRAFT\nOperators will be required to perform a baseline assessment of pipeline integrity along all\nsegments that can affect HCAs. The baseline assessment is necessary to determine which\npipeline segments need to be repaired in order to maintain pipeline integrity. This will\nbetter protect the environment in the HCA and adjacent area","truncated":true,"body_characters":55716}