{"operation":"document","citation":"0900006480e8ae8d","title":"U.S. DOT/RSPA - Environmental Assessment","source_type":"rulemaking","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"current","official":true,"published_on":null,"effective_on":null,"summary":"Research and Special Programs Administration U.S. Department of Transportation Environmental Assessment Final Rule Pipeline Integrity Management in High Consequence Are 13s for Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Operators Operating Less than 500 Miles of Pipeline Docket: RSPA 00-7408 Preliminary Finding of No Significant Impact This Environmental Assessment is prepared in accordance with section 102(2)(c) of the Natio: ial Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. Section 4332), the Council on Environmental Quality regulations (40 CFR Sections 1500-1 508), and Department of Transportation Order 5610. IC,...","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/regulations-gov-attachment-0900006480e8ae8d.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/regulations-gov-attachment-0900006480e8ae8d.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/regulations-gov-attachment-0900006480e8ae8d","source_url":"https://downloads.regulations.gov/PHMSA-RSPA-2000-7408-0034/attachment_1.pdf","body":"<<<PAGE 1>>>\n\nResearch and Special Programs Administration\nU.S. Department of Transportation\nEnvironmental Assessment\nFinal Rule\nPipeline Integrity Management in High Consequence Are 13s\nfor\nHazardous Liquid Pipeline Operators\nOperating Less than 500 Miles of Pipeline\nDocket: RSPA 00-7408\n\n<<<PAGE 2>>>\n\nPreliminary Finding of No Significant Impact\nThis Environmental Assessment is prepared in accordance with section 102(2)(c) of the Natio: ial\nEnvironmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. Section 4332), the Council on Environmental Quality\nregulations (40 CFR Sections 1500-1 508), and Department of Transportation Order 5610. IC,\nProcedures for Considering Environmental Impacts. It was prepared to assist in the Research ;md\nSpecial Programs Administration’s (RSPA) planning and decision-making. This document is an\nupdate of the original Environmental Assessment prepared in support of the proposed rule (66\nFR 15821).\nThis document concisely describes the RSPA’s final rule on integrity management in high\nconsequence areas for certain operators of hazardous liquid pipelines. It also addresses the n a d\nfor the proposed action, the alternative actions considered, the environment affected by this\naction, the consequences to the environment of the proposed action and the alternatives, and a list\nof the agencies and organizations consulted. This Environmental Assessment provides suffici .:nt\nevidence to determine that the provisions of the final rule are expected to have no significant\nimpact on the environment.\ni\n\n<<<PAGE 3>>>\n\nTable of Contents\nA.\nA. 1\nA.2\nA.3\nA.4\nB.\nPurpose and Need for Action\nRecent RSPA Pipeline Safety and Environmental Protection Programs\nLegislative History and National Transportation Safety Board Recommendations\nInteractions with Industry, Other Agencies, and Stakeholders\nFuture RSPA Integrity Management Initiatives\n1\n1\n2\n5\n8\nDescription of Proposed Action 10\nC.\nD.\nAlternatives Considered 14\nAffected Environment 15\nE.\nEnvironmental Consequences of Proposed Action and Alternatives 19\nE. 1\nE.l.l\nE. 1.2\nE.1.3\nE. 1.4\nE. 1.5\nE. 1.6\nEnvironmental Impact of the Integrity Management Rule Overview of Internal Inspection and Pressure Testing\nEnvironmental Impacts of Internal Inspection and Pressure Testing\nEnvironmental Impacts of Baseline Integrity Assessment Requirements in Final Rule\nEnvironmental Impacts of Periodic Assessment Requirement in Final Rule\nEnvironmental Impacts of Other Preventive and Mitigative Actions\nSummary of Environmental Impacts for Final Rule\n19\n20\n22\n23\n27\n29\n31\nE.2\nEnvironmental Impacts of the Altematives\nE.2.1\nE.2.2\nTake No Action\nMandatory Integrity Assessment in all High Consequence Areas Every Ten Years\nF.\nEnvironmental Justice Considerations\n33\n33\n34\n35\nG.\nInformation Made Available to States, Local Governments, and Individuals\nH.\nList of Agencies and Persons Consulted\nI.\nConclusion\nJ.\nReferences\nAppendix 1 Environmental Impacts of Oil Spills\n36\n38\n39\n40\n41\nI I\n\n<<<PAGE 4>>>\n\nA. Purpose and Need for Action\nThe Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) believes that pipeline safety\nregulations address the most important risks to the nation’s pipelines, and have served the\nindustry and the nation well. The hazardous liquid pipeline industry has a good safety record\ncompared to other modes of transportation. However, pipeline incidents still occur and, on\noccasion, with serious consequences. Continued improvement in safety and environmental\nperformance is still RSPA’s highest objective. RSPA believes that safety programs based onllr\non compliance with the regulations can result in a piece-meal approach to identifying and\ncontrolling risks, sometimes neglecting the relationships among different risk factors and the\npotential benefits of coordinated risk control activities. Having operators implement more\nsystematic and integrated approaches to assure pipeline integrity and address the most important\npipeline risks offers the greatest opportunity to improve the industry’s performance.\nPipeline operators also have strong incentives to ensure the integrity of their pipelines. In\naddition to the positive safety and environmental benefits, the lost product and unscheduled\ndowntime for repairs following a major incident can significantly impact the company’s financial\nperformance, and its ability to satisfy customer commitments. Operators can not afford to have\nthese critical transportation assets out of service for lengthy periods of time in today’s\ncompetitive business environment. In addition, the damage to the company’s public image arid\nreputation, as well as the legal implications of serious incidents, can pose an even broader and\nlonger term negative impact on the company’s business operations. For these and other reasoi is,\nmany pipeline operators have implemented and are continuing to improve more systematic sa fety\nand environmental management processes.\nA. 1 Recent RSPA Pipeline Safety and Environmental Protection Promams\nTo better understand and promote more comprehensive and integrated approaches to safety a id\nenvironmental protection, RSPA created the Risk Management Demonstration Program, and the\nSystem Integrity Inspection (SII) Pilot Program. These programs encourage and evaluate\noperator-developed safety and environmental management processes that incorporate operatc r-\nand pipeline-specific information and data to identify, assess, and address pipeline risks. Thtmse\nprograms, along with the Oil Spill Response Plan Review and Exercise Program, are helping\nRSPA’s Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) refine its regulatory oversight processes. These\nprocesses help to ensure that pipeline operators have effective processes in place to identify the\nmost important risks to the public and the environment, and to develop and implement cost-\neffective preventive and mitigative actions to manage these risks. These initiatives have\nvalidated the importance of focusing resources and establishing higher levels of protection ir\nareas where a pipeline failure could have significant consequences.\nThrough the Risk Management Demonstration Program and the System Integrity Inspection I?ilot\nProgram, OPS has improved its understanding of pipeline operator integrity management sy:,tems\nand activities. This experience has shown that a number of liquid operators have formalized\n1\n\n<<<PAGE 5>>>\n\nmanagement systems to identify and address the most significant integrity threats to their pipelline\nsystems. In the Risk Management Program, participants perform systematic and comprehensive\nrisk assessments to identify the specific nature and location of the most significant risks posec by\noperation of their pipeline system. An essential feature of these risk assessments is the\nintegration of information fi-om many diverse sources to fully understand the integrity threats it\nspecific locations on the pipeline. Environmental consequences and the impact on nearby\npopulation are explicitly considered in these risk assessments. Through formal, risk-based\ndecision making processes, these companies use the risk assessment results to identify projecl s\nand activities that address potential system integrity threats, thereby helping to prevent oil spi Is.\nThe risk management process also examines the consequences of potential releases and exploires\nopportunities to minimize the environmental and public safety and health impacts should a\nfailure occur. These investigative risk management programs, and the preventive and mitigative\nrisk control activities that evolve from them, supplement the minimum regulatory requirements\nestablished in 49 CFR 195 to protect the public and the environment.\nThe SII Program is focused on developing a more integrity-based approach to OPS inspectior s.\nIn addition to verifying an operator's compliance with the pipeline safety regulations, OPS is\nfocusing the inspection process on an operator's integrity management processes and activiticms.\nBy working with the operator, OPS is able to understand and influence the methods and\napproaches used to integrate integrity assessment data with other pipeline specific informatio ,I to\nidentify the most significant integrity threats to the system. Specifically, OPS has observed how\noperators examine in-line inspection data in conjunction with other surveillance and operatin\ndata, expected population growth, land use, construction activity along the pipeline, and othe .\ninformation relevant to assuring the integrity of the pipeline in high population areas and in\nenvironmentally sensitive areas. Through this interaction OPS is acquiring a broader\nunderstanding and a greater confidence that effective programs are in place to address the mc st\nsignificant risks. Similar to the Risk Management Program, the SI1 Program is emphasizing liow\noperators evaluate their system condition and its risks, and use this information to make sour d\nintegrity management decisions.\nWhile these two programs only involve a limited number of operators, OPS discussions with\nother companies in industry forums and working groups have indicated that formal integrity\nmanagement programs have become more common, particularly within the liquid pipeline\nindustry. OPS found that many liquid companies are developing more sophisticated and mal ure\nintegrity management systems, analytical methods, data integration processes, and diagnostic:\ntools. OPS believes the next step is to require all operators to develop and follow at least\nminimum level integrity management programs.\nA.2 Legislative History and National Transportation Safety Board Recommendations\nCongress has also directed DOT to consider several initiatives that could improve safety and\nenvironmental protection, especially in locations where pipeline failures might have signific mt\n2\n\n<<<PAGE 6>>>\n\nimpacts to human health and safety and the environment. Specifically Congress has directed\nDOT to:\nPrescribe standards establishing criteria for identifying gas pipeline facilities located ii I\nhigh-density population areas, and hazardous liquid pipelines that cross waters where I\nsubstantial likelihood of commercial navigation exists, are located in high-density\npopulation area, or are located in an area unusually sensitive to environmental damage\n(USAs) [49 U.S.C. 4 60109(a)(2)].\nPrescribe additional standards requiring the periodic inspection of pipelines in US As rind\nin high-density population areas. The regulations are to prescribe when an inst”enti2d\ninternal inspection device, or similarly effective inspection method, should be used to\ninspect the pipeline [49 U.S.C. 4 60102(f)(2)].\n0 Survey and assess the effectiveness of emergency flow restricting devices (EFRDs) ar,d\nother procedures, systems, and equipment used to detect and locate hazardous liquid\npipeline ruptures, and to prescribe regulations on the circumstances under which an\noperator of a hazardous liquid pipeline facility must use an EFRD or such other\nprocedure, system, or equipment [49 U.S.C. 4 60102(i)].\n,\nIn addition to these Congressional directives, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTS B)\nhas made several recommendations addressing improved protection for high population and\nenvironmentally sensitive areas. These recommendations include:\n0 Requiring periodic testing and inspection to identify corrosion and other time-dependiznt\npipeline damage.\nEstablishing criteria to determine appropriate intervals for inspections and tests, inch ding\nsafe service intervals between pressure testing.\n0 Determining hazards to public safety from electric resistance welded (ERW) pipe and\nestablishing standards for leak detection systems.\nEstablishing requirements for installing automatic or remote-operated mainline valve s on\nhigh-pressure lines in urban and environmentally sensitive areas to provide for rapid\nshutdown of failed pipeline segments.\nRSPA has initiated several programs and activities in response to these legislative mandates and\nNTSB recommendations. As summarized in Section A. 1, the Risk Management and SII Pili kt\nPrograms have provided an understanding of how these issues can be effectively addressed\nwithin the context of a comprehensive and systematic integrity management program that\nconsiders the total spectrum of risks from pipeline operation, including those risks in locatic ns\nwhere the consequences to public health and safety and the environment may be elevated.\n3\n\n<<<PAGE 7>>>\n\nRSPA has also undertaken a rigorous and thorough process for developing the criteria to definje\nUSAs. This multi-year process involved numerous interactions with other Federal and State\nagencies, representatives of the hazardous liquid pipeline industry, environmental organizatioi,is,\nand other stakeholders. RSPA published for public comment proposed criteria to define USA!;\non December 30, 1999 (64 FR 73464). Numerous public comments were received on the\nproposed criteria (available in Docket # 99-5455).\nThe proposed USA criteria were also pilot tested to confirm that the proposed USA definition\ncan be used to identify and locate unusually sensitive drinking water and ecological resources\nusing available data from government agencies and environmental organizations. The pilot te st\nidentified USAs in Texas, California, and Louisiana - states with a large number of hazardou,;\nliquid pipelines, as well as considerable drinking water and ecological resources. The results Iof\nthe pilot test, as well as the criteria in the proposed USA definition, were reviewed by a team of\nnationally recognized experts on drinking water and ecological resources. In late 2000, RSPA\ncompleted its evaluation of the feedback from the technical peer review, public comments, and\nthe pilot test results. After extensive consultation with other Federal agencies, a final rule\ndefining USAs was issued on December 21,2000 (65 FR 80530).\nRSPA evaluated the potential benefits of EFRDs in limiting the volume of product released\nfollowing a hazardous liquid pipeline failure. The results were published in \"Emergency Flow\nRestricting Devices Study\" in 1991 (available in Docket # PS-133). This study recommendecl\nthat OPS seek public input on the placement of EFRDs in urban areas, at water crossings, at\nother critical areas affected by commodity release, and in areas in close proximity to the public\noutside of urban areas. This study also concluded that remote control and check valves are tl e\nonly effective EFRDs.\nIn January 1994, RSPA issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) (59 FR\n2802) to solicit data from the public through a series of questions primarily concerning the\nperformance of leak detection equipment and location of EFRDs. A public workshop was hcmld\nin October 1995 to further address the issues associated with requiring EFRDs. These forums\nraised important concems about the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of these mitigative\nfeatures. It was suggested that the need for EFRDs should evolve from an integrated evaluation\nof the site-specific conditions and risks facing a particular pipeline location. This evaluation\nwould include assessing the effectiveness of the existing preventive and mitigative activities as\nwell as considering the need for additional preventive or mitigative risk control activities.\nEspecially when considering mitigative actions like EFRDs, the environmental sensitivity of the\nlocation is an important factor that must be considered to make the best overall risk reductio 1\ndecisions. Thus, RSPA deferred proposing regulations requiring EFRD installation until US.Qs\nwere defined.\nRSPA believes that the experience obtained through the Risk Management Demonstration\nProgram, the SLI Pilot Program, the USA definition process, and other initiatives has providcd a\nfoundation for moving forward with a rule that addresses these Congressional mandates and\nNTSB recommendations in a comprehensive and integrated manner.\n4\n\n<<<PAGE 8>>>\n\nA.3 Interaction with Industry, Other Agencies, and Stakeholders\nOn October 21, 1999, RSPA issued a Notice (64 FR 56725) announcing a public meeting to\ndiscuss the need for additional regulations for natural gas and hazardous liquid lines in high\npopulation areas, commercially navigable waters, and areas of the environment that are unusu:illy\nsensitive to the environment damage (Le., high consequence areas). This Notice included a\nconceptual approach to providing improved protection in high consequence areas, and solicite d\nfeedback on a number of specific questions relative to this approach. In the Notice, RSPA sta,ted\nthat any process for protecting high consequence areas should include:\n8 Pipeline-specific assessments in determining the need for additional preventive and\nmitigative activities;\na An assessment approach that considers all risk factors and risk reduction activities in ;In\nintegrated manner; and\na Increased assurance that high consequence areas are being protected.\nThe public meeting was held on November 18 and 19, 1999, in Hemdon, Virginia. The prirriary\ndiscussion topics included: the key elements of an effective integrity management program, tl le\nextent to which operators now have integrity management programs, and how to validate the\neffectiveness of such programs. In addition, RSPA obtained feedback and input on a broad airay\nof integrity management issues, including:\na How to characterize and define high consequence areas,\na Key elements of operator integrity management programs,\na Types of information that should be integrated to assure pipeline integrity; and\na OPS review of integrity management programs, including what elements to review arid\ninspect.\nA synopsis of the feedback obtained at this meeting, as well as complete transcripts of the fo ;mal\npresentations are available in Docket # 99-6355, and on the OPS home page at http://ops.dot.gov.\nOn December 22, 1999, RSPA issued a Notice in the Federal Register (64 FR 7 17 13) annoui icing\nan extension of the public comment period to January 17,2000. The availability of an electIonic\ndiscussion forum was announced to allow interested parties to express their views on integri y\nmanagement program issues and the need for improved protection in high consequence area:,'.\nThis Notice also referenced a draft conceptual model for assuring pipeline integrity in high\nconsequence areas, and solicited comments on the draft approach. RSPA received commenl s\nfrom several organizations and individuals. These are available in the Docket # 99-6355, and are\n5\n\n<<<PAGE 9>>>\n\nsummarized in the preamble of the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) announcing the\nproposed requirements for integrity management programs. (65 FR 21695, April 24,2000: See\nadditional discussion below).\nFollowing the public meeting, RSPA hosted a number of smaller meetings and conference cal s\nto make sure the broadest range of comments and information were considered in drafting the\nNPRM. Discussion items included the areas that should be considered high consequence areal;,\nreasonable milestones for completing benchmark testing, developing industry standards to\nsupport a rule, how a rule should acknowledge differences between the gas and liquid pipeline\nindustries as well as among individual operators, and how best to involve affected communitii :s.\nThese topics were discussed with Interstate Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA)\nrepresentatives on January 12, American Petroleum Institute (MI) representatives on January 13,\nNational Association of Pipeline Safety Representatives (NAPSR) on January 14, February 1 ,\nand March 3, public interest representatives on January 19 and February 29, and the NTSB on\nFebruary 8. Minutes from each of these sessions are in the Docket.\nAfter considering the feedback from the public meeting, comments to the Docket, and experimce\nin the Risk Management and SII programs, RSPA elected to implement integrity managemen1\nrequirements for the pipeline industry through a series of rules focused on different objectives.\nOn April 24,2000, RSPA published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) “Pipeline\nIntegrity Management in High Consequence Areas” (65 CFR 21695). This proposed rule\nfocused on the hazardous liquid industry operators who own or operate 500 or more miles of\npipeline. Approximately 87% of the hazardous liquid transportation lines are operated by\noperators with 500 or more pipeline miles.\nA number of individuals and organizations provided comment on the proposed rule describec in\nthe NPRM. These comments are available in Docket # 99-6355, and summarized in the\npreamble to the final rule. In addition to public input, RSPA also continued its consultations\nwith other Federal agencies, including the Environmental Protection Agency, the Departmenl of\nJustice, and the Department of the Interior. Guidance was also obtained from the Technical\nHazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Standards Committee, RSPA’s statutory advisory committ ,:e\nfor hazardous liquid pipeline safety. On December 1 , 2000, RSPA published a final rule on\nhtegrity Management in High Consequence Areas covering Hazardous Liquid Operators wit 1\n500 or More Miles of Pipeline (65 FR 75378). The key provisions of the final rule are\nsummarized below:\n0 Operators must identify pipeline segments on their systems where a release could impact\na high consequence area. High consequence areas are defined as populated areas, US As,\nand commercially navigable waterways.\n0 Operators must conduct baseline integrity assessments on pipeline segments that cou .d\naffect high consequence areas. Acceptable methods for assessment include internal\ninspection, pressure testing, or another technology that the operator demonstrates can\nprovide an equivalent level of understanding of the pipe’s condition. Baseline\n6\n\n<<<PAGE 10>>>\n\nassessments for these pipeline segments must be completed by March 3 I , 2008, with 5 0%\nof the distance assessed by September 30,2004. The highest risk segments must be\nassessed first.\nOperators must perform periodic integrity assessments on segments that could affect high\nconsequence areas at intervals not to exceed 5 years.\nOperators must develop and follow a written integrity management program that consiists\nof the following elements:\nt\na process for determining which pipeline segments could affect high consequei ice\nt\nb\nt\nt\nt\nareas,\na Plan for conducting the baseline assessments noted above,\na process for continual integrity assessment and evaluation,\nan analytical process that integrates all available information about pipeline\nintegrity and the consequences of a failure,\nrepair criteria to address issues identified by the integrity assessment method aiid\ndata analysis (the rule provides minimum repair criteria for certain, higher risk,\nfeatures identified through internal inspection, as well as time frames in which\ncertain features must be repaired),\na process to identify and evaluate preventive and mitigative measures to protecmt\nhigh consequence areas,\nmethods to measure the integrity management program's effectiveness, and\na process for review of integrity assessment results and data analysis by a\nqualified individual.\nOn March 2 1,2001, RSPA issued a NPRM (66 FR 15821) to extend the same requirements 1 o\nprotect high consequence areas and establish integrity management programs to all hazardou ,;\nliquid pipeline operators regulated under 49 CFR 195 (i.e., include those operating less than ,io0\nmiles of pipeline). An Environmental Assessment was prepared in support of this NPRM. I his\nfinal Environmental Assessment is an update of the previous work.\nRSPA received a small number of public comments on the NPRM. After reviewing this inpi it, as\nwell as discussions with other Federal agencies, RSPA has decided that the same requirements\nfor protection of high consequence areas and the development of integnty management prog ams\nshould apply to all hazardous liquid pipeline operators. Section B of this Environmental\nAssessment describes these requirements.\nIn addition to these requirements for integrity management in high consequence areas, there :are\nmany other Federal, state, and local government regulations in place to protect sensitive\nresources. These include regulations to protect drinking water resources, threatened and\nendangered species, critical habitats for various species, and spawning areas. Areas have be.:n\ncreated and designated to protect and maintain aquatic life, wildlife, and various other naturd\nand water resources. Permits, environmental assessments, and consultations with resource\n7\n\n<<<PAGE 11>>>\n\nexperts are required by various Federal, state, and local agencies before a pipeline can be\ninstalled or construction to modify or repair an existing line take place. RSPA’s existing and\nplanned future regulations complement and enhance these other Federal, state, and local\ngovernment regulations on sensitive drinking water or ecological resources.\nA.4 Future RSPA Intea-itv Management Initiatives\nRSPA plans to propose additional rules on pipeline integrity management for interstate and\nintrastate natural gas operators in the near future. RSPA has met with representatives of CNGI,A\non January 12, March 29, April 19, June 15, July 20, September 6, September 19, October 12.\nand December 18,2000 to discuss a variety of issues related to improved integrity manageme it\nfor gas pipelines, including:\na the definition of high consequence areas for gas pipelines;\na integrity assessment technologies for gas pipelines, including “direct assessment”;\ne inspection fiequency;\ne data integration and analysis;\ne integrity management for low hoop stress piping;\na the level of integrity assurance provided by the current regulations (including high\npopulation areas);\na current company practices that go beyond the protection explicitly required in the\nregulations; and\na fbture standards to support integrity management.\nOn February 12 and 14, 2001 RSPA conducted a public meeting in Arlington, VA to discuss\nthese subjects and other topics relevant to an integrity management rule for gas pipeline\noperators. Subsequent to the public meeting RSPA synthesized the input received, and issued a\nNotice to request public comment and input on integrity management concepts related to gas\npipelines (June 27,2001; 66 FR 34318). This input is currently being evaluated. RSPA expticts\nto issue one or more proposed rules for gas pipelines beginning in late 2001.\nRSPA has also initiated dialog with industry and various public interest representatives to\nexplore approaches to improve communication between OPS, pipeline operators, and the\ncommunities in which pipeline facilities are located. Initial discussions have focused on\nstrengthening the liaison between public officials and pipeline companies, testing the usefuli less\nof pipeline data provided to public officials, and developing concepts for restructuring the\nrespective roles of federal, state, and local officials, emphasizing the distinction between\n8\n\n<<<PAGE 12>>>\n\nparticipation and communication. Meetings were conducted on February 28 and 29, Septemb ,:r\n17, and October 10, 2000 to begin addressing the multi-faceted communication issue. During a\npublic meeting on February 13,2001 , OPS sought additional input on enhancing communicat on\nwith the public and local officials near pipeline facilities. RSPA is currently considering how to\nbest improve communications between pipeline operators, the government, and local officials\nThe specific requirements of any future proposed rules related to integrity management for\nnatural gas pipelines and communications, and the environmental impacts associated with thc se\nrequirements will be considered in their respective rulemaking processes.\n9\n\n<<<PAGE 13>>>\n\nB. Description of Proposed Action\nOn December 1, 2000, RSPA published a final rule establishing new requirements for integrit,y\nmanagement in high consequence areas for operators that own or operate 500 or more miles o I\npipe (65 FR 75378). RSPA is now establishing similar requirements for the remaining hazarclous\nliquid operators. ’ Under these requirements, high consequence areas covered by this rule are\npopulated areas, commercially navigable waterways, and areas unusually sensitive to\nenvironmental damage. (Section D provides more detailed definition and description of high\nconsequence areas.) The final rule establishes new requirements to enhance and validate the\nintegrity of hazardous liquid pipelines in high consequence areas. Furthermore, the rule prov des\nadditional assurance that appropriate preventive and mitigative measures are in place to prote :t\nthese high consequence areas.\nThe final rule requires operators to develop and implement an Integrity Management Program for\nall portions of their pipelines that could affect high consequence areas. This Integrity\nManagement Program includes at a minimum:\na the identification of all pipeline segments that could impact high consequence areas,\na a Baseline Assessment Plan to assure integrity of these segments, and\na a framework that identifies how each element of the Integrity Management Program will\nbe implemented.\nThe operator’s Integrity Management Program must include the following elements:\na a process for determining which pipeline segments could affect a high consequence ai-ea;\na a Baseline Assessment Plan (as described below);\na a process for conducting periodic integrity assessments and evaluation on those segments\nthat could affect a high consequence area;\na an analytical process that integrates all available information about pipeline integrity and\nthe consequences of a failure (also noted above);\na repair criteria to address issues identified by the integrity assessment method and dat i\nanalysis;\n’ Throughout the remainder of this Environmental Assessment, wherever “operator” is\nused in the text, it means hazardous liquid operators operating less than 500 miles of pipelin e\nused in transportation.\n10\n\n<<<PAGE 14>>>\n\n0 a process to identify and evaluate additional preventive and mitigative measures to\nprotect high consequence areas;\n0 methods to measure the Integrity Management Program’s effectiveness; and\na process for review of integrity assessment results and data analysis by an individual\nqualified to perform evaluate integrity assessment results.\nEach of these elements must be addressed in the framework.\nOperators must follow recognized industry practices in their Integrity Management Program.\nThe pipeline segments that could affect a high consequence area must be identified within nir e\nmonths of the rule’s effective date. The Baseline Assessment Plan and Framework must be\ndocumented within one year of the rule’s effective date.\nThe Baseline Assessment Plan delineates the integrity assessment method(s) selected for eacli\nhigh consequence area, the schedule by which these initial integrity assessments will be\nperformed, and the technical basis for integrity assessment method(s) selection and risk facto ’s\nused in scheduling the assessments. The rule requires operators to perform a baseline integril y\nassessment within seven years after the effective date of the rule for all pipelines that could a ‘fect\na high consequence area, with 50% of this pipeline mileage being assessed within three and c ne-\nhalf years. In scheduling the baseline assessments, operators are to perform assessments of tlie\nhighest risk segments first. Operators who have performed and documented integrity\nassessments in the five years previous to the effective date of the final rule may use these\nassessments to validate a pipeline segment’s integrity if the assessment approach and\ndocumentation are consistent with the provisions of the rule. The acceptable methods for\nconducting the baseline integrity assessment are pressure testing, instrumented internal\ninspection2, or other technology that the operator demonstrates can provide an equivalent\nunderstanding of the pipe’s condition.\nIn evaluating the results of integrity assessments, operators must integrate information from ()her\nrelevant sources with the inspection or testing results to hlly identify and characterize the\npotential threats to pipeline integrity. These other information sources might include cathodi c\nprotection system data, close interval surveys, results of previous internal inspections, operat mg\nand leak history, patrolling reports, exposed pipe reports, etc. From this evaluation, the operator\nshould identify the location, nature, and relative severity of anomalies and defects that could\nthreaten pipeline integrity. Operators will be expected to address the important threats by\nevaluating and repairing, if necessary, defects or anomalies in the pipe. Operators must use ; L\nrisk-based approach in prioritizing repair activities, in which any severe defects or damage that\nhave the potential to result in a near term leak or failure are addressed immediately. The ruli :\nThe integrity assessment methods used for low frequency, electric resistance weldel 1\n(ERW) pipe and lap welded pipe susceptible to longitudinal seam failures must be capable o f\nassessing seam integrity and detecting corrosion and deformation anomalies.\n11\n\n<<<PAGE 15>>>\n\nprovides minimum mitigation and repair schedules and criteria that must be applied for certaii i,\nhigher risk features identified through internal inspection.\nIn addition to the initial, baseline integrity assessment, the rule requires that operators\nperiodically reconfirm pipeline integrity in high consequence areas through regular integrity\nassessments. An operator must perform subsequent assessments of line segments that could\naffect high consequence areas no later than five years after the previous assessment.3 Within 1 his\nfive year limit, operators must establish assessment frequencies commensurate with the risk e ich\npipeline segment presents to a high consequence area. In other words, those segments present ng\na greater risk to high consequence areas would be assessed more frequently than segments\npresenting lower risk. The risk factors to be considered when selecting integrity assessment\nmethods and establishing a schedule for a particular segment include:\nm\nresults of previous pressure testing and internal inspection data and results,\na\npipe design, materials, and manufacturing information,\npipe coating type and condition,\na\nleak history, and repair history,\na\ncathodic protection system performance,\nm\nproduct transported,\noperating stress level,\na\na\nlocal environmental factors that could affect integrity (e.g., soil corrosivity, ground\nmovement potential, and climatic factors),\ncurrent or projected activities in the pipeline vicinity, and\nphysical support of the segment such as by a cable suspension bridge.\nGuidance for identifylng and applying risk factors is provided in Appendix C of the final rulc\nThe rule allows operators to extend the period between integrity assessments to more\nthan five years if a reliable engineering evaluation and other external monitoring activities show\nthe pipe to be in good condition, or if an integrity assessment technology the operator plans t I\nuse is not readily available. If the justification for extending the re-assessment period is on an\nengineering basis, an operator must notify OPS nine months before the end of the five-year\ninterval. If the justification is because of unavailable technology, an operator must notify OE'S\n180 days before the end of the five year interval.\n12\n\n<<<PAGE 16>>>\n\nBesides the integrity assessment provisions of the rule, operators also have to conduct an\nintegrated evaluation of line segments that could affect high consequence areas to understand the\ngreatest risks to these locations. This evaluation must include the results of the integrity\nassessments along with other information necessary to obtain a complete understanding of thc\nrisk contributors to a particular pipe segment. As part of this evaluation, the operator must\ncritically evaluate the effectiveness of existing preventive and mitigative risk control measure s,\nand consider if additional preventive and mitigative actions can improve protection for these\nareas. The operator must explicitly consider whether the installation of EFRDs or enhancing 1 eak\ndetection system capability is warranted. The need for additional preventive and mitigative\nmeasures in high consequence areas must be periodically re-assessed in light of new informal ion\nsuch as changes in the pipeline condition, operating parameters, or the nearby population demity\nor environment.\nThe final regulatory language articulating these requirements is provided in 195.450, 195.452,\nand the Federal Register Notice establishing the final requirements for operators who operate less\nthan 500 miles of hazardous liquid pipeline.\n13\n\n<<<PAGE 17>>>\n\nC. Alternatives Considered\nRSPA considered several alternatives in the decision process that led to the final rule. These\naltematives are summarized below.\n1. Take No Action. In this alternative, RSPA would rely on the existing regulatory requiremc :nts\nto provide protection for high consequence areas. Without the provisions of the rule, operatoi’s\nwould not be required to conduct the baseline integrity assessments, perform an integrated\napproach to integrity evaluation, conduct periodic reassessments, and consider other preventi Ive\nand mitigative actions for pipeline segments that could affect high consequence areas. By\nselecting this alternative, RSPA would not be responsive to the Congressional mandates to\nconsider internal inspection and other protective measures for high population areas and area,;\nunusually sensitive to environmental damage (see Section A.2).\n2. Require Mandatorv Intemitv Assessments in All High Consequence Areas Everv Ten Yea E.\nIn determining the practical and appropriate requirements for operators who operate less thar 500\nmiles of hazardous liquid pipeline, RSPA considered establishing different requirements for\nconducting the baseline and subsequent integrity assessments than those established for oper, itors\noperating 500 or more miles of pipeline. Initially RSPA considered allowing up to ten years for\nthis group of operators to conduct the baseline assessments on segments that could affect higli\nconsequence areas, and allowing an interval for periodic reassessments of up to ten years. BI )th\nof these periods are longer than seven years allowed for baseline assessments, and the maxini um\nfive year interval for subsequent assessments that were recently established for operators\noperating 500 or more miles of pipeline (65 FR 75378). RSPA was initially concerned that\noperators who operate less than 500 miles of pipeline would not have the financial and tech ical\nresources available to comply with the requirements described in Section B. RSPA was also\nconcerned that during the initial few years, the demand for internal inspection tools might be\nmore than the inspection device vendors could satisfy (with the simultaneously high demand\nbeing placed by operators operating 500 or more miles of pipeline). If internal inspection de vices\nwere not available, operators would be forced to conduct hydrostatic testing to achieve\ncompliance - which in some instances might not be the most desirable approach.\nDuring the period leading up to the proposed rule, RSPA reviewed its internal data, talked N ith\nseveral operators, and gathered information from its Regional inspectors who routinely inspcict\nthese operators in standard compliance inspections. This investigation showed that many\noperators who operate less than 500 miles of pipe already perfom periodic internal inspection or\npressure testing on sizeable portions of their pipeline system (see Section E. 1.3). Thus, RSF A’s\ninitial assumption about the technical and financial resource capabilities of this group of\noperators was not valid. Furthermore, new information obtained from vendors of intemal\ninspection devices indicated that while the demand for these tools will be high, the industry\nshould be capable of satisfying pipeline operators’ needs f","truncated":true,"body_characters":141440}