{"operation":"document","citation":"0900006480e8d3f1","title":"U.S. DOT/PHMSA - Presentation: Briefing Paper on Special Permits to Waive MAOP in New HL Pipe","source_type":"rulemaking","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"current","official":true,"published_on":null,"effective_on":null,"summary":"The paper: - Describes PHMSA’s past actions and context: recognition of metallurgical and manufacturing improvements, comparison to Canadian standards and ASME committees. - Notes TransCanada Keystone’s November 17, 2006 request to operate at 80% of SMYS (not for high consequence areas, stations, or crossings). - Summarizes PHMSA’s meetings with TransCanada, a January technical meeting covering pipe materials, manufacture, coating, design, construction, testing, operations, leak detection, maintenance, and emergency response, and PHMSA deliberations on overpressure, abnormal operations, and cyclic fatigue. - States PHMSA is reviewing hazardous liquid pipeline accidents caused by abnormal operations (pressure excursions) and notes difficulty in determining if excursions cause premature flaw failure because the effect is accretive. Limitations: all conclusions and descriptions are limited,","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/regulations-gov-attachment-0900006480e8d3f1.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/regulations-gov-attachment-0900006480e8d3f1.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/regulations-gov-attachment-0900006480e8d3f1","source_url":"https://downloads.regulations.gov/PHMSA-RSPA-1998-4470-0229/attachment_1.pdf","body":"<<<PAGE 1>>>\n\nBriefing Paper February 12, 2007\nConsideration of Special Permit to Waive the Maximum Allowable\nOperating Pressure in New Hazardous Liquids Pipelines\nAdvisory Committee Action: Briefing\nProject Contacts: Joy Kadnar and Alan Mayberry\nPast PHMSA action:\nPHMSA continues to seek ways to improve the safety and efficiency of the nation’s\nenergy infrastructure and in doing so recognizes that improvements in metallurgical\nproperties, pipeline manufacture, and life cycle management practices have improved the\nsafety performance of these facilities. The Canadian standards and the National Energy\nBoard allow hazardous liquid pipelines to operate at 80% of SMYS. The ASME B31.4\ncommittee, unlike the counterpart ASME B31.8 (gas) committee, has not made changes\nto allow for higher operating stress levels.\nOn November 17, 2006 TransCanada Keystone Pipeline, LP requested PHMSA to\nconsider a waiver to allow them to operate at 80% of the specified minimum yield\nstrength (SMYS) as opposed to 72% of SMYS, the current regulatory maximum stress\nlevel. The Keystone Pipeline originates at an oil sands supply hub near Hardisty,\nAlberta, and extends 1,845 miles to Patoka, Illinois. The US portion includes 1,023 miles\nof 36- inch, 55 miles of 24- inch and in the future may include a 291–mile long extension\nto Cushing, Oklahoma. TransCanada is not requesting a waiver for portions of the\nproposed pipeline operating in high consequence areas, stations and crossings of roads,\nrailroads and navigable waterways.\nPHMSA met three times with TransCanada since last October to discuss the project. In\nJanuary PHMSA hosted a technical meeting with TransCanada’s engineering staff to\ndiscuss all known technical issues related to pipe skelp, manufacture, coating, design,\nconstruction, testing, operations inclusive of leak detection, maintenance, and emergency\nresponse. PHMSA debated at length about pressure excursions and abnormal operations.\nWe wanted to understand why the higher overpressure allowance is reasonable and would\nnot exacerbate cyclic fatigue. Alternatively, we discussed if it would be reasonable to\nimpose a lower limit. In researching overpressure and cyclic fatigue issue, PHMSA is\nalso reviewing hazardous liquids pipeline accident caused by abnormal operations,\nspecifically pressure excursions. However, because the affect of excursions on flaws is\naccretive, it may be very difficult to positively determine if pressure excursions caused\nflaws to fail prematurely.","truncated":false,"body_characters":2492}