{"operation":"document","citation":"0900006480e9258d","title":"U.S. DOT/PHMSA - Material Available for Comment:  Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Internal Corrosion, Briefing Paper and Data Sheets","source_type":"rulemaking","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"current","official":true,"published_on":null,"effective_on":null,"summary":"Docket No. PHMSA-2007-28993 Materials For Review and Comment on Internal Corrosion Regulations for Hazardous Liquid Pipelines • Briefing paper dated July 24, 2007 prepared for the meeting of Technical Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Standards Committee (THLPSSC) on that date. The briefing paper contains questions on the adequacy of the internal corrosion regulations. • Data on Internal Corrosion on Hazardous Liquid Pipelines. The data updates and expands on data consistent with the discussion by the THLPSSC. Briefing Paper July 24, 2007 Technical Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Standards Committee Adequacy of Internal Corrosion Regulations for Hazardous Liquid Pipelines Committee action: Discussion. Contact:...","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/regulations-gov-attachment-0900006480e9258d.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/regulations-gov-attachment-0900006480e9258d.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/regulations-gov-attachment-0900006480e9258d","source_url":"https://downloads.regulations.gov/PHMSA-2007-28993-0002/attachment_1.pdf","body":"<<<PAGE 1>>>\n\nDocket No. PHMSA-2007-28993\nMaterials For Review and Comment on\nInternal Corrosion Regulations for Hazardous Liquid Pipelines\n• Briefing paper dated July 24, 2007 prepared for the meeting of Technical\nHazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Standards Committee (THLPSSC) on that date.\nThe briefing paper contains questions on the adequacy of the internal corrosion\nregulations.\n• Data on Internal Corrosion on Hazardous Liquid Pipelines. The data updates and\nexpands on data consistent with the discussion by the THLPSSC.\n\n<<<PAGE 2>>>\n\nBriefing Paper July 24, 2007\nTechnical Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Standards Committee\nAdequacy of Internal Corrosion Regulations for Hazardous Liquid Pipelines\nCommittee action: Discussion.\nContact: Barbara Betsock\nStatutory direction: Section 22 of the Pipeline Integrity, Protection, and Enforcement\nSafety Act of 2006 directs PHMSA\n. . . in consultation with the Technical Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Standards\nCommittee and other appropriate entities [to] review the internal corrosion control\nregulations set forth in subpart H of part 195 of title 49 of the Code of Federal\nRegulations to determine if such regulations are currently adequate to ensure that the\npipeline facilities subject to such regulations will not present a hazard to public safety\nor the environment.\nCurrent regulations on internal corrosion:\n• Section 195.579(a) requires an operator who transports a hazardous liquid that\nwould corrode the pipeline to take adequate steps to mitigate internal corrosion.\n• If an operator uses corrosion inhibitors, an operator must follow § 195.579(b)\nwhich sets requirements for inhibitors and coupons.\n• When an operator removes pipe from a pipeline, §195.579(c) requires an operator\nto check for internal corrosion.\n• If a pipeline’s failure could affect an HCA (commercially navigable waterway,\nhigh population area, other populated area, or unusually sensitive area), the\noperator must identify whether internal corrosion is a threat. If it is, § 195.452\nrequires an operator to have a continual process of evaluation and assessment to\nmaintain integrity.\nRisk history:\n• Between 2002 and mid-2007, hazardous liquid pipeline accidents due to internal\ncorrosion reported to PHMSA resulted in $10.9 million in property damage, and\n72.7 thousand lost barrels. Property damage includes damage to the property of\nthe operator or others, cost of clean-up and recovery, value of lost product. It is\nreportable to the extent it exceeds $50,000.\n• Slow leaks due to internal corrosion can go undetected for years and pollute\naquifers and soils.\n• Based on PHMSA data from the past 5 years, 91% of internal corrosion accidents\non hazardous liquid pipelines occurred on crude pipelines. This includes $7\nmillion of the damages and 67.9 thousand lost barrels.\n• An unregulated BP low pressure pipeline failed on March 2, 2006, and spilled an\nestimated 201,000 gallons of crude oil onto the tundra on the North Slope of\nAlaska near Prudhoe Bay. The cause was internal corrosion. Because the\npipeline is not regulated, the accident is not included in PHMSA data.\n\n<<<PAGE 3>>>\n\n• Is this extent of risk acceptable? Explain why or why not?\n• Is leak detection in use on most crude lines sufficient to detect internal corrosion\nleaks?\nControl of risk:\n• What consensus standards or best practices exist on internal corrosion?\n• Are these standards/practices adequate forms of risk control?\n• Would you use any particular strategy to assign priorities to risk control options?\nIf so, what might these be?\n• Should PHMSA get involved in controlling risks here? If so how (by regulating,\nsponsoring best practices workshops, participating in development of consensus\nstandards, etc.)\n• After the BP accident, PHMSA proposed to require low stress pipelines in high\nconsequence areas to be continually monitored for internal corrosion in a notice of\nproposed rulemaking published in September 2006. Because the low stress lines\ncovered in this first phase of low stress regulation will be covered by the continual\nevaluation requirement in integrity management, PHMSA decided to drop the\nrequirement for continual monitoring for internal corrosion risk. In the\nsupplemental notice of proposed rulemaking issued in May 2007, PHMSA noted\nthat it would consider the need for continual monitoring for internal corrosion for\nall pipelines (including those operating above 20 percent SMYS) in the second\nphase of the rulemaking on low stress lines. How should PHMSA handle this?\n• Operators commonly include use of cleaning pigs and corrosion inhibitors as part\nof internal corrosion programs. Is there good guidance on this method of control?\nIf more is needed, what is the best approach?\n• The transportation of hazardous liquids poses a greater risk of internal corrosion\nthan the transportation of natural gas. At the recommendation of the National\nTransportation Safety Board, PHMSA adopted design and construction standards\naddressing internal corrosion in gas transmission pipelines. (72 FR 20055, April\n23, 2007). Is there good guidance for hazardous liquid pipelines? If more is\nneeded, what is the best approach?\n\n<<<PAGE 4>>>\n\nData on Internal Corrosion on Hazardous Liquid Pipelines\nPrepared by PHMSA August 8, 2007\n• Internal corrosion is one of the most common causes of reportable failure in hazardous liquid\npipelines1:\nHazardous Liquid Pipeline Accidents by Cause - More than 5 barrels spilled\nPHMSA Data as of 07/25/2007\nOTHER OUTSIDE FORCE\nDAM AGE, 3%\nOTHER, 10%\nCORROSION, EXTERNAL,\n14%\nNATURAL FORCES, 5%\nC OR R OSION ,\nIN T ER N A L, 15%\nM ATERIAL AND/OR WELD\nFAILURES, 13%\nINCORRECT OPERATION,\n8%\nEQUIPM ENT, 17%\nEXCAVATION DAM AGE,\n13%\n• Between 2002 and mid-2007, operators reported 124 hazardous liquid pipeline accidents due to\ninternal corrosion. Eighty-two percent of these occurred on pipelines whose failure would not\neffect a high consequence area (HCA)2. These non-HCA pipelines are not required to be\ncovered by integrity management programs.\nHazardous Liquid Pipeline Accidents\nCaused by Internal Corrosion\nNon-HCA vs. HCA\n25\n20\n15\n10\n5\n0\nNon-HCA\nHCA\n2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007\nPHMSA Data as of 07/25/2007\n1 Unless otherwise specified, data comes from accident reports filed with PHMSA between January 1, 2002 and July 27,\n2007.\n2 An HCA is defined at 49 CFR § 195.450. It includes a commercially navigable waterway, a high population area (an\nurbanized area with a population of 50,000 or more and a density of 1,000 or more), an other populated area (defined by\nthe Census Bureau as having a concentrated population), or an unusually sensitive area (with respect to environmental\ndamage).\n\n<<<PAGE 5>>>\n\n• Each of these accident resulted in a release of more than 5 barrels. The total released was 73.0\nthousand barrels of hazardous liquid. These accidents resulted in a total of $11.7 million in\nproperty damage. Property damage includes damage to the property of the operator or others,\ncost of clean-up and recovery, value of lost product. It is reportable to the extent it exceeds\n$50,000. Approximately half of the accidents occurred on interstate and half on intrastate\npipelines.\nHazardous Liquid Pipeline Accidents\nCaused by Internal Corrosion\nPHMSA Data as of 07/25/2007\nProperty Damages\nDamage, $128,700\nPublic Property\nCost of Emergency\nResponse Phase,\n$1,883,671\nLosses, $5,144,780\nOther Operator\nCost of Envirom ental\nRe mediation,\n$3,193,016\nProperty Damage,\nValue of Operator\n$760,686\nOther Community\nLosses, $27,350\nValue of Product\nLost, $568,127\n• In addition, during this period, there were an additional 65 hazardous liquid pipeline accidents\nresulting in a release of between 5 gallons and 5 barrels for which the cause was corrosion.\nThere is no breakdown between internal and external corrosion. These caused a total of\n$ 6,100,699 in damage and resulted in 129 lost barrels.\n• Slow leaks due to internal corrosion can go undetected for years and pollute aquifers and soils.\nBetween 2002 and mid-2007, operators reported the following environmental damage:\nHazardous Liquid Pipeline Accidents Caused by Internal Corrosion\n160\nCost of\n140\nRemediation in 10's\nEnvironmental\n120 -\nof thousands dollars\n100\nNumber of\n80\ncontaminated\naccidents\n60\nsoil/water\n40\n20\n2002\n2003\n2004\n2005\n2006\n2007\nPHMSA Data as of 07/25/2007\n\n<<<PAGE 6>>>\n\n• Approximately half of the reports of corrosion accidents on hazardous liquid pipelines do not\nspecify whether the release resulted in a leak or a rupture. Of those that do, none indicate that\nan internal corrosion accident resulted in a rupture.\n• Ninety-three percent of internal corrosion accidents on hazardous liquid pipelines occurred on\ncrude pipelines. This includes $7 million of the damages and 67.7 thousand lost barrels.\n• An unregulated BP low stress pipeline failed on March 2, 2006, and spilled an estimated\n201,000 gallons (4,786 barrels) of crude oil onto the tundra on the North Slope of Alaska near\nPrudhoe Bay. The cause was internal corrosion. Because the pipeline is not regulated, the\naccident is not included in PHMSA data. PHMSA has proposed regulating low stress pipelines\nnot currently regulated; namely, those in rural areas; in a phased approach. PHMSA\nanticipates completing the first phase of regulation, extension of regulation to rural low stress\nlines impacting unusually sensitive areas, this year.\n• Ten states, comprised of 126.1 million people, contain 64.2 percent of the non-HCA liquid\npipeline mileage3. Thirty seven percent of the population in those states, 46.9 million people,\nlive within 5 miles of a non-HCA hazardous liquid pipeline. Fourteen percent, 18 million\npeople, live within 5 miles of a non-HCA crude pipeline.\n3 Based on PHMSA mapping data.","truncated":false,"body_characters":9740}