{"operation":"document","citation":"0900006481ca7cd9","title":"U.S. DOT/PHMSA - Environmental Assessment (EA)","source_type":"rulemaking","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"current","official":true,"published_on":null,"effective_on":null,"summary":"Preliminary Environmental Assessment Regulatory Development Support Services Pipeline Safety: Safety of On-Shore Hazardous Liquid Pipelines Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) Contract No.: DPTH56-09-F-000012 Order No.: DTPH56-09-F-000012TTD002 Project No.: 1027-002 Submitted To: Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Safety Administration U.S. Department of Transportation Attn: Ms.... Contents Contents .............................................................................................................................. 1 List of Acronyms ................................................................................................................ 2 Preliminary Environmental Assessment...","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/regulations-gov-attachment-0900006481ca7cd9.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/regulations-gov-attachment-0900006481ca7cd9.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/regulations-gov-attachment-0900006481ca7cd9","source_url":"https://downloads.regulations.gov/PHMSA-2010-0229-0036/attachment_1.pdf","body":"<<<PAGE 1>>>\n\nPreliminary Environmental Assessment\nRegulatory Development Support Services\nPipeline Safety: Safety of On-Shore Hazardous\nLiquid Pipelines Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM)\nContract No.:\nDPTH56-09-F-000012\nOrder No.:\nDTPH56-09-F-000012TTD002\nProject No.:\n1027-002\nSubmitted To:\nPipeline & Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nU.S. Department of Transportation\nAttn: Ms. Cheryl Whetsel, COTR\n1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE\nWashington, DC 20590–0001\nSubmitted By:\nEconometrica, Inc.\n4416 East-West Highway, Suite 215\nBethesda, Maryland 20814\nFebruary 2, 2015\n1\n\n<<<PAGE 2>>>\n\nContents\nContents .............................................................................................................................. 1\nList of Acronyms ................................................................................................................ 2\nPreliminary Environmental Assessment ............................................................................. 3\n1.1 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 3\n1.2 BACKGROUND ........................................................................................... 4\n1.3 PURPOSE AND NEED ............................................................................... 5\n1.4 Public Involvement ...................................................................................... 6\n1.5 ALTERNATIVES ......................................................................................... 7\nRequirement Area #1 – Extend Reporting Requirements to Gravity Lines .... 7\nRequirement Area # 2. Extend Reporting Requirements to All Hazardous\nLiquid Gathering Lines ................................................................................... 8\nRequirement Area #3. Require Inspections of Pipelines in Areas Affected by\nExtreme Weather, Man-made or Natural Disasters and Other Similar Events\n....................................................................................................................... 9\nRequirement Area # 4. Require Periodic Assessments of Pipelines Not\nAlready Covered Under the IM Program ...................................................... 10\nRequirement Area #5. Require Leak Detection Systems on Hazardous\nLiquid Pipelines in All Locations ................................................................... 13\nRequirement Area # 6. Modify the Provisions of Making Pipeline Repairs .. 14\nRequirement Area # 7. Require All Pipelines Subject to the IM Program be\nCapable of Accommodating Inline Inspection Tools .................................... 15\nRequirement Area #8. Clarify Other Requirements ..................................... 16\nNumber 8.1 Enhancing the Definition of Information Analysis to Improve the\nQuality of Operator Evaluations ................................................................... 16\nRequirements Number 8. 2 Periodic Verification of the Identification of\nCovered Segments ...................................................................................... 17\nRequirement Number 8.3. Clarification of IM Requirements for Non-Pipe\nFacilities ....................................................................................................... 18\n1.7 ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF THE RULE .......................................... 19\nHazardous Materials Transportation ............................................................ 21\nSocioeconomics ........................................................................................... 21\n1.8. CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 24\n1.9 LIST OF PREPARERS AND REVIEWERS ............................................... 25\n2.0 SOURCE DOCUMENTS ........................................................................... 26\n1\n\n<<<PAGE 3>>>\n\nList of Acronyms\nANPRM Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking\nAPI-AOPL American Petroleum Institute – Association of Oil Pipelines\nCEQ U.S. Council on Environmental Quality\nCFR Code of Federal Regulations\nDOT U.S. Department of Transportation\nEA Environmental Assessment\nEFRD Emergency flow restricting devices\nESA Endangered Species Act\nGIS Geographic information system\nHCA High consequence area\nILI Inline inspection\nIM Integrity Management\nNEPA National Environmental Policy Act\nNHPA National Historic preservation Act\nNPRM Notice of proposed rulemaking\nOCS Outer continental shelf\nOPS Office of Pipeline Safety\nPHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nSCC Stress corrosion cracking\nUSA Unusually Sensitive Area\n2\n\n<<<PAGE 4>>>\n\nPreliminary Environmental Assessment\n1.1 INTRODUCTION\nThe nation's pipelines are a transportation system that enables the safe movement of\nenergy products to industry and consumers. The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials\nSafety Administration (PHMSA) is the Federal safety authority for the nation's natural\ngas and hazardous liquid pipelines. PHMSA is the Federal agency charged with the safe\nand secure movement of almost one-million daily shipments of hazardous materials by all\nmodes of transportation. The agency also oversees the nation's pipeline infrastructure\nwhich accounts for 64 percent of the energy commodities consumed in the United States.\n1\nFederal agencies are required to evaluate the environmental impacts of their actions under\nthe National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).2 NEPA and the Council on\nEnvironmental Quality’s (CEQ) implementing regulations3 establish policies and\nprocedures that ensure environmental information is available to decision makers,\nregulatory agencies, and the public before Federal actions are implemented. This EA\nfollows the procedures established by the United States Department of Transportation\n(DOT)4 to implement NEPA, pursuant to the CEQ regulations.\nThe Federal pipeline safety regulations (1) assure safety in design, construction,\ninspection, testing, operation, and maintenance of pipeline facilities and in the siting,\nconstruction, operation, and maintenance of LNG facilities; (2) set out parameters for\nadministering the pipeline safety program; and (3) delineate requirements for onshore oil\npipeline response plans.\nPHMSA is proposing changes to the regulations covering the safety of hazardous liquid\nonshore pipelines. These changes follow from an Advance Notice of Proposed\nRulemaking (ANPRM) published on October 18, 2010 (75 FR 63774). Through the\nnotice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) is proposing\nto make certain changes to the hazardous liquid pipeline safety regulations.\nAs written in the NPRM, the changes include (1) extending the reporting requirements to\nall gravity lines; (2) extending the reporting requirements to all gathering lines; (3)\nrequiring inspections of pipelines in areas affected by extreme weather, man-made and\nnatural disasters, and other similar events; (4) requiring periodic assessments of pipelines\nthat are not already covered under the integrity management program requirements; (5)\nrequiring leak detection systems on pipelines in all locations; (6) modifying the\n1 Hearing on “Pipeline Safety: Public Awareness and Education”\nhttp://cooperativeplan.slco.org/pdf/Projects/Pipelines/PipelineAwarenessHea.pdf.\n2 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.\n3 40 C.F.R. § 1500 et seq.\n4 DOT Order 5610.1C, Procedures for Considering Environmental Impacts, 9/18/79, as amended 7/13/82,\n7/30/85.\n3\n\n<<<PAGE 5>>>\n\nprovisions for performing pipeline repairs; (7) requiring that all pipelines subject to the\nintegrity management requirements be capable of accommodating inline inspection tools\nwithin 20 years, unless the basic construction of a pipeline cannot be modified to permit\nthat accommodation; and (8) clarifying other requirements.\n1.2 BACKGROUND\nPHMSA is responsible for regulating the safety of hazardous liquid pipelines located\nthroughout the United States, which traverse of variety of environments – from highly\npopulated urban sites to remote, unpopulated rural areas.\nThe physical environment potentially affected by the proposed rule includes the airspace,\nwater resources (e.g., oceans, streams, lakes), cultural and historical resources (e.g.,\nproperties listed on the National Register of Historic Places), biological and ecological\nresources (e.g., coastal zones, wetlands, plant and animal species and their habitat,\nforests, grasslands, offshore marine ecosystems), and special ecological resources (e.g.,\nthreatened and endangered plant and animal species and their habitat, national and state\nparklands, biological reserves, Wild and Scenic Rivers) that exist directly adjacent to and\nwithin the vicinity of pipelines.\nPHMSA’s mission is “to protect people and the environment from the risks inherent in\ntransportation of hazardous materials – by pipeline and other modes of transportation.”\nPHMSA is committed to reducing the risk of harm to people and the environment\nresulting from the transportation of hazardous materials by pipelines.\nPipeline accidents can impact surrounding populations, property, and the environment,\nand may result in injuries or fatalities as well as property and environmental damage. One\nof the major ways PHMSA’s strategic plan includes the following goals:\nReduce the risk of harm to people due to the transportation of hazardous materials by\npipeline and other modes. Pipeline accidents, depending on their mode and severity, can\ncause many health hazards, including toxicity, dizziness, asphyxiation, irritation or burns.\nPipeline accidents not only have a negative impact on the environment and the economy\nbut can also affect health and wellbeing.\nReduce the risk of harm to the environment due to the transportation of oil and\nhazardous materials by pipeline and other modes. Ground and waterway releases can\ncause environmental damage, impact wildlife, or contaminate drinking water supplies.\nSince some petroleum product vapors are heavier than air, they can spread, creating a\nvapor explosion. Releases can affect ground and waterway contamination. Oil spills that\nspread over the permeable ground may require clean-up. Since oil products are lighter\nthan water, spills that impact waterways can travel through or close to populated areas\nthrough storm drains, creating a pathway for flammable or combustible liquids as well as\n4\n\n<<<PAGE 6>>>\n\nthe resulting vapors to travel. The spread can be undetectable from the surface. Also,\nrunoff may cause pollution.\nHelp maintain and improve the reliability of systems that deliver energy products and\nother hazardous materials in a way that increases safety and minimizes the effect of\ndisruptions. Accidents have the potential to increase the demand for community\nresources. There is typically an increased demand for assistance from first responders\nand firefighters to control fires, and police and other law enforcement personnel to\ncontrol traffic and assist in possible evacuations. These releases may also prompt\ndemand for services from engineers or other public workers to deal with utility and\ninfrastructure problems. Releases can cause business interruptions or loss of fuel supplies\nsuch as natural gas, gasoline, and home heating oil. Although the potential for releases to\ncause displacement of populations near or around fires or explosions is remote, these\nreleases could cause the need for permanent or temporary shelter, putting more strain on\ncommunity resources. Combined effects on businesses, transportation, and other\neconomic resources can exacerbate response and recovery issues.\n1.3 PURPOSE AND NEED\nThe statement of purpose and need defines the need for PHMSA action, not just for the\nproposed action. The statement is an explanation of why agency action is needed or\nproposed, and reflects the goals to be achieved.\nCongress established the current framework for regulating the safety of hazardous liquid\npipelines in the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act (HLPSA) of 1979 (P.L. 96-129).\nLike its predecessor, the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 (P.L. 90-481), the\nHLPSA provided the Secretary of Transportation (Secretary) with the authority to\nprescribe minimum Federal safety standards for hazardous liquid pipeline facilities. That\nauthority, as amended in subsequent reauthorizations, is currently codified in the Pipeline\nSafety Laws (49 U.S.C. §§ 60101 et seq.).\nPHMSA has issued a set of comprehensive safety standards for the design, construction,\ntesting, operation, and maintenance of hazardous liquid pipelines. Those standards are\ncodified in the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Regulations (49 C.F.R. Part 195).\nPart 195 applies broadly to the transportation of hazardous liquids or carbon dioxide by\npipeline, including on the Outer Continental Shelf, with certain exceptions as required by\nstatute or for reasons of policy. Performance-based safety standards are generally\nfavored (i.e., a particular objective is specified, but the method of achieving that objective\nis not). Risk management principles play a critical role in the Pipeline Integrity\nManagement requirements for high consequence areas.\nCongress recently enacted the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation\nAct of 2011 (P.L. 112-90). That legislation included several provisions that are relevant\nto the regulation of hazardous liquid pipelines. A comprehensive analysis of the effect of\nthose provisions on this proceeding is provided below.\n5\n\n<<<PAGE 7>>>\n\nPHMSA chose the proposed actions among many alternatives considered. The actions\nrepresent PHMSA’s preferred alternatives. The actions are expected to enhance\nPHMSA’s ability to:\n Understand, measure, and assess the performance of individual operators and the\nindustry as a whole.\n Integrate pipeline safety data in a way that will allow a more thorough, rigorous,\nand comprehensive understanding and assessment of risk.\n Improve the data and analyses PHMSA relies on to make critical, safety-related\ndecisions and improve PHMSA decision-making.\n Facilitate PHMSA’s allocation of inspection and other resources based on a more\naccurate accounting of risk.\n Reduce the time PHMSA spends on gathering data from multiple sources to carry\nout pipeline oversight responsibilities.\nSee section 1.5 Alternatives for a more detailed discussion of the purpose and need of\neach facet of the NPRM.\n1.4 Public Involvement\nPublic involvement is a critical aspect of the NEPA process. As such, PHMSA must\nconsider any comments received from the public and any comments and\nrecommendations of the Technical Pipeline Safety Standards Committee and other\nrelevant stakeholders. PHMSA has already solicited public comments on the ANPRM5\n.\nThe notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) will be published.\n6 PHMSA will again\nrequest public comments on the proposed rulemaking. The public will also have the\nopportunity to comment on this Draft EA before the Final EA is published.\n7\nIn regard to regulatory development, OPS works with statutorily mandated advisory\ncommittees who provide peer reviews of all proposed pipeline safety rules to assure\ntechnical feasibility, reasonableness, cost-effectiveness and practicability. In addition to\nthe issuance of pipeline safety regulations, OPS monitors compliance via inspections and\nworks with stakeholders to address current and potential pipeline safety issues. OPS also\nissues advisory bulletins, safety alerts, special permits, and interpretations letters on a\nwide range of pipeline safety areas. Advisory bulletins are used to inform affected\npipeline operators and Federal and state pipeline safety personnel of matters that have the\npotential of becoming safety or environmental risks.\n8 PHMSA has two pipeline safety\nstandards advisory committees that are mandated by legislation. The Natural Gas Pipeline\nSafety Act of 1968 established the Technical Pipeline Safety Standards Committee\n5 The ANPRM may be viewed at http://www.regulations.gov by searching for Docket ID PHMSA-2010-\n0229.\n6 The NPRM may be viewed at http://www.regulations.gov by searching for Docket ID PHMSA-2010-\n0229.\n7 The EA may be viewed at http://www.regulations.gov by searching for Docket ID PHMSA-2010-0229.\n8 http://opsweb.phmsa.dot.gov/pipelineforum/dot-action/regulatory-guidance/.\n6\n\n<<<PAGE 8>>>\n\n(TPSSC), and the Hazardous Liquid Safety Act of 1979 established the Technical\nHazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Standards Committee (THLPSSC). The TPSSC and\nTHLPSSC review PHMSA’s proposed regulatory initiatives to assure the technical\nfeasibility, reasonableness, cost-effectiveness and practicability of each proposal. The\ncommittees also evaluate the cost-benefit analysis and risk assessment information of the\nproposals. Each committee has 15 members with equal representation from government,\nindustry, and the public. Proceedings are published accessible on the PHMSA Web 9\n1.5 ALTERNATIVES\nFollowing is an area by area listing of the proposed actions.\nRequirement Area #1 - Extend Reporting Requirements to Gravity\nLines\nThe Target Problem, Need and Purpose of the Proposed Action\nPHMSA’s preferred alternative is the requirement to modify § 195.48, the scope\nstatement for Subpart B, Annual, Accident, and Safety-Related Condition Reporting, to\nacquire the desired data.10 The proposed revision states that Subpart B applies to all\npipelines subject to Part 195 and to pipelines excepted from regulation under specific\nparagraphs of § 195.1(b). PHMSA is proposing no change to its exercise of jurisdiction\nrelative to these pipelines at this time other than for reporting purposes.\nThe need for PHMSA’s action is based on the newly enacted Pipeline Safety, Regulatory\nCertainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-90). That legislation included several\nprovisions that are relevant to the regulation of hazardous liquid pipelines that have had\nquestions about the safety of hazardous liquid gathering lines. PHMSA requires\nadditional information to address these concerns.\nPurpose: Assist in determining whether the existing Federal and State regulations for\nthese lines are adequate.\n9 http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/regs/technical-advisory-comm/TPSSC.\n10The desired data is described on the PHMSA forms. The relevant forms can be viewed\non the Web at http://phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/library/forms.\n7\n\n<<<PAGE 9>>>\n\nAlternatives Considered and Rejected\nAlternative 1: No Action\nShould PHMSA not extend the reporting requirements to gravity lines, the unknown risks\nof accidental release and the subsequent damages will remain a mystery. The “No\nAction” alternative is used as a base-line comparison of environmental impacts if no\naction is taken by the Agency.\nAlternative 2: Subject to Regulation Only Gravity Flow Pipelines Carrying Ethanol\nCommenters that stated that the current exception for gravity flow pipelines is\nappropriate but expressed the view that the exception should not apply to pipelines that\ntransport ethanol. This alternative was rejected because releases of all hazardous liquid\nproducts carried by gravity lines pose a threat to the physical environment.\nRequirement Area # 2. Extend Reporting Requirements to All\nHazardous Liquid Gathering Lines\nThe Target Problem, Need and Purpose of the Proposed Action\nPHMSA’s preferred alternative is the requirement to modify § 195.48, the scope\nstatement for Subpart B, Annual, Accident, and Safety-Related Condition Reporting, to\nacquire the desired data.11 The proposed revision states that Subpart B applies to all\npipelines subject to Part 195 and to pipelines excepted from regulation under specific\nparagraphs of § 195.1(b). PHMSA is proposing no change to its exercise of jurisdiction\nrelative to these pipelines at this time other than for reporting purposes.\nThe need for PHMSA’s action is based on the newly enacted Pipeline Safety, Regulatory\nCertainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-90). That legislation included several\nprovisions that are relevant to the regulation of hazardous liquid pipelines that have had\nquestions about the safety of hazardous liquid gathering lines. PHMSA requires\nadditional information to address these concerns.\nPurpose: Assist in determining whether the existing Federal and State regulations for\nthese lines are adequate.\nAlternatives Considered and Rejected\n11The desired data is described on the PHMSA forms. The relevant forms can be viewed\non the Web at http://phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/library/forms.\n8\n\n<<<PAGE 10>>>\n\nAlternative 1: No Action.\nUnder this option, PHMSA would maintain existing requirements for reporting by taking\nno action. However, PHMSA believes this would not effectively support PHMSA’s\nsafety mission.\nBy not taking action, the Agency would be unresponsive to mandates imposed by\nCongress, and there would likely be inefficiencies and gaps identified in the NPRM that\nwould continue to exist. Although taking no action would eliminate additional\ncompliance costs, there would be no benefits ensuing from the proposal.\nAlternative 2: Require different reporting requirements for some operators.\nPHMSA can establish different requirements for large and small operators affected by the\nproposed rule, basing the requirements on estimated differences in expected costs and\nbenefits. PHMSA is aware that some regulations, rules, and government policies place a\ndisproportionate burden on small firms. Consequently, to promote entrepreneurship,\ngovernment agencies have sometimes granted small businesses preferential regulatory\ntreatment, such as exemptions from legislation and regulations or extended deadlines for\ncompliance.\nPHMSA judged that these considerations were not sufficient to recommend reporting\nrequirements based on business size. This option was not chosen because PHMSA\nconcluded that allowing disparate reporting would not meet its informational needs by\nleaving a significant number of operators outside the reporting requirements. The\nAgency believes reporting must provide relevant information that is useful for the\ndecision-making needs of groups for whom the information is provided. PHMSA\ndetermined, therefore, that not requiring the smaller operators to report would dampen the\nregulation’s effectiveness and that special regulatory treatment would not, in fact, help\nsmall businesses. PHMSA believes that although there may be a learning curve for small\nentities, with practice and guidance—which PHMSA is willing to provide—small\noperators will learn how to comply with the reporting requirements.\nRequirement Area #3. Require Inspections of Pipelines in Areas\nAffected by Extreme Weather, Man-made or Natural Disasters and\nOther Similar Events\nThe Target Problem, Need and Purpose of the Proposed Action\nPHMSA’s preferred alternative is the requirement to add a new section, § 195.414,\nwhich will require operators to: (1) Inspect a pipeline in an area affected by extreme\nweather, a man-made or natural disaster, or other similar event to ensure that no\nconditions exist which could adversely affect the safe operation of that pipeline; (2)\nConsider the nature of the event and the physical characteristics, operating conditions,\n9\n\n<<<PAGE 11>>>\n\nlocation, and prior history of the affected pipeline in determining the appropriate method\nfor performing the inspection; (3) Perform the inspection within 72 hours after the\ncessation of the event, or as soon as the affected area can be safely accessed; and (4) Take\nappropriate remedial action to ensure the safe operation of a pipeline based on the\ninformation obtained as a result of performing the inspection.\nThe need for PHMSA’s action is based on the fact that natural disasters such as storms,\nearthquakes, floods, can damage or disrupt pipeline operations and cause fuel shortages\nand rising prices. Natural disasters on energy systems can have extensive ramifications\nfor infrastructure development, the economy, public health, general quality of life, and\neven peaceful coexistence of communities, regions, and countries.\nPurpose: Ensure that pipelines are still capable of being safely operated after these\nevents.\nAlternatives Considered and Rejected\nAlternative 1: No Action\nUnder this option, PHMSA would maintain existing requirements for reporting by taking\nno action. However, PHMSA believes this would not effectively support PHMSA’s\nsafety mission.\nBy not taking action, there would likely be inefficiencies and gaps in pipeline safety.\nRequirement Area # 4. Require Periodic Assessments of Pipelines\nNot Already Covered Under the IM Program\nThe Target Problem, Need, and Purpose of the proposed action\nPHMSA preferred alternative is the requirement to adopt a provision that would require\noperators to perform periodic assessments of hazardous liquid pipelines which are not\nalready covered under the IM program requirements. Specifically, the proposed §\n195.416 would require operators to assess non-IM pipelines with an inline inspection\n(ILI) tool at least once every 10 years. Other assessment methods could be used if an\noperator provides OPS with prior written notice that a pipeline is not capable of\naccommodating an ILI tool, and that the use of an alternative technology would provide a\nsubstantially equivalent understanding of its condition in light of the threats which could\naffect its safe operation. Such alternative technologies would include hydrostatic\npressure testing or appropriate forms of direct assessment.\nThe individuals who review the results of these periodic assessments would be subject to\nthe operator qualification requirements in Subpart G of Part 195 and would need to\nconsider any uncertainty in the results obtained, including ILI tool tolerance, in\ndetermining whether any conditions could adversely affect the safe operation of a\npipeline. Such determinations would have to be made promptly, but no later than 180\n10\n\n<<<PAGE 12>>>\n\ndays after an inspection, unless operator demonstrates that the 180-day deadline is\nimpracticable.\nOperators would be required to comply with the other provisions in Part 195 in\nimplementing the requirements in § 195.416. That includes having appropriate\nprovisions for performing these periodic assessments and any resulting repairs in an\noperator’s procedural manual (see § 195.402), adhering to the recordkeeping provisions\nfor inspections, test, and repairs (see§ 195.404), and taking appropriate remedial action\nunder § 195.422, as discussed below. Section 195.11 would also be amended to subject\nregulated onshore gathering lines to the periodic assessment requirement.\nPHMSA is also proposing to modify the IM pipeline repair criteria and apply the criteria\nto non- IM pipeline repairs. Specifically, the criteria in § 195.452(h) for IM repairs\nwould be modified to:\n Categorize bottom-side dents with stress risers as immediate repair conditions;\n Require immediate repairs whenever the calculated burst pressure is less than 1.1\ntimes maximum operating pressure;\n Eliminate the 60-day and 180-day repair categories; and\n Establish a new, consolidated 270-day repair category.\nPHMSA is also proposing to amend the requirements in § 195.422 for performing non-\nIM repairs by applying the criteria in the immediate repair category in § 195.452(h) and\nestablishing an 18-month repair category for hazardous liquid pipelines which are not\nsubject to the IM requirements. The existing requirements in § 195.422 would also be\nmodified to include a general requirement for performing all other repairs within a\nreasonable time. A proposed amendment to § 195.11 would extend these new pipeline\nremediation requirements to regulated onshore gathering lines.\nThe need for PHMSA’s action is based on the fact that this requirement will ensure that\npipeline operators obtain the information necessary for the prompt detection and\nremediation of corrosion and other deformation anomalies (e.g., dents, gouges, and\ngrooves) in all locations, not just in areas which could affect HCAs. PHMSA believes\nthat these changes will ensure that immediate action is taken to remediate anomalies that\npresent an imminent threat to the integrity of hazardous liquid pipelines in all locations.\nMoreover, many anomalies which would not qualify as immediate repairs under the\ncurrent criteria will meet that requirement as a result of the additional conservatism that\nwill be incorporated into the burst pressure calculations. The new timeframes for\nperforming non-immediate repairs will also allow operators to remediate those conditions\nin a timely manner while allocating resources to those areas which present a higher risk\nof harm to the public, property, and the environment.\nPHMSA’s IM inspection experience (since 2002) has identified that some operators were\nnot considering explicitly the accuracy of tools when evaluating the results of\nassessments conducted using these tools. As a result, random variation within recorded\ndata led to both overcalls (i.e., an anomaly was identified to be more severe than it\nactually was) and under-calls. Overcalls are conservative, resulting in repair of some\n11\n\n<<<PAGE 13>>>\n\nanomalies that might not actually meet repair criteria. Under-calls, however, are non-\nconservative, since they could result in anomalies exceeding specified repair criteria\ngoing unremediated. The inline inspection tools provide superior information about the\ncondition of a pipeline, and mandating their broader use will improve the detection of\nanomalies and prevent or mitigate future accidents. Explicitly considering the accuracy\nof the ILI tool tends to reduce the number of overcalls. PHMSA has concluded, based on\nits experience inspecting operator IM program implementation, that the repair criteria\nchanges in this proposal would be acceptable, provided that all operators explicitly\nconsider the accuracy of the ILI tools that they use. PHMSA believes that the proposed\nmeasures will assure that anomalies requiring repair are identified regardless of whether\nthey are within or outside of segments that could affect HCAs.\nPurpose: Provide critical information about the condition of these pipelines, including the\nexistence of internal and external corrosion and deformation anomalies.\nAlternatives Considered and Rejected\nAlternative 1: No Action\nIf there are no changes to the current practices related to assessments made by ILI, the\nunreliable information due to inaccurate tools and the inefficiencies which result from\nunder-calls and overcalls will continue. Unintended and untimely repairs will be made,\nwhile undetected pipeline anomalies that could lead to costly releases of hazardous\nliquids are not repaired. The No-Action alternative would not benefit or enhance the\nenvironment since fewer anomalies may be detected and repaired in a timely manner.\nHistorically, more anomalies leading to repairs have occurred outside of segments that\ncould affect HCAs. Therefore, PHMSA rejected the No Action alternative for the\nproposal that operators who select ILI as the method for performing IM assessments be\nprecluded from limiting data collection to covered segments.\nAlternative2: Create a “Monitored” Category\nThis alternative would include the creation of a scheduled and monitored classification of\nanomalies (in line with rules for the gas industry in 49 CFR Part 192), as well as the\ncreation of a 365-day repair category. Anomalies currently part of the 60-day and 180-\nday classifications would be reorganized into the abovementioned categories (immediate,\n365-day, scheduled, and monitored), thus eliminating the 60-day and 180-day repair\ncategories. PHMSA states that this alternative is not needed because the rule addresses\nconditions which would be covered in a “monitored” category and instead is proposing\nthat all of the current 180-day criteria become 365-day criteria.\n12\n\n<<<PAGE 14>>>\n\nRequirement Area #5. Require Leak Detection Systems on Hazardous\nLiquid Pipelines in All Locations\nThe Target Problem, Need and Purpose of the Proposed Action\nPHMSA’s preferred alternative is the requirement to amend § 195.134 to require that all\nnew hazardous liquid pipelines be designed to include leak detection systems. PHMSA is\nalso proposing to amend § 195.444 to require that operators have a means for detecting\nleaks on all portions of a hazardous liquid pipeline system, and to require that an\nevaluation be performed to determine what kinds of systems must be installed to\nadequately protect the public, property, and the environment. The factors that must be\nconsidered in performing that evaluation would include the characteristics and history of\nthe affected pipeline, the capabilities of the available leak detection systems, and the\nlocation of emergency response personnel. A proposed amendment to § 195.11 would\nextend these new leak detection requirements to regulated onshore gathering lines.\nThe need for PHMSA’s action is is based on the recent pipeline accident in Marshall,\nMichigan which demonstrates the importance of having a means for promptly detecting\nleaks in all locations. The preliminary findings from that accident indicate that the\noperator failed to detect the rupture in its pipeline for nearly 18 hours, resulting in the\nrelease of approximately 819,000 gallons of crude oil into the Talmadge Creek and\nKalamazoo River.12 Other recent pipeline accidents, including a pair of related failures\nthat occurred in 2010 on a crude oil pipeline in Salt Lake City, Utah, further corroborate\nthe significance of having an adequate means for identifying leaks in all locations.\nThese changes will ensure that immediate action is taken to remediate anomalies that\npresent an imminent threat to the integrity of hazardous liquid pipelines in all locations.\nMany anomalies that would not qualify as immediate repairs under the current criteria\nwill meet that requirement as a result of the additional conservatism that will be\nincorporated into the burst pressure calculations. The new timeframes for performing\nother repairs will allow operators to remediate those conditions in a timely manner while\nallocating resources to those areas that present a higher risk of harm to the public,\nproperty, and the environment.\nPurpose: Help to mitigate the effects of hazardous liquid pipelines failures that occur\noutside of HCAs.\nAlternatives Considered and Rejected\nAlternative 1: No Action\nUnder this option, PHMSA’s safety mission would be compromised. By not taking\naction on leak detection, the Agency would be unresponsive, and there would likely be\n12 http://phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/enbridge (last accessed January 13, 2012).\n13\n\n<<<PAGE 15>>>\n\ninefficiencies and gaps in pipeline safetyInefficiencies and compromised safety would\nnot benefit the public or the environment.\nAlternative 2: Change Criteria for Identifying HCAs\nPHMSA considered proposing to make changes to the criteria for identifying HCAs, but\nchanging or broadening the existing Census-based approach for determining high\npopulation and other populated areas is not currently justified. The existing approach\nensures uniformity and provides an adequate margin of safety by including some less\ndensely populated areas. PHMSA recognizes that other areas of ecological, cultural, or\nnational significance could be designated as PHMSA notes that the new safety standards\nthat are being proposed for hazardous liquid pipelines are not located in an HCA, such as\nproposing to adopt other regulations that require inspections of pipelines in areas affected\nby extreme weather, natural disasters, provides an adequate margin of safety. Also, most\nsurface waters are already covered under the present criteria\nRequirement Area # 6. Modify the Provisions of Making Pipeline\nRepairs\nThe Target Problem, Need, and Purpose of the Proposed Action\nPHMSA’s preferred alternative is to make certain modifications to the IM repair criteria\nand to establish similar repair criteria for pipeline segments that are not located in HCAs.\nSpecifically, under the current proposal, the repair criteria in § 195.452(h) would be\namended to:\n Categorize bottom-side dents with stress risers as immediate repair conditions;\n Require immediate repairs whenever the calculated burst pressure is less than 1.1\ntimes maximum operating pressure (MOP);\n Eliminate the 60-day and 180-day repair categories; and\nEstablish a new, consolidated 270-day repair category.\nPHMSA is also proposing to adopt new requirements in § 195.416 that would:\n Apply the criteria in the immediate repair category in § 195.452(h) to pipelines\nthat are not subject to the integrity management requirements; and\n Establish an 18-month repair category for hazardous liquid pipelines that are not\nsubject to the integrity management requirements.\nThe need for PHMSA’s action is based on the need to ensure that immediate action is\ntaken to remediate anomalies that present an imminent threat to the integrity of hazardous\nliquid pipelines and environment.\nIf adopted as proposed, these changes will ensure the prompt remediation of anomalous\nconditions on all hazardous liquid pipeline segments, while allowing operators to allocate\ntheir resources to those areas that present a higher risk of harm to the public, property,\nand the environment.\n14\n\n<<<PAGE 16>>>\n\nPurpose: To facilitate timely repairs which will mitigate the likelihood of environmental\ndamage and the disruption of supply to the public. Also, to improve the condition of\nhazardous liquid pipelines.Alternatives Considered and Rejected\nAlternative 1: No Action\nUnder this option, PHMSA’s safety mission would be compromised. By not action on\nmodifying pipeline repair provisions, there would likely be inefficiencies and gaps in\npipeline safety. Repairing pipelines in a timely manner is likely to reduce the risk to the\nenvironment and public.\nRequirement Area # 7. Require All Pipelines Subject to the IM\nProgram be Capable of Accommodating Inline Inspection Tools\nThe Target Problem, Need, and Purpose of the Proposed Action\nPHMSA’s preferred alternative is the requirement to require that all hazardous liquid\npipelines in areas that could affect an HCA be made capable of accommodating ILI tools\nwithin 20 years, unless the basic construction of a pipeline will not accommodate the\npassage of such a device.\nPHMSA is proposing to establish a new provision in § 195.452(n) which would require\nall pipelines in areas which could affect an HCA be made capable of accommodating ILI\ntools within 20 years.\nThe need for PHMSA’s action is based on the ability of operators to use inline inspection\ntools in performing integrity assessments. This will enhance public safety and protect\nthe environment, because modern ILI tools : (1) provide a relatively complete\nexamination of the entire length of a pipeline, including information about threats that\ncannot always be identified using other assessment methods; and (2) superior\ninformation about incipient flaws (i.e., flaws that are not yet a threat to pipeline integrity,\nbut that could become so in the future), thereby allowing these conditions to be\nmonitored over consecutive inspections and remediated before a pipeline failure occurs.\nPurpose: Broadening the use of ILI tools will improve the detection of anomalies and\nprevent or mitigate future accidents in high-risk areas.\nAlternatives Considered and Rejected\nAlternative 1: No Action\nIf there are no changes to the current practices related to assessments, There will be gaps\nin basic knowledge about the condition of any given pipeline not subject to assessments.\nThe risk from spills will not be curtailed or improved, and pipeline operator will not take\n15\n\n<<<PAGE 17>>>\n\nadvantage of the latest technology available to them to help protect the public and the\nenvironment.\nHistorically, more anomalies leading to repairs have occurred outside of segments that\ncould affect HCAs. Therefore, PHMSA rejected the No Action alternative for the\nproposal that operators who select ILI as the method for performing IM assessments be\nprecluded from limiting data collection to covered segments.\nAlternative 2: Require that all Pipelines be Capable of ","truncated":true,"body_characters":64649}