NTSB Safety Recommendation P-00-020

NTSB safety recommendation P-00-020.

THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT RSPA: INFORM NATURAL GAS PIPELINE OPERATORS OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE 1/22/99, ACCIDENT IN BRIDGEPORT, AL. FURTHER, ADVISE OPERATORS TO REVIEW THEIR EMERGENCY PLANS AND PROCEDURES FOR RESPONDING TO GAS PIPELINE EMERGENCIES AND MODIFY THEM AS NECESSARY. THE REVIEW SHOULD DETERMINE WHETHER THE PROCEDURES PROMPT THE APPROPRIATE ACTIONS FOR GAS LEAKS CAUSED BY EXCAVATION DAMAGE NEAR BUILDINGS AND WHETHER THE PROCEDURES ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE POSSIBILITY OF MULTIPLE LEAKS AND THE UNDERGROUND MIGRATION OF GAS INTO NEARBY BUILDINGS.

Priority: CLASS II

Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action

Issued Date: 2000-12-15

Adopted Date: 2000-12-07

Overall Date Closed: 2002-06-28

Synopsis: ON 1/22/99, WHILE DIGGING A TRENCH BEHIND A BUILDING AT 406 ALABAMA AVENUE, A BACKHOE OPERATOR DAMAGED A 3/4-INCH STEEL NATURAL GAS SERVICE LINE AND 1-INCH WATER SERVICE LINE, BOTH OF WHICH WERE UNDERGROUND. THIS RESULTED IN TWO LEAKS IN THE NATURAL GAS SERVICE LINE, WHICH WAS OPERATED AT 35 PSIG. ONE LEAK OCCURRED WHERE THE BACKHOE BUCKET HAD CONTACTED AND PULLED THE NATURAL GAS SERVICE LINE. THE OTHER WAS A PHYSICAL SEPARATION OF THE GAS SERVICE LINE AT AN UNDERGROUND JOINT NEAR THE METER, WHICH WAS CLOSE TO THE BUILDING. GAS MIGRATED INTO THE BUILDING AT 406 ALABAMA AVENUE, WHERE IT IGNITED ABOUT 10:02 A.M. AN EXPLOSION FOLLOWED, DESTROYING THREE BUILDINGS: 404, 406, AND 408 ALABAMB AVENUE. OTHER BUILDINGS WITHIN A TWO-BLOCK AREA OF THE EXPLOSION WERE SIGNIFICANTLY DAMAGED. THREE FATALITIES, FIVE SERIOUS INJURIES, AND ONE MINOR INJURY RESULTED FROM THIS ACCIDENT. THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD DETERMINED THAT THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT WAS THE FAILURE OF R&B CONSTRUCTION (R&B) TO ESTABLISH AND FOLLOW SAFE PROCEDURES FOR EXCAVATION ACTIVITIES, RESULTING IN DAMAGE TO A 3/4-INCH GAS SERVICE LINE, AND THE FAILURE OF THE UTILITIES BOARD OF THE CITY OF BRIDGEPORT (UTILITIES BOARD) TO PROVIDE APPROPRIATE EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO THE SUBSEQUENT NATURAL GAS LEAK.

Probable Cause: The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the probable cause of the accident was the failure of R&B Construction (R&B) to establish and follow safe procedures for excavation activities, resulting in damage to a 3/4-inch gas service line, and the failure of the Utilities Board of the City of Bridgeport (Utilities Board) to provide appropriate emergency response to the subsequent natural gas leak.

Ntsbnumber: DCA99MP004

Report Number: PAB-00-01

Addressee Name: RSPA

Addressee Status: Closed - Acceptable Action

Addressee Date Closed: 2002-06-28

Addressee Acronym: RSPA

Addressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government

Communication Date: 2002-06-28

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: RSPA has advised the Safety Board that it issued an advisory bulletin, Emergency Plans and Procedures for Responding to Multiple Gas Leaks and Migration of Gas into Buildings (66 Federal Register 28027), to ensure that all gas pipeline operators are aware of the cause of the accident in Bridgeport, Alabama. Further, the advisory bulletin states that owners and operators should review their emergency response plans and procedures to determine whether the procedures prompt the appropriate actions for gas leaks caused by excavation damage near buildings, and whether the procedures adequately address the possibility of multiple leaks and the underground migration of gas into nearby buildings. The issuance of this advisory bulletin fully addresses this recommendation. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation P-00-20 is classified "Closed--Acceptable Action."

Addressee Acronym: RSPA

Addressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government

Communication Date: 2001-07-06

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: The Safety Board understands that RSPA plans to issue an Advisory Bulletin to ensure that all gas pipeline operators are aware of the cause of the accident in Bridgeport, Alabama, reminding operators of the need to periodically review and amend their emergency response manuals as required by the gas pipeline safety regulations at Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations Part 192.605. Accordingly, pending receipt of further information from RSPA on the completion of this effort, Safety Recommendation P-00-20 is classified "Open-Acceptable Response."

Addressee Acronym: RSPA

Addressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government

Communication Date: 2002-04-17

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: Letter Mail Controlled 04/30/2002 7:02:52 PM MC# 2020436 RSPA issued an Advisory Bulletin, "Emergency Plans and Procedures for Responding to Multiple Gas Leaks and Migration of Gas into Buildings," (66 FR 28027) to ensure that all gas pipeline operators are aware of the cause of the accident in Bridgeport, Alabama. The Advisory Bulletin, issued to owners and operators of gas pipeline distribution systems, states that they should review their emergency response plans and procedures to determine whether the procedures prompt the appropriate actions for gas leaks caused by excavation damage near buildings, and whether the procedures adequately address the possibility of multiple leaks and the underground migration of gas into nearby buildings. A copy of the Advisory Bulletin is enclosed for your information.

Addressee Acronym: RSPA

Addressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government

Communication Date: 2001-04-12

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: Letter Mail Controlled 04/23/2001 2:57:19 PM MC# 2010341 RSPA plans to issue an Advisory Bulletin to ensure that all gas pipeline operators are aware of the cause of the accident in Bridgeport, Alabama. This Advisory Bulletin will remind operators of the need to periodically review and amend their emergency response manuals as required by the gas pipeline safety regulations at 49 CFR 192.605. In addition, it will emphasize to operators that their plans must include provisions for promptly responding to leaks caused by excavation damage, evaluating the possibility of multiple leaks, and determining whether gas is migrating into nearby buildings. An operator's emergency plan must also specify actions to be taken to prevent accidental ignition and to evacuate threatened buildings to protect life and property. The Advisory Bulletin will be published in the Federal Register, mailed to all gas operators, and placed on the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) web site.