NTSB Safety Recommendation P-11-006

NTSB safety recommendation P-11-006.

TO THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION: Conduct an audit of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s state pipeline safety program certification program to assess and ensure state pipeline safety programs and Federal pipeline safety grants are used effectively to conduct oversight of intrastate pipeline operations, including an evaluation of state inspection and enforcement activities.

Priority: CLASS II

Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action

Issued Date: 2011-09-26

Adopted Date: 2011-09-12

Overall Date Closed: 2014-07-29

Synopsis: On September 9, 2010, about 6:11 p.m. Pacific daylight time,1 a 30-inch-diameter underground natural gas transmission pipeline (which is identified by the company as Line 132), owned and operated by Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E), ruptured in a residential area in San Bruno, California. The accident killed eight people, injured many more, and caused substantial property damage. The rupture on Line 132 occurred near mile point 39.28, at the intersection of Earl Avenue and Glenview Drive in San Bruno. About 47.6 million standard cubic feet of natural gas were released as a result of the rupture. The released natural gas was ignited after the rupture; the subsequent explosion created a crater about 72 feet long by 26 feet wide, and the resulting fire destroyed 38 homes and damaged 70. A ruptured pipe segment about 28 feet long was found about 100 feet away from the crater.

Probable Cause: The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the Pacific Gas and Electric Company's (PG&E) (1) inadequate quality assurance and quality control in 1956 during its Line 132 relocation project, which allowed the installation of a substandard and poorly welded pipe section with a visible seam weld flaw that, over time grew to a critical size, causing the pipeline to rupture during a pressure increase stemming from poorly planned electrical work at the Milpitas Terminal; and (2) inadequate pipeline integrity management program, which failed to detect and repair or remove the defective pipe section.

Ntsbnumber: DCA10MP008

Report Number: PAR-11-01

Addressee Name: DOT

Addressee Status: Closed - Acceptable Action

Addressee Date Closed: 2014-07-29

Addressee Acronym: DOT

Addressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government

Communication Date: 2013-09-30

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: This letter concerns 22 open safety recommendations that the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) issued to the US Department of Transportation (USDOT) between 1997 and 2013. Enclosure 1 is a list of these recommendations; Enclosure 2 is a copy of the correspondence history regarding them. The NTSB is currently reviewing a July 24, 2013, update from the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration regarding Safety Recommendations I-02-1 and -2, which will be addressed in separate correspondence. We recently corresponded with the Federal Aviation Administration regarding Safety Recommendation A-06-43; Enclosure 3 provides a more detailed history of correspondence regarding this recommendation. The NTSB is interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. We are concerned because we have not received updates regarding action either taken or planned to address the remaining 19 open recommendations for some time—in some cases, over 10 years. We would like to point out that, when we issue a safety recommendation directly to the USDOT rather than to an individual modal agency, we do so because the scope of the recommendation falls outside the authority of the modal agency, or for some other specific reason. Failure to address these important safety issues places the public at risk.

Addressee Acronym: DOT

Addressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government

Communication Date: 2012-01-31

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: The NTSB notes that the DOT will conduct an audit of the effectiveness of PHMSA’s oversight of performance-based pipeline safety programs to address Safety Recommendation P-11-4 and will review its enforcement policies and procedures as recommended in Safety Recommendation P-11-5. We also note that, to address Safety Recommendation P-11-6, the DOT Inspector General has been scheduled to audit PHMSA’s State pipeline safety certification program. In addition, the PHMSA Administrator has been directed to ensure that the certification program is amended, as appropriate, to comply with the findings of the audit. Pending completion of these efforts, Safety Recommendations P-11-4 through -7 are classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

Addressee Acronym: DOT

Addressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government

Communication Date: 2014-07-29

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: We have reviewed the audit report that the Office of Inspector General issued on May 7, 2014, PHMSA’s State Pipeline Safety Program Lacks Effective Management and Oversight, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, Report Number: AV-2014-041. The report satisfies Safety Recommendations P-11-4 through -6; accordingly, these recommendations are classified CLOSED—ACCEPTABLE ACTION. We look forward to receiving information regarding action you are taking to address Safety Recommendation P-11-7. In the meantime, this recommendation is classified “Open-Acceptable Response.”

Addressee Acronym: DOT

Addressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government

Communication Date: 2011-01-03

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: -From Ray LaHood, Secretary of Transportation: This letter responds to the National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) safety recommendations P-11-4 through -7, which were issued on September 26, 2011, following NTSB's investigation of the tragic September 9, 2010, natural gas pipeline rupture in the city of San Bruno, California. The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) takes NTSB's safety recommendations seriously and is focused on appropriately addressing all of the pipeline safety recommendations in your report. The Department will conduct an audit of the effectiveness of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration's (PHMSA) oversight of performance based pipeline safety programs (P-11-4), as well as a review of its enforcement policies and procedures (P-11-5). In addition, the DOT Inspector General is already scheduled to conduct an audit of PHMSA's State pipeline safety certification program which will fulfill the final recommendation (P-11-6). I have directed the PHMSA Administrator to ensure that the certification program is amended, as appropriate, to comply with the findings of this audit (P-11-7). If I can provide further information or assistance please feel free to call me.

Addressee Acronym: DOT

Addressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government

Communication Date: 2012-01-03

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: -From Ray LaHood, Secretary, United States Department of Transportation: This letter responds to the National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) safety recommendations P-11-4 through -7, which were issued on September 26,2011, following NTSB's investigation of the tragic September 9, 2010, natural gas pipeline rupture in the city of San Bruno, California. The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) takes NTSB's safety recommendations seriously and is focused on appropriately addressing all of the pipeline safety recommendations in your report. The Department will conduct an audit of the effectiveness of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration's (PHMSA) oversight of performance-based pipeline safety programs (P-11-4), as well as a review of its enforcement policies and procedures (P-11-5). In addition, the DOT Inspector General is already scheduled to conduct an audit of PHMSA's State pipeline safety certification program which will fulfill the final recommendation (P-11 6). I have directed the PHMSA Administrator to ensure that the certification program is amended, as appropriate, to comply with the findings of this audit (P-11-7).