NTSB Safety Recommendation P-11-021

NTSB safety recommendation P-11-021.

TO THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA: Expeditiously evaluate the authority and ability of the pipeline safety division within the California Public Utilities Commission to effectively enforce state pipeline safety regulations, and, based on the results of this evaluation, grant the pipeline safety division within the California Public Utilities Commission the direct authority, including the assessment of fines and penalties, to correct noncompliance by state regulated pipeline operators.

Priority: CLASS II

Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action

Issued Date: 2011-09-26

Adopted Date: 2011-09-12

Overall Date Closed: 2013-03-20

Synopsis: On September 9, 2010, about 6:11 p.m. Pacific daylight time,1 a 30-inch-diameter underground natural gas transmission pipeline (which is identified by the company as Line 132), owned and operated by Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E), ruptured in a residential area in San Bruno, California. The accident killed eight people, injured many more, and caused substantial property damage. The rupture on Line 132 occurred near mile point 39.28, at the intersection of Earl Avenue and Glenview Drive in San Bruno. About 47.6 million standard cubic feet of natural gas were released as a result of the rupture. The released natural gas was ignited after the rupture; the subsequent explosion created a crater about 72 feet long by 26 feet wide, and the resulting fire destroyed 38 homes and damaged 70. A ruptured pipe segment about 28 feet long was found about 100 feet away from the crater.

Probable Cause: The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the Pacific Gas and Electric Company's (PG&E) (1) inadequate quality assurance and quality control in 1956 during its Line 132 relocation project, which allowed the installation of a substandard and poorly welded pipe section with a visible seam weld flaw that, over time grew to a critical size, causing the pipeline to rupture during a pressure increase stemming from poorly planned electrical work at the Milpitas Terminal; and (2) inadequate pipeline integrity management program, which failed to detect and repair or remove the defective pipe section.

Ntsbnumber: DCA10MP008

Report Number: PAR-11-01

Addressee Name: State of California

Addressee Status: Closed - Acceptable Action

Addressee Date Closed: 2013-03-20

Addressee Acronym: CA

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2013-01-18

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: -From Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Governor: This is in response to your letter regarding the National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) report investigating the 2010 natural gas pipeline rupture in San Bruno, California. In particular, Safety Recommendation P-11-21 of that report called on the Governor of California to evaluate the authority of the pipeline safety division within the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) to effectively enforce state pipeline safety regulations and to grant the division direct authority to correct noncompliance by state regulated pipeline operators. Since the NTSB report was issued in September 2011, California has enacted several statutes and taken a number of administrative steps to strengthen the CPUC's enforcement authorities, including the assessment of fines and penalties, as well the CPUC's regulatory oversight of pipeline operators. These measures are described in the enclosure to this letter. I believe these measures respond to the NTSB' s concerns and will better protect the public against future accidents. I look forward to your continued partnership in this critical safety area. Summary of Measures Taken In Response to Safety Recommendation P-11-21 • Legislation enacted in 2011, Senate Bill (SB) 879, increased the maximum amount of the daily penalty provisions set forth in Public Utilities Code § 2107 to $50,000, and reinforced the CPUC's ability to issue fines against pipeline operators who violate federal and state gas pipeline safety regulations. In tum, the CPUC issued Resolution ALJ-274, which delegated greater authority to the CPUC's gas pipeline inspectors to issue citations to pipeline operators. The Resolution also requires pipeline operators to provide notice to the CPUC of any self-identified violations discovered. To date, the CPUC has received over 30 self-identified violations reported by pipeline operators. For one such violation, reported by Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E), CPUC staff issued and the CPUC approved a $16.76 million penalty against PG&E for failing to properly leak survey its gas distribution facilities. • Other legislation adopted during the 2011-12 legislative session has significantly expanded the CPUC's regulatory oversight of pipeline operators in a manner consistent with the findings and recommendations made by the NTSB. These new bills include: o Assembly Bill (AB) 578 (providing that when the NTSB submits a gas pipeline safety recommendation letter to the CPUC, within 90 days the CPUC must respond and either fully implement the NTSB's recommendation or provide a detailed justification as to why it is not fully implementing the recommendation); o AB 56 (prohibiting pipeline operators from recovering any fine or penalty in any rate approved by the CPUC and requiring pipeline operators to demonstrate that revenue requested will be sufficient to fund projects to maintain safe and reliable service); o AB 1456 (requiring the CPUC to adopt safety performance metrics for pipeline safety, evaluate utility performance based on the metrics, and consider whether to implement a rate incentive program, which may include penalties); o Senate Bill (SB) 705 (requiring pipeline operators to develop a plan for safe and reliable operation of their pipeline facilities, subject to approval by the CPUC; o SB 44 (specifying emergency shut-down and pressure reduction procedures and emergency response communications procedures); o SB 216 (requiring the CPUC to consider the installation of automatic shutoff or remote controlled sectionalized block valves on certain transmission pipelines that are located in a high consequence area or traverse an active seismic earthquake fault); o And AB 2559 and 2564 (expediting permitting for pipeline integrity management work under local law and the California Environmental Quality Act). The NTSB's recommendations to the CPUC and certain of these legislative requirements are issues that the CPUC has been addressing in its natural gas safety rulemaking proceeding (i.e., R.II-02-0 19). The CPUC also has significantly increased its engineering staff devoted to pipeline safety enforcement and oversight. The state budget for each of the past two years has authorized the CPUC to hire additional natural gas safety staff, and as a result the CPUC has hired ten additional pipeline inspectors and is in the process of hiring six more. In 2011 the CPUC established a new Risk Assessment Unit to develop tools to improve pipeline safety and oversight, including developing effective metrics to evaluate the integrity of pipeline systems. The CPUC is hiring five additional utility engineering specialists to work on these pipeline integrity management programs (as well as to carry out other regulatory oversight). These additional staff resources are already bearing fruit. For example, a recent CPUC investigation of PG&E's pipeline class location and patrolling practices identified over 3,000 violations. Likewise, the Risk Assessment Unit conducted a nationwide survey that identified 17 potential gas safety hazards that impact public safety that the CPUC plans to incorporate into its regulatory practices.

Addressee Acronym: CA

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2012-06-14

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: To date, the NTSB has received no information regarding the state of California’s efforts to address Safety Recommendation P-11-21; accordingly, we would appreciate receiving an update regarding what, if anything, has been done to address this important safety issue. We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure the public the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that we can share with others. A copy of the NTSB’s September 26, 2011, letter issuing the recommendation is enclosed for your review. The full report of the San Bruno, California, accident investigation (Report Number: PAR11-01) is available on our website at www.ntsb.gov.

Addressee Acronym: CA

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2013-03-20

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: The NTSB is pleased that California enacted several statutes and took a series of administrative steps to strengthen CPUC’s enforcement authorities, including the assessment of fines and penalties and its regulatory oversight of pipeline operators. Because these actions satisfy the intent of Safety Recommendation P-11-21, it is classified CLOSED—ACCEPTABLE ACTION.