NTSB Safety Recommendation P-12-002

NTSB safety recommendation P-12-002.

TO THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION: Allocate sufficient resources as necessary to ensure that the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s onshore pipeline facility response plan program meets all of the requirements of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.

Priority: CLASS II

Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action

Issued Date: 2012-07-25

Adopted Date: 2012-07-10

Overall Date Closed: 2017-12-27

Synopsis: On Sunday, July 25, 2010, about 5:58 p.m., eastern daylight time, a segment of a 30-inch-diameter pipeline (Line 6B), owned and operated by Enbridge Incorporated (Enbridge) ruptured in a wetland in Marshall, Michigan. The rupture occurred during the last stages of a planned shutdown and was not discovered or addressed for 17 hours. During the time lapse, Enbridge twice pumped additional oil (81 percent of the total release) into Line 6B during two startups; the total release was estimated to be 843,444 gallons of crude oil. The oil saturated the surrounding wetlands and flowed into the Talmadge Creek and the Kalamazoo River. Local residents self-evacuated from their houses, and the environment was negatively affected. Cleanup efforts continue as of the adoption date of this report, with continuing costs exceeding $767 million. About 320 people reported symptoms consistent with benzene exposure. No fatalities were reported.

Probable Cause: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determines that the probable cause of the pipeline rupture was corrosion fatigue cracks that grew and coalesced from crack and corrosion defects under disbonded polyethylene tape coating, producing a substantial crude oil release that went undetected by the control center for over 17 hours. The rupture and prolonged release were made possible by pervasive organizational failures at Enbridge Incorporated (Enbridge) that included the following: Deficient integrity management procedures, which allowed well-documented crack defects in corroded areas to propagate until the pipeline failed. Inadequate training of control center personnel, which allowed the rupture to remain undetected for 17 hours and through two startups of the pipeline. Insufficient public awareness and education, which allowed the release to continue for nearly 14 hours after the first notification of an odor to local emergency response agencies. Contributing to the accident was the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) weak regulation for assessing and repairing crack indications, as well as PHMSA’s ineffective oversight of pipeline integrity management programs, control center procedures, and public awareness. Contributing to the severity of the environmental consequences were (1) Enbridge’s failure to identify and ensure the availability of well-trained emergency responders with sufficient response resources, (2) PHMSA’s lack of regulatory guidance for pipeline facility response planning, and (3) PHMSA’s limited oversight of pipeline emergency preparedness that led to the approval of a deficient facility response plan.

Ntsbnumber: DCA10MP007

Report Number: PAR-12-01

Addressee Name: DOT

Addressee Status: Closed - Acceptable Action

Addressee Date Closed: 2017-12-27

Addressee Acronym: DOT

Addressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government

Communication Date: 2013-09-30

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: This letter concerns 22 open safety recommendations that the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) issued to the US Department of Transportation (USDOT) between 1997 and 2013. Enclosure 1 is a list of these recommendations; Enclosure 2 is a copy of the correspondence history regarding them. The NTSB is currently reviewing a July 24, 2013, update from the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration regarding Safety Recommendations I-02-1 and -2, which will be addressed in separate correspondence. We recently corresponded with the Federal Aviation Administration regarding Safety Recommendation A-06-43; Enclosure 3 provides a more detailed history of correspondence regarding this recommendation. The NTSB is interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. We are concerned because we have not received updates regarding action either taken or planned to address the remaining 19 open recommendations for some time—in some cases, over 10 years. We would like to point out that, when we issue a safety recommendation directly to the USDOT rather than to an individual modal agency, we do so because the scope of the recommendation falls outside the authority of the modal agency, or for some other specific reason. Failure to address these important safety issues places the public at risk.

Addressee Acronym: DOT

Addressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government

Communication Date: 2017-12-27

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: We note that the audit conducted in response to Safety Recommendation P-12-1 determined that PHMSA is responsible for reviewing and approving oil spill response plans for onshore pipeline facilities, and that PHMSA may carry out response plan exercises (drill programs) but is not required by law to do so. When we issued our report on the Marshall, Michigan accident, PHMSA had a large backlog of plans that needed review and approval, but that backlog has been addressed. PHMSA has increased the number of staff devoted to reviewing pipeline facility response plans, and the OPS has successfully managed the 523 active response plans in its inventory as a result of this increased staffing. We further note that you believe that PHMSA has now allocated sufficient resources to ensure that the onshore pipeline facility response plan program meets all of the requirements of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. These actions satisfy Safety Recommendation P-12-2, which is classified CLOSED--ACCEPTABLE ACTION.

Addressee Acronym: DOT

Addressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government

Communication Date: 2013-07-08

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: The DOT’s plan (1) to audit the business practices of, and evaluate the resources allocated to, PHMSA’s onshore pipeline facility response plan program, (2) to review the response plans and drill programs, and (3) to take appropriate action to correct identified deficiencies, constitutes an acceptable plan for addressing Safety Recommendations P-12-1 and 2. Accordingly, pending completion of these efforts, these recommendations are classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

Addressee Acronym: DOT

Addressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government

Communication Date: 2016-07-08

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: On July 8, 2013, based on information in then-Secretary LaHood’s October 18, 2012, letter, we classified Safety Recommendations P-12-1 and -2 “Open—Acceptable Response,” pending completion of the proposed efforts to address them. On September 30, 2013, as part of a clean-up effort of 22 safety recommendations issued to the DOT, we also requested information on the status of action to implement Safety Recommendations P-12-1 and -2. To date, you have not provided any further information regarding your actions or intentions to address either recommendation. Accordingly, we would appreciate receiving a prompt update supplying this information. We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure the public the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that can be shared with others. Pending your response, Safety Recommendations P-12-1 and -2 remain classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

Addressee Acronym: DOT

Addressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government

Communication Date: 2016-10-18

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: We note that, based on the results of the above-mentioned audit, necessary resources will be determined and appropriate actions will be taken to correct deficiencies. We are pleased to learn that, as part of this effort, PHMSA has already increased the number of staff devoted to reviewing facility response plans to 7.5 full-time equivalents in fiscal year 2016. Pending completion of this audit review and further information on the allocation of necessary resources, Safety Recommendation P 12-002 is classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

Addressee Acronym: DOT

Addressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government

Communication Date: 2017-08-17

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: -From Finch Fulton, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Transportation Policy: The audit determined that PHMSA is responsible for the review and approval of oil spill response plans for onshore pipeline facilities; PHMSA may carry out response plan exercises (drill programs) as a policy choice, but is not required by law to carry out response plan exercises. At the time of the audit PHMSA had a large backlog of plans that needed review and approval. That backlog has been addressed. Since the NTSB accident report was released, PHMSA has increased the number of staff devoted to the review of pipeline facility response plans to 7.5 full-time equivalents as of Fiscal Year 2016, and OPS has been able to successfully manage the 523 active response plans in its inventory with this augmented staffing level. The addendum to the above audit provides further details. DOT believes PHMSA has allocated sufficient resources to ensure that the onshore pipeline facility response plan program meets all of the requirements of OPA 90, and we request closure of this recommendation. We look forward to continuing to work with you and the NTSB on pipeline safety improvements.

Addressee Acronym: DOT

Addressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government

Communication Date: 2012-10-18

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: -From Ray LaHood, Secretary of the United States Department of Transportation: This letter responds to the National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) Safety Recommendations P-12-1 and P-1 2-2. which were issued on July 25, 2012, following NTSB's investigation of the July 25. 20 I 0, pipeline rupture in Marshall, Michigan. The pipeline was owned and operated by Enbridge Incorporated. The U.S. Department of Transportation takes NTSB 's safety recommendations seriously and is focused on appropriately addressing all of the pipeline safety recommendations in your report. The Department will conduct an audit of the effectiveness of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration's onshore pipeline facility response plan program's business practices, including reviews of response plans and drill programs, and take appropriate action to correct deficiencies (P-12-1 ). In addition, we will evaluate the resources allocated to the onshore pipeline facility response plan program.

Addressee Acronym: DOT

Addressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government

Communication Date: 2016-08-19

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: -From Antony R. Foxx, Secretary of Transportation: Based on the results of the audit, necessary resources will be determined and appropriate actions will be taken to correct deficiencies. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Report PAR-12-01 stated that PHMSA devoted fewer full-time equivalent (FTE) resources to the review of response plans, comparable to the response plan review programs that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. Coast Guard carry out. However, since that finding, PHMSA has increased the number of staff devoted to the review of facility response plans. In Fiscal Year 2016, 7.5 FTEs were devoted to facility response plan review.