NTSB Safety Recommendation P-19-008

NTSB safety recommendation P-19-008.

TO THE GAS TECHNOLOGY INSTITUTE: In coordination with the National Fire Protection Association and the International Code Council, work to develop standards for methane detection systems for all types of residential occupancies in both the International Fuel Gas Code and the National Fuel Gas Code, National Fire Protection Association 54. At a minimum, the provisions should cover the installation, maintenance, placement of the detectors, and testing requirements.

Priority: CLASS II

Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action

Issued Date: 2019-06-10

Overall Date Closed: 2022-07-20

Synopsis: On August 10, 2016, at 11:51 p.m., eastern daylight time, a 14-unit apartment building, located at 8701 Arliss Street, in the unincorporated community of Silver Spring, in Montgomery County, Maryland, partially collapsed due to a natural gas-fueled explosion and fire. The explosion and fire also heavily damaged an adjacent apartment building, 8703 Arliss Street, which shared a common wall with building 8701. As a result of this accident, 7 residents died, 65 residents were transported to the hospital, and 3 firefighters were treated and released from the hospital. The damage from the accident exceeded $1 million. The following are safety issues in this accident: • the location and inspection of service regulators within a structure • the inspection of the gas meter assembly • the notification of the natural gas odor to Washington Gas Light Company • the detection of natural gas through odorants and methane

Probable Cause: The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the explosion in building 8701 of the Flower Branch apartment complex was the failure of an indoor mercury service regulator with an unconnected vent line that allowed natural gas into the meter room where it accumulated and ignited from an unknown ignition source. Contributing to the accident was the location of the mercury service regulators where leak detection by odor was not readily available.

Keywords: Hazmat

Ntsbnumber: DCA16FP003

Report Number: PAR-19-01

Addressee Name: Gas Technology Institute

Addressee Status: Closed - Acceptable Action

Addressee Date Closed: 2022-07-20

Addressee Acronym: GTI

Addressee Organization Type: A-Associations

Communication Date: 2022-05-05

Communication Type: Non-Recipient Correspondence

Communication Contents: -From Christian Dubay, P.E., Vice President and Chief Engineer, National Fire Protection Association: This correspondence is in response to NTSB Safety Recommendation P-19-007, in which the NTSB recommended that the NFPA, “in coordination with the Gas Technology Institute and the International Code Council, revise the National Fuel Gas Code, National Fire Protection Association 54 to require methane detection systems for all types of residential occupancies with gas service. At a minimum, the provisions should cover the installation, maintenance, placement of the detectors, and testing requirements.” We would like to provide an update on our efforts towards addressing this recommendation. As described in correspondence from August 2019, the NFPA Standards Council approved a new Technical Committee to develop a standard on fuel gas detectors. This new standard, NFPA 715, Standard for the Installation of Fuel Gases Detection and Warning Equipment, has been issued with an effective date of April 9, 2022. The Gas Technology Institute is represented on the Technical Committee and participated in the development of this standard. The scope of this new document is as follows: 1.1.1 This standard shall be concerned with life safety and protection of property. 1.1.2* This standard shall cover the selection, design, application, installation, location, performance, inspection, testing, and maintenance of fuel gas detection and warning equipment in buildings and structures. 1.1.3 This standard shall contain requirements for the selection, installation, operation, and maintenance of equipment that detects concentrations of fuel gases that could pose a life or property safety risk. Subsequently, the National Fuel Gas Code Technical Committee, which is responsible for NFPA 54, National Fuel Gas Code, has reviewed the NTSB Safety Recommendation P-19-007 as well as the new standard NFPA 715 and has taken two relevant actions. First, the Technical Committee has revised Annex D Suggested Emergency Procedure for Gas Leaks with First Revision 32 to include a new section D.2 as follows: D.2 Where accumulation of gas inside a building is detected by odor or by activation of a combustible gas detector or system designed and installed in accordance with NFPA 715, the procedures in Section D.1 should be followed. Section D.1 contains immediate actions to be taken in the case of a gas leak. Annex D is not a part of the requirements of the National Fuel Gas Code but is included for informational purposes only. The Technical Committee also created Committee Input 48 (CI 48) to propose adding the following section to chapter 4: 4.X Gas Detection. Where fuel gas detection and warning equipment is required in residential occupancies with gas service, the installation shall be in accordance with NFPA 715, Standard for the Installation of Fuel Gases Detection and Warning Equipment. A Committee Input is a proposed technical committee–generated revision that the technical committee does not want to put in the first draft but wants published for public review in the first draft report. To become proposed legislative text for the second draft stage, this proposal would need to have public comment suggesting revision or have second revision language proposed at the second draft meeting. If the NTSB would like this language included in Chapter 4, a Public Comment should be submitted in support. The Technical Committee has stated in their Committee Statement for CI 48 that requiring fuel gas detectors in residential or other occupancies with gas service would be better addressed in building and fire codes, such as NFPA 101, Life Safety Code® or NFPA 5000, Building Code. These codes address the installation of similar warning equipment, such as carbon monoxide alarms, and the Technical Committee believes that the enforcing authorities who enforce the Life Safety Code or the Building Code would be better equipped to enforce fuel gas detector requirements in residential and other occupancies. On a related note, the ICC Committee Action Hearings were held the week of March 27 to April 6, 2022. One of the items that was on the docket to be considered for the Residential Building Code (IRC), RB18- 22, would add a requirement for fuel gas alarms or detection, and would require household fuel gas detection systems to comply with NFPA 715. Item RB18-22 failed in the committee but can still be brought back via their public comment process. If the NTSB would like to comment on the proposed new section 4.X Gas Detection in NFPA 54, or comment on any other portion of the draft, the First Draft Report is now posted at www.nfpa.org/54next and is open for public comments until May 31, 2022. NFPA 101, Life Safety Code® or NFPA 5000, Building Code, are also open for public comments until May 31, 2022 at www.nfpa.org/101next and www.nfpa.org/5000next respectively. Since the topic was not introduced to NFPA 101 or NFPA 5000 at the First Draft stage, another option is to propose a Tentative Interim Amendment (www.nfpa.org/tia). Laura Moreno, Standards Lead, Industrial and Chemical Safety (lmoreno@nfpa.org or 617-984-7496) can assist your team with that process, should you choose to pursue Public Comments or a TIA as a next step. We look forward to continued open communication and the opportunity to work with the NTSB towards a shared safety mission.

Addressee Acronym: GTI

Addressee Organization Type: A-Associations

Communication Date: 2021-02-08

Communication Type: Recommendation Reiteration

Communication Contents: From the Pipeline Accident Report Atmos Energy Corporation Natural Gas-Fueled Explosion Dallas, Texas February 23, 2018: 2.5 Methane Detection Odorant is the primary safety feature that members of the public rely upon to detect a natural gas release (GAO 2018). Because these gas distribution systems are situated primarily in populated areas, the odorant can act as an early warning of a gas release to prevent an explosion and fire. However, when odorized natural gas passes through the soil from a leaking supply pipe, the soil can absorb and deplete the odorant from the gas (Tenkrat and others 2010). This phenomenon has been recognized since at least 1974 when the NTSB published a report which cited “lack of odor in the leaked gas when it reached the houses and the atmosphere” as a contributing cause (NTSB 1974). Atmos added odorant to its gas distribution system in a manner that was consistent with PHMSA regulations, and yet none of the residents smelled gas prior to the incident. This is the expected response for natural gas that migrates a sufficient distance through soil, and is consistent with observations made during integrity tests after the explosion where the odor was apparent near the crack, but not noted at other excavation locations despite high methane gas readings. Many NTSB investigations have demonstrated that gas odorant does not always provide sufficient warning of gas leaks and hazardous conditions, including: • The June 28, 1982, natural gas explosion that killed five people and injured one in a single-family home in Portales, New Mexico. The natural gas release was caused by a failed service line that had been damaged from excavation work for the local telephone company over a month before the accident occurred. Between the time of the excavation work and the explosion, no one had detected gas. The natural gas was tested and found to have met the federal requirements for odorant level. At that time there was high rainfall in the region. The NTSB concluded that the odorant compounds in the gas were absorbed in the surrounding soil where the gas leaked from the service line. Soil samples were taken and supported this conclusion (NTSB 1983). • The March 5, 2008, natural gas explosion and fire that killed one person and severely injured a child in a single-family home in Plum Borough, Pennsylvania. The NTSB determined that the gas distribution pipeline had been damaged from excavation work years prior which created corrosive conditions, causing the pipe to fail. No one smelled gas 30 minutes prior to the explosion, and the gas was thought to have migrated through the porous backfill of a new sewer line and accumulated rapidly in the house with little warning to residents. Odorant levels were tested and found to be in compliance with federal requirements (NTSB 2008). As part of the investigation of the August 10, 2016, natural gas explosion and fire of an apartment building in Silver Spring, Maryland, the NTSB analyzed 20 accidents between 1971 and 2018 where natural gas had either migrated from an outside leak or within a structure and accumulated to dangerous concentrations leading to explosions, fires, fatalities, injuries, and severe property damage (NTSB 2019). The NTSB identified within those investigations whether gas odorant played a significant role in warning the occupants about the presence of gas in buildings. In some of these 20 cases, as in the three events in Dallas in February 2018, gas odor was not detected by the occupants in time for them to evacuate before the explosion occurred, despite the odorant levels being compliant with regulatory requirements. In several of the 20 cases, the NTSB cited odorant fade due to soil adsorption as a contributing factor. Based on this analysis, the NTSB concluded that the use of gas odorants alone does not effectively mitigate the risk of death and injuries caused by gas system leaks (NTSB 2019). The residents at 3534 Espanola Drive did not smell gas and were not alerted by DFR or Atmos officials of the potential hazard at any point before the explosion occurred. Likewise, none of the residents at either of the first two incident houses smelled gas prior to the incidents. Finally, had there been an alarm to warn of a natural gas release, residents could have been notified earlier to evacuate to a safe place away from the residence, without relying on someone within the house to smell gas odors or an outside party to notify them of the hazard. The NTSB concludes that had methane detectors been installed at the residences located on Durango and Espanola Drives, an alarm would have alerted residents to a gas release, reducing the potential for and consequences of the resulting natural gas fires and explosions. For 45 years, the NTSB has recommended that methane detectors be required to provide early warning of gas leaks. As a result of its investigation of an April 22, 1974, natural gas explosion in a commercial building in New York City, New York, on April 19, 1976, the NTSB issued Safety Recommendation P-76-12 to the US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) (NTSB 1976). The investigation report noted that many commercial buildings were required to have smoke or heat detectors placed in strategic interior locations; therefore, it seemed logical for similar requirements to be adopted for installing gas detectors. Investigate the practicality and the availability of gas vapor detection instruments for installation at strategic locations in buildings. Based on the results of this investigation, recommend guidelines to appropriate State and local government agencies for regulations for the installation of gas detection instruments in buildings. (P-76-12) HUD responded that gas detectors were technically possible, but the agency did not believe they were practical at the time. HUD also said that it would continue to review developments in the field and would reevaluate its position “when a practical, cost effective natural gas detection system is developed.” The NTSB made a similar recommendation as a result of the investigation of a June 9, 1994, natural gas explosion and fire in a retirement home in Allentown, Pennsylvania (NTSB 1996). The NTSB’s investigation found that the performance and cost-effectiveness of gas detectors had improved in the 20 years since Safety Recommendation P-76-12 was issued. Therefore, the NTSB issued Safety Recommendation P-96-16 to HUD: Evaluate the safety benefits of using gas detectors in buildings approved by the Department for Federal rent subsidies as a means of providing building occupants and local emergency-response agencies with early notice of released natural gas within buildings; require that gas detectors be used in buildings in which the Department has determined that a gas detector would be cost effective and beneficial. (P-96-16) For 5 years, HUD did not respond to this safety recommendation. In July 2001, HUD declined to implement the recommendation because it claimed that it did not have the statutory authority and that gas detection should be required in the National Fire Code. The NTSB classified this safety recommendation Closed?Unacceptable Action. Currently, methane gas or combustible gas alarms are not required by federal or state regulations, nor are they required in building or fire codes for residential occupancies. While smoke and carbon monoxide alarm requirements have been incorporated into many state regulations, methane detection alarms have not been widely adopted. In the United States, the NFPA and the International Code Council (ICC) are nationally recognized standard-setting bodies for both building and fire codes, as well as fuel gas codes such as the International Fuel Gas Code (IFGC) and the National Fuel Gas Code (NFPA 54). The IFGC and NFPA 54 provide minimum safety requirements for the design and installation of fuel gas piping systems in homes and

Addressee Acronym: GTI

Addressee Organization Type: A-Associations

Communication Date: 2026-03-26

Communication Type: Recommendation Mention

Communication Contents: From the report “Atmos Energy Corporation Natural Gas Fueled Home Explosions and Fires, Jackson, Mississippi, January 24, 2024, and January 27, 2024” published on March 26, 2026: 1.10.1.3 Dallas, Texas In February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas-fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students (NTSB 2021). The NTSB determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by Atmos’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion. The investigation found that while Atmos’s periodic leak survey methodology and frequency complied with the minimum state and federal requirements, it did not identify the degraded system that was found after the explosion. As a result, the NTSB issued Safety Recommendation P-21-2 to PHMSA to evaluate industry’s implementation of the gas distribution pipeline integrity management requirements and develop updated guidance for improving their effectiveness. Footnote: Safety Recommendation P-21-2 is currently classified Open—Acceptable Response. The investigation found that had the Dallas Fire-Rescue Department arson investigators been adequately trained on natural gas systems, their investigation findings may have provided more timely and accurate assistance to Atmos in locating the source of the gas leak. As a result, the NTSB issued Safety Recommendation P 21 8 to Atmos to provide initial and recurrent training to the Dallas Fire-Rescue Department arson investigators and firefighters on the local natural gas distribution system and associated hazards. In 2022, the NTSB classified Safety Recommendation P-21-8 Closed—Acceptable Action when Atmos detailed the initial and recurrent training it had provided to the Dallas Fire-Rescue Department and indicated that it would continue its outreach and training to those emergency response officials. The investigation found that Atmos did not adequately consider or mitigate against threats that were degrading its pipeline system, the likelihood of failure associated with the threats, or the potential consequences of such a failure as required by gas distribution integrity management requirements. As a result, the NTSB issued Safety Recommendation P 21 12 to Atmos to assess its distribution integrity management program, paying particular attention to the areas identified in the NTSB investigation, and revise the program to appropriately consider: (1) threats that degrade a system over time, and (2) the increased risk that can result from factors that simultaneously increase the likelihood and consequence of failure. In 2023, the NTSB classified Safety Recommendation P-21-12 Closed—Acceptable Action when Atmos reported that it had enhanced its distribution integrity management risk model in several ways, including enhancements that provided notice of areas where rain or other weather conditions could be causing soils to shrink or swell and therefore increase the potential for pipeline stress. The investigation also found that had methane detectors been installed at the accident homes, an alarm would have alerted residents to a gas release, reducing the potential for and consequences of the resulting natural gas fires and explosions. Footnote: Over the years, the NTSB has referred variously to these systems as “methane detectors;” “methane detection systems;” and, as in this report, “natural gas alarms.” As a result, the NTSB reiterated recommendations to the International Code Council, the National Fire Protection Association, and the Gas Technology Institute to develop requirements and standards for residential natural gas detection alarms (Safety Recommendation P-19-6, Safety Recommendation P 19 7, and Safety Recommendation P-19-8, respectively). Footnote: Safety Recommendation P-19-6 is currently classified Open—?Unacceptable Response. Safety Recommendation P 19 7 is currently classified Open—?Acceptable Alternate Response. In 2022, the NTSB classified Safety Recommendation P-19-8 Closed—?Acceptable Action when the Gas Technology Institute issued a new standard for fuel gas detection and warning equipment.

Addressee Acronym: GTI

Addressee Organization Type: A-Associations

Communication Date: 2024-11-20

Communication Type: Recommendation Mention

Communication Contents: This information is preliminary and subject to change. From the Preliminary Report PLD25FR001, “Enbridge Inc. Natural Gas-Fueled Home Explosion, South Jordan, Utah, November 6, 2024,” published on November 20, 2024: On November 6, 2024, about 3:09 p.m., a natural gas-fueled explosion fatally injured one person and destroyed a home in South Jordan, Utah. Footnote: All times in this report are local times. There were no other injuries reported. Several nearby residences were damaged, and families were displaced. (See figure.) The South Jordan Fire Department responded and arrived on scene in about 6 minutes. Enbridge Inc. (Enbridge) subsidiary, Enbridge Gas Utah, provided natural gas service to the home. Footnote: In June 2024, Canada-based Enbridge purchased local gas distribution company Questar Gas from Dominion Energy, Inc. and renamed it Enbridge Gas Utah, Enbridge Gas Wyoming, and Enbridge Gas Idaho. Enbridge responded and arrived on scene about 3:45 p.m. and worked continuously to find and isolate the leak; Enbridge isolated the leak about 12:16 p.m. on November 7. At the time of the explosion, conditions were daylight and clear; the temperature was 41°F with no precipitation. After the accident, Enbridge found a leak about 150 feet northeast of the home on a 4-inch diameter Aldyl A natural gas main it owned and operated. Footnote: Aldyl A is the trademarked name of a polyethylene plastic gas pipeline product that was manufactured by the DuPont chemical company using a proprietary polymer resin. It is no longer manufactured or used in new pipelines. The Aldyl A main was manufactured and installed in 1976 and operated at a pressure of about 45 psig, below the legal maximum allowable operating pressure of 60 psig. Enbridge detected subsurface gas between the main and two neighboring residences, including the accident home and the home immediately to the north. The subsurface gas extended from the main to the backyard and front yard of each home, reaching about 250 feet from the leak. Enbridge also detected gas in the atmosphere of the neighboring home after the accident. Before National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigators arrived, Enbridge conducted pressure testing; completed leak surveys; and removed, retained, and repaired the failed main. After NTSB investigators arrived, Enbridge continued testing for gas in the area surrounding the exploded home. While on scene, NTSB investigators examined the site where the explosion occurred, reviewed Enbridge’s operational procedures, gathered documentation, conducted interviews, and recovered physical evidence for examination by the NTSB Materials Laboratory. Preliminary information indicates that none of the five residents reported smelling gas before the explosion and there was not a natural gas alarm in the accident home. Footnote: Natural gas alarms, or methane detectors, are not required in residential structures but are recommended by the NTSB. See: data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-public/sr-details/P-19-006, data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-public/sr-details/P-19-007, and data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-public/sr-details/P 19-008. The NTSB’s investigation is ongoing. Future investigative activity will focus on Enbridge’s integrity management program, emergency response procedures, public awareness program, and pipeline safety management system, as well as other causal factors. Parties to this NTSB investigation include the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration; the Utah Department of Public Safety, Office of the State Fire Marshal; the Utah Department of Commerce, Division of Public Utilities, Pipeline Safety Section; the City of South Jordan; and Enbridge.

Addressee Acronym: GTI

Addressee Organization Type: A-Associations

Communication Date: 2019-06-10

Communication Type: Transmittal Letter

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. We are providing the following information to urge your organization to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. On April 24, 2019, the NTSB adopted its report, Building Explosion and Fire, Silver Spring, Maryland, August 10, 2016, NTSB/PAR-19/01. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. As a result of this investigation, the NTSB identified the following safety issues: • The location and inspection of service regulators within a structure. • The inspection of the gas meter assembly. • The notification of the natural gas odor to Washington Gas Light Company. • The detection of natural gas through odorants and methane. Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the Gas Technology Institute. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. • In coordination with the National Fire Protection Association and the International Code Council, work to develop standards for methane detection systems for all types of residential occupancies in both the International Fuel Gas Code and the National Fuel Gas Code, National Fire Protection Association 54. At a minimum, the provisions should cover the installation, maintenance, placement of the detectors, and testing requirements. (P 19 008) (See section 2.5.2.) The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-008). We encourage you to submit your response to correspondence@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20MB, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Acronym: GTI

Addressee Organization Type: A-Associations

Communication Date: 2019-09-03

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: -From Anthony (Tony) Lindsay, P.E., Managing Director- Energy Delivery: I have been in touch with leadership at both National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) and the International Code Council to coordinate a response. GTI agrees with the strategy proposed by NFPA to create a stand-alone standard specifically for residential gas detection devices to which the National Fuel Gas Code and the International Fuel Gas Code could refer in the future. GTI has already taken steps to be represented on the NFPA technical committee responsible for this standard and will play an active role in the consensus standards development process to inform and guide coverage of installation, maintenance, placement, and testing requirements. As several of your staff and many industry stakeholders are aware, GTI has conducted extensive laboratory testing of commercially available residential methane detectors (US and international products) and has been studying the optimal placement of detectors in residential occupancies. We look forward to continuing to provide unbiased and fact-based guidance to the industry to improve safety and increase awareness on this important technical topic. Kristine Wiley, GTI R&D Director, will continue to oversee our efforts and will be supported by Karen Crippen, GTI Analytical Services Director (appointed by NFPA to the Fuel Gases Warning Equipment Committee).

Addressee Acronym: GTI

Addressee Organization Type: A-Associations

Communication Date: 2021-04-22

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: -From Anthony (Tony) Lindsay, P.E., Managing Director, Energy Delivery: GTI has been an active participant in the drafting and development of a stand-alone standard specifically for fuel gas detection devices to which the National Fuel Gas Code and the International Fuel Gas Code will be able to refer to in the future. GTI’s representative (one of the twenty to form the Technical Committee) will continue her active role in the consensus standards development process to advance the NFPA 715, Standard for the Installation of Fuel Gases Detection and Warning Equipment in order to inform and guide coverage of installation, maintenance, placement, and testing requirements for methane detectors. The progress made to date includes the development of the draft standard “covering the selection, design, application, installation, location, performance, inspection, testing, and maintenance of fuel gas detection and warning equipment in buildings and structures” (Section 1.1.2) and moving the standard through the first public input stage. On 2/18/21 the Committee balloted the first draft which is now out for public comment through 5/11/21. The Committee will reconcile and address any comments throughout the summer and formally review the second draft during a meeting in the fall. The cycle repeats before the final version is balloted, expected sometime in 2022. Karen Crippen, GTI Analytical Services Director, our representative on the NFPA Fuel Gases Warning Equipment Committee, will continue this important work with NFPA and the International Code Council. Please feel free to contact Karen or me directly for updates at any time.

Addressee Acronym: GTI

Addressee Organization Type: A-Associations

Communication Date: 2019-12-16

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: We note that you have already extensively tested commercially available residential methane detectors and have been studying where to best place detectors in residential occupancies. In addition, you agree with the strategy that the NFPA has developed in response to Safety Recommendation P-19-7, which includes creating a new technical committee to develop a stand alone standard for residential gas detection devices to which the International Fuel Gas Code and the National Fuel Gas Code can refer once it is implemented. We further note that you have taken steps to have the GTI represented in this new NFPA technical committee, and you expect to play an active role in developing the consensus standards. Pending completion and implementation of a new standard, developed in coordination with the NFPA and ICC, requiring methane detection systems for all types of residential occupancies with gas service that covers, at a minimum, detector installation, maintenance, placement, and testing, Safety Recommendation P-19-8 is classified OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

Addressee Acronym: GTI

Addressee Organization Type: A-Associations

Communication Date: 2021-05-17

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: We note that the Gas Technology Institute (GTI) is actively participating in the development of a stand-alone standard for fuel gas-detection devices to which the National Fuel Gas Code and the International Fuel Gas Code can refer in the future. Karen Crippen, GTI Analytical Services Director, is one of the 20 members of NFPA’s Technical Committee NFPA 715, Standard for the Installation of Fuel Gases Detection and Warning Equipment, which is developing a standard to inform and guide installation, maintenance, placement, and testing requirements for methane detectors. We further note that the technical committee has balloted the first draft, which was out for public comment through May 11, 2021. The committee will reconcile and address any comments throughout the summer and formally review the second draft during a meeting in the fall, and then this cycle will repeat before the final version is balloted sometime in 2022. Pending completion of these actions, Safety Recommendation P-19-8 remains classified OPEN-- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

Addressee Acronym: GTI

Addressee Organization Type: A-Associations

Communication Date: 2022-07-20

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: On May 5, 2022, we received a letter from the NFPA reporting that NFPA 715, Standard for the Installation of Fuel Gases Detection and Warning Equipment, has been issued with an effective date of April 9, 2022. We note that the standard covers the selection, design, application, installation, location, performance, inspection, testing, and maintenance of fuel gas detection and warning equipment in buildings and structures. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation P-19-8 is classified CLOSED-- ACCEPTABLE ACTION. We commend the Gas Technology Institute for its contributions in developing this new standard for fuel gas detection and warning equipment in coordination with the NFPA and ICC.