NTSB Safety Recommendation P-25-007

NTSB safety recommendation P-25-007.

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA: Review your statutes and amend them to clarify that confidential security information disclosure restrictions do not apply to the National Transportation Safety Board when it is conducting an accident investigation.

Priority: CLASS II

Overall Status: Open - Await Response

Issued Date: 2025-04-08

Adopted Date: 2025-03-18

Synopsis: This report discusses the March 24, 2023, natural gas–fueled explosion and fire at Building 2 of the R.M. Palmer Company, a candy manufacturer located in West Reading, Pennsylvania. The explosion destroyed the manufacturer’s Building 2 and caused significant structural damage to its adjacent Building 1 and other surrounding structures. In total, 7 people were killed, 10 people were injured, and 3 families were displaced from a neighboring apartment building. Safety issues identified in this report include degradation of a retired service tee, insufficient consideration of threats to pipeline integrity, the risk associated with unmarked private pipeline assets crossing public rights-of-way (for example, a public street), delayed evacuation of Building 2 despite detection of natural gas, natural gas safety messaging that may not reach certain members of the public, insufficient guidance on gas leak emergency procedures, absence of natural gas detection alarms in commercial buildings, and insufficient accessibility of gas distribution line valves. As part of this investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board issued recommendations to the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 50 states along with the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, the American Gas Association, the American Petroleum Institute, the Gas Piping Technology Committee, the Common Ground Alliance, the International Code Council, the National Fire Protection Association, UGI Corporation, and R.M. Palmer Company.

Probable Cause: The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the explosion was degradation of a retired 1982 Aldyl A polyethylene service tee with a Delrin polyacetal insert that allowed natural gas to leak and migrate underground into the R.M. Palmer Company candy factory buildings, where it was ignited by an unknown source. Contributing to the degradation of the service tee and insert were significantly elevated ground temperatures from steam escaping R.M. Palmer Company’s corroded underground steam pipe, located near the service tee, that had been unmarked and cracked. Contributing to the steam pipe crack was soil movement and R.M. Palmer Company’s lack of awareness of the pipe’s corroded state. Contributing to the natural gas leak was UGI Corporation’s lack of awareness of the nearby steam pipe, which led to an incomplete integrity management program evaluation that did not consider or manage the risk posed by the steam pipe. Contributing to the accident’s severity was R.M. Palmer Company’s insufficient emergency response procedures and training of its employees, who did not understand the hazard and did not evacuate the buildings before the explosion.

Ntsbnumber: PLD23LR002

Report Number: PIR-25-01

Addressee Name: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

Addressee Status: Open - Await Response

Addressee Acronym: PA

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2025-04-08

Communication Type: Transmittal Letter

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. We are providing the following information to urge the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to act on the safety recommendations in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. This letter also includes information about our March 18, 2025, report, UGI Corporation Natural Gas-Fueled Explosion and Fire, West Reading, Pennsylvania, March 24, 2023, NTSB/PIR-25/01. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: • Degradation of a retired Aldyl A service tee that was accelerated by elevated ground temperatures from a corroded and cracked steam pipe nearby. • UGI Corporation’s insufficient consideration of pipeline integrity threats, particularly Aldyl A service tees with Delrin inserts at elevated temperatures. • Presence of unmarked and unreported private assets crossing public rights-of-way, excluding them from the Pennsylvania One Call System and increasing the risk of damage to them. • Delayed evacuation of Palmer’s Building 2 despite detection of natural gas by employees and others. • Natural gas safety messaging from pipeline operator public awareness programs that may not reach certain members of the public. • Insufficient guidance on natural gas emergency procedures. • Absence of natural gas alarms in commercial buildings. • Insufficient accessibility of gas distribution line valves. Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendations to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (additional information regarding these recommendations can be found in the noted sections of the report): • Require the installation of natural gas alarms that meet the specifications of National Fire Protection Association 715 in businesses, residences, and other buildings where people congregate that could be affected by a natural gas leak. (P-25-5) (See section 2.5.1.) • Modify your Underground Utility Line Protection Law to require all owners and operators of pipelines transporting steam or other high-temperature materials located in public rights-of-way to register their assets with the Pennsylvania One Call System. (P-25-6) (See section 2.4.) • Review your statutes and amend them to clarify that confidential security information disclosure restrictions do not apply to the National Transportation Safety Board when it is conducting an accident investigation. (P-25-7) (See section 2.7.) The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendations by number (Safety Recommendations P-25-5 through -7). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. All communications regarding safety recommendations are stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to these recommendations. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. In the likely event that your company uses auto generated and/or preformatted confidentiality statements on letterhead or outgoing e-mails, please include a statement in your letter indicating that the information can be publicly released. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. The attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the March 18, 2025, report UGI Corporation Natural Gas-Fueled Explosion and Fire, West Reading, Pennsylvania, March 24, 2023, PIR-25-1. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-25-5 through P-25-7). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. From the report UGI Corporation Natural Gas-Fueled Explosion and Fire, West Reading, Pennsylvania, March 24, 2023, PIR-25-1: 2.7 Withholding Safety-Related Information from the NTSB PHMSA requires pipeline operators to evaluate risks from all threats to the pipeline system integrity through their DIMPs. In our investigation of the March 24, 2023, explosion, the NTSB sought information on the PA PUC’s observations and oversight of UGI, requesting DIMP inspection reports from the PA PUC in June 2023. During inspections, the PA PUC collects and analyzes data on an operator’s DIMP and determines if the program complies with pipeline safety regulations; this information is then documented in inspection reports. The PA PUC declined to produce the reports, citing state security information nondisclosure laws that support withholding information from “members of the public” and treating the NTSB as a member of the public. Therefore, in September 2023, the NTSB removed the PA PUC as a party to the investigation, after which the PA PUC could not participate in information sharing among parties during the investigation. During its time as a party, PA PUC was otherwise responsive to the NTSB and assisted in the investigation. The NTSB then issued a subpoena for the reports; after lengthy legal action, the NTSB was able to obtain the reports from the PA PUC in April 2024. Federal law authorizes the NTSB to require, by subpoena or otherwise, the production of necessary evidence during an accident investigation. Further, federal regulations allow the NTSB to obtain any information related to an accident under investigation. The PA PUC’s inspection records of UGI’s DIMP were material to the investigation because they contained information on UGI’s knowledge of and compliance with pipeline safety regulations and safety bulletins or notifications from PHMSA or other agencies. The NTSB thus concludes that the PA PUC’s refusal to provide investigative information pursuant to the NTSB’s federal authority added to delays in the investigation and safety recommendations. The NTSB recognizes Pennsylvania’s concern about the security of pipeline information