NTSB Safety Recommendation P-70-004

NTSB safety recommendation P-70-004.

THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION TAKE THE FOLLOWING ACTION: INCLUDE IN ITS PROPOSED STANDARDS A REQUIREMENT THAT GAS COMPANIES ESTABLISH EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS TO ENABLE CUSTOMERS AND THE GENERAL PUBLIC TO RECOGNIZE GAS EMERGENCY SITUATIONS AND, FURTHER, TO PROVIDE NECESSARY INFORMATION TO NOTIFY COMPANIES IMMEDIATELY.

Priority: CLASS II

Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action

Issued Date: 1969-12-04

Adopted Date: 1969-12-04

Overall Date Closed: 1976-07-20

Synopsis: ON JUNE 3, 1969, A SERIES OF EXPLOSIONS AND FIRES OCCURRED IN THE NATURAL GAS DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM IN THE WESTERN HALF OF THE GLEN PARK RESIDENTIAL SUBDIVISION OF GARY, INDIANA. THERE WERE NO FATALITIES, BUT NINE RESIDENTS AND FIVE FIREMEN WERE INJURED. SEVEN HOUSES WERE DESTROYED, AND 45 OTHERS INCURRED DAMAGE EXTENDING FROM MINOR TO VIRTUAL DESTRUCTION. TOTAL PROPERTY DAMAGE WAS ABOUT $350,000.

Probable Cause: The Board finds that the probable cause of this accident was a combination of personnel error and system inadequacy. Involved were the inadvertent opening of a separation valve by a gas company employee allowing gas at 20 p.s.i.g. to flow into a 1/4 p.s,i,g. system and a system which could not control adequately such an increase in pressure owing to the lack of overpressure protection devices. Thereafter, the increase in pressure caused the failure of a regulator diaphragm which allowed an 80-fold overpressure in the low-pressure system to become continuous for 30 - 45 minutes. Significant contributing causal factors were: 1. The inaccessibility of the shutoff valve for the regulator which failed. 2. The lack of systematic review of the hazards in the conversion operation which could have revealed the hazardous condition in which one human error could produce catastrophe, coupled with the lack of a written plan for conversion. 3. The absence in Code B31.8 of any specification of safeguards to be employed at separation (isolation) valves during pressure conversions. 4. The lack of complete leakage surveys, before and during the pressure increase in the eastern area, which would have probably disclosed and leaking condition of the pipe and avoided the major leaks which occurred on June 3, 1969.

Keywords: Training and Education, Public Education (Pipeline)

Ntsbnumber: DCA69FP004

Report Number: PAR-UNNUMBERED

Addressee Name: RSPA

Addressee Status: Closed - Acceptable Action

Addressee Date Closed: 1976-07-20

Addressee Acronym: RSPA

Addressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government

Communication Date: 1970-03-06

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: LETTER FROM OPS: THIS RECOMMENDATION WILL BE COVERED IN THIS FIRST SERIES OF PROPOSED STANDARDS. 4/2/70 NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING APPEARED IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER AS SECTION 613(D), 49 CFR PART 192. 8/12/70 INCLUDED IN THE FEDERAL GAS PIPELINE SAFETY STANDARDS EFFECTIVE NOVEMBER 12, 1970: SECTION 192.615, EMERGENCY PLANS. 10/29/70 - LETTER FROM DOT: AN ADDITION WAS MADE TO OUR PROPOSED REGULATION "AND TO KNOW HOW AND WHEN TO SHUT OFF THE SUPPLY OF GAS AT THE CUSTOMER'S METER IN AN EMERGENCY." IN RESPONSE TO THIS PROPOSAL, WE RECEIVED MANY COMMENTS POINTING OUT THAT IF PEOPLE WERE INSTRUCTED IN TURNING THE GAS OFF THEY MIGHT ALSO TURN GAS ON AND AN UNQUALIFIED PERSON TURNING GAS ON WOULD BE A VERY DANGEROUS SITUATION. BECAUSE OF THIS RESPONSE, THE ADDITIONAL PHRASE WAS DELETED IN THE REGULATION AS PUBLISHED. CORRESPONDENCE DOCUMENTATION INCOMPLETE.

Addressee Acronym: RSPA

Addressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government

Communication Date: 1970-10-12

Communication Type: Official Correspondence