NTSB Safety Recommendation P-70-022

NTSB safety recommendation P-70-022.

THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA STANDARDS INSTITUTE B31.8 COMMITTEE TAKE THE FOLOWING ACTION: INCLUDE IN ITS STANDARDS AN ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENT THAT A LEAKAGE SURVEY, AS DEFINED IN SECTION 851.21 OF USAS B31.8, BE CONDUCTED PRIOR TO CONVERSION OF LOW-PRESSURE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS TO HIGHER PRESSURE SYSTEMS, THAT SUCH SURVEYS BE CONDUCTED AT ONE OR MORE PRESSURE INCREMENTS, AND, FINALLY, AFTER THE DESIRED PRESSURE HAS BEEN ATTAINED.

Priority: CLASS II

Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action

Issued Date: 1969-12-04

Adopted Date: 1969-12-04

Overall Date Closed: 1976-07-20

Synopsis: ON JUNE 3, 1969, A SERIES OF EXPLOSIONS AND FIRES OCCURRED IN THE NATURAL GAS DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM IN THE WESTERN HALF OF THE GLEN PARK RESIDENTIAL SUBDIVISION OF GARY, INDIANA. THERE WERE NO FATALITIES, BUT NINE RESIDENTS AND FIVE FIREMEN WERE INJURED. SEVEN HOUSES WERE DESTROYED, AND 45 OTHERS INCURRED DAMAGE EXTENDING FROM MINOR TO VIRTUAL DESTRUCTION. TOTAL PROPERTY DAMAGE WAS ABOUT $350,000.

Probable Cause: The Board finds that the probable cause of this accident was a combination of personnel error and system inadequacy. Involved were the inadvertent opening of a separation valve by a gas company employee allowing gas at 20 p.s.i.g. to flow into a 1/4 p.s,i,g. system and a system which could not control adequately such an increase in pressure owing to the lack of overpressure protection devices. Thereafter, the increase in pressure caused the failure of a regulator diaphragm which allowed an 80-fold overpressure in the low-pressure system to become continuous for 30 - 45 minutes. Significant contributing causal factors were: 1. The inaccessibility of the shutoff valve for the regulator which failed. 2. The lack of systematic review of the hazards in the conversion operation which could have revealed the hazardous condition in which one human error could produce catastrophe, coupled with the lack of a written plan for conversion. 3. The absence in Code B31.8 of any specification of safeguards to be employed at separation (isolation) valves during pressure conversions. 4. The lack of complete leakage surveys, before and during the pressure increase in the eastern area, which would have probably disclosed and leaking condition of the pipe and avoided the major leaks which occurred on June 3, 1969.

Ntsbnumber: DCA69FP004

Report Number: PAR-UNNUMBERED

Addressee Name: American Society of Mechanical Engineers

Addressee Status: Closed--No Longer Applicable

Addressee Date Closed: 1976-07-20

Addressee Acronym: ASME

Addressee Organization Type: A-Associations

Communication Date: 1970-06-26

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: LETTER FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE: SUBSEQUENT TO THE RELEASE OF THE REPORT THE CODE COMMITTEE ISSUED A SUPPLEMENT TO ANSI B31.8-1968 THIS SUPPLEMENT NOW REQUIRES ACTION ON THE PART OF UTILITIES, DURING CONVERSIONS, WHICH MEET THE INTENT OF THIS RECOMMENDATION. CORRESPONDENCE DOCUMENTATION INCOMPLETE.