NTSB Safety Recommendation P-73-002

NTSB safety recommendation P-73-002.

TO THE OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION: Undertake a study of fail-safe devices which will stop the flow of gas from ruptured lines. Based on the results of this study, ops should consider amending 49 CFR 192 to require the installation of such devices at appropriate locations in gas distribution systems. (Superseded by P-81-38 through P-81-39)

Priority: CLASS II

Overall Status: Closed - Superseded

Issued Date: 1973-05-16

Adopted Date: 1973-05-16

Overall Date Closed: 1982-10-25

Synopsis: On October 30, 1972, a bulldozer struck and snapped a 3/4-inch gas-service line in Lake City, Minn. A department store located near the rupture, but not served by gas, blew up and later caught fire. Six persons died as a result of the explosion and 10 more were injured. The Northern States Power Company (NSP) later unearthed the entire service line and discovered that in addition to being snapped by the bulldozer, the line had been pulled out of a compression coupling next to the main. Gas had permeated the soil, migrated into the department-store basement, accumulated, and exploded.

Ntsbnumber: PLD73XR001

Report Number: PAR-73-01

Addressee Name: RSPA

Addressee Status: Closed - Superseded

Addressee Date Closed: 1982-10-25

Addressee Acronym: RSPA

Addressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government

Communication Date: 1973-07-20

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: -From Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety, and Consumer Affairs, Office of Pipeline Safety, United States Department of Transportation: We have reviewed your Pipeline Accident Report No. PAR-7 3·-1 on the October 30, 1972, incident at Lake City, Minnesota, and the recommendations included therein. With regard to the recommendations made to the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), we wish to advise that on April 30, 1973, a contract was awarded to the Mechanics Research Institute to conduct a study on the rapid shutdown of failed pipeline facilities and pressure limiting of pipeline systems. Included in the contract work will be a study of fail-safe devices as recommended in the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) recommendation No. P-73-2. This study will also relate to the number and location of emergency valves in high pressure distribution systems as recommended in recommendation No. P-73-4. This contract study is scheduled for completion in December 1973. The OPS will then evaluate the data obtained and take the appropriate action. We will keep you advised of the action taken in this regard. In addition, NTSB recommendation No. P-73-4 requests consideration for placing valve keys in the hands of local authorities. This portion of the recommendation is being considered in connection with the OPS's plan to clarify the intent of the requirements for operating and maintenance plans and emergency plans as outlined in our letter to you dated July 5, 1973. We agree with NTSB recommendation No. P-73-3 insofar as it recommends a review of the regulations relative to the uncertainty as to the conditions which permit the use of compression couplings. Such a review will shortly be initiated. To the extent that the review shows a need for amending Paragraph 192.367(b), rulemaking will be initiated. The OPS also concurs with the recommendations made by NTSB to the other parties of interest in this Lake City incident. The NTSB's recommendations No. P-73-5 to the Department of Labor and No. P-73-11 to the Department of Public Works of Lake City, Minnesota, will lend support to the OPS program to promote the Model Statute For The Protection of Underground Pipelines and Utilities. The NTSB recommendation No. P-73-·6 to the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Gas Piping Standards Committee (ASME) will support the OPS recommendation to that Society to develop guideline material on the location of emergency valves. The OPS has suggested to ASME that they include such guideline material in a supplement to the "ASME Guide For Gas Transmission and Distribution Pipeline Systems -1973." The recommendations Nos. P-73-7 through 10 to the Northern States Power Company all relate to areas that we are emphasizing in the OPS/State agencies pipeline safety seminars that are presently being conducted throughout the country. These areas will also be included in our considerations for clarifying the intent of the requirements for operating and maintenance plans and emergency plans as discussed in our letter of July 5. We greatly appreciate your pipeline accident investigation report and will continue to take the appropriate actions as indicated.

Addressee Acronym: RSPA

Addressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government

Communication Date: 1982-08-11

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: RSPA (MTB) LTR: THIS RESPONSE WAS DIRECTED AT P-81-38 AND 39 BUT IT APPLIES HERE AS "FAIL SAFE DEVICES" CAN BE INTERPRETED AS "EXCESS FLOW VALVES."

Addressee Acronym: RSPA

Addressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government

Communication Date: 1978-04-03

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: OPSO LETTER IN RESPONSE TO NTSB 11/4/77 LETTER REQUESTING UPDATE OF OPSO CONTRACT WORK AND FURTHER ACTION: DISCUSSED STUDY ON RAPID SHUTDOWN OF FAILED FACILITIES WHICH INCLUDES A SECTION ON FAIL SAFE DEVICES. EVALUATION OF THE REPORT AND OTHER DATA HAVE SHOWN THAT SUCH DEVICES MAY HAVE SAFETY POTENTIAL. RULEMAKING ACTION WILL BE CONSIDERED FOR OPSO'S 1979 PROGRAM.

Addressee Acronym: RSPA

Addressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government

Communication Date: 1977-11-04

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Addressee Acronym: RSPA

Addressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government

Communication Date: 1982-10-25

Communication Type: Official Correspondence