NTSB Safety Recommendation P-74-018

NTSB safety recommendation P-74-018.

THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION: Require that designated emergency valves be the valves closed initially when a section of main is required to be isolated in an emergency.

Priority: CLASS II

Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action

Issued Date: 1974-03-11

Adopted Date: 1974-02-27

Overall Date Closed: 1979-02-22

Synopsis: A gas explosion and fire occurred on December 9, 1972, in downtown Clinton, MO. Gas had leaked into a building from a cracked cast-iron main located behind the building. Missouri Public Service Company personnel arrived at the site of the reported leak 50 minutes before the explosion. Eight persons died, and seven others were injured.

Ntsbnumber: PLD73XR004

Report Number: PAR-74-03

Addressee Name: RSPA

Addressee Status: Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action

Addressee Date Closed: 1979-02-22

Addressee Acronym: RSPA

Addressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government

Communication Date: 1974-03-29

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: Enclosed is a copy of the National Transportation Safety Board's report of a natural gas pipeline accident which occurred in Clinton, Missouri, on December 9, 1972. In this accident eight persons died, seven others were injured, and two office buildings were destroyed. We call your attention to the Safety Board's recommendations issued to prevent similar accidents. The Office of Pipeline Safety's cooperation in assisting the Safety Board during the investigation is appreciated. This document will be released to the public on the date stamped on the cover. No public dissemination of this document should be made prior to that date. The purpose of providing this document in advance of the public release date is to give you an opportunity to be acquainted with its contents prior to release, so that you can be prepared to answer inquiries.

Addressee Acronym: RSPA

Addressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government

Communication Date: 1979-02-22

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: We have reviewed our file related to our pipeline safety recommendations P-74-16 and P-74-18. These recommendations address the problems of gas flow data telemetering for warnings of system failures and the closing of designated emergency valves for isolation of system segments. We note that on June 29, 1974, an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) was published which requested comments on recommendations P-74-16 through P-74-27 all developed as a result of the National Transportation Safety Board’s investigation of the Missouri Public Service Company fire and explosion in Clinton, Missouri, on December 9, 1972. Further, on September 21, 1978, a withdrawal of that ANPRH was published. In that withdrawal, reasons were published for not expending further effort on P-74-16, P-74-17, and P-74-18, those addressed to HTB (OPSO). Based on the activity since the issuance of P-74-16 on February 27, 1974, the Board has classified that recommendation as "CLOSED – NO LONGER APPLICABLE." On July 31, 1978, we issued recommendation P-78-44 which deals on a smaller scale with the same problem addressed in P-74-16, that of prompt warning of system failure through remote data gathering. Your letter of November 17, 1978, notified us that you will again seek comments through an ANPRM on the concept of telemetering. We have also issued a similar recommendation (P-78-43) to the Gas Piping Standards Committee. of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers. They have agreed to discuss the concept in the hopes of developing an industry guideline. We will follow the ANPRM activity with interest. With regard to P-74-17 and P-74-18, we are in agreement that the March 31, 1976, revisions to 49 CFR 192.615 do provide the protection necessary. The Board acted to close P-74-17 as acceptable action on September 28, 1978, and we have now classified P-74-18 as "CLOSED -ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATE ACTION." We appreciate the cooperation we have received from MTB on matters concerning pipeline transportation safety. We value the opportunity to discuss openly our views in this field and we hope to maintain this channel for the exchange of ideas.

Addressee Acronym: RSPA

Addressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government

Communication Date: 1974-04-09

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: -From Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety, and Consumer Affairs, Office of Pipeline Safety, United States Department of Transportation: This letter acknowledges receipt of your report of the gas pipeline accident in Clinton, Missouri, December 9, 1972. I have sent the report to the Office of Pipeline Safety for appropriate action, and have asked that they provide specific responses to the recommendations applicable to this office.

Addressee Acronym: RSPA

Addressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government

Communication Date: 1974-04-01

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: -From Claude S. Brinegar, Secretary of Transportation: This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter of March 29 enclosing a copy of the Board's report of a natural gas pipeline accident which occurred in Clinton, Missouri, on December 9, 1972. The recommendations contained in the report are receiving attention by the Department's Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety and Consumer Affairs, as well as other appropriate Departmental officials.

Addressee Acronym: RSPA

Addressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government

Communication Date: 1974-07-31

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: -From Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety, and Consumer Affairs, Office of Pipeline Safety, United States Department of Transportation: Thank you for your report on the Missouri Public Service Company pipeline failure that occurred in Clinton, Missouri, December 9, 1972 (NTSB-PAR-74-3). The Board concluded the report by recommending that the Office of Pipeline Safety: "(a) Revise 49 CFR 192.741 to require pipeline operators to telemeter gas pressure or flow data in such a way as to insure prompt warnings of significant system failures shown by pressure or flow changes. The type and location of the data points should be considered on an individual basis and should include single-fed systems serving substantial numbers of customers. "(b) Define what constitutes an emergency and provide clarification of the requirements of emergency procedures under 49 CFR 192.615, Emergency plans. "(c) Require that designated emergency valves be the valves closed initially when a section of main is required to be isolated in an emergency." Because we are uncertain about the scope of any proposed rules involving each of the Board's recommendations and whether they may be reasonably implemented, we have published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking on the subject to seek any additional information that might be available. This notice was published in 39 F.R. 24027 on June 28, 1974, and the closing date for comments is September 2, 1974. We will advise you whether or not a regulatory action is considered necessary at the conclusion of our evaluation of the Board's recommendations and any comments received as a result of the notice.