NTSB Safety Recommendation P-81-016

NTSB safety recommendation P-81-016.

THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE AND THE AMERICAN GAS ASSOCIATION: WORK WITH APPROPRIATE INDUSTRY GROUPS AND OTHER PIPELINE COMPANIES TO ADVANCE THE STATE OF THE ART IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNAL PIPELINE INSPECTION EQUIPMENT FOR THE DETECTION OF STRESS CRACKS IN OPERATING PIPELINES.

Priority: CLASS II

Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action

Issued Date: 1981-07-21

Adopted Date: 1981-07-15

Overall Date Closed: 1997-03-20

Synopsis: ON MARCH 6, 1980, A 32-INCH-DIAMETER REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS PIPELINE OWNED AND OPERATED BY THE COLONIAL PIPELINE COMPANY RUPTURED IN TWO LOCATIONS SIMULTAN EOUSLY. ONE BREAK, WHERE THE PIPE HAD BEEN THINNED BY CORROSION IN A CASING UNDER A ROAD, CAUSED THE RELEASE OF 8,000 BARRELS (336,000 GALLONS) OF AVIATION-GRADE KEROSENE ADJACENT TO ROUTE 234 NEAR MANASSAS VIRGINIA. BEFORE BEING FULLY CONTAINED, THE KEROSENE HAD FLOWED INTO BULL RUN RIVER AND HAD ENTERED THE OCCOQUAN RESERVOIR, A SOURCE OF DRINKING WATER FOR SEVERAL NORTHERN VIRGINIA COMMUNITIES.

Probable Cause: None

Ntsbnumber: DCA80MP010

Report Number: PAR-81-02

Addressee Name: American Petroleum Institute

Addressee Status: Closed - Acceptable Action

Addressee Date Closed: 1997-03-20

Addressee Acronym: API

Addressee Organization Type: A-Associations

Communication Date: 1996-08-05

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: API CONTINUES TO SUPPORT RESEARCH RELATED TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNAL PIPELINE INSPECTION EQUIPMENT & TO THE TYPES OF DEFECTS THAT CAN BE IDENTIFIED USING IN-LINE TOOLS. AN API STAFF MEMBER & A LIQUID PIPELINE INDUSTRY REPRESENTATIVE CURRENTLY SERVE AS MEMBERS OF THE GAS RESEARCH INSTITUTE TRANSMISSION PROJECT ADVISORY GROUP. GRI'S TRANSMISSION RESEARCH PROGRAM INCLUDES TESTING OF THE CAPABILITIES OF IN-LINE INSPECTION TOOLS AT THE PIPELINE SIMULATION FACILITY.

Addressee Acronym: API

Addressee Organization Type: A-Associations

Communication Date: 1981-10-23

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE (API) LTR: API HAS RECEIVED A REQUEST FROM THE MATERIALS TRANSPORTATION BUREAU TO JOINTLY STUDY WITH THE MTB THE EXTENT TO WHICH FATIGUE CRACKING MAY EXIST IN LARGE DIAMETER PIPELINES BUILT PRIOR TO 1965. WE HAVE TRANSMITTED COPIES OF THE TWO LETTERS TO THE INSTI TUTE'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE ON PIPELINE TRANSPORTATION WITH A REQUEST THAT COMPANIES REVIEW THE EVENTS OF THESE ACCIDENTS FOR RELEVANCE TO THEIR OWN OPERATIONS. THE MTB REQUEST HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO OUR TECHNICAL COMMITTEES FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION.

Addressee Acronym: API

Addressee Organization Type: A-Associations

Communication Date: 1981-12-22

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: We have reviewed your October 23, 1981, letter in response to the National Transportation Safety Boards Safety Recommendations P-81-16 and -20 which resulted from our investigation of the petroleum products pipeline failures at Manassas and Locust Grove, Virginia on March 6, 1980, and of the gasoline explosion and fire at RoseviIIe, Minnesota on April 16,1980, With respect to P-81-16, we are pleased to learn that you have asked your transportation committee to review the events of the Manassas and Locust Grove, Virginia accident. We hope that the committee wiII be able to advise that the resources of the American Petroleum Institute (API) wiII be brought to bear on the problem of internal pipe inspection equipment. We wiII classify this recommendation as “Open-Acceptable Action” pending further API action and response. The use of the transportation committee to have companies review the RoseviIIe, Minnesota accident is acceptable toward fulfilling P-81-20. We would appreciate receiving a copy of any letter of request for accident review by the individual companies that may have gone out under API auspices. We wiII hold the file for P-81-20 in an ’Open-Acceptable Action” status pending further response. Thank you for your effort in responding to our recommendations.

Addressee Acronym: API

Addressee Organization Type: A-Associations

Communication Date: 1997-03-20

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: THE BOARD UNDERSTANDS THAT THE API IS CONDUCTING AS WELL AS SUPPORTING RESEARCH WHICH ADDRESSES THE DEVELOPMENT & USE OF TECHNOLOGY FOR LOCATING & EVALUATING PIPELINE DEFECTS WITH IN-LINE INSPECTION EQUIPMENT; THEREFORE, P-81-16 HAS BEEN CLASSIFIED "CLOSED--ACCEPTABLE ACTION."

Addressee Name: American Gas Association

Addressee Status: Closed - Acceptable Action

Addressee Date Closed: 2005-09-15

Addressee Acronym: AGA

Addressee Organization Type: A-Associations

Communication Date: 1981-08-11

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: AMERICAN GAS ASSOCIATION LTR: AN OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENTLY SPONSORED RESEARCH IS DESCRIBED IN THE 1981 PIPELINE RESEARCH SUMMARY. FOR 1981 THE PROGRAMS TOTAL &4 MILLION. CURRENTLY THREE SPECIFIC PROGRAMS ARE BEING DIRECTED BY AGA TO NO-DESTRUCTIVE TESTING EVALUATIONS FOR ENHANCING THE TECHNOLOGY OF PIPELINE INTEGRITY. PROPRIETARY RESEARCH IS REPORTEDLY BEING CONDUCTED BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS FOR ACHIEVING THE MUTUAL GOAL OF AN IMPROVED INTERNAL PIPELINE INSPECTION SYSTEM. THIS RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITY IS AIMED AT IMPROVING THE INTEGRITY OF RECORDINGS, I.E,. TO INSURE THAT NEARLY ALL SIGNIFICANT ANOMALIES ARE RECORDED BY MAGNETIC OR ULTRASONIC METHODS & THEN IDENTIFIED AS TO THEIR DEGREE OF SEVERITY. AGA, THROUGH ITS MULTI-INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS, IS COGNIZANT OF THESE RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES &, AS SUCH IS CLOSELY MONITORING & BEING KEPT AWARE OF THE SALIENT DEVELOPMENTS. HOWEVER, IT IS YET TOO EARLY TO REACH ANY CONCLUSIONS AS TO THE DEPENDABILITY OR ECONOMIC VIABILITY SUCH PROSPECTIVE DEVICES AS APPLIED TO THE U.S. PIPELINE SYSTEMS.

Addressee Acronym: AGA

Addressee Organization Type: A-Associations

Communication Date: 2005-09-15

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: In the course of reviewing the status of safety recommendations classified "open" in the Safety Recommendations database, the Safety Board noted that while P-81-16 was classified "Closed-Acceptable Action" on March 20, 1997, for the API and the overall status was also classified "Closed-Acceptable Action," the recommendation remained classified "Open-Await Response" to the AGA. Board staff cannot determine why the classification remained "Open-Await Response" to the AGA. The AGA responded to the recommendation on August 11, 1981. And the Safety Board's October 13, 1981, letter back to the AGA suggests that the Board was satisfied with AGA's initial response and even stated that "We appreciate the light you have shed on the subject and expect no further direct response to the recommendation." The Board did not assign a status in the October 1981 letter, and there was no further correspondence with the AGA on this recommendation. From the database, we know that because the API worked with the AGA and other industry groups to conduct as well as support the development and use of technology for locating and evaluating pipeline defects with in-line inspection equipment, Safety Recommendation P-81-16 was classified "Closed-Acceptable Action" to the API. Accordingly, because it is apparent that the AGA likewise worked with the API and other industry groups, Safety Recommendation P-81-16 is classified "Closed-Acceptable Action" to the AGA as well. The Board believes that this issue should have been corrected in the database long ago, and that a letter to the AGA informing them of the revised status of this recommendation will have little meaning for them. Accordingly, no letter will be sent. Notation #3262B will serve as documentation for administratively classifying Safety Recommendation P-81-16 "Closed-Acceptable Action" for the AGA.

Addressee Acronym: AGA

Addressee Organization Type: A-Associations

Communication Date: 1981-10-13

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: We have reviewed your August 11, 1981, letter in response to the National Transportation Safety Board’s Safety Recommendation P-81-16 which resulted from our investigation of the pipeline failures on the Colonial Pipeline Company system at Manassas and Locust Grove, Virginia on March 6, 1980. The discussion and examples of research being carried out within the gas industry related to non-destructive testing * (NDT) of buried pipelines, that is also non-invasive, has satisfied the Board that the American Gas Association is taking steps to solve buried pipeline integrity problems. We appreciate the light you have shed on the subject and expect no further direct response to this recommendation. We would appreciate, however, being informed of any decisions made on actions taken to validate or develop the acoustic emission form of NDT. The Board also appreciates your comments on the rail transportation of line pipe and the copy of the Battelle report on the problem for future reference. We have placed this report in our library of transportation safety. Thank you for your continued efforts on behalf of pipeline safety.