NTSB Safety Recommendation P-83-040

NTSB safety recommendation P-83-040.

THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE AMERICAN GAS ASSOCIATION AND THE INTERSTATE NATURAL GAS ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA: ADVISE ITS MEMBER COMPANIES TO COORDINATE AND COOPERATE WITH LOCAL FIRE AND EMERGENCY AGENCIES ALONG THEIR SYSTEMS TO ALLOW THEM TO BECOME FAMILIAR WITH COMPANY FACILITIES AND TO PROVIDE FACILITY MAPS TO THESE AGENCIES IN ORDER THAT RAPID, EFFECTIVE RESPONSE CAN BE MADE IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS.

Priority: CLASS II

Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action

Issued Date: 1984-01-17

Adopted Date: 1983-12-12

Overall Date Closed: 2001-04-05

Synopsis: ON MAY 26, 1983, NATURAL GAS AT 815 POUNDS/SQUARE INCH GAGE (PSIG) BEGAN TO ESCAPE THROUGH A FAILED GASKET IN A COMPRESSOR AT THE EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY'S BLANCO GASOLINE PLANT NEAR BLOOMFIELD, NEW MEXICO. THE COMPRESSOR STATION OPERATOR HEARD A LOUD NOISE, RAN TO THE VALVE MANIFOLD OUTSIDE THE COMPRESSOR BUILDING, AND TRIED TO SHUT OFF THE GAS SUPPLY TO COMPRESSOR NO. 14. ANOTHER EMPLOYEE, WHO ALSO HEARD THE NOISE, RAN INTO THE COMPRESSOR BUILDING AND TRIED TO SHUT DOWN THE COMPRESSOR ENGINE. BEFORE EITHER PERSON SUCCEEDED, THE ESCAPING GAS IGNITED, EXPLODED, AND BURNED. THE TWO EMPLOYEES WERE BURNED SEVERELY, ONE COMPRESSOR WAS DESTROYED, ANOTHER COMPRESSOR WAS DAMAGED, THE WINDOWS AND DOORS OF THE COMPRESSOR BUILDING WERE BLOWN OUT, AND OTHER STRUCTURAL DAMAGE RESULTED.

Probable Cause: The probable cause was the improper tightening of compressor head bolts, which caused a compressor head gasket to rupture and release natural gas that ignited; contributing factors were El Paso’s lack of proper bolt-tightening procedures and maintenance training, and inadequate emergency-procedure training that delayed blowdown and extended the emergency.

Ntsbnumber: DCA83MP019

Report Number: PAR-83-04

Addressee Name: Interstate Natural Gas Association of America

Addressee Status: Closed - Unacceptable Action

Addressee Date Closed: 2001-04-05

Addressee Acronym: INGAA

Addressee Organization Type: A-Associations

Communication Date: 1984-01-20

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: INGAA LETTER: ENCLOSED FOR YOUR INFORMATION IS A COPY OF THE MEMO TO INGAA'S MEMBERSHIP NOTIFYING THEM OF NTSB'S RECOMMENDATIONS P-83-38 THROUGH -40. ADDITIONALLY, AS HAS BEEN INGAA'S POLICY IN THE PAST, THESE RECOMMENDATIONS WILL BE AGENDA ITEMS AT THE NEXT INGAA PIPELINE SAFETY AND CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATIONS COMMITTEE MEETINGS.

Addressee Acronym: INGAA

Addressee Organization Type: A-Associations

Communication Date: 1984-04-30

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: On April 30, 1984, based on information provided in the INGAA letter of January 20, 1984, indicating that the Board’s recommendations were scheduled for discussion at the next INGAA pipeline committee meeting, Safety Recommendations P-83-38 through -40 were classified “Open-Acceptable Response.” Because the Safety Board has received no further response from INGAA on these issues, Safety Recommendations P-83-38 through -40 are classified “Closed-Unacceptable Action.”

Addressee Acronym: INGAA

Addressee Organization Type: A-Associations

Communication Date: 2000-08-08

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: ON 4/30/84, BASED ON INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THE INGAA LETTER OF 1/20/84, P-83-38 THROUGH -40 WERE CLASSIFIED "OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE." TO DATE THE SAFETY BOARD HAS HAD NO FURTHER RESPONSE FROM INGAA, AND WE WOULD APPRECIATE LEARNING WHAT ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN TO IMPLEMENT THESE RECOMMENDATIONS.

Addressee Acronym: INGAA

Addressee Organization Type: A-Associations

Communication Date: 2001-04-05

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: On April 30, 1984, based on information provided in the INGAA letter of January 20, 1984, indicating that the Board’s recommendations were scheduled for discussion at the next INGAA pipeline committee meeting, Safety Recommendations P-83-38 through -40 were classified “Open--Acceptable Response.” Because the Safety Board has received no further response from INGAA on these issues, Safety Recommendations P-83-38 through -40 are classified “Closed--Unacceptable Action.”

Addressee Name: American Gas Association

Addressee Status: Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action

Addressee Date Closed: 1985-01-11

Addressee Acronym: AGA

Addressee Organization Type: A-Associations

Communication Date: 1984-07-20

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: AGA LETTER: MEMBERS SHOULD REVIEW 192.615, EMERGENCY PLANS, AND ENSURE THAT PROPER PROCEDURES, BOTH INTERNALLY AND WITH APPROPRIATE LOCAL FIRE AND EMERGENCY AGENCIES, ARE OUTLINED AND CAN BE IMPLEMENTED EFFECTIVELY WHEN REQUIRED.

Addressee Acronym: AGA

Addressee Organization Type: A-Associations

Communication Date: 1985-01-11

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: FAMILARITY WITH A FACILITY BY THE JURISDICTIONAL FIRE DEPARTMENT IS HIGHLY IMPORTANT, MAY WELL PREVENT THE TOTAL LOSS OF A FACILITY, AND WILL ASSIST IN KEEPING FIREFIGHTER AND EMPLOYEE INJURIES TO A MINIMUM. WE REITERATE THAT 49 CFR 192.615(C) REQUIRES LIAISON OF THE NATURE WE HAVE SUGGESTED AS WELL AS PLANNING FOR MUTUAL ASSISTANCE. THE SAFETY BOARD BELIEVES ALSO THAT IT IS IN THE BEST ECONOMIC INTEREST OF GAS COMPANIES TO PREPLAN WITH LOCAL FIRE DEPARTMENTS FOR EMERGENCIES. YOUR ENCOURAGEMENT TO YOUR MEMBER COMPANIES TO REVIEW 192.615 AND ENSURE PROPER PROCEDURES APPEARS TO BE A SATISFACTORY ALTERNATE TO PROVIDING FACILITY MAPS IN ALL SITUATIONS. WE HAVE PLACED P-83-40 IN A "CLOSED--ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATE ACTION" STATUS.