NTSB Safety Recommendation P-87-011

NTSB safety recommendation P-87-011.

THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CORROSION ENGINEERS: DEVELOP A SYSTEM FOR COLLECTING INFORMATION ON CORROSION-CAUSED PIPELINE FAILURES AND LEAKS TO EVALUATE THE ADEQUACY OF CRITERIA AND PROCEDURES INCLUDED IN ITS RECOMMENDED PRACTICES FOR CONTROLLING THE CORROSION OF BURIED PIPELINES.

Priority: CLASS III

Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action

Issued Date: 1987-03-24

Adopted Date: 1987-02-18

Overall Date Closed: 2003-03-27

Synopsis: ON APRIL 27, 1985, NATURAL GAS UNDER 990 PSIG RUPTURED THE NO. 10 PIPELINE OF THE TEXAS GAS PIPELINE COMPANY SYSTEM. THE RUPTURE WAS IN AN AREA WEAKENED BY ATMOSPHERIC CORROSION THAT WAS LOCATED WITHIN THE PIPELINE'S CASING UNDER KENTUCKY STATE HIGHWAY 90 NEAR BEAUMONT, KENTUCKY. THE ENSUING FIRE KILLED FIVE PERSONS IN A HOUSE LOCATED NORTH OF THE RUPTURE, INJURED THREE PERSONS AS THEY FLED FROM THEIR HOUSE LOCATED SOUTH OF THE RUPTURE, AND DESTROYED SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNTS OF PROPERTY. ON FEBRUARY 21, 1986, NATURAL GAS UNDER 987 PSIG RUPTURED THE NO. 15 PIPELINE OF THE TEXAS EASTERN GAS PIPE LINE SYSTEM. THE RUPTURE WAS IN AN AREA WEAKENED BY GAL VANIC CORROSION AND WAS LOCATED SOUTH OF KENTUCKY STATE HIGHWAY 52 NEAR LANCASTER, KENTUCKY. THE FORCE OF THE ESCAPING GAS AND THE ENSUING FIRE INJURED THREE PERSONS AS THEY FLED FROM THEIR HOUSES, RESULTED IN THE EVACUATION OF 77 OTHER PERSONS, AND DESTROYED SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNTS OF PROPERTY.

Probable Cause: None

Ntsbnumber: DCA85FP011

Report Number: PAR-87-01

Addressee Name: National Association of Corrosion Engineers

Addressee Status: Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action

Addressee Date Closed: 2003-03-27

Addressee Acronym: NACE

Addressee Organization Type: A-Associations

Communication Date: 2002-11-22

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: Letter Mail Controlled 12/05/2002 4:03:21 PM MC# 2020996 The NTSB Safety Recommendation P-87-11 contains a request which ask NACE to develop a system for collecting information on corrosion-caused pipeline failures and leaks to evaluate the adequacy of criteria and procedures included in its recommended practices for controlling the corrosion of buried pipelines. In your letter received by NACE on April 27, 1989, which was in response to the letter from NACE dated January 18,1989, you noted that a survey we conducted was not able to produce reliable data for determining if the cathodic protection criteria were adequate to achieve cathodic protection. In relation to this issue, the industry conducted a research project to evaluate the effectiveness of the cathodic protection criteria in actual field conditions. This work was performed by the Pipeline Research Council International (PRCI), and was published in February 1994. It was done under contract number PR-208-163, and is entitled "Field Testing the Criteria for Cathodic Protection of Buried Pipelines." This project was done to examine under actual field conditions, similar work that was done in a laboratory under PRCI project number PR-3-129. This latter report was published in 1983, and is entitled "An Assessment of Criteria for Cathodic Protection of Buried Pipelines." The two reports reached the same conclusion with respect to the adequacy of the cathodic protection criteria contained in RP0169-83. It was determined that any of the published criteria would be adequate in certain conditions, but that none of the criteria would be adequate in every circumstance. It also found that some criteria were difficult to apply (e.g., the "E log-l" and "Net Protective Current" criteria) and that one, the "300 millivolt shift" criterion, could be inadequate in many cases. These three criteria were excluded from the 1992 and later editions of RP0169. The other criteria, "-850 millivolt potential" criterion and the "100 millivolts of polarization" criterion remain in the document. The -850 millivolt criterion was slightly revised in the 1992 version of RPO169 to make clear that the IR Drop must be accounted for when evaluating pipe-to-soil potential readings. These criteria, as applied to carbon steel pipe, are contained in Section 62.2 of RP0169-2002. The PR-208-163 report cited elevated temperatures and the presence of sulfate-reducing bacteria as two conditions where the criteria would be inadequate and higher levels of cathodic protection would be necessary. This concept was recognized at the time and was incorporated in RPOl69-83 and is continued into the current standard, RP0169-2002. Section 6.0 of RP0169-2002 is titled "Criteria and Other Considerations for Cathodic Protection" and is intended to convey to the reader that the criteria are to be used in consideration of several "Special Conditions" and "Precautions", which are described in Sections 6.2.2.2 and 6.2.2.3, respectively.

Addressee Acronym: NACE

Addressee Organization Type: A-Associations

Communication Date: 1989-01-18

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: ALTHOUGH DEVELOPMENT OF SUCH A DATA BASE CONTAINING APPROPRIATE INFORMATION VOLUNTEERED BY INDUSTRY IS FEASIBLE, TWO OBSTACLES MUST BE OVERCOME. ONE COULD BE THE ECONOMIC BURDEN IMPOSED ON INDUSTRY TO OBTAIN WORTHWHILE DATA. THOSE COSTS WOULD RESULT IN INCREASED COSTS BEING PASSED ON TO THE CONSUMER. THE SECOND OBSTACLE WOULD BE IN COLLECTING RELIABLE DATA ON THE CATHODIC PROTECTION CRITERIA BECAUSE OF NONUNIFORM MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUES USED BY THE VARIOUS COMPANIES. IN ITS EFFORTS TO COLLECT THAT TYPE OF DATA DURING THE REVISION OF RP0169, NACE, WITH COOPERATION FROM AGA AND API, CONDUCTED A SURVEY OF THE PIPELINE INDUSTRY. QUESTION NAIRE FORMS COVERING 2000 CASE HISTORIES WERE OBTAINED. ALL DATA WAS REQUESTED TO BE SUBMITTED FROM BELL HOLE AND IN LINE INSPECTIONS. UNFORTUNATELY, NO RELIABLE CONCLUSIONS COULD BE MADE FROM THE DATA BECAUSE OF INCOMPLETE FORMS SUBMITTED AND BECAUSE OF NONUNIFORM METHODS OF TAKING THE READ INGS. TASK GROUP T-10, AFTER A CAREFUL REVIEW OF THE DATA SUMMARIZED IN 40 DIFFERENT CHARTS ANALYZING THE DATA FROM MANY PARAMETERS, DECIDED THAT ANY CONCLUSIONS MADE FROM THE DATA COULD BE MISLEADING AND INACCURATE. CURRENTLY, AGA IS COMPLETING A 5-YEAR FIELD RESEARCH PROGRAM ON THE EFFECTIVES OF THE CATHODIC PROTECTION CRITERIA CURRENTLY LISTED IN RP0169. THAT RESEARCH PROGRAM MAY BE COMPLETED WITHIN 2 YEARS AND MAY PROVIDE INFORMATION ON WHETHER THE CRITERIA ARE EFFECTIVE MEANS OF DETERMINING WHETHER CATHODIC PROTEC TION IS ACHIEVED. AS SOON AS THE REVISED RP0169 HAS BEEN APPROVED, NACE WILL SEND YOU A COPY.

Addressee Acronym: NACE

Addressee Organization Type: A-Associations

Communication Date: 2003-03-27

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: The Safety Board notes that NACE International, in conjunction with industry, conducted a research project to evaluate the effectiveness of the cathodic protection criteria in actual field conditions. This research was performed by the Pipeline Research Council International (PRCI) and was published in February 1994 in a report titled Field Testing the Criteria for Cathodic Protection of Buried Pipelines. An earlier project examined the corrosion of pipelines within a laboratory; this research, An Assessment of Criteria for Cathodic Protection of Buried Pipelines, was published in 1983. We appreciate your providing us the results of this research. While NACE International, after extensive work with the pipeline industry, has been unable to provide a reliable system for the collection of across-the-board reliable data for all operations, it was able to develop a system with some accuracy for collecting information on corrosion-caused pipeline failures and leaks. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation P-87-11 is classified "Closed--Acceptable Alternate Action."

Addressee Acronym: NACE

Addressee Organization Type: A-Associations

Communication Date: 2002-05-06

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: On April 27, 1989, in consideration of information in the January 18, 1989, letter from Mr. Dale Miller, NACE's Director of Public Affairs, Safety Recommendations P-87-10 and -11 were classified "Open--Acceptable Response." To date, no further correspondence has been received from NACE concerning this issue. The Safety Board is interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all our recommendations. We would appreciate an update from you regarding actions taken or planned to implement these recommendations. Please address your response to Ms. Marion C. Blakey, Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, and refer to the recommendations by number in your response.

Addressee Acronym: NACE

Addressee Organization Type: A-Associations

Communication Date: 2002-11-18

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: On April 27, 1989, in consideration of information in the January 18, 1989, letter from Mr. Dale Miller, NACE International's Director of Public Affairs, Safety Recommendations P-87-10 and -11 were classified "Open-Acceptable Response." In response to the Safety Board's May 6, 2002, letter requesting information on the status of action to implement the recommendations, NACE International responded on July 9, 2002, advising that this issue had been forwarded to the NACE International Public Affairs Committee, Technical Resource Team, to address these issues. The Technical Resource Team, comprising a number of subject matter experts, would complete its work on these issues by September 15, 2002, and NACE International would provide a follow-on response to the Safety Board. On February 25, 1999, in response to information provided in NACE International's January 7, 1999, letter, the Safety Board classified Safety Recommendation P-98-40 "Open--Acceptable Response," pending publication of the proposed NACE International standard, Detection and Control of Microbially Influenced External Corrosion for Buried, Partially Buried or Submerged Metallic Piping Systems. To date, the Safety Board has received no further information from NACE International on the status of activities related to these recommendations. The Board is interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all our recommendations. We would appreciate receiving an update from you regarding actions taken or planned to implement the recommendations. Please address your response to Ms. Carol J. Carmody, Acting Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, and refer to the recommendations by number in your response. Copies of the recommendation letters and associated correspondence are enclosed for your reference.

Addressee Acronym: NACE

Addressee Organization Type: A-Associations

Communication Date: 1990-05-31

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Addressee Acronym: NACE

Addressee Organization Type: A-Associations

Communication Date: 1988-10-21

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Addressee Acronym: NACE

Addressee Organization Type: A-Associations

Communication Date: 1989-04-27

Communication Type: Official Correspondence