NTSB Safety Recommendation P-87-012

NTSB safety recommendation P-87-012.

THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERS GAS PIPE STANDARDS COMMITTEE: REVISE ITS GUIDE LINES TO ASSIST OPERATORS OF GAS PIPELINES IN DETERMINING WHEN ANNUAL TEST STATION MONITORING MAY NOT BE EFFECTIVE FOR IDENTIFYING AREAS OF CORROSION, IN DETERMINING WHERE SEGMENTS OF PIPELINE MAY BE SHIELDED FROM THE AFFECTS OF CATHODIC PROTECTION SYSTEMS, IN DETERMINING HOW AND WHEN TO INSPECT PIPES INSTALLED IN CASINGS FOR EVIDENCE OF ATMOSPHERIC CORROSION, AND IN DETERMINING WHEN HYDROSTATIC TESTING OR IN-LINE INSTRUMENT INSPECTIONS SHOULD BE USED FOR IDENTIFYING AREAS OF CORROSION.

Priority: CLASS III

Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action

Issued Date: 1987-04-27

Adopted Date: 1987-02-18

Overall Date Closed: 2002-05-07

Synopsis: ON APRIL 27, 1985, NATURAL GAS UNDER 990 PSIG RUPTURED THE NO. 10 PIPELINE OF THE TEXAS GAS PIPELINE COMPANY SYSTEM. THE RUPTURE WAS IN AN AREA WEAKENED BY ATMOSPHERIC CORROSION THAT WAS LOCATED WITHIN THE PIPELINE'S CASING UNDER KENTUCKY STATE HIGHWAY 90 NEAR BEAUMONT, KENTUCKY. THE ENSUING FIRE KILLED FIVE PERSONS IN A HOUSE LOCATED NORTH OF THE RUPTURE, INJURED THREE PERSONS AS THEY FLED FROM THEIR HOUSE LOCATED SOUTH OF THE RUPTURE, AND DESTROYED SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNTS OF PROPERTY. ON FEBRUARY 21, 1986, NATURAL GAS UNDER 987 PSIG RUPTURED THE NO. 15 PIPELINE OF THE TEXAS EASTERN GAS PIPELINE SYSTEM. THE RUPTURE WAS IN AN AREA WEAKENED BY GALVANIC CORROSION AND WAS LOCATED SOUTH OF KENTUCKY STATE HIGHWAY 52 NEAR LANCASTER, KENTUCKY. THE FORCE OF THE ESCAPING GAS AND THE ENSUING FIRE INJURED THREE PERSONS AS THEY FLED FROM THEIR HOUSES, RESULTED IN THE EVACUATION OF 77 OTHER PERSONS, AND DESTROYED SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNTS OF PROPERTY.

Probable Cause: None

Ntsbnumber: DCA85FP011

Report Number: PAR-87-01

Addressee Name: American Society of Mechanical Engineers

Addressee Status: Closed - Acceptable Action

Addressee Date Closed: 2002-05-07

Addressee Acronym: ASME

Addressee Organization Type: A-Associations

Communication Date: 1987-04-14

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: THE ASME GAS PIPING TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE IS IN RECEIPT OF YOUR TRANSMITTAL OF 3/24/87 CONCERNING THE INCIDENTS AT BEAUMONT AND LANCASTER, KENTUCKY. BE ADVISED THAT THE COM MITTEE HAS INITIATED WORK ON NTSB'S RECOMMENDATION UNDER OUR TRANSACTION NUMBER TR87-6.

Addressee Acronym: ASME

Addressee Organization Type: A-Associations

Communication Date: 1996-03-19

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: GPTC NEEDS TO RE-BALLOT THE PROPOSED GUIDE MATERIAL TO ADDRESS THE NTSB RECOMMENDATION. THIS SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE NEXT LETTER BALLOT TO THE MAIN BODY. A PREVIOUS BALLOT NEGATIVE RESULTED IN A SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE REQUIRING THE RE-BALLOT.

Addressee Acronym: ASME

Addressee Organization Type: A-Associations

Communication Date: 2002-05-07

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: Notation 7458: On March 7, 1997, based on information provided in the GPTC letter of March 19, 1996, Safety Recommendation P-87-12 was classified "Open-Acceptable Response," pending receipt of further information from the GPTC. Although the Safety Board has never received a further response from the GPTC, staff is aware that the guidance material on in-line inspections and casing examinations has been developed and incorporated into the GPTC Guide at paragraph 192.751. Consequently, staff believes that Safety Recommendation P-87-12 should now be classified "Closed-Acceptable Action."

Addressee Acronym: ASME

Addressee Organization Type: A-Associations

Communication Date: 1997-03-07

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: P-87-12 RECOMMENDED THAT THE COMMITTEE: REVISE ITS GUIDELINES TO ASSIST OPERATORS OF GAS PIPELINES IN DETERMINING WHEN ANNUAL TEST STATION MONITORING MAY NOT BE EFFECTIVE FOR IDENTIFYING AREA OF CORROSION, IN DETERMINING WHERE SEGMENTS OF PIPELINE MAY BE SHIELDED FROM THE EFFECTS OF CATHODIC PROTECTION SYSTEMS, IN DETERMINING HOW & WHEN TO INSPECT PIPES INSTALLED IN CASINGS FOR EVIDENCE OF ATMOSPHERIC CORROSION, & IN DETERMINING WHEN HYDROSTATIC TESTING OR IN-LINE INSTRUMENT INSPECTIONS SHOULD BE USE FOR IDENTIFYING AREAS OF CORROSION. YOU ADVISED US THAT THE COMMITTEE NEEDS TO RE-BALLOT THE GUIDANCE PROPOSED TO ADDRESS THIS RECOMMENDATION BECAUSE THE COMMENTS YOU RECEIVED FROM A PREVIOUS BALLOT CAUSED THE COMMITTEE TO MAKE SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES. WE LOOK FORWARD TO RECEIVING THE GUIDANCE LANGUAGE FINALLY APPROVED BY THE COMMITTEE. UNTIL THEN P-87-12 HAS BEEN CLASSIFIED "OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE."

Addressee Acronym: ASME

Addressee Organization Type: A-Associations

Communication Date: 2001-03-08

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: To date, the Safety Board has not received a response from ASME. The Board would appreciate learning what action has been taken to implement Safety Recommendation P-87-12.

Addressee Acronym: ASME

Addressee Organization Type: A-Associations

Communication Date: 1987-08-05

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Addressee Acronym: ASME

Addressee Organization Type: A-Associations

Communication Date: 1987-05-22

Communication Type: Official Correspondence