NTSB Safety Recommendation P-90-002

NTSB safety recommendation P-90-002.

TO THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR: Assist the Department of Transportation, to determine effective methods of inspection, maintenance, and protection for offshore pipelines located in the Gulf of Mexico to depths of water comparable to the maximum drafts of marine vessels that may operate outside of established sea lanes. (Superseded by P-90-034)

Priority: CLASS II

Overall Status: Closed - Superseded

Issued Date: 1990-02-22

Adopted Date: 1990-02-21

Overall Date Closed: 1990-10-02

Synopsis: ABOUT 5:50 P.M. CENTRAL DAYLIGHT TIME ON OCTOBER 3, 1989, THE UNITED STATES MENHADEN FISHING VESSEL NORTHUMBERLAND, OWNED AND OPERATED BY THE ZAPATA HAYNIE CORPORATION (VESSEL OWNER), WAS BACKING AND MANEUVERING IN 9 TO 11 FEET OF WATER WHEN THE STERN OF THE VESSEL STRUCK AND RUPTURED AN OFFSHORE 16-INCH NATURAL GAS TRANSMISSION PIPELINE OWNED BY NATURAL GAS PIPELINE COMPANY OF AMERICA (PIPELINE COMPANY). NATURAL GAS UNDER 835 POUNDS PER SQUARE INCH PRESSURE WAS RELEASED. AN UNDETERMINED SOURCE ON BOARD THE VESSEL IGNITED THE GAS, AND WITHIN SECONDS, THE ENTIRE VESSEL WAS ENGULFED IN FLAMES. THE FIRE ON THE VESSEL BURNED UNTIL 4:30 A.M. ON OCTOBER 4, WHEN IT BURNED ITSELF OUT. LEAKING GAS FROM THE PIPELINE ALSO CONTINUED TO BURN UNTIL THE FLOW OF GAS SUBSIDED AND THE FIRE SELF-EXTINGUISHED ABOUT 6 A.M. ON OCTOBER 4. ELEVEN OF FOURTEEN CREW MEMBERS DIED AS A RESULT OF THE ACCIDENT. THE VESSEL WAS LOCATED ABOUT 1/2 MILE OFFSHORE IN THE GULF OF MEXICO (GULF) AND ABOUT 5 1/3 NAUTICAL MILES WEST OF THE JETTIES AT THE ENTRANCE TO SABINE PASS, TEXAS.

Ntsbnumber: DCA90MM001

Report Number: PAR-90-02

Addressee Name: United States Department of the Interior

Addressee Status: Closed - Superseded

Addressee Date Closed: 1990-10-02

Addressee Acronym: DOI

Addressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government

Communication Date: 1990-10-02

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: A similar recommendation, P-90-5, was issued on the same date to the DOT. The DOT responded that a Federal task force, under the sponsorship of OPS, had been established in February 1990 to develop solutions to the hazards that may exist between offshore pipelines and fishing vessels in the Gulf of Mexico. Other participating agencies included the MMS, the U.S. Coast Guard, the Corps, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the States of Texas and Louisiana. The OPS has indicated that by October 1, 1990, the task force will have completed a report on the long-term regulatory and administrative projects to be initiated by each agency. The DO1 responded that it is cooperating with the DOT through the Federal task force. Since these two recommendations were issued, however, the Safety Board has become concerned that the safety problems with submerged pipelines are not confined to the offshore areas of the Gulf of Mexico. A submerged pipeline under a river, shipping channel, or other body of water is also susceptible to being unburied and damaged or ruptured by a vessel. For example, on January 2, 1990, a submerged 12-inch pipeline transporting heating oil was ruptured in the Arthur Kill channel between Staten Island, New York, and Linden, New Jersey. Evidence indicates that the pipeline was struck possibly by a passing ship or dredge. Although the Federal task force is addressing safety issues involving commercial fishing vessels and offshore pipelines in the Gulf of Mexico, the Safety Board now believes that the scope of the initial recommendations needs to be expanded to evaluate the level of safety that exists for all submerged pipelines located under navigable waterways. The evaluation should address the issues and problems concerning the practices of the both the fishing and pipeline industries, the jurisdiction over submerged pipelines, the deficiencies in regulatory standards for submerged pipelines, the inadequacy of enforcement and oversight, and the need for improved communication and coordination. Because the RSPA, through the OPS, is the primary Federal agency for pipeline safety, the Safety Board believes that the RSPA, with the assistance of the MMS, the Coast Guard, and the Corps, should build on the work of the current Federal task force and develop and implement effective methods and requirements to bury, protect, inspect the burial depth of, and maintain all submerged pipelines in areas subject to damage by surface vessels and their operations. The Safety Board has therefore classified Safety Recommendations P-90-2 to the DO1 and -5 to the DOT as "Closed--Superseded" by recommendations P-90-34 to the MMS and -29 to the RSPA. The Safety Board has also issued similar recommendations to the other Federal agencies on the DOT-sponsored task force.As a result of its investigation, the Safety Board issued recommendations to the Zapata Haynie Corporation, Natural Gas Pipeline Company of America, U.S. Department of Transportation, Research and Special Programs Administration, U.S. Coast Guard, Minerals Management Service, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Interstate Natural Gas Association of America, American Gas Association, American Public Gas Association, American Petroleum Institute, National Fish Meal and Oil Association, Louisiana Shrimp Association, and National Council of Fishing Vessel Safety and Insurance.

Addressee Acronym: DOI

Addressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government

Communication Date: 1990-04-09

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: Thank you for the National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) Safety Recommendation dated February 22, 1990. That Safety Recommendation recommends that the Department of the Interior (DOI) assist the Department of Transportation (DOT) in an organized and coordinated effort to determine the extent of the danger of offshore pipelines to marine vessels and to propose effective methods to inspect, maintain, and protect offshore pipelines. Mr. Barry A. Williamson, Director of DOI's Minerals Management Service (MMS), advises me that MMS representatives are working with representatives of other Federal Agencies to better define and resolve this problem. This working group is comprised of representatives of DOT's Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, U.S. Coast Guard, and the National Ocean Service. This group is looking for ways to provide a coordinated Federal approach which will serve to better define the extent of the danger of offshore pipelines to marine vessels and to.initiate coordinated corrective measures when and where appropriate. Mr. Williamson assures me that MMS expects to play a significant role in this effort even though the pipelines in the more hazardous offshore areas fall outside MMS's area of jurisdiction. Since OPS has taken the initiative to organize and coordinate this Federal, State, and industry effort, it is appropriate that that Agency keep you apprised of the progress of this coordinated effort. Thank you again for providing me NTSB's views on the potential dangers offshore pipelines pose to marine vessels.