P-98-034
P-98-034
NTSB safety recommendation P-98-034.
THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THE THAT RSPA: REQUIRE THAT KOCH PIPELINE COMPANY , LP, EVALUATE THE INTEGRITY OF THE REMAINDER OF ITS HVL (HIGHLY VOLATILE LIQUID) PIPLINE, INCLUDING THE CONDITION OF THE COATING, AND REHABILITATE THE PIPELINE AS NECESSARY.
Priority: CLASS II
Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Issued Date: 1998-11-18
Adopted Date: 1998-11-06
Overall Date Closed: 2002-07-22
Synopsis: ON SATURDAY, 8/24/96, ABOUT 3:26 P.M., AN 8-INCH-DIAMETER STEEL LPG (LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS) PIPELINE TRANSPORTING LIQUID BUTANE, OPERATED BY KOCH PIPELINE COMPANY, LP (KOCH), RUPTURED NEAR LIVELY, TEXAS, SENDING A BUTANE VAPOR CLOUD INTO A SURROUNDING RESIDENTIAL AREA. THE BUTANE VAPOR IGNITED AS TWO AREA RESIDENTS IN A PICKUP TRUCK DROVE INTO THE VAPOR CLOUD. THE PEOPLE DIED AT THE ACCIDENT SITE FROM THERMAL INJURIES. ABOUT 25 FAMILIES WERE EVACUATED FROM THE AFFECTED AREA. KOCH ESTIMATED ITS DIRECT PIPELINE LOSSES, INCLUDING THE LOSS OF PRODUCT FROM THE LINE, TO BE ABOUT $217.000. OTHER PROPERTY LOSSES INCLUDED DAMAGE TO THE ROADWAY UNDER WHICH THE RUPTURE OCCURRED & DAMAGE TO A PICKUP TRUCK, A MOBILE HOME, SEVERAL OUTBUILDINGS, & ADJACENT WOODLANDS.
Probable Cause: The failure of Koch to adequately protect its pipeline from corrosion.
Ntsbnumber: DCA96FP007
Report Number: PAR-98-02-SUM
Addressee Name: RSPA
Addressee Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Addressee Date Closed: 2002-07-22
Addressee Acronym: RSPA
Addressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government
Communication Date: 2001-04-18
Communication Type: Official Correspondence
Communication Contents: The Safety Board is aware of the reported action that has been taken on these issues and appreciates the RSPA update. Specifically, RSPA reports that in accordance with its risk-based regulatory philosophy, it intends to incorporate a process into its regulations to validate pipe integrity, especially in high-consequence areas. RSPA staff provided a briefing to Safety Board staff on a new initiative to examine effective methods to maintain pipeline integrity in high-consequence areas. In addition, RSPA has issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) concerning pipeline integrity management for pipeline operators who operate 500 or more miles of hazardous liquid pipelines. On September 13, 2000, the Safety Board provided its comments regarding this NPRM. On December 1, 2000, RSPA issued its rule for operators who operate 500 or more miles of hazardous liquid pipelines. The Board is also aware that RSPA plans to issue NPRMs covering the balance of operators of hazardous liquid pipelines, as well as operators of natural gas transmission pipelines. The Safety Board is also aware that on December 8, 2000, RSPA issued a NPRM to address P-98-35 and -36. The Safety Board is reviewing the NPRM and expects to provide comments in the near future. The Board notes that your April 24, 2000, letter did not provide specific information on Safety Recommendations P-87-26, P-90-29, P-95-2, and P-98-34 through -36. We are aware, however, through staff contact of some ongoing activity with respect to these recommendations; these recommendations are currently classified "Open--Acceptable Response." The Safety Board would appreciate specific information on actions taken by RSPA to meet these safety recommendations so that RSPA's progress on these issues can be evaluated.
Addressee Acronym: RSPA
Addressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government
Communication Date: 2002-07-22
Communication Type: Official Correspondence
Communication Contents: Accordingly, because RSPA has taken action as requested, Safety Recommendation P-98-34 is classified "Closed--Acceptable Action."
Addressee Acronym: RSPA
Addressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government
Communication Date: 2002-05-20
Communication Type: Official Correspondence
Communication Contents: Letter Mail Controlled 05/23/2002 9:15:00 AM MC# 2020529 Under the Corrective Action Order (CAO) (formerly referred to as a Hazardous Facility Order), RSPA required Koch to run an internal instrumented inspection device (smart pig) through the pipeline. Koch established a program of tests to identify and address the external corrosion problem on the Sterling #I highly volatile liquid (HVL) pipeline and to evaluate the coating on the pipeline. The operator took the following actions: ·Koch replaced the 70-mile pipeline segment near Lively, Texas with new pipe and coating. That area is no longer under pressure restriction, ·Koch performed at least two successive smart pig inspections and made the indicated repairs to the pipeline. ·The initial pressure restriction on the pipe was eased to an 80% restriction until another successful pigging run and the remediation activities are completed. On April 5, 2001, RSPA met with Koch on the results of a smart pig run between the Durant, Oklahoma booster pump station and the Nevada station and their plan to internally inspect the remainder of the pipeline within the next three to five years. ·Koch completed the required plans and activities directed by the CAO to identify and correct areas of continuing corrosion; to establish an approved operating scenario; and to conduct a public awareness campaign. RSPA is satisfied with the actions taken by Koch in response to the CAO. However, it is our intent to continue monitoring their actions and to follow-up and evaluate the results of their internal inspection program. Since the Koch accident, RSPA has pursued several regulatory actions to require improvements in corrosion control. First, RSPA issued a final rule on controlling corrosion on hazardous liquid pipelines that incorporates specific criteria for corrosion protection based on generally accepted national standards. Second, RSPA issued a final rule requiring hazardous liquid pipeline companies (including Koch) to conduct an ongoing pipeline integrity management program. This program must include actions to assess, evaluate, repair, and validate through comprehensive analyses the integrity of pipelines that could impact a high consequence area. High consequence areas include populated areas, areas unusually sensitive to environmental damage (USAs), and commercially navigable waterways. The integrity management program requirement went into effect in May 2001. Operators were required to complete an identification of all pipeline segments that could impact a high consequence area by December 2001. All operators were required to develop and implement a written integrity management program by March 3 1,2002. RSPA requests that NTSB Safety Recommendation P-98-34 be reclassified as "Closed - Acceptable Action" based on the program described above.
Addressee Acronym: RSPA
Addressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government
Communication Date: 1999-04-12
Communication Type: Official Correspondence
Communication Contents: Letter Mail Controlled 7/28/99 1:05:21 PM MC# 990814 RSPA ISSUED A HAZARDOUS FACILITY ORDER (HFO) TO KOCH PIPELINE COMPANY LP (KOCH) ON 10/7/96. THE HFO REQUIRED KOCH TO TAKE CERTAIN CORRECTIVE MEASURES ON ITS HIGHLY VOLATILE LIQUID (HVL) PIPELINE BETWEEN MEDFORD, OK, AND MONT BELVIEU, TX (THAT WAS SUBSEQUENT TO THE PIPELINE RUPTURE ON THE KOCH PIPELINE 8/24/96. RSPA DIRECTED THAT THE AFFECTED KOCH PIPELINE REMAIN OUT OF SERVICE UNTIL (1) RSPA APPROVED A PLAN FOR IDENTIFYING AND CORRECTING AREAS OF CONTINUING CORROSION; (2) VARIOUS PUBLIC AWARENESS ACTIONS WERE FOUND ACCEPTABLE BY RSPA; AND (3) A REASONABLE AND PRUDENT OPERATING SCENARIO WAS ESTABLISHED BY KOCH AND APPROVED BY RSPA. KOCH WAS ALSO REQUIRED TO SUBMIT A WRITTEN PLAN TO ESTABLISH A PROGRAM OF TESTS TO IDENTIFY AND ADDRESS THE EXTERNAL CORROSION PROBLEM ON THE STERLING #1 HVL LINE. THIS PROGRAM MANDATED THE USE OF INTERNAL INSTRUMENTED INSPECTION DEVICES C, SMALL PIGS, CLOSE INTERVAL SURVEYS, PUBLIC AWARENESS ACTIONS, RE-DETERMINATION OF ALLOWABLE OPERATING PREMIUMS, AND CORROSION MITIGATION MEASURES. RSPA IS REVIEWING AND MONITORING ALL REQUIRED ACTIONS. A COPY OF THE HFO, WITH DETAILS ON THE REQUIRED ACTIONS, IS ENCLOSED. RSPA STAFF WILL MEET WITH KOCH PIPELINE IN MAY 1999 TO VERIFY COMPLETION OF THE ACTIONS REQUIRED IN THE HFO. KOCH INFORMED RSPA THAT IT HAS REPAIRED ALL CRITICAL ANOMALIES, CONDUCTED CLOSE INTERVAL SURVEYS, AND IMPLEMENTED NOW CATHODIC PROTECTION SURVEY PROCEDURES. ADDITIONALLY, KOCH HAS INDICATED THAT IT WILL REPLACE A 70 MILE PIPELINE SEGMENT NEAR LIVELY, TX, IN LATE 1999. BASED ON THE ACTIONS REQUIRED BY RSPA AND UNDERTAKEN BY KOCH, WE REQUEST THAT P-98-34 BE CLASSIFIED AS "CLOSED--ACCEPTABLE ACTION."
Addressee Acronym: RSPA
Addressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government
Communication Date: 1999-11-30
Communication Type: Official Correspondence
Communication Contents: THE SAFETY BOARD UNDERSTANDS THAT RSPA ISSUED A HAZARDOUS FACILITY ORDER (HFO) TO KOCH ON 10/7/96, REQUIRING IT TO TAKE CERTAIN CORRECTIVE MEASURES ON ITS HVL PIPELINE BETWEEN MEDFORD, OK, AND MONT BELVIEU, TX, SUBSEQUENT TO THE 1996 PIPELINE RUPTURE. THE SAFETY BOARD UNDERSTANDS THAT RSPA STAFF HAVE BEEN MEETING WITH KOCH STAFF TO VERIFY COMPLETION OF THE ACTIONS REQUIRED BY THE HFO. THE BOARD NOTES RSPA IS REVIEWING DATA SUBMITTED BY KOCH, THAT SOME TESTS ARE ONGOING, AND THAT KOCH IS REVISING SOME OF ITS PUBLIC EDUCATION MATERIALS. THE BOARD REQUESTS THAT RSPA CONTINUE TO MONITOR KOCH'S ACTIONS ON THIS MATTER INCLUDING EVALUATION OF THE COATING ON THE REMAINING PORTION OF THE PIPELINE FROM MEDFORD, OK, TO MOUNT BELVIEU, TX, AND TO INFORM THE BOARD WHEN IT IS SATISFIED THAT ALL ISSUES HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. PENDING FURTHER INFORMATION FROM RSPA, P-98-34 HAS BEEN CLASSIFIED "OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE."
Addressee Acronym: RSPA
Addressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government
Communication Date: 2000-04-24
Communication Type: Official Correspondence
Communication Contents: Pipeline Integrity Management: In accordance with our risk-based regulatory philosophy, RSPA intends to incorporate a process into its regulations to validate pipe integrity, especially in high consequence areas. At the last semiannual meeting RSPA briefed the NTSB pipeline safety staff on a new initiative to examine effective methods to maintain pipeline integrity in high consequence areas. We updated the NTSB staff on our progress earlier this month. RSPA held a public meeting at the Dulles Hyatt Hotel (Herndon, Virginia) on November 18-19, 1999, to consider the need for additional safety and environmental regulations for gas transmission lines and hazardous liquid pipelines in high-density population areas, commercially navigable waters, and areas unusually sensitive to environmental damage. We were pleased that Robert Chipkevich, Chief of NTSB's Hazardous Materials Division, was able to share his insights on this issue. The purpose of the meeting was to determine the extent to which operators now have integrity management programs, to explore effective ways to promote their development and implementation by all operators, and to discuss mechanisms by which RSPA could confirm the existence and adequacy of such operator-developed programs. The attendees discussed a practical definition of high consequence areas, as well as the possible need for increased inspection, enhanced damage prevention, improved emergency response, and other measures to prevent and mitigate pipeline leaks and ruptures in high consequence areas. We believe that an effective regulation to protect pipelines in high consequence areas will help address NTSB Safety Recommendations P-87-4, P-87-5, P-87-23, P-87-26, P-90-29, P-91-1, P-95-1, P-95-2, and P-98-34. A proposed regulation for hazardous liquid pipelines will be issued by early April 2000.
This material provides agency context. It does not replace binding regulatory text, and its legal effect depends on the underlying authority and facts.