NTSB Safety Recommendation Letter P-72-008 through P-72-018

Page 1Official PDFhis determination to warn his neigh- (a) Review the proposals made by the bors, prevented an accident of even Hazardous Materials Regulation Board more serious proportions. in Docket No. HM-6A on Aprd 18, 12. The volunteer fire companies, the local 1969. Rulemaking should be under- Sheriff‘s officers, and the Missouri taken to provide for more complete State Police combined effectively to controls for the transportation by pipe- extinguish the fire, aid and assist the $- line of liquefied petroleum gas. These displaced people, and restore and main- regulations should include minimum tain order. standards for the design, construction, testing, operation, and maintenance of both new and existing pipelines. V. PROBABLE CAUSE (b) Initiate an amendment to the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 49, Sec- tion 195.218 Welding: Seam offset, to The National Transportation Safery Board require longitudinal welds to be placed determines that the probable cause of the acci- in the upper half of the pipe during dent was the rupture of an insufficiently construction. Similarly, that in repairs bonded longitudinal weld, which had been 1 to a pipeline involving pipe replace- further weakened by internal corrosion. Con- ment, a requirement be issued that the tributing to the rupture was a pump station longitudinal welds of replacement pipe which shut down and produced a higher pres- be positioned in the upper half. sure on the failed pipeline section than it had 1 (c) Conduct a study, in cooperation been subjected to during recent operations. with sources of qualified pipeline ex- The explosion and fire were caused by the pertise, concerning minimum valve- ignition of the released propane which had 3 spacing standards and the use of been confined in a concrete block building. remotely operated valves, automatically The explosion inside the building initiated a operated valves, and check valves on all shock wave which caused the detonation of the liquefied petroleum pipelines. As an entire unconfined propane-air cloud. adjunct to this, the Safety Board invites Contributing to the intensity of the explo- attention to a recommendation made in sion and fire were the weather inversion pres its special study of “Effects of Delay in ent at the time, which acted as a lid on the Shutting Down Failed Pipeline Systems 1 detonation and helped to deflect the resultant and Methods of Providing Rapid Shut- forces earthward, the delay in shutting down down.”’ r the pumping stations, and the amount of time (d) Undertake a study, in cooperation taken to close the manually operated valves on with sources of qualified pipeline ex- ~ either side of the split. 1 pertise, of the various current practices I / / in the handling, containing, and dispos- mg of liquefied petroleum products VI BWmMENDATLONS resulting from pipeline failures. This study should include such external fac- i . tors as Weather conditions, leak site I The National Transportation Safety Board topography and population density in I i recommends that: the vicinty of the leak. Based upon the 1. The Federal Railroad Administration of the Department of Transportation: ‘Report Number NTSB-PSS-71-1 r .3 1#

Page 2’ I results of this study, there should be formulated and added as an amend- ment to 49 CFR 195, minimum regula- t i o n s regarding th‘e handling of liquefied petroleum gas as a result of pipeline leaks. 2 The Phillips Pipe Line Company: (a) Maintain as a maximum, the re- duced pumping pressures recommended by the National Transportation Safety Board’s S a f e t y Recommendation P-71-6 issued April 27, 1971, which limits to 900 ps.i.g. the maximum dis- charge pressures at each of the pump stations between Borger and East St. Louis, as well as Phillip’s own pressure limitation of 900 p.s.i.g. on the four 7, pump stations in the affected area; Syracuse. Jefferson City, Rosebud, and Vila Ridge. A 24-hour hydrostatic pressure test equal to 125 percent of the maximum anticipated pressure as specified in the CFR Title 49 Part 195 would be required before this line pres- sure could be again increased. (b) Revise their pipelme operating pro- cedures and initiate any equipment changes necessary to reduce substan- tially the time required to shut down the pump stations Included in this re- / 3 view and revision should be explicit instructions to the dispatcher for the immediate emergency shutdown of all p u m p stations together with some means of practicing these procedures. , (q (c) Institute main line valve changes or modifications needed to reduce sub- stantially the amount of time required to completely block off and isolate a failed pipeline section. Consideration should be given to the use of automati- cally operated valves, remotely oper- ated valves, or check valves installed at strategic locations on this pipeline. Special consideration should be given to the concentration of population-at- * / b 1 risk along and adjacent to the pipeline right-of-way. The Safety Board invites Phillips attention to the section on the Public-at-Risk in the Safety Board’s special study of “Effects of Deky in Shutting Down Failed Pipeline Systems a n d M e t h o d s of Providing Rapid Shutdown.” ( d ) Provide maps of their pipeline system in sufficient detail to establish clearly the system locarion with regard to the various affected civil agencies along the right-of-way. These maps should be kept current by the notations of pipeline additions or route changes as required. Specifically recommended to receive this information are the fire departments, both civil and volunteer, the state, county and local police departments, and other agencies con- cerned with hazardous materials. (e) Establish a l i e of communication with the affected civil agencies and all residents along the pipeline right-of- way, by supplying a card or sticker with the names, addresses, and tele- phone numbers of pipeline personnel to be contacted during an emergency. ( f ) Hold periodic meetings to include the local fire departments and other interested agencies, to inform further ’@ and educate the attending personnel as I 7 to basic pipeline operations, and mate- rials pumped, hazards encountered, and procedures to follow during LPG leaks. (9) Continue with the experimental work in cooperation with other quali- fied pipelin? groups in testing and developing a tool to detect longitudinal 8 weld defects and thin wall pipe caused by corrosion. Based on the findings, the methods of operation should be in- corporated in the pipeline industry standards, as an additional tool for the detection of in-place line pipe flaws, but not as a substitute for hydrostatic testing. 32#