P-75-005 through P-75-006
P-75-005 through P-75-006
Page 1Official PDFATlONAb TRA TATlON SAFETY BOARD WASHINGTON, D.C. ISSUED: May 8, 1975 SAFETY RECOMMENDAT 1 ON (S) P-75-5 and 6 On January 17, 1975, a crude oil fire erupted in the terminal facilities of the Mid Valley Pipeline Company in Lima, Ohio. As a result of the facts discovered in its investigation of the accident, the Safety Board believes that corrective action is needed. On January 17, Mid Valley's 1,040-mile-long pipeline had been delivering crude oil from Longview, Texas, to Lima, Ohio, at 10,800 barrels per hour ( 4 5 3 , 6 0 0 gallons). At 2:35 p-m., the Mid Valley deliveryman detected a pressure buildup at the Lima terminal, and he tried to divert the crude stream into tankage at an adjacent terminal. He notified the dispatcher at Longview to shut down the pipeline. At 2 : 4 1 p.m., three pump stations were shut down; the crude stream was diverted from Lima, but the pressure was not relieved at the terminal. A break in the terminal metering facilities at 522 psi pressure caused crude oil to spray over the metering facili- ties; the pressure relief system had not prevented the line from rupturing. A fire followed which rapidly engulfed the terminal, blazed several hundred feet into the air, and melted high-voltage overhead power lines. The power lines arced, burned, and short-circuited when they fell inside the terminal compound. As a result of this accident, the deliveryman was killed, power lines were downed, and the terminal was destroyed. 1 5 3 4 p A/? .-76 -'3#
Page 2-2- In view of the foregoing, the National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Office of Pipeline Safet of the Department of Transportation: (a) Require the Mid Valley Pipeline Company t review all their pump station and termina facilities to determine whether condit exist, similar to those at Lima, which could cause additional accidents on the1 system. (Class I - Urgent Followup) (b) Urge the Mid Valley Pipeline Company to utilize a total systems approach to pipe- line safety in the redesign and recon- struction of the destroyed facility at Lima so that single failures and frequent combinations of failures do not escalate to leaks or over pressures. (Class I - Urgent Followup) REED, Chairman, McADAMS, THAYER, BURGESS, and HALEY, Members, concurred in the above recommendations. By: cc: Mid Valley Pipeline Company Y ~ Z '3 a ' N O L ~ N I H S#
This is an NTSB safety recommendation letter. NTSB recommendations are advisory and do not themselves create binding regulatory requirements.