P-76-091 through P-76-093
P-76-091 through P-76-093
Page 1Official PDFTWANSPO TATION SAFETY BOARD WASHINGTON, D.C. I S S U E D : J a n u a r y 31, 1977 _______-____l______l____________________- F o r w a r d e d to: M r . Howard C . Ullrich Director of Transportation S t a t e of California Department of Transportation 1120 N Street Sacramento, California 95814 SAFETY RECOMMENDAT I ON ( S ) P-76-91 through 93 A t 10:32 a.m., P . d . t . , on June 1 6 , 1 9 7 6 , a piece of construction equipment excavating for a s t r e e t widening pro,ject on Venice Boulevard i n Los Angeles, California, struck and punctured an 8-inch petroleum products pipeline owned by the Standard O i l Company of California. The escaping gasoline sprayed on nearby buildings and ignited 90 seconds l a t e r . As a r e s u l t of t h i s accident 9 persons were k i l l e d , 14 persons were injured, 7 buildings were destroyed, other buildings were damaged by f i r e and heat, and 15 vehicles were destroyed. The intense f i r e melted powerlines and t e l e - phone l i n e s . - 11 The California Department of Transportation, designers and originators of the construction project; the G r i f f i t h Company, the prime contractor f o r the p r o j e c t ; C . W . P o s s , I n c . , the sub- contractor; and the Standard O i l Company of California were a l l aware of the existence of the 8-inch pipeline. However, the precise depth of the pipeline within the accident area was not known, although preconstruction meetings had been held, testholes t o determine the pipeline depth had been dug a t other locations, and the pipeline i n another area had been lowered because of i t s i n s u f f i c i e n t depth. No "one-call'' n o t i f i c a t i o n system was i n e f f e c t i n the Los Angeles area a t the time of the accident which would have enabled the contractor t o request and receive s p e c i f i c informa- tion concerning the depth and location of buried u t i l i t i e s . - 11 For more detailed information on t h i s accident, read "Standard O i l Comoanv of California. 8-Inch Pioeline Rupture, Venice Bbulkvard, LOS Angeles, C a l i f o k i a , June 16, 1976." NTSB-PAR-76- 8 . 1939#
Page 2P-76-91 t h r o u g h 93 Therefore, the National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the State of California Department of Trans- portation: Develop guidelines for preconstruction meetings, which should include methods of preventing damage to underground utilities to be encountered during the proposed construction work. Such preconstruc- tion meetings should be attended by all operators whose facilities are involved. (Class 11, Priority Followup) (P-76-91) (The Safety Board made this recommendation to the American Public Works Associati on February 2 , 1973.) Cooperate and coorclinate with those groups attempting to establish a "one-call'' notification system in southern California and other areas of the State where none exist, and work with systems already in existence. (Class 11, Priority Followup)(P-76-92) Require, as a prerequisite of a contract award, that the contractor be in contact with the "one-call" notification system or the individual facilities operators to determine the precise depth and location of any underground facilities before beginning the project. (Class 11, Priority Followup) (P-76-93) TODD, Chairman, BAILEY, Vice Chairman, HOGUE and RALEY, Members, concurred in the above recommendations. McADAMS, Member, did not participate I Chairman N A l l O N A L l R A N S P O R P h I I O N S A F E I Y WASHINGTON. D c 2 ~ 5 9 1 BOARD OFFICIAL IIUSINESS P E N A L I Y FOR PRIVATE USE. $300#
This is an NTSB safety recommendation letter. NTSB recommendations are advisory and do not themselves create binding regulatory requirements.