NTSB Safety Recommendation Letter P-78-066 through P-78-067

Page 1Official PDFp- (LE- NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD WASHINGTON, D.C. ISSUED: November 20, 1978 Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Mi.dAmerica PiDeline Svstem 1800 South Baitimore Avenue Tulsa, Oklahoma 74119 i P-78-66 and 67 A t 12:02 a.m., c.d.t.,on August 4 , 1978, propane that had vaporized and spread widely from a ruptured 8-inch liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) pipeline owned by the MidAmerica Pipeline System (MAPCO) was ignited by an unknown source i n a r u r a l area near Donnellson, Iowa. The intense f i r e k i l l e d two persons and c r i t i c a l l y burned three others as they fled t h e i r homes; one of the c r i t i c a l l y burned persons l a t e r died. A farm- house and six buildings were destroyed, and two adjacent homes were damaged. MAPCD extends from west Texas to Conway, Kansas, where i t forms two branches. One branch extends to Minneapolis, Minnesota; the o t h e r , to Janesville, Wisconsin -- more than 5,000 miles of multiple l i n e s from 4 inches to 1 2 inches i n diameter. The section of pipeline involved i n t h i s accident extended from Birmingham Junction, Iowa, t o Farmington, I l l i n o i s -- 116 miles. Although the l f n e was not operating when i t f a i l e d , it was under a s t a t i c pressure of over 1,200 p s i g a t the rupture. After the f i r e erupted, an area resident closed valves a t mileposts 32 and 36.8, thus isolating the failed section a t milepost 33. A t 12:06 a.m., the dispatching center a t Tulsa, Oklahoma, recorded indications of a pressure drop on t h i s system. Since MAPCO's maintenance personnel are scattered over several States and cannot always respond within minutes t o close valves near an accident, MAPCO incorporates i n its emergency plans a list of individuals, usually residents along the right-of-way, t o contact i n case of an emergency. These individuals are given keys that allow them to close certain valves. The list available t o the dispatcher a t t h e t i m e of the accident had not been updated for a t l e a s t 5 years. The persons l i s t e d for the valve a t milepost 32 had both died; one of them several years e a r l i e r . The other valve a t milepost 36.8 was not included i n t h i s list; the reason for the omission is still undetermined. 2460-8#

Page 2- 2 - Before the fire was extinguished at 3:30 a.m., 3,750 barrels of propane had burned and 75 acres of cornfields and woods were damaged. The volunteer fire departments that responded to the fire had not received instructions or educational material on the hazards of LPG from MAPCO, and they had not previously encountered an LPG fire of this magnitude. According to MAPCO's emergency plans, field locations were instr to "...hold an annual fire school and safety session. ..," and local polic and fire departments would be asked to participate in these schools. MAPCO held no training sessions for local firefighters and police in the area near accident site. Therefore, the National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the MidAmerica Pipeline System: Update the list of individuals who should be contacted to close specific valves in the event of an emergency and institute a procedure to assure that the list is updated at least annually. (Class I, Urgent Action)(P-78-66) Conduct periodic training for public emergency response agencies along the route of its pipelines. As a minimum, this training should be conducted annually and be sufficient to inform emergency response agencies of the properties of the various products transported, the expected behavior of each product when released to the atmosphere, the locations of shutdown valves, the residents designated to operate each valve, and other information necessary for emergency response personnel to take effective actions and minimize losses. (Class I, Urgent Action)(P-78-67) KING, Chairman, DRIVER, Vice Chairman, McADAMS and HOGUE, Members, concurred in the above recommendations.#