NTSB Safety Recommendation Letter P-80-075 through P-80-080

Page 1Official PDF- ,p-/ ?/ NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY B O A ~ D WASHINGTON, D.C. I S S U E D : February 26, 1981 Mr. E. J. Ossi President The Pipelines of Puerto Rico, Inc. G.P.O. Box 2768 San Juan. Puerto Rico 00936 SAFETY RECOMMENDAT I ON (S) P-80-75through-80 - -----"-----.---,"------------------------~- I At 9:50 a.m., on January 30, 1980, an 8-inch-diameter, refined petroleum products pipeline owned by The Pipelines of Puerto Rico, Inc., and operated by t h e Shell Oil Company (Puerto Rico) Ltd. was struck and ruptured by a bulldozer during maintenance work on a nearby waterline in the Sector Cana of Bayamon, Puerto Rico, about 1 0 miles southwest of San Juan. Gasoline from t h e rupture sprayed downhill and ran off into a small creek. About 1 1 / 2 hours later, the gasoline vapors were ignited by an undetermined source and exploded; the subsequent fire killed one person and extensively damaged 25 houses and other property. L/ Earlier that morning, an employee of the Aqueduct and Sewer Authority of Puerto Rico had been using a pavement breaker 2/ during repair work on a 6-inch-diameter waterline. Unable to remove a cement anchor that supported the waterline with the pavement breaker, an Aqueduct and Sewer Authority employee at the site requested help from Highwav Authority of Puerto Rico personnel who were working nearby. The Highway Authority contractor moved a bulldozer-ripper 31 t o the site. About 9:50 a.m., the ripper struck and punctured the pipeline which waclocated approximately 3 inches below t h e waterline. The investigation disclosed that the pipeline had not been properly marked in accordance with 49 CFR 195.410 by visible aboveground temporary markers at the accident site where heavy highway construction was underway. Also, it w a s determined that t h e labels on t h e permanent steel markers that are placed along the pipeline did not conform to Federal specifications. A preconstruction meeting was held before the beginning of the highway construction project and the pipeline company assigned a full- time inspector to the highway project. However, t h e inspector was not present when the maintenance work on the waterline began. - 1/ For more detailed information, read "Pipeline Accident Report--The Pipelines of Puerto Rico, Inc., Petroleum Products Pipeline Rupture and Fire, Bayamon, Puerto Rico, January 30, 1980" (NTSB-PAR-80-6). - 2/ A pavement breaker is a hydraulic or air-operated piece of equipment used to break or fracture pavement. - 3/ A ripper is the name given to a bulldozer which has as a part of its excavation equipment a heavy, metal, extendable tooth resembling a plow. 29208#

Page 2-2- For many years, the owners of underground facilities throughout t h e United States have been troubled with damage to their facilities as a result of third-party activity an other outside forces. The underground utility industry, recognizing the seriousness of t h excavation damage problem, has developed, implemented, and publicized many program and procedures to reduce the number of these underground contacts and the subseque public safety hazard. However, The Pipelines of Puerto Rico, Inc., does not have written damage prevention program and the Public Service Commission (PSC) of Puert Rico has not encouraged the development of such a program. There is no "one- system operating in the accident area or in any other area on the island of Puerto and there are no local or Commonwealth laws requiring excavators to notify uti planned excavations. The Safety Board believes that good communication between excavat operators of underground facilities is essential for any successful pipeline prevention program and that one of the most effective methods of pr excavation-caused damage to underground facilities is to insure that excavators notif the owners or operators of utility companies in advance of the proposed excavation wor so that operators can mark the location of their facilities before excavation begins. Th most convenient method for such notification is a "one-call" system. If an excavat gives reasonable advance notice of his plans, owners of underground facilities can loca and mark their facilities promptly and accurately, or can advise the excavators that ther are no facilities in the proposed area of excavation. In all, "one-callfl systems operate in 4 3 States. The "one-call'' system international committee of the American Public Works Association Utility Location and Coordination Council, located a t 1313 East 60th Street, Chicago, Illinois, (telephone 312-947-2520), has appointed nine regional representatives who are available to consult with community officials around the continental United States and its territories to set up "one-call" systems. While the Safety Board fully understands that t h e "one-call" system is not a panacea for all underground utilities accidents, it believes that an established "one-call" system, with a requirement for contractors to use it, is an extremely valuable tool for the prevention of damage t pipelines. In this case, if such a system had been in operation and if the highwa contractor, by his contractual requirements, had been continuously "in contact with t h 'one-call' notification system or t h e individual facilities operators to determine t h precise depth and location of any underground facility," this accident might not have - - occurred. It appears that the pipeline company's parent companies furnish satisfactory pipeli safety training, especially for pipeline corrosion control, and have acceptable traini programs for their professional staff in Puerto Rico. However, the PSC lacks an effective training program for its employees. The local fire department had not been trained i emergency procedures to follow after a pipeline accident such as this. Area resident were not evacuated until after the explosion and fire. The pipeline company became aware of the pipeline rupture a t 1O:OE 8.m January 30, 1980, but failed to report this accident to the U. S. Departme Transportation's National Response Center, which is not on the company's list of p to notify in case of an emergency. The Safety Board learned about the accident newspaper article the next day; therefore, a Safety Board investigator could not get t the accident site until 35 hours after t h e accident occurred. The delayed arrival of t h Safety Board's investigator hampered t h e timely onsite witness interviews and visu postaccident inspection of the pipeline. I '\#

Page 3-3- Therefore, the National Transportation Safety Board recommends that The Pipelines of Puerto Rico, Inc.: Coordinate with the Public Service Commission, local fire departments, and other utilities t o develop procedures to employ during pipeline emergencies. (Class II, Priority Action) (P-80-75) Immediately update the list of parties to be contacted in an emergency, and institute a procedure to insure that the list is updated at least annually. (Class I, Urgent Action) (P-80-76) Install additional permanent pipeline markers sufficient to comply with 49 CFR 195.410. (Class 11, Priority Action) (P-80-77) Install new pipeline identification labels on permanent markers in accordance with 49 CFR 195.410 (a)(2). (Class 11, Priority Action) (P-80-78) In cooperation with other operators of underground facilities, help establish an island-wide "one-call" excavation notification system. (Class II, Priority Action) (P-80-79) Instruct its pipeline inspectors of t h e importance of remaining at the construction site and closely monitoring the contractor's work as i t approaches t h e pipeline. (Class 11, Priority Action) (P-80-80) KING, Chairman, DRIVER, Vice Chairman, McADAMS and BURSLEY, Members, concurred in these recommendations. GOLDMAN, Member, did not participate.#

Page 4NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOAR WASHINGTON, D.C. ISSUED: 26 febrero 1981 ......................................... Forwarded to: Sr. E. 3. 0ssi P r e s i d e n t e The P i p e l i n e s of Puerto Rico, Inc. G.P.O. Box 2768 SAFETY RECOMMENDATION(S San Juan, Puerto Rico 00936 P-80-75 h a s t a -80 -- E l 30 de enero de 1980, a las 9:50 a.m., una t u b e r i a de ocho pulgadas para productos refinados de p e t r 6 l e o , propiedad de “The P i p e l i n e s of Puerto Rico, In y operada por l a S h e l l O i l Company (Puerto Rico) Ltd., s u f r i b una r u p t u r a debid a l a acometida de un bulldozer durante t r a b a j o s de mantenimiento en una linea d e l acueducto en el Sector Cana de Bayam&, Puerto Rico, a unas 10 millas a1 sudoes de San Juan. La g a s o l i n a que man6 de l a ruptura se e s p a r c i b c u e s t a abajo h a c i a una pequeiia quebrada. Alrededor d e una hora y media m5s t a r d e , se inflamaron 1 vapores d e l a g a s o l i n a e h i c i e r o n explosi6n; el fuego mat6 a una perso extensos dafios en 25 casas y o t r a s propiedades. L/ Temprano esa maiiana, un empleado de 10s s e r v i c i o s de Acueducto y A l c a n t a r i l l a d o de Puerto Rico habia estado u t i l i z a n d o un m a r t i l l o rompedor de pavimento durante 10s t r a b a j o s d e reparacibn de una t u b e r i a de agua de se pulgadas de digmetro. A 1 no poder remover con e l m a r t i l l o rompedor l a travi de cement0 que soportaba l a t u b e r i a de agua, un empleado d e l Acueducto y A l c a n t a r i l l a d o que se encontraba en e l l u g a r s o l i c i t 6 ayuda d e l personal d S e r v i c i o s de Carreteras de Puerto Rico que e s t a b a trabajando c E l c o n t r a t i s t a de S e r v i c i o s de Carreteras llev6 un bulldozer e a1 lugar. Cerca de las 9:50 a . m . el bulldozer chocb y perforb e l oleod se h a l l a b a a unas tres pulgadas por debajo de l a t u b e r i a d e agua. La i n v e s t i g a c i g n r e v e l 6 que e l oleoducto no habia s i d o marcado deb de acuerdo con e l cgdigo de reglamentos f e d e r a l e s 49 CFR195.410, p r o v i s i o n a l e s v i s i b l e s s o b r e e l t e r r e n o en e l lugar d e l a c c i d e n t e donde l a l a b o r de construccicn. Tambizn se determinz que las i n d i c a c 10s indicadores de acero permanentes, colocados a l o l a r g o d e l o se re - 1/ Para m2s informacibn, lean e l “Informe s o b r e a c c i d e n t e de 01 --La r u p t u r a y fuego d e l oleoducto de l a compaiiia The P i p e l i n e s Rico, I n c . , en Bayam&, Puerto R i c o , e l 3 0 d e e n e r o de 1980” (NTBS - 2 / Un m a r t i l l o rompedor de pavimento es un equipo h i d r g u l i c o o neumz se usa para romper o f r a c t u r a r e l pavimento. - 3 / Escariador es e l nombre que se l a da a un bulldozer que, como par equipo de excavacibn t i e n e un d i e n t e pesado de metal extendible, que se p a un arado.#

Page 5-2- se a j u s t a n a las especificaciones Federales. Antes de comenzar e l proyecto de construcci6n de l a c a r r e t e r a se c e l e b r 6 una reuni6n previa ya l a compaiiia a cargo d e l oleoducto asignd un i n s p e c t o r a tiempo completo a1 proyecto de l a carretera. No obstante, e l i n s p e c t o r no e s t a b a presente cuando se i n i c i 6 el t r a b a j o de mantenimiento de l a t u b e r l a de agua. Por muchos aiios, 10s p r o p i e t a r i o s de i n s t a l a c i o n e s subterrzneas en todos 10s Estados Unidos se han v i s t o perjudicados con dafios en sus i n s t a l a c i o n e s como r e s u l t a d o de a c t i v i d a d e s de t e r c e r o s y o t r a s causas. L a i n d u s t r i a de 10s s e r v i c i o s subterrzneos, reconociendo l a gravedad d e l problema por 10s daiios causados por las excavaciones, ha desarrollado, puesto en p r z c t i c a y dado publicidad a muchos programas y procedimientos p a r a r e d u c i r e l n h e r o de estss contactos subterrzneos y e l r i e s g o que representan c o n t r a l a seguridad pGblica. No o b s t a n t e , l a compaiiia "The P i p e l i n e s of Puerto Rico, Inc.", no tiene un programa e s c r i t o de prevenci6n c o n t r a daiios y l a Comisi6n de Servicios PGblicos (CSP) de Puerto Kico no ha alentado e l d e s a r r o l l o de un programa d e esa indole. No hay ning6n sistema de "una llamada" que e s t 6 en us0 en l a r e g i 6 n d e l a c c i d e n t e n i en flingfin o t r o l u g a r de l a isla n i tampoco hay l e y e s d e l Estado L i b r e Asociado n i l o c a l e s que e x i j a n a 10s excavadores n o t i f i c a r a las compaiiias de s e r v i c i o s pGblicos de l a s excavaciones que piensan hacer. La J u n t a de Seguridad considera e s e n c i a l mantener una buena comunicaci6n entre 10s excavadores y l a s empresas que operan i n s t a l a c i o n e s subterrzneas p a r a c u a l q u i e r programa eficaz de prevenci6n de daiios de t u b e r i a s y , uno de 10s mgtodos m 6 s e f e c t i v o s de prevenir 10s datios causados por excavaci6n a i n s t a l a c i o n e s subterrzneas es asegurarse que 10s excavadores n o t i f i q u e n a 10s p r o p i e t a r i o s o o p e r a d o r e s de l a s compaiiias de s e r v i c i o s pGblicos con a n t i c i p a c i 6 n acerca d e l t r a b a j o de excavaci6n que vayan a hacer. De esta forma las empresas de s e r v i c i o s piiblicos pueden marcar e l lugar donde se h a l l a n sus i n s t a l a c i o n e s a n t e s de comenzar l a excavaci6n. E l m6todo m z s conveniente para esta n o t i f i c a c i 6 n es e l sisrema denominado de "una llamada". S i un excavador informa sus planes con un preaviso razonable, 10s p r o p i e t a r i o s de l a s i n s t a l a - c i o n e s s u b t e r r z n e a s podrsn l o c a l i z a r l a s y marcarlas pronto y en forma p r e c i s a o podrzn informar a 10s excavadores que no hay i n s t a l a c i o n e s en l a zona propuesta p a r a excavaci6n. E l sistema de "una llamada" e s t 5 en s e r v i c i o en 4 3 e s t a d o s d e l p a i s . E l Comit6 I n t e r n a c i o n a l d e l sistema de "una llamada" d e l "American P u b l i c Works Association U t i l i t y Location and Coordination Council", con sede en e l 1313 East 60th S t r e e t , Chicsgo, Illinois (telgfono 312-947-2520), ha nombrado nueve r e p r e s e n t a n t e s regionales que est% disponibles para a c l a r a r c o n s u l t a s con f u n c i o n a r i o s de comunidades de todos 10s Estados Unidos y sus t e r r i t o r i o s p a r a el establecimiento de sistemas de "una llamada". Aun cuando l a J u n t a de Seguridad comprende que e l sistema de "una llamada" no es una panacea para t o d o s 10s accidentes con i n s t a l a c i o n e s subterrzneas, considera que el sistema de "una llamada" e s t a b l e c i d o y con el r e q u i s i t o de que 10s c o n t r a t i s t a s lo usen, es un instrumento v a l i o s o para prevenir daiios en las t u b e r i a s . En este caso, s i hubiese estado en s e r v i c i o e s e sistema y e l c o n t r a t i s t a de c a r r e t e r a s , por sus obligaciones c o n t r a c t u a l e s , hubiera estado "continuamente en contact0 con e l sistema de "una llamada" o con 10s explotadores de i n s t a l a c i o n e s s u b t e r r z n e a s para determinar l a profundidad p r e c i s a y l o c a l i z a c i 6 n de una instalaci6n subterrznea", t a l vez no h a b r i a ocurrido el a c c i d e n t e en cuesti6n.#

Page 6-3- Parece que las compaiiias principales de la empresa operadora oleoducto ofrecen entrenamiento satisfactorio sobre seguridad, especia en el control de corrosi6n de la tuberia y tienen programas de entrena aceptables para su personal profesional en Puerto Rico. No obstante, Comisibn de Servicios Pilblicos no tiene un programa eficaz de entrenamie para sus empleados. El departamento local de bomberos no ha sido entren en procedimientos de emergencia en casos de un accidente como el ocurrido. Los residentes del Zrea no fueron evacuados sin0 hasta desDu6s de la exdo y el fuego. La compaiiia a cargo del oleoducto sup0 de la ruptura a 30 de enero de 1980, per0 no present6 el informe sobre este accidente a1 Centr Nacional de Respuestas del Departamento de Transporte de 10s figura en la lista de la compafifa de entidades a las que hay que notificar cas0 de emergencia. La Junta de Seguridad se enter6 del accidente par un articulo del peri6dico a1 d5.a siguiente; por consiguiente, un investigador la Junta de Seguridad no se pudo transladar a1 lugar del accidente hasta 35 horas depu6s de haber ocurrido. El retardo de la llegada del i la Junta de Seguridad entorpeci6 las entrevistas de testigos presenciales y la inspecci6n visual de la tuberia despu6s del accidente. Por consiguiente, la National Transportation Safety Board recomienda que la empresa The Pipelines of Puerto Rico, Inc.: Coordine con la Comisi6n de Servicios PGblics, 10s cuerpos L de bomberos y otras empresas pilblicas, el desarrollo de proc mientos que se deben seguir durante emergencias con tuberias subterrzneas. (Prioridad de Acci6n Clase II) (P-80-75) Actualice de inmediato la lista de entidades con las ponerse en contact0 en una emergencia e instituir para asegurar que la lista sea actualizada, por lo (Accibn Urgente, Clase I) (P-80-76) Instale indicadores permanentes de oleoductos, en nGmero sufici para cumplir con el c6digo de reglamentos federales 49CFR 195.4 (Prioridad de Acci6n Clase 11) (P-80-77) Instale nuevas etiquetas de identificaci6n del oleod permanentes de conformidad con el inciso (a) (2) del csdigo de federales 49 CFR 195.410. (Prioridad de Acci6n Clase 11) (P-80-78 En cooperacibn con otras empresas con instalaciones ayude a establecer un sistema de notificaci6n de exc "una llamada para toda la isla.(Prioridad de Accibn Clase I (P-80-79)#

Page 7-4- I n s t r u y a a sus i n s p e c t o r e s de t u b e r r a s sobre l a importancia de permanecer en el lugar de l a construcci6n y supervisar de cerca 10s t r a b a j o s d e l c o n t r a t i s t a a medida que se vayan acercando a1 oleoducto. (Prioridad d e Accio'n Clase 11) (P-80-80) KING, P r e s i d e n t e ; DRIVER, Vicepresidente; McADAMS y BURSLEY, miembros que concuerdan con es tas recomendaciones; e no participo'.#