NTSB Safety Recommendation Letter P-80-081 through P-80-085

Page 1Official PDFp-0 2 NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD WASHINGTON, D.C. I S S U E D : February 26, 1981 Public Service Commission Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Call Box "C.P." Hato Rey, Puerto Rico 00919 i SAFETY RECOMMENDAT I O N (S) P-80-81 through -85 At 9:50 a.m., on January 30, 1980, an 8-inch-diameter, refined petroleum products pipeline owned by The Pipelines of Puerto Rico, Inc., and operated by the SheU Oil Company (Puerto Rico) Ltd. was struck and ruptured by a bulldozer during maintenance work on a nearby waterline in the Sector Cana of Bayamon, Puerto Rico, about 10 miles southwest of San Juan. Gasoline from the rupture sprayed downhill and ran off into a small creek. About 1 1/2 hours later, the gasoline vapors were ignited by an undetermined source and exploded; the subsequent fire killed one person and extensively damaged 25 houses and other property. lJ Earlier that morning, an employee of the Aqueduct and Sewer Authority of Puerto Rico had been using a pavement breaker 2/ during repair work on a 6-inch-diameter waterline. Unable to remove a cement azchor that supported the waterline with the pavement breaker, an Aqueduct and Sewer Authority employee at the site requested help from Highway Authority of Puerto Rico personnel who were working nearby. The Highway Authority contractor moved a bulldozer-ripper 3/ to the site. About 9:50 a.m., t h e ripper struck and punctured the pipeline which was-located approximately 3 inches below the waterline. For many years, the owners of underground facilities throughout the IJnited States have been troubled with damage to their facilities as a result of third-party activity and other outside forces. The underground utility industry, recognizing the seriousness of the excavation damage problem, has developed, implemented, and publicized many programs and procedures to reduce the number of these underground contacts and the subsequent public safety hazard. However, The Pipelines of Puerto Rico, Inc., does not have a written damage prevention program and the Public Service Commission (PSC) of Puerto Rico has not encouraged the development of such a program. There is no "one-call" system operating in the accident area or in any other area on the island of Puerto Rico, and there are no local or Commonwealth laws requiring excavators to notify utilities of planned excavations. - 1/ For more detailed information, read "Pipeline Accident Report--The Pipelines of Puerto Rico, Inc., Petroleum Products Pipeline Rupture and Fire, Bayamon, Puerto Rico, January 30, 1980" (NTSB-PAR-80-6). - 2/ A pavement breaker is a hydraulic or airoperated piece of equipment used to break or fracture pavement. - 3/ A ripper is the name given to a bulldozer which has as a part of its excavation equipment a heavy, metal, extendable tooth resembling a plow. 2920B#

Page 2-2- The Safety Board believes that good communication between excavators an operators of underground facilities is essential for any successful pipeline damag prevention program and that one of the most effective methods of preventin excavation-caused damage to underground facilities is to insure that excavators notif the owners or operators of utility companies in advance of the proposed excavation wor so that operators can mark the location of their facilities before excavation begins. The most convenient method for such notification is a "one-call" system. If an excavator gives reasonable advance notice of his plans, owners of underground facilities can locate and mark their facilities promptly and accurately, or can advise t h e excavators that there are no facilities in the proposed area of excavation. In all, "one-call" systems opera 43 States. It appears that the pipeline company's parent companies furnish satisfactory pipe1 safety training, especially for pipeline corrosion control, and have acceptable train programs for their professional staff in Puerto Rico. However, the PSC lacks an effective training program for its employees. The PSC staff has limited or no experience in the operations of a petroleum products pipeline. On October 16, 1973, and again on January 14, 1980, t h e Office of Pipeline Safety Operations of the US. Department of Transportation (DOT) suggested that the PSC send its pipeline personnel to training courses on the safety evaluation of pipeline facilities at the DOT'S Transportation Safety Institute in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Half of the total costs for such training courses are paid by the Federal government. As yet, no personnel from t h e PSC have been assigned to attend these pipeline safety courses. Participation in these courses or other courses could provide PSC personnel with valuable training in pipeline safety and would assist them in properly evaluating t h e pipeline facilities of Puerto Rico. The local fire department had not been trained in emergency procedures to follow after a pipeline accident such as this. Area residents were not evacuated until after t h e explosion and fire. No one from t h e fire department or even the police department or pipeline company followed t h e leaking gasoline down through the creek and the canal behind the houses. Nothing was done to stop the flow of gasoline after it flowed into the creek and canal. The only effort was at the rupture site where a small earthen dam was built, but this w a s not adequate. The pipeline company, together with the fire and police departments, should have undertaken at least the following actions: 1. Determined the extent of the leaking gasoline and the area affected downstream. 2. Notified the residents along t h e path of the leaking gasoline and coordinated the immediate evacuation of the premises. 3. Shut off all ignition sources in the area and blocked off all the leading across the creek and open canal to avoid introduction of ig sources. 4. Placed booms or other dams across the creek at various points to slow the progress of the leaking gasoline toward the residential areas. 5. Assembled tanktrucks to remove and dispose of t h e accumulate gasoline at the dams or booms. -#

Page 3-3- Therefore, the National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Public Service Commission of t h e Commonwealth of Puerto Rico: Train its pipeline safety personnel to effectively assess compliance by petroleum products pipeline operators with applicable Federal pipeline safety requirements. (Class II, Priority Action) (P-80-81) Encourage training of local fire, police, and other public agencies regarding petroleum products pipeline emergencies, and coordinate with them during emergencies. (Class 11, Priority Action) (P-80-82) Establish requirements for a petroleum products pipeline damage prevention program which includes the use of a "one-call" excavation notification system. (Class II, Priority Action) (P-80-83) Initiate a petroleum products pipeline safety program which would include sending personnel to appropriate pipeline safety institutes. (Class 11, Priority Action) (P-80-84) Assign at least one full-time qualified professional to the duties of pipeline safety so that the tasks of inspections and investigations can be carried out in compliance with Federal regulations. (Class II, Priority Action) (P-80-85) KING, Chairman, DRIVER, Vice Chairman, McADAMS and BTJRSLEY, Members, concurred in these recommendations. GOLDMAN, Member, did not participate.#

Page 4NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD WASHINGTON, D.C. 1 I S S U E D : 26 febrero 1981 --------------------______I_____________- Forwarded to: LCDO. Manuel Amadeo Gonz6lez Presidente d e l a Comisi6n de Servicios PGblicos d e l Estado Libre de Puerto Rico C a l l Box "C.P." Hato Rey, Puerto Rico 00919 SAFETY RECOMMENDATION (S) P-80-81 hasta -85 E l 30 de enero de 1980, a l a s 9:50 a.m., una tuberia d e ocho pulgadas para productos refinados d e petrbleo, propiedad de "The Pipelines of Puerto Rico, Inc." y operada pcr l a Shell O i l Company (Puerto Rico) Ltd., s u f r i 6 una ruptura debido a l a acometida de un bulldozer durante trabajos de mantenimiento en una l h e a d e l acueducto en e l Sector Cana de Bayamo'n, Puerto Rico, a unas 10 millas a 1 sudoeste de San Juan. La gasolina que man6 de l a ruptura s e esparci6 cuesta abajo hacia una pequeiia quebrada. Alrededor de una hora y media m6s tarde, se inflamaron 10s vapores de l a gasolina e hicieron explosi6n; el fuego mato' a una persona y causo' extensos daiios en 25 casas y o t r a s propiedades. 11 Temprano e s a maiiana, un empleado de 10s s e r v i c i o s de Acueducto y Alcantarillado de Puerto Rico habia estado utilizando un m a r t i l l o rompedor 7.1 de pavimento durante 10s trabajos d e reparacio'n de una tuberfa d e agua d e szis pulgadas de digmetro. A l no poder remover con e l m a r t i l l o rompedor l a t r a v i e s a de cement0 que soportaba la tuberfa d e agua, un empleado d e l Acueducto y Alcantarillado que se encontraba en e l lugar s o l i c i t 6 ayuda d e l personal d Servicios d e Carreteras de Puerto Rico que estaba trahajando cerca de a132 E l c o n t r a t i s t a de Servicios d e Carreteras l l e v 6 un bulldozer escarificador a 1 lugar. Cerca de l a s 9:50 a.m. e l bulldozer choc6 y perfor6 e l oleoduct se hallaba a unas tres pulgadas por debajo de l a tuberia d e agua. - Por muchos aiios, 10s propietarios de instalaciones subterr'aneas en t 10s Estados Unidos s e han v i s t a perjudicados con daiios en sus instalaciones como resultado de actividades de terceros y o t r a s causas. La i n d u s t r i a d 10s s e r v i c i o s subterrsneos, reconociendo la gravedad d e l problema por 10s - 11 Para d s informaci6n. lean e l "Informe sobre sccidente de oleoducto --La ruptura y fuego d e i oleoducto de l a compaiifa The Pipelines of Puerto Rico, Lnc., en Bayamo'n, Puerto Rico, e l 30 de enero de 1980" (NTSB-PAR-80- - 2 1 Un m a r t i l l o rompedor de pavimento es un equipo hidr'aulico o n e d t i c o q se usa para romper o f r a c t u r a r e l pavimento. - 3 1 Escariador es e l nombre que se la da a un bulldozer que, como p a r t e equipo de excavacio'n t i e n e un d i e n t e pesado d e metal extendible, que se pare a un arado.#

Page 5-a- daiios causados por las excavaciones, ha desarrollado, puesto en pr2ctica y dado publicidad a muchos programas y procedimientos para reducir e l nihero de estos contactos subterrzneos y e l riesgo que representan contra l a seguridad pGblica. No obstante, l a compaiiia ”The Pipelines of Puerto Rico, Inc.”, no t i e n e un programa e s c r i t o d e prevenci6n contra daiios y l a ComisiBn de Servicios PGblicos (CSP) d e Puerto Rico no ha alentado e l desarrollo de un programa de esa indole. No hay ningGn sistema de “una llamada” que estE en us0 en l a regi6n d e l accidente n i en ningcn o t r o lugar de l a isla n i tampoco hay l e y e s d e l Estado Libre Asociado n i l o c a l e s que exijan a 10s excavadores n o t i f i c a r a l a s compaiifas d e s e r v i c i o s pGblicos d e las excavaciones que piensan hacer. La Junta de Seguridad considera esencial mantener una buena comunicaci6n e n t r e 10s excavadores y l a s empresas que operan instalaciones subterrsneas para cualquier programa e f i c a z de prevencia’n de daiios de tuberias y, uno de 10s mgtodos m2s e f e c t i v o s d e prevenir 10s daiios causados por excavaci6n a instalaciones subterrzneas es asegurarse que 10s excavadores notifiquen a 10s propietarios o explotadores de l a s compaiiias de s e r v i c i o s pGblicos con anticipaci6n acerca d e l t r a b a j o de excavaci6n que vayan a hacer. D e e s t a forma l a s empresas de s e r v i c i o s pGblicos pueden marcar e l lugar donde se hallan s u s instalaciones a n t e s de comenzar l a excavaci6n. E l mgtodo m 2 s conveniente para esta notificaci6n es el sistema denominado de ”una llamada”. S i un excavador informa s u s planes con un preaviso razonable, 10s propietarios de las i n s t a l a - ciones subterrsneas podr2n l o c a l i z a r l a s y marcarlas pronto y en forma precisa o podr5n informar a 10s excavadores que no hay instalaciones en l a zona propuesta para excavacibn. E l sistema de ”una llamada” est2 en s e r v i c i o en 43 estados d e l p a i s . Parece que las compaiiias principales de l a empresa o p e r a d o r a d e l oleoducto ofrecen entrenamiento s a t i s f a c t o r i o sobre seguridad d e l oleoducto, especialmente en control de corrosi6n de l a s tuberias y tienen programas de entrenamiento aceptables para s u personal profesional de Puerto Rico. No obstante, l a Comisi6n de Servicios PGblicos (CSP) no t i e n e un programa e f i c a z de entrenamiento para s u s empleados. E l 1 6 d e octubre de 1973 y, nuevamente, el 14 de enero de 1980, l a “Office of Pipeli.ne Safety Operations” (Oficina de seguridad de operaci6n de oleoductos) d e l Departamento de Transporte (DOT) de 10s Estados Unidos s u g i r i 6 que l a CSP enviara personal a1 DOT I n s t i t u t o d e Seguridad de Transporte ubicado en Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, para que tomaran cursos de entrenamiento sobre e v a l u a c i k de seguridad de tuberias. La mitad de 10s costos de dichos cursos l a paga e l gobierno Federal. Hasta ahora no s e ha asignado a nadie d e l personal de l a CSP a e s t o s cursos de seguridad de oleoductos. A 1 p a r t i c i p a r en e s t o s o en o t r o s cursos, e l personal de laCSP a d q u i r i r i a un entrenamiento valioso en seguridad de t u b e r i a s s u b t e r r k e a s que les capacitarra para evaluar adecuadamente e s t a s instalaciones en Puerto Rico. E l cuerpo local. de bomberos no habia s i d o entrenado en procedimientos de emergencia para atender un accidente de oleoducto como el. acaecido. Los residentes d e l &rea no fueron evacuados hasta que se produjo l a explosi6n y e l fuego. Nadie d e l departamento de bomberos, de l a p o l i c i a n i de l a compafiia acargo d e l oleoducto s i g u i 6 e l r a s t r o de l a fuga de gasolina a t r a v s s de l a quebrada hasta el canal d e t r k d e l a s casas. No se hizo nada para detener#

Page 6-3- el flujo de la gasolina despuzs de haberse derramado en la quebrada y el canal. La Gnica labor fue en el lugar de la ruptura donde se levant6 una pequeiia presa de tierra que result6 no ser adecuada. La compaiiia encargada del oleoducto junto con 10s departamentos de bom y de policia deberfa haber efectuado, por l o menos, las labores siguientes: 1.Determinar la magnitud de la fuga de gasolina y el 5rea afectada cuesta abajo. 2. Notificar a 10s residentes a lo largo del trayecto del flujo de la gasolina y coordinar la inmediata evacuaci6n del lugar. 3. Cerrar todas las Fosibles fuentes de ignici6n en el &ea y bloquear todos 10s accesos que conducen a la quebrada y a1 canal abierto para evitar una posible ignici6n. 4 . Colocar barreras flotantes o presas en diversos puntos a travEs de la quebrada con el objeto de disminuir el flujo del derrame de gasolina hacia las zonas residenciales. 5. Reunir camiones tanque para sacar y disponer de la gasolina acumulada en las barreras flotantes y presas. Por lo tanto, la National Transportation Safety Board recomienda que la Comisi6n de Servicios PGblicos del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico: Entrene a1 personal a cargo de la seguridad de oleoductos y tuberias para que pueda determinar que 10s operadores de tuberias transpor- tadoras de productos de petr6leo cumplen efectivamente con las disposiciones federales correspondientes sobre seguridad de tuberias. (Prioridad de Acci6n Clase 11) (P-80-81) Aliente el entrenamiento del cuerpo de bomberos local, policia y otras agencias pGblicas sobre emergencias de tuberias transportadoras de productos de petr6leo y coordinar con ellos durante emergencias (Prioridad de Acci6n Clase 11) (P-80-82) Determine 10s requisitos para un programa de prevenci6n de daiios tuberias transportadoras de productos de petr6leo que incluyan un sistema de notificaci6n de excavaciones de "una llamada". (Priori de Acci6n Clase 11) (P-80-83) lnicie un programa sobre seguridad de tuberia transportadora de productos de petr6leo que incluya el envio de personal a segui cursos en institutos especializados en seguridad de oleoductos. (Prioridad de Acci6n Clase 11) (P-80-84)#

Page 7Asigne, por lo menos un profesional calificado, en forma permanente a las tareas de velar por la seguridad del oleoducto de forma que la labor de inspecciones e investigaciones se puedan realizar en cumplimiento con las disposiciones y reglamentos Federales. (Prioridad de Acci6n Clase 11) (P-80-85). K I N G , Presidente; DRIVER, Vicepresidente; McADAMS y BURSLEY, miemb5os que concuerdan con estas recomendaciones; GOLDMAN, miembro que no participo.#