P-82-041
P-82-041
Page 1Official PDFNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD WASHINGTON, D.C. ISSUED: October II, 1982 ............................................. Forwarded t o : \ M r . Howard Hawks President Northern P l a i n s Gas Company (Managing Partner f o r t h e Northern Border P i p e l i n e Company) 224 South 108th Street Omaha, Nebraska 68102 --_---------_-------__L_________________---- SAFETY RECOMMENDAT ION (S) P-82-41 -- The National Transportation Safety Board has reviewed t h e Notices published by t h e Materials Transportation Bureau (MTB) of t h e U.S. Department of Transportation: " P e t i t i o n f o r Waiver" and "Grant of Waiver," Docket No. 82-3W3, Notices Nos. 1 and 2 , which appeared a t 47 FR 16248 and 47 FR 20715 on A p r i l 15, 1982, and May 13, 1982, respectively. Both Notices concerned t h e r e p a i r of g i r t h weld d e f e c t s i n approximately 635 m i l e s of 42-inch diameter gas transmission p i p e l i n e constructed by t h e Northern Border P i p e l i n e Company (Company). This p i p e l i n e s e c t i o n w a s constructed in 1981 through t h e S t a t e s of Montana, North Dakota, Minnesota, and Iowa. The Notices a l s o concerned "possible r e p a i r of d e f e c t s i n approximately 181 m i l e s (of p i p e l i n e ) t o be constructed i n 1982." A s reported i n Notice No. 1, t h e weld d e f e c t s were n o t detected by t h e Company's x-ray technicians responsible f o r q u a l i t y assurance, but r a t h e r when an a u d i t of the weld x-rays was performed a f t e r t h e pipe waS buried. The Safety Board i s concerned t h a t important issues r a i s e d by the a u d i t were not addressed i n your p e t i t i o n , f o r example: 1. Why were these weld flaws not detected and corrected immediately a f t e r they were x-rayed? 2. Why did weld flaws occur only i n t h e eastern s e c t o r and not i n t h e western sector of t h i s pipeline? 3 . Were the x-ray technicians properly q u a l i f i e d and adequately experienced? 4. Were t h e welders properly q u a l i f i e d f o r t h e procedures used? 5. Did the Company employ enough q u a l i f i e d i n s p e c t o r s t o assure t h a t a l l welding was done i n compliance with its standards? 3549#
Page 2- 2 - o t h e r d e f e c t s . Further, t h e Board b e l i e v e s t h a t a p r i o r i t y concern Company should be to ascertain t h e answers t o t h e questions above an c o r r e c t i v e a c t i o n . Therefore, the National Transportation Safety Board recomm Northern Border P i p e l i n e Company: Revise its q u a l i t y assurance program (1) t o provide high q u a l i f i c a t i o n standards f o r x-ray technicians and (2) t o p r e s c r i b e procedures which w i l l r e s u l t i n t h e d e t e c t i o n and r e p a i r o r replacement of g i r t h weld d e f e c t s before a p i p e l i n e is buried. (Class I, Urgent P r i o r i t y ) (P-82-41) The National Transportation Safety Board is a n independent Feder letter. By: J i m Burnett#
This is an NTSB safety recommendation letter. NTSB recommendations are advisory and do not themselves create binding regulatory requirements.