NTSB Safety Recommendation Letter P-84-026

Page 1Official PDFNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD WASHINGTON, D.C. Corrected copy I S S U E D : June 18, 1984 ---_-_______________________I^__________-..-~- F o r w a r d e d to: Honorable Howard Dugoff Administrator Research and Special Programs Administration U.S. Department of Transportation Washington, D.C. 20590 i SAFETY RECOMMENDAT I ON ( S ) i P-84-26 / --_-----------__-_..____________I________----- About 7 2 5 p.m., c.s.t., on March 15, 1983, an 8-inch-diameter liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) pipeline operated by the Mid-America Pipeline System (MAPCO) was damaged by a rotating power auger being used to drill holes in rocky terrain to plant trees on Lot 8, Section 5, Block 43 of the Chaparral Estates housing development near West Odessa, Texas. The damaged pipeline ruptured and within 3 minutes, LPG, which was being transported a t 1,075 psig, escaped, vaporized, and was ignited by an undetermined source. In the resultant fire, five persons were killed and five persons were seriously injured--one person died 5 days later. Two mobile homes, a small frame house, an auger truck, two cars, and a pickup truck were destroyed; 9,375 barrels of LPG were burned. When the pipeline was installed in 1960, the area west of Odessa was undeveloped and uncultivated land. The Grant of Easement entered into in 1960 between MAPCO and the former owner of the land now known as Chaparral Estates provided permanent rights for MAPCO to clear and keep clear an area along the route of the pipeline which extended 25 feet on each side of the center of the pipeline. The easement was recorded in Vol. 369, page 1 of the deed records of Ector County. Additionally, the easement precluded the grantor of the easement from building or allowing others to build upon the easement in any way "that will interfere with the normal operation and maintenance" of the pipeline. With the growth of Odessa after 1960, surrounding acreage has been developed into unincorporated residential communities, many of which have been built over existing oil gathering, natural gas transmission, and liquefied petroleum pipelines. In the late 1970's and early 1980's, the area known as Chaparral Estates was subdivided into residential lots. Many conventional and mobile homes have been placed on the lots. Block 43 of Section 5, the portion of Chaparral Estates in which the rupture occurred, was subdivided in 1981, and I1 of the residential lots overlay MAPCO's LPG pipeline easement. The two mobile homes destroyed in the fire were located on 2 of these - I/ For more detailed information read Pipeline Accident Report--"Mid-"America Pipeline System Liquefied Petroleum Gas Pipeline Rupture, West Odessa, Texas, March 15, 1983" (NTSB/PAR-84/01). 3721A#

Page 2-2- 11 lots, and the mobile home 011 Lot 8 encroached 15 feet into MAPCO's eas was within 10 feet of the pipeline. Since the development of Block 43 of Chaparral Estates, roads have been graded over the pipeline, and numerous excavations have bee made adjacent to the pipeline for installing buried telephone cables, septic tanks, an poles for electric power lines. When MAPCO learned that land adjacent to its pipeline was being dev residential lots, additional markers were installed over the pipeline. Even t was aware that its pipeline lay only 1 6 inches below the surface, that roads had bee graded over the pipeline, and that the high-pressure pipeline now would be exposed t additional risks which might endanger a significant number of people, no changes wer made in the design or operation of the pipeline to increase protection for persons u would live close to the pipeline. No changes were required by 49 CFR Part 195 (Fede requirements for liquid pipelines). Chaparral Estates, like many other land subdivisions, was planned with consideration of the hazards that might be posed to future residents pipelines transporting hazardous materials. Moreover, Ector County officials approved the plans for Chaparral Estates without consideration of the effect of the development upon the safety of MAPCO's pipeline and also without consideration of the possible hazard to future residents posed by the pipeline. Because neither the developer nor land planning officials recognized the location of the pipeline within the planned subdivision as a potential threat to the safety of future residents, 11 lots in Block 43 were allowed to be developed over the land occupied by MAPCO's pipeline easement. Dwellings could not be erected or placed on some of these lots without siting the dwelling ove MAPCO's first knowledge of the development was provided by i t 7 nrt-ial construction activity was noted. The Safety Board recognizes that high-pressure pipelines underlie many residential lots throughout the nation and that houses have been built over them. These potential1 adverse conditions will be difficult to abate easily or economically; however, there is n justification for local land use and planning agencies or land developers to continue to ad t o the problem. Local governments should establish land development standards which will preclude subdividers from creating lots over pipelines 01' lots in which construction cannot be undertaken without encroaching on pipeline easements. Such s even be tailored to force land developers to subdivide lands so that the high-pressu pipelines lie within an area to be used as streets or clear areas within the community. these alternatives are not possible, the developer should be required to arrange with t h owner of a pipeline for its relocation away from the residential development or to a necessary margin of safety by other means. Title 49 CFB Part 192 and 49 CFR Part 195 were primarily based on industr (ASA B31.8 for natural gas pipelines and ASA B31.4 for liquid pipelines). took into account population densities for the construction of pipelines w code did not incorporate comparable restrictions. Consequently, the Feder regulations do not take into account population densities. Title 49 CFR Part 192 requires operatoks of natural gas pipelines that are areas where the population has increased significantly since the pipeline's inst reevaluate and/or retest the pipeline to confirm that its margin of safety t o reduce the maximum allowable operating pressure such that an adeq safety is achieved. However, the regulations in Part 195 do not require ope pipelines to take comparable action and, consequently, many liquid pipelin#

Page 3-3- operate without increasing the margin of safety even though the land adjacent to t h e pipeline may have become more densely populated. The margin of safety provided for liquid pipelines, especially for those that transport highly volatile liquids or liquids which possess toxic materials, should be reevaluated periodically. Provisions for reevaluating safety factors, such as the provisions contained in 49 CFR 192.611 for natural gas pipelines, should be established for liquid pipelines which transport highly volatile or toxic liquids. Therefore, the National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Research and Special Programs Administration: Amend Federal regulations governing pipelines that transport highly volatile liquids to require a level of safety for the public comparable t o that now required for natural gas pipelines. (Class II, Priority Action) (P-84-26) BURNETT, Chairman, and BURSLEY and GROSE, Members, concurred in this recommendation. GOLDMAN, Vice Chairman, did not participate.#

Page 4Safety Recommendation Reiteration List SR Numbe r Reiteratio n Number Report Numbe r Report Date P-84- 026 1 PAR- 91-01 6/11/199 1 P-84- 026 2 PAR- 87-02 7/20/198 7 P-84- 026 3 PAR- 90-02 6/19/199 0 Accident Description Liquid Propane Pipeline Rupture And Fire Texas Eastern Products Pipeline Company Williams Pipe Line Company Liquid Pipeline Rupture And Fire Derailment Of Southern Pacific Transportatio n Company Freight Train on 5/12/89, and Subsequent Reputure Of Calnew Petroleum Pipeline on 5/25/1989 Accident City North Blenheim Mounds View San Bernardin o Acciden t State NY MN CA Accident Date 3/13/199 0 7/8/1986 5/25/198 9#