NTSB Safety Recommendation Letter P-89-005 through P-89-006

Page 1Official PDFNational Transportation Safety Board Washington, D.C. 20594 Safety Recommendation Date: August 9, 1989 In r e p l y r e f e r to: P-89-5 and -6 Mr. Travis P. Dungan Admini s t r a t o r Research and Special Programs Administration 400 Seventh S t r e e t , S.W. Washington, D . C . 20590 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . On May 12, 1989, a Southern P a c i f i c Transportation Company (SP) f r e i g h t t r a i n d e r a i l e d i n San Bernardino, California, with portions of the engines and r a i l c a r s coming t o r e s t over a 14-inch products pipeline being operated by Calnev Pipe Line Company (Calnev) i n excess of 1,600 psig. After l e a r n i n g of the derailment, Calnev personnel stopped pumping product through t h e pipeline. Pressure i n t h e pipeline near milepost 6.8, the area of t h e derailment, was reduced t o about 1,100 psig when the pumps were shut down; however, Calnev personnel desired t o reduce the pressure t o about 300 psig t o provide g r e a t e r safety in t h e event t h a t its pipeline had been damaged. To reduce t h e pressure, Calnev personnel removed about 120 b a r r e l s of product from the pipeline a t i t s Colton Pump S t a t i o n (Colton) a t Milepost Post (MP) Ot00, and this r e s u l t e d in a 60-psig pressure reduction both a t Colton and a t a pressure monitoring point located a t Cajon Pass (MP Ot28), which i s a t an elevation o f 3,440 f e e t above Colton. Since t h e pressure dropped a t both locations, Calnev personnel were aware t h a t t h e check valves i n the p i p e l i n e between these two points were not closed. Again Calnev personnel removed 120 b a r r e l s of product a t Colton i n an attempt t o c l o s e the check valves so t h a t pressure could be reduced in t h e area of the derailment. Again the pressure dropped about 60 psig both a t Colton and a t Cajon Pass. The t h i r d withdrawal of product resulted i n pressure being reduced t o about 800 psig a t Colton, b u t again pressure was reduced a t both l o c a t i o n s . I t was believed t h a t the check valves would not c l o s e because t h e r a t e o f withdrawal of product from t h e p i p e l i n e was too low. Calnev personnel determined t h a t the pressure now a t Colton l i k e l y was the r e s u l t of the s t a t i c pressure of the product in the l i n e and t h a t f u r t h e r reduction was not p r a c t i c a l as this would require the removal of a l a r g e q u a n t i t y o f product from t h e pipeline. 51 28A#

Page 22 Calnev personnel performed a l i m i t e d number o f excavations t o inspect t h e p i p e l i n e a t l o c a t i o n s they believed t h e g r e a t e r chances o f damage from t h e derailment existed. Although some p o r t i o n s o f t h e d e r a i l e d t r a i n were found i n t h e excavations below ground l e v e l , none were found nearer t o the p i p e l i n e than 3 f e e t . No i n t e r n a l pipe inspections o r h y d r o s t a t i c t e s t s were performed before r e t u r n i n g the p i p e l i n e t o maximum operating pressure nor were any r e q u i r e d by t h e Research and Special Programs' O f f i c e o f P i p e l i n e Safety (RSPA) which monitored the p i p e l i n e i n s p e c t i o n a c t i v i t i e s through i t s agent, t h e C a l i f o r n i a State F i r e Marshal. [The RSPA now has established a p o l i c y t h a t any p i p e l i n e p o t e n t i a l l y damaged by an accident, such as a t r a i n derailment, w i l l be excavated i n the areas o f p o t e n t i a l impingement, inspected f o r damage w i t h any damage found being repaired, b a c k f i l l e d , and then s u c c e s s f u l l y h y d r o s t a t i c a l l y tested before the p i p e l i n e can be returned t o s e r v i c e . ] A t 8:05 a.m. on May 25, 1989, Calnev's 14-inch products p i p e l i n e r u p t u r e d i n t h e area o f the May 12, 1989, SP derailment r e l e a s i n g gasoline which sprayed over houses i n the adjacent neighborhood and i g n i t e d . Gasoline f e d t h e f i r e s u n t i l they were extinguished about 1O:OO p.m. Two persons were k i l l e d , 31 persons were i n j u r e d , 10 houses were destroyed, 5 houses were e x t e n s i v e l y damaged, and 18 automobiles were destroyed. A d d i t i o n a l l y , about 1,000 people were evacuated d u r i n g t h e emergency response a c t i v i t i e s . Later, Calnev personnel inspected the check valve i n the 14-inch p i p e l i n e a t milepost Ot06.9 (about 0.1 m i l e n o r t h o f t h e rupture) and found it i n t h e f u l l y open p o s i t i o n . No d e b r i s o r other reason was evident f o r the clapper o f t h e check v a l v e n o t t o be closed, b u t considerable f o r c e was r e q u i r e d t o c l o s e t h e clapper. A f t e r r e p l a c i n g the pipe i n t h e area o f the rupture, Calnev i n s t a l l e d a v a l v e j u s t upstream o f t h e check valve a t MP 0+0.9 and about 9,400 b a r r e l s o f product were required t o r e f i l l the p i p e l i n e . For t h i s 14-inch p i p e l i n e , t h a t q u a n t i t y o f product would fill 10.24 m i l e s o f pipe i n d i c a t i n g t h a t a f t e r t h e rupture, gasoline from beyond the check valve a t MP Ot14.9 had flowed d o w n h i l l t o t h e s i t e o f t h e r u p t u r e . Consequently, the check valve a t MP Ot14.9 d i d n o t c l o s e t o prevent t h e back f l o w o f gasoline. Because Calnev personnel were unable t o reduce the pressure i n the p i p e l i n e on May 12, 1989, a f t e r t h e derailment and experienced t h e same reductions i n pressure a t Colton (MP 040) and a t Cajon Pass (MP Ot28), i t appears t h a t t h e check valve a t m i l e p o s t 25.7 also d i d n o t f u n c t i o n p r o p e r l y . While Calnev has man,y check valves i n s t a l l e d i n i t s p i p e l i n e s , each o f t h e check valves i n question are 14-inch " A l l - C l e a r Check Valves," Model ACE-976 t h a t were manufactured by the Wheatley Company. The clapper i n these valves i s hinged on the s i d e r a t h e r than a t t h e top as i s usual. Calnev has n o t previously experienced a release o f product o r o t h e r circumstance t h a t would provide an i n d i c a t i o n t h a t these valves ever functioned p r o p e r l y t o prevent back f l o w o f product i n t h e p i p e l i n e . Calnev a l s o has never performed any maintenance on o r operational t e s t s o f these valves since t h e p i p e l i n e began operations i n 1970 even though these#

Page 33 sidehinged check valves provide t h e only automatic p r o t e c t i o n against product f l o w i n g downhill i n t o populated areas i n and near San Bernardino, C a l i f o r n i a , should an undesired opening, such as a rupture, occur. T i t l e 49 CFR 195.420, Valve maintenance, requires the p i p e l i n e operator t o maintain i n good working order a t a l l times each valve necessary for the safe operation o f i t s p i p e l i n e and t o inspect each mainline valve twice each year t o determine t h a t it i s f u n c t i o n i n g properly. Since the term "valve" i s n o t defined i n s e c t i o n 192.2, D e f i n i t i o n s , o r otherwise defined i n P a r t 195, Transportation o f Hazardous Liquids by Pipeline, i t i s not c l e a r whether the inspection and maintenance provisions f o r valves apply t o check valves. However, Calnev obviously has not interpreted t h i s requirement as applying t o i t s check valves, and since no actions have been taken against Calnev f o r f a i l u r e t o inspect and maintain these valves, i t would appear t h a t RSPA's inspectors a l s o do not consider these requirements t o apply t o check valves. Therefore, the Safety Board recommends t h a t the Research and Special Programs Administration: Require p i p e l i n e operators t h a t have " A l l - C l e a r Check Valves" manufactured by t h e Wheatley Company i n s t a l l e d i n t h e i r p i p e l i n e systems t o t e s t these valves f o r proper closure and r e q u i r e the replacement o f any t h a t f a i l t o close properly. (Class I , Urgent Action) (P-89-5) E s t a b l i s h inspection, maintenance, and t e s t requirements t o demonstrate and maintain the proper functioning o f check valves i n s t a l l e d i n p i p e l i n e systems. (Class 11, P r i o r i t y Action) (P-89-6) KOLSTAD, Acting Chairman, BURNETT, LAUBER, NALL, and DICKINSON, Members, concurred i n these recommendations. : James L. Kolstad Acting Chairman#