NTSB Safety Recommendation Letter P-95-001 through P-95-004

Page 1Official PDFI);tte: FEB 7 1995 ]In .R$y Refer TO: P-55-1 th@ -4 Hoiloiable D. K. Sharma Adminishator Research and Special Programs Admihistration Washington, D.C. 20.590 About 115.5 psn. on NLuch 23, I N , a 3&i.inch diarneter pipeline owned and operated by Texas Eastern Transmission Coipration (TEiXD) ruptured catastrophically in Edison Township, New Jersey, witI7in an asphalt pIant c o v u n d . The form of the nrpture a d of natural gas escaping at a pressure of about 970 psig @om% per square inch gauge) excavated the soil a~oulxl the pipe and blew gas Iiundreds of feet into the air, propelling pipe hgmnts, rocks, a~xl debiis nxlre tlian 800 feet. With 1 to 2 minutes of the rupture, one of several possible s0urce.s ignited the escaping gas, sending flam upward 400 to 500 feet in the air. Hezit radiating from the massive fire ignited the roofs of several building roofs in a nearby apartment cnmplex. Ocxupants, alerted to the emrgercy by noises from escqing gas and mh hitting the ioofs, fled fiomthe burning buildings. Approximately 1,500aparbnent residents were evacuated. Mhaculously, no deaths directly resulted from the rupture and resulting fife. Most injuries were n h i foot biuns and cuts that tlie apartmiit residents sustained fromtlie hot pavemnt and glass slxrds as they fled the complex. Damage from the accident exceeded $25 rnillio~~' As a result of its investigation of tlis accident, the Safety Board m~ltlded that the iupture of " X D s LUE 20 in Edison Towship likely resulted from a crack in an excavation- caused gouge that grew to ciitical size. The Safety Bard determined tllat the brittle piopelties of the p i p inaterial at the opiating t e p r a t w e conhibuted to the catastrophic failure. The Safety Board also coxluded that the inabdity of TETCO to promptly stop die flow of nat7Kd gas to the rupture coilxibuted to tlie severity of the accident C o ~ e n c e s . 7#

Page 22 The Safety Board believes that the %son pipeline accident again demonstrates the need for Unproved pipeline safety mures, particularly in urban communities. The Board identified problem in a rnunbei of issue areas, im1:lUding pipeline rmkmg, damage prevention programs, rapid detection and sliutdown, internal inspatiom, pipe toughness staidads, and land use m g e m n t . In its report of this accident, the Safety Board observed that Federd standards for pipeline safety co&iue to be deficient in these areas despite repeated reconmidations that the Research and Special Progam Administration (RSPA) addrm and correct these matters. ?he safety recomiedations resulting born this investigation follow. The accident report supporting the firdkip and safety recommendations will be f o m d e d d e r separate cover. In tlw report, the Safety Board classified Safety Recommendafions P-876 and -7 "Closed- Acceptable Response, " and classified Safety Recammendation P-87-22 "Closed-Unacceptable Superseded." l i e Safety Board also reiterates the safety rmmrmdations noted below. The Natiorzil Transportation Safety Board r e c o m r h tllat the Research mi Special Programs Administiation: Fqmilte requirerwnts for installing automatic- or reimte-operated mainline valves on high-pressure pipelines in urban and enviromrmtaJly sensitive areas to provide for rapid shutdown of failed pipeline segmntsts. (Class 11, Riority Action) (P-95-1) Develop toughness starxlards for new pipe installed in gas and hazardous liquid pipelines, especially in urban areas. (Class 11, Priority Action) (P-95-2) Eliminate the exception for rnarking p i p e k in Class 3 and 4 locatiorls corn existing standards and establish standards for permanent markings that identify the location of high-presswe natural gas and hazardous liquid pipelines in urban, idustrial, and comnmcial areas, wliete marking is feasible. (Class 11, Priority Action) (P-95-3) Expxhte the coinpletion of the study on ri~th0d.s to reduce public safety risks in the siting and pioximity of pipelines, modify that study to include coilsideration of building standards, and rmke the completed study widely available to local ad State govenmds. (Class 11, Priority Action) (P-95-4) The National Transportation Safety Board reiterates to the Research and Special Progr--ams Administiation: (#

Page 33 P-87-4 m e operators of both gas and liquid transmission pipelii to periodically determine the adequacy of their pipelines to operate at established nxaimum allowable operating pressures by performing inspections or tests capable of identifying corrosion-causd and dier timeilependent damages tliat m y be detrimental to the contiilued safe operation of these pipelines and require necessary remdial action. P-90-21 Assess existing gas iidustry prograrrr; for educating the public on the dangers of gas leaks and on reporting gas leaks to determine the appropriateness of infoimaiion provided, the effectiveness of educational techniques used, and those techniques used in other public education progmm and based on its findings, amend the public education provisions of the Federal regulations. Also, the Safety Board issued Safety Rixomndations P-95-5 through -7 to the Texas Eastern Transinkision corporation, P-95-8 and -9 to the An~rirxm Public Works Association, P-95-10 and -11 to the Interstate Natural Gas Association of Ameiica, P-95-12 and 13 to the Association of Oil Pipe L k , P-95-14 and -15 to the American Petroleum htitute, P-95-16 and -17 to the h r i c x m Gas Association, P-95-18 arid -19 to the American Society of Civil Engineers, P-95-20 and -21 tothe International City/coUnty Minagemnt Association, and P-95- 22 a d -23 to the American Planning Association. If you need additional infoinution, you m y call (202) 382-0672. Cliaiman HALL and Members €%WMERSCXMIX and FRANCIS w~~uned in these recomidations.#

Page 4Safety Recommendation Reiteration List SR Number Reiteration Number Report Number Report Date P-95- 001 1 SIR-96- 02 1/23/1996 Accident Description Evaluation of Accident Data And Federal Oversight of Petroleum Product Pipelines Accident City N/A Accident State Accident Date N/A N/A#