NTSB Safety Recommendation Letter P-95-010 through P-95-011

Page 1Official PDFD&x FEB 7 In ERefer TO: P-95-10 and -11 h4r. Jerald V. Valvorsen President Interstate Natural (73s Assmiation of Anzrica 555 13th Street, Suite 300 West Waslliigton, D.C. 20001 About 1155 p.m onMarch 23, 199.1, a 36-inch diameter pipeline ow& and qperated by Texas Eastern Transinission Corporation (TElTO) ruptured catastrophically in Edison Tow~ship, New Jersey, witlin an asphalt plant compolllld. The force of tlie rupture and of natural gas escaping at a pressure of abut 970 psig @ounds per s p e inch gauge) excavated tlie soil aroud the pipe and blew gas l i d & of feet into the air, propelling pipe fragments, rwh, and debris more than 800 feet. Within 1 to 2 minutes of the rupture, one of several possible sources ignited the escaping gas, sending flames upward 400 to 500 feet in the air. H a radiating from the massive fire ignited tlie roofs of several building roofs in a ilearby apartmiit complex. Oxupants, alerted to tlie emrgency by noises froin escaping gas and rocks liitting the roofs, fled from the bunling buildings. Approximately 1,500 apartmnt residents were evacuated. Miraculously, IX) deaths directly resulted from the rupture and resulting fire. Most injuries were iilinor foot burns and cuts that the apa~tmiit residents sustained f?om the hot pavemiit and glass slmck as they fled the complex. h n a g e from the accident exceeded $25 inillion.' Following tlie accident, die Safety Board interviewed tlie asphalt plant employees and mailed q~~estioimires to the apar-tment complex residents to determix: wlietlier they were aware of tlie presem of the TEXCO pipeline. Only long-time plant employees who had witnessed the installation of tlie pipeline were aware tliat it crossed tlie plant property. All of the aparmiz residents respading to tlie Safety Board survey indirated that they had ix) kmwledge of the pipeline.#

Page 2T E T C U s public awareness actions were typical of mst natural gas transmission companies. ?lie pipeline company sent annual mailings to all ownets of property adjacent to the pipeline infonning them about the pipelirle and related safety information. TETco also notified the general public about the pipeline by publishing notices in area newspapers. The Edison accident raises questions as to whether T m s and other pipeline operators' public education program are adequate to reach the llecessary audiences. ?he Safety Board d m ilot believe pipelk viators can practicably dissenunate public W o n informtion to all occupants a#l employees of comrcial and industrial properties adjacent to pipellines. Rather, it believes the notified land owners should further disseminate information abut the pipelk. Apartment inanagers can provide pipeline safety information to tenants when they rent their units. h i s of business properties adjacent to the pipeline can pm pipeline infomalion on an employee bulletin bard, conduct a briefing about tlie pipeline in an employee safety meeting, or disseminate the information to their employees in the manner that they determine is mst effective. In the case of this accident, such information m y have tetter prepared the apartment residents for evacuating the buildings and cautiorwi plant employees about excavating or storing materials in the area or the pipelk. The Safety Board believes that pipeline operators should advise land owners about the irriportance of M i e r disseminating its safety infomation to tenants ad employees who live or work on lad adjacent to high-prwe pipellines. The Safety Board d e t e r n M that the major problem in this accident was TEI'co's inability to shut off the gas flow to the rupture for 2 112 lious. The buning gas codmed to radiate such great heat that firefighters could not even get close enough to the burning a p t m n t buildings m e s t the freball to combat tlie blazes, let alone contain or extinguish the fires. Had TEKO had the capability to promptly shut down the flow of gas to the rupture, fiefi_&rs could have sooner extinopislied the blazes after the pressure in the line dimiislied aud likely could have controlled tlie spread of the fires to adjacent buildings. The damage in the q t u r e area likely would have been the same, but tlie damage to the surrounding residential area probably would have been substantially less. Tie TETC'O employees had no way to renlotely shut down the gas flow because the company's valves were not equipped to close automatically or be cont~olled remtely. TEKU has no autoinatic-operated valves (ACVs) and few remte-operated autor7atic valves (RCVs) on its 10,000-mile system Uespite the limitations in " s system, the company is in compliance with Federal regulations, which do not contain specific requireixnts for mpid detection and shutdown offailed pipe sepeilts. E X " s Senior Vice President stated that the conipariy is considering using RCVs to Improve its ability to rapidly shut down failed pipeline segnlents. I-Ie said TEXCO is not considering autonntic sliutdown valves because it is cominced they are not sufficiently reliable. In its bacl<growd investigation for tlis accident, tlie Safety Board reviewed pipeline operator Iesponses to a 1989 Research a~d Special Program Administration (RSPA) request for conn~nts on the use of ACVs zd RCVs (Docket PS-1W). Tie number of valves used by each operator m i g d koin 4 to 600. Because RSPA did not request specific information mt respilses from oixrators did not contain sufficient informtion to determine whether tli2y were#

Page 33 currently using ACVs and RCVs, how inany valves tliey were using, how long they had used ACVs or RCVs, or on wlnt length of pipeliile they lnd installed ACVs or RCVs. However, a nlunber of respnden indicated tlnt tlieir experierxle with ACVs and RCVs had k i i good; several cited insbxxs in wlich ACVs or RCVs sensed a pressure drop following a rupture ad closed properly. nie Safety Board believes tlnt, based on current uses of ACVs and RCVs by som gas transmission c~mpanies, the industry needs to assess the iisks psed to public safety if failed pipeline segments are not promptly shut down. ACVs and RCVs should be iilstalled wliere public safety risks are determined to be unreasonable. Tierefore, the National Transportation Safety Board r e m m n d s that the Interstate NaturaI Gas Association of Anmica: Emurage your Menhrs to n?odify the information in the annual inailings of tlieir public education pipeliix! safety prograni to emurage recipients to disseminate the pipeline safety precautioils to tliek teilants ad einployea who reside and work on property adjacent to high-pressure pipelines, (Class II, Priority Action)(P-95-10) Eimurage your Ivfehrs to develop program, which hxlude tlie modifcation of exisiting valves for reimte or autoimtic operation, tlnt will reduce to a mil- the tiiile required to stop the flow of natural gas or llazardous liquids to failed pipeline segments, especially those segments in uban or environmnklly sensitive lccatioils. (Class E, Priority ACtiOi?)(P-95-1 I) Also, tlie Safety h a r d issued Safety Recom&ois P-95-1 through 4 to the Research and Special Programs Administration, P-95-5 through -7 to the Texas Eastern Transmission Copration, P-95-8 and -9 to the American Public Works Association. P-95-12 ad -13 to tlie Assmiationof Oil PipeLines, P-95-14and-15 tothe Ameri~iPetroleum~lstiCute, P-95-16 and -17 to the Amrican Cm Association, P-95-18 and -19 to the An~iiwi Society of Civil Eiigkers, P-95-20 and -21 to the Inteiilational City/Cowty Managemilt Association, ad P-95-22 ad -23 to die Anmican Plan~~ing Association. Tie Safety Board is also reitemting Safety Reconmmdations P-87-4 ad P-%21 to the Research ad Special Progxams Administration. If you additional infomation, you imy call (202) 382-Oti72. Xie National Transportation Safety Board is an iixlepeixlent Federal agency with tlie statutory responsibility "to pronmte transpitation safety by coiducting indepeident accident investigations ad by fomdating safety inlprovemnt rmmnmdations" (Public Law 93633). llie Safety Board is interested in aiy action taken as a result of its safety recoiim7eixfatioils. 'Therefore, it wordd aplireciate a response &om you regarding action taken or coiiteinplated with respect to the reconrnmdations in this letter. Please refer to Safety Recornillendations P-95-10 and -1 1 in your reply.#

Page 44 Chairman HALL and Members HAMMERSCHMIDT and FRANCIS concurred in these recommendations. Findlall By: Jim Hall Chairman#