NTSB Safety Recommendation Letter P-95-014 through P-95-015

Page 1Official PDFFEB 7 I995 In Replly ]Refer TO: P-9514 and -IS &l?. (%rIes J. D&na President Arnerican Petroleum Institute 1220 L Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20005 About 11:SS p.m. on March 23, 1994, a 36incli diamter pipelhe owlled and aperated by Texas Eastern Tra~inission Corporation (TEKD) q t w e d catastropliidy in Mson Township, New Jersey, within an asphalt plant compound. nie force of the rupture and of natural gas escaping at a pressure of about 970 psig @ounds per square imli gauge) excavated the soil around the pipe aid blew gas I1uldreds of feet into tlie air, propelling pipe fragments, rocks, a~d debris nme than 800 feet. Witlfm 1 to 2 millutes of the ruptwe, one of several possible sources ignited the esrqing gas, sending flm upward 400 to SO0 feet in the air. Heat radiating from the imsive fire igited the roofs of several building roofs hi a ilearby apart~~~nf complex. Occupants, alerted to the emergency by noises from escapmg gas and rocks hitting tlie roofs, fled from the burning buiIdings. Approximately 1,500 apartment residents were evacuated. Miraculously, IX) death directly resulted from the rupture auxl resultiig fire. Most injuries were minor foot bum and cuts that tlie apartment residents sustai~ied from tlie hot pavenmt and glass slixds as tliey fled the complex. Damage froin the arxident exceeded 525 million. * Following tlie accident, tlie Safety Board interviewed the asplialt plant employees and inailed questionnaires to tlie apartmiit complex residents to determine whether they were aware of the presence of the pipeliile. Only long-tim plait employees who had witnessed the installation of the pipeline were aware that it crossed the plait property. All of the aparhlrsnt#

Page 22 residents responding to the Safety Board survey indicated that they lmd no knowledge of the pipeline. TEKOs public a w e m s s actions were typical of most natural gas transmission companies. llie pipeline company sent miual mailings to all owners of property adjacent to the pipeline informing them about the pipeline and related safety infomtion. TETCO also notified the general public about the pipeline by publishing notices in a m newspapers. 'Ilie H s o n accident raises questions as to whether lTX'Os and other pipeline operators' public education progmm are adequate to reach the necessary audiexes. llie Safety Board does not believe pipeline operators can practicably dissen%nate public education information to all occupants and employees of comwrcial and industrial propeIties adjacent to pipelines. Rather, it believes tlie notified lad owneis should further disseminate infomation abut tlie pipeline. Apxtrnent immgers can provide pipeline safety infornntion to tenants when they rent their. units. Olnlers of business properties adjacent to the pipeline can p s t pipeline infomation on an employee bulletin board, conduct a briefing about the pipeline in an ernployee safety meeting, or disseminate the information to their employees in the imner ttmt they deterink is most effective. In the m e of this accident, such information may have better prepared tlie apartment residents for evacuating the buildings and cautioned plant enqloyees about excavating or storing materials in the area or the pipeline. l i e Safety Board believes that pipeline operators should advise land owners about tlie i r p r t a x ~ of fi.utiier disseminating its safety infomation to tenants and employees who live or work on land adjacent to Iligli-pressure pipelines. ?he Safety Board determined that the major problem in this accident was " W ' s idiility to shut off the gas flow to the rupture for 2 1/2 hours. llie burning gas continued to radiate such great heat that firefighters could not even get close enough to the bunling apartrwnt buildings m e s t the fireball to combat the blazes, let alone contain or extinguish the fires. Had TEXO had the capabiility to promptly shut down tlie flow of gas to tlie mpture, firefighters could have sooner extinguished the blazes after the pressure in tlie line dininislied ad likely could have controlled tlie spread of the fires to adjacent buildings. llie damage in the rupture area likely would have lxen tlie s a m , but the damage to the surromding residential area probably would have been substantially less. 'Ilie TEKO employees had m way to remotely shut down the gas flow because the coqany's valves were not equipped to close automatically or be controlled remotely. TEK% Im no automatic-operated valves (ACVs) and few remte-operated automatic valves @ W s ) on its 10,000-mile system Uespite tlie limitations in TEK%'s system, the company is in compliance with Federal regulations, which do nut contain specific re@emnts for rapid detection ard shutdowi of failed pipe segnmts. TEKOs Senior Vice President stated that the conpiny is considering using RCVs to improve its ability to rapidly shut down failed pipeline segnmts. He said 'ET33 is not considering automatic sliutdown valves because it is coriviilced they are not sufficiently reliable. In its Lackground investigation for this accident, the Safety b a r d reviewed pipeline operator responses to a 1989 Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) request for#

Page 33 c o ~ m n t s on the use of ACVs and RCVs (Docket PS-lM). 'The nunlber of valves used by each operator ranged from 4 to 600. E?emuse RSPA did not request specific information, m s t responses from operators did not contain sufficient information to determk whether they were currently using ACVs and R n s , how many valves they were using, how long they had used ACVs or RCVs, or OII what lenglh of pipeline they had installed ACVs or RCVs. However, a number of mpoders indicated that their expeiiew with ACVs and RCVs had been good; several cited instances in WIlich ACVs or RCVs seised a pressure drop following a rupture and closed prperly. l3e Safety Board believes that, based on currenl uses of ACVs and RCVs by som gas transmission companies, the industry needs to assess the risks posed to public safety if failed pipeline segmnts are not promptly shut clown. ACVs and RCVs should be installed where public safety risks are determined to be wmisonable. Tlierefore, the National Transportation Safety Board r m m d s that the American Petroleum hstitute: Emmage your Meinbers to modify tlie information in the annual mailings of their public education pipeline safety program to emurage recipients to disseminate the pipeline safety precautions to their tenants and enlployees who reside and work on property adjacent to high-pressure p i p e l k . (Class II, Piiority Action)(P-9.5-14) Encourage yola mmberj to develop programs, wllich include the nlodifirxtion of exisiting valves for remote or automatic operation, that will reduce to a minimum the time required to stop the flow of natural gas or hazardous liquids to failed pipeline segments, especially those segmixs in urban or ensriromntaUy sensitive locations. (Class II, Priority Action)(P-95-15) Also, the Safety Board issued Safety Recormnendations P-95-1 though -4 to the Research and Special F'rogtm Administration, P-95-5 through -7 to the Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation, P-9.5-8 and -9 to the American Public Works Association, P-95-10 and -1 1 to the Interstate Natural Cm Association of A~xrica, P-95-12 ad -13 to the Association of Oil Pipe Lim, P-95-16 and -17 to the American Gas Association, P-95-18 and -19 to the Amrican Society of Civil E n w r s , P-95-20 axi -21 to the International CityRounty Mimgemnt Association, and P-95-22 and -23 to the Anxrican Planning Association. Tlie Safety Board is also reiterating Safety Rmnmndations P-87-4 and P-90-21 to the Research ad Special P r o g t m Administration. If you need additioral information, you may call (202) 3824672. l i e National Transportation Safety Board is an independent Federal agency with the statutory responsibility "to promote transprtation safety by conductiig independent accident investigations and by fondating safety i~nproveinent recomndations" @"ic Law 93-633). Tlie Safety Board is interested in any action laken as a result of its safety recoIlunendatiorls. Therefore, it would appreciate a response from you regarding action taken or contemplated with#

Page 44 respect to the xcamrerldations in this letter. Please refer to Safety Recamendations P-95-14 and -15 in your reply. Cliai~man HALL and Meinbz~s HAMMJBSCMh4IDT and FRANCIS coxmed in these remmiimdations. By:#