NTSB Safety Recommendation Letter P-95-016 through P-95-017

Page 1Official PDFMr. Mcllaei Rally IJI President Anleiiran Gas Association 1515 Wilson Boulevard Arlington, Ms@a 22209 About 1155 pm. on March 23, 194, a 36iixIi diameter pipeline owxed and operated by Texas Eastern Tra~zsmissio~i Coipration (TE3CO) ruptured catastrophically in E%son Township, New Jersey, withini an aspllalt plant co~npund. The force of tlie rupture and of ilatwal gas escaping at a pressure of about 970 psig @US per sqwe hlch gauge) excavated tlie soil around tlie pipe and blew gas l i d & of feet into tlie air, propelling pipe fragmilts, socks, and debris imre tl1an800 feet. Within 1 to 2 ininUtes of tlie rupture, ow of several possible sowce.s ignited the escaping gas, seixling flm upward 400 to 500 feet in tlie air. Heat radiating from the nlassive fire ignited the roofs of several building roofs in a nearby apatinent con@ex. Occupants, alerted to the eiimgeilcy by noises fiom escaping gas and rocks hitting the loofs, fled fromtlie biu-ning buildings. Approximately 1,500 apartnmt residents were evacuated. Miaculously, no death directly resulted from the rupture and resulting fie. Most injuries were niuior f i t burns and cuts that the apart~wnt residents sustained fiom the hot pavenmt and glass shards as they fled the complex. bixige from the accident exceeded $25 nill lion.^ Following the accident, the Safety Boxd interviewed the asphalt plant en@oyees and mailed questionnaires to the aparhilent complex residents to deteiiiiiix whether they were aware of the preseilce of the TEXO pipeline. Only long-tim plait employees who had wiQmsed tlie installatioii of tlie pipeline were aware that it crossed the plant property. All of the apa-tnmit residenis respoixling to tlie Safety Board siuvey iIldicated that they had no lmowledge of the pipeline.#

Page 22 TETCO's public awareness actions were typical of imt natural gas ttansmission companies. "lie pipeline company sent annual nlailings to all owws of property adjacent to the pipelirle inforinirig them about the pipeline and related safety infomtion. TE33.l also notified the general public a b u t the pipeline by publishing ilotices in area newspapers. l i e Edisori accident raises quastions as to whether TEIys)'s and other pipeline operators' public education progams are adequate to reach the necessary audiem. l i e Safety Board does mt believe pipeline operators can practicably disseminate public education infoilnation to all occupants and employees of coinmrcial and industrial properties adjacent to pipelines. Rather, it believes the ilotiied land owners should fUrther disseininate infomation about the pipeline. Aparbneiit i m g e r s ca~i provide pipeline safety infomation to tenants when they lent tliek units. Chwix of business propeities adjacent to the pipeline can post pipeline information on an employee bulletin board, conduct a briefing about the pipelike in an enployee safety meting, or disseininate the i~foimtion to their employees in the m11ler that they deterriline is most effective. In the case of this accident, such information rnay have better prepared the apartment residents for evacmting the buildings and cautioned plant employees about excavating or storing inaterials in tlie wea or the pipeline. "lie Safety Board klieves tliat pipdim operators should advise land OWL'RTS abut the i m p t a m of further disseminating its safety infoinxition to tenants and employees who live or work on land adjacent to high-pressure pi~xluw. Tie Safety Board deterrnined tllat the nlajor problem in llus accident was TEKYYs imbiiity to shut off the gas flow to the rupture for 2 1/2 hours. "lie burning gas continued to radiate such great heat that fiefigliters could not even get close enough to the burring apartment buildings nearest the fireball to coinbat the blazes, let alone contain or extinguish the fiIes. Had TETCO had the capabillity to promptly shut down the flow of gas to the xuphm, firefighters could have sooner extinguished the blazes after the pressure in the line diminished and likely could have co~ltr.olled the spread of the fires to adjacent buildings. "lie danage in the Npture area likely would have baen the s m , but tlie darmge to the surrounding residential area probably would have been substantially less. "lie TEKO employees had IK) way to reinotely shut down the gas flow because the company's valves were not qui@ to close autoirmtically or be controlled rermtely. I'ETCO has 1x) autonBtic-operated valves (ACVs) and few remte-opeiated automatic valves (RCVs) on its lO,OM)-mile system, Despite the limitations in l " s system, the conipany is in coinpliaulce with Federal regulations, which do not contain specific requirements for rapid detection and sliutdown offailed pirx segmnts. TETCO's Senior Vice President stated that the conpny is considering using RLVs to improve its abiiity to rapidly shut down failed pipelice segments. He said TETCV is not considerkig automatic shutdown valves because it is convinced they are not sufficiently reliable. In its backgound investigation for this accident, the Safety Board reviewed pipeline operator responses to a 1989 Research and Special Progmm AdministAon (RSPA) request for conxmnts on tlie use of ACVs and RCVs @ocket PS-104). l i e n u d e r of valves used by each operator ranged from 4 to KO. Because RSPA did ilot request specific information rmst responses from operators did Iiot coiitaui sufficieilt infoimtio11 to deteiiiiine whether tliey were (#

Page 33 currently using ACVs and RCVs, how m y valves they were using, how long they had used ACVs or RCVs, or on what length of pipelii~ they had installed ACVs or RCVs. However, a nuhr of responders ideated that their experience with ACVs and RCVs had been good; several cited instances in which ACVs or RCVs sensed a pressure drop following a iuptwe ad closed proprly. Xie Safety Board believes that, based on current uses of ACVs ad RCVs by som gas tra~xsmissio~i companies, the idusbry needs to assess the risks posed to public safety if failed pipeline segments are not proniptly shut down. ACVs and RCVs should be installed where public safety risks are determuled to be unreasonable. Xierefore, the National Tmxsportation Safety Board reccJnmds that the Amxican Chi Association: Eimurage your Members to imdifj the infonmtiori in the annual n7aiiings of their public education pipelk safety program to emurage recipients to disseminate tlie p i p l i ~ e safety precautiorxs to their ternits and employees who reside arld work on property adjacent to high-pressure pipelirm. (Class II, Priority Action)(P-95-16) Encourage your Members to develop p r o w , which include the nxxlification of exisiting valves for reemote or automatic operation, that will redurz to a minimmi the time required to stop the flow of natural gas or hazardous liquids to failed pipeline segixia, especially those segnmts in urban or enviromxntally sensitive locations. (Class II, Priority Action)(P-9.5-17) Also, the Safety Board issued Safety F&co~mndations P-95-1 throiigh -4 to the Research and Spxial Progams A&ni~iishation, P-95-5 through -7 to the Texas Eastem Trmmission Corporation, P-95-8 ad -9 to the Amrican Public Works Association, P-95-10 ad -11 to the lilterstate Natural Gas Association of h r i c a , P-95-12 and -13 to the Association of Oil Pipe LUES, P-95-14 ad -15 to the Anmican Petroleum Institute, P-9.5-18 and -19 to the American Society of Civil E,ngineers, P-95-20 ad -21 to the Intermtional City/County Management Association, and P-95-22 and -23 to the Amricau Planning Association. nie Safety Board is also reiterating Safety Recoinnmxlations P-87-4 a d P-W21 to tlie Resmch and Special Progi-am Adn~inistration. If you ileed additional Uifonmtion, you m y call (202) 382-0672. The National Transportation Safety Board is an hdepideiit Federal agency with tlie statutoiy responsibility "to pronmte transportation safety by coducting irxlependent accident investigations and by foniidating safety inpovemnt rmitnxndations" (l'ublic Law 93-633). The Safety Board is interested in my action taken as a result of its safety reconim~datio~xs~ Therefore, it would appr"eciate a response horn you regarding action taken or contemplated with respect to the recornmeidations in this letter. Please refer to Safety Rmn~n~rxlations P-9.5-lG and -17 in your reply.#

Page 44 Ctlait-man HALL and Me~nbers HAMMERSCWT and FRANCIS c017curred in these recommendations. BY:#