P-95-020 through P-95-021
P-95-020 through P-95-021
Page 1Official PDFMr. William H. Hansell, Jr. Executive Director International CitylCounty Manageirent Association 777 N. Capitol Street, N.E. Waslington, D.C 2c#xn About 1155 p.m on March 23,1994, a 3 G i h diamter pipeline owned and operated by Texas Eastern Transmission Qrpration (TEXD) nrptured mtastroplically in Edison Townslip, New Jersey, widin an asphalt plant conpund. ?he forcz of the rupture and of iatural gas escaping at a pressure of about 970 psig (pounds per square inch gauge) excavated the soil aouud the pipe and blew gas hundreds of feet into the air, propelling pipe h g n ~ n t s , rocks, and debris nxm tlm 8oQ feet. Withii 1 to 2 minutes of the rupture, one of several possible sources ignited the exaping gas, se&g flames upward 400 to 500 feet in the air. Heat radiating from the inassive fie ignited the roofs of several buildmg mfs in a nearby apartment camplex. Ckcupants, alerted to the emrgency by noises from eseaping gas and rocks hitting the rmfs, fled from the buming buildmgs. Approximately 1,500 apartment iesidents were evacuated. Miraculously, 1x1 deak directly resulted from the rupture and resulting fire. Most injuries were nlinor foot buns and cuts that the apartment residents sustained from the hot pavemnt and glass slmds as they fled the complex. Damage from the amident exceeded $25 million. In the early 1%k, dien TETCO was planning to add a new pipeline, which it designated Line 20, across New Jersey, tlie accident site w;ls in a Class 2 locatian, Le., an area tlnt was on tlie fringe of a townslip, tlxit was used for farming or for iixlustrial purpses, and tlnt had fewer than 20 buildings inteded for l m o c c u p y witlk 1 sqiare mile In anticipation of residential growth, the pipeline company designed the 1 i 1 ~ using, as a rniniim the more resttictive Class 3 location standards. When "ElKO built Lie 20, the company conplied fully with New Jersey statutes that new high-pressure pipclines be co~smckd amy from buildings. However, the State#
Page 22 statutes had no provisions limiting the construction of buildings adjacent to pipelines. Over the years, as local govemnts granted permits for building construction mar L i i 20, tlie original separation distance between the pipeline and structures was suhstanhlly reduced. ?Iie Safety Board has previously identified the need for local and State g o v e m n t agencies, which generally have the authority to control land use and building construction, to consider the public safety risks presented by pipelim in u h settings. Following its investigation ofa Rlluch 15,1983, pipeline accident in West Odessa, Texas? in which six peopie died, the Safety h d expi& comrn about the responsibilities of planning officials ad abut goverimnt land-use policies. In that accident, an owner/residert in a new housing developmiit and his relative were drilling holes with an auger to plant trees when they struck and ruptured a liquid petroleum gas (LpG3 pipeline. 7he escaping gas initially p l e d and vaporized, foming an explosive gas-k-ak i n k h e that was ignited. The LFG beiig blown into !he air by the pressure in the line then ignited, forming a fireball that engulfed the relative operating the auger and the resident's horn. The auger opelator and the four residents of the mobiie horn were b u n d fatally; the owm sustained serious burns and died 5 days later. The fire also threatened the residents of the horn on the adjoining lot. They escaped with rninor bums only by breaking and fleeing tlmugh a back widow in their horn. As a result of the West Odessa accident investigation, the Safety Boani concluded that new public policy should be developed to improve public safety as it Ida@ to the proxknity of pipelines to populated areas, including: Defining the role of Federal, State, and local govermnts conxmhg land planning for land adjacent to pipelines; Placing restrictions on the use of land adjacent to pipelinas; Eeteiiinniig what infomx%ion should be connimkatwf to prospective users about adjacent pipelines; and Informing prospective users about the existence of and poterltial hazards of m b y pipelines. The Board f u ~ x l ~ r concluded tint crafting public policy for land developrllent adjacent to pipelines would requhe extensive research and would involve inc0iyOrating the view from m y interests, i.cluding the general public, pipeline operators, land developers, local, State, and Fedexal governmiit agencies, and m y others. Noting the abiity of the Tm~~p~htioxi Research Board (TRJ3) of tlle National Acadenly of Sciences to bring diveIse interests groups together to formulate piactid public safety policy, the safety Board recomnded tlat the TIB:#
Page 33 Assess the adequacy of exishng public policy for surface and subsurface use of land adjacent to pipelines tlnt transport Ilazardous c o d t i e s to provide ieasonable public sdety. Based on t l ~ findings of the assessmnt, develop a recomided plicy to correct identified deficiemies in current policy (p-84-30), In 1988, tlle TRB published Rpelirzes aid Riblic S@eiy (Special R e p t 219)? which synthesized policies ad practices for enlming public safety near pipelines through danzige pievention piograms, land-use imswes, and emergency prepareduess program;. Tie rcport identified m y poIicies and practices used to e n l m public safety near pipelines, but concluded tlmt goveiiimnt and indushy applies tlw masures unevenly. Tie report rmimded that State and local govemnts: 0 Enact damage prevention statutes that cliify enfommnt responsibility, increase contractor liability, and stipulate that permitting agemies mlst r q u e , as a coiditionof permit approval, pioof tlut applicants for building or excavation )?elnits have notified the pipeline conpmy/one-call system Prohibit constniction of structures on pipeline riglits-of-way and ensure access to pipelines is unobstructed. 0 Institute a refeiral and approval procedure that requires pipeline operator review of sulxiivisionplans, site plas, and vatiances for all pioperties tlnt have a pipeline easeillent. 0 Modernize land records system to ensure tlxit i n f o d o n about the of easemnts, easemnt boundaries, and holders of easemnts by parcel is readily accessible to local planners. e Repare, in coisuitation with pipeline operators and developers, plaming guidehxs for safely integrating pipellnes easemnts into developmnt projects and protecting the lines duing construction; incorporate tliese guidelines in conpxhmsive plans, miling ordirmrxs, and building cdes. 0 Consider building setbacks and low-deisity developmmt near transmission pipeline iiglits-of-way in densely populatd areas with high comntrations of pipeliiE ndeage where the risks of damging a pipeline m y be sufficiently great, and the coisequeim sufficiently severe to warrant special measures; provide developmiit bonuses to rompensate the developer for loss of deve1opable property.#
Page 44 The reporl also included rrrxlel/qle daxmras for danrage preveniion legislation, right-of-way agreenmts, State legislation for suldivision plan review, guidelines for sulxlivision developrnats near pipeline rights-of-my, and local setback ordinances. After reviewing the 1X3 report, the Deprtmnt of Transportation's Resmch and Special Program Administration ( W A ) "wholeheartedly" supported the report's recomxlation that local goveimmnts should deteimine the appropriate use of land near pipelines and enact laws to prevent developmilt on pipeline rights-of-my. Following the Ekhon accident, RSPA coitracted the New Jersey Institute of Technology (wrr) in August 1W to pxform a study on methods to reduce the risks and eibrxx pipeline safety and enviromntal protection with respect to the siting and proximity of pipelks to the public and sensitive environments. RSPA noted that the existing population-based rquiremnts, which were considered adequate for assessing risk in the past, proved to be inadequate in the Edison, New Jersey accident. RSPA achwledged the need to revaluate pipeline safety regulations in49 CFRhts 1Y2 and 195 as they related to the. proximity of pipelines to populated and environmntally sensitive areas. RSPA noted that land use, including ppulationcorwntrationand surrounding environment, should be considered inthe evaluation. T h e contract i-quires that the ilxtiklte: e Develop a franzwork for effective environtmntal and public safety requiremnts in the areas of land use, siiing, and rehabilitation and retrofitting practices; compre this fiarmwrk with existing regulatory requirements and industry piactices and rmmd d e d iqrovei~rits. e Assemble two gronps consisting of m rime than seven me&rs to provide technical assistance on factual imtters and to give the instiMe feedback d e d in completing the analyhcal requirements of the contract. One group shall be composed of individuals having pipeline engineering and technical expertise and the other of representatives kom the environmntal c o m i t y ald representatives having e v & e in New Jersey land use and zoning matte~s. * Study the prohbiility of failures that can oc(w on gas trammission and I m d o u s liquid pipelines and identdjl the factors that cause pipdire failures. ?he institute shall corlsider failures that might occur anywhere along the pipeline corridor, but shall comntrate on failures that OCCUT at high iisk xeas arld enviroinmitally serlsitive areas, such as urbn areas water bcdies used for hunran comnption. The Safety W d believes tllat the NJIT contract offem significant potential for rationally quanhfying the risks posed to public safety by high-pressure pipelines in urban areas, for assessing tlie effectiveness of government requirernents in reducing identified risks to acceptable levels, and for identifying wllat additional actions may be needed and by wliom. Tlie Safety Board lm asked RSPA to d e the NJIT study widely available to local and State goveinmiits wlien it is con@eted. Howver, conpletion of and dissenination of the study will not e i m e that recom~ixled actions ax enacted. T~E safety Board therefore reviewd tlle (#
Page 55 objectives and capabilities of several associatiom to determine which would be best able to translate the study results into guidance suitable for implementation by local and State govermnts and to work with ad encourage Uiem on implementation. l i e I1iterrnatioI1.11 clity/Coimty Mimagelrent Association cmprises nme than 7,800 appointed administrators and assistant administrators serving cities, counties, and other local govemrents. ?he Safety Board recog;llizes that through its publications, techilical assistance, and training seminars, the International city/couity Mmagement Association can be instn~~ilental in helping develop policies and practices on surface aud subsurface use of land adjacent to pipelines to provide reasoilable public safety. Therefore, the National Transportation Safety Board recomnds that the International City/cOuity Mamgemnt Association: cooperate with the Anlerican Public Works Association on developing model programs and statutes a d o r guidelines for local aud State govenxrents to implement the rec~m&tiom from the New Jersey htitute of Teclmlogy's study on enlmitig public safety near high- pressure pipelines. (Class II, Priority Actioii))(P-95-20) Advise your Mmibxs of the public safety coi7cenls addressed in this accident report anrl uge them to i~qjement the land-use improvemiit recmnmndations in tlie Transportation Research Board's Report 219. (Class II, Pliority Action)(P-95-21) Also, the Safety b a r d issued Safety Recom&tiom P-95-1 through -4 to the Research ad Special Pr- Administration, P-95-5 through -7 to UE Texas Eastern Transmission CorporatiOn, P-95-8 and -9 to the American Public Works Association, P-95-10 and -11 to UE. Interstate N a t d Cm Association of Amrica, P-95-12 and -13 to the Association of Oil Pipe Li, P-95-14 a115 -15 to the American Petroleumhtitute, P-95-16 aud -17 to the Amrican Gas Association, P-95-18 and -19 to the Amxican Society of Civil hgi~xers, aud P-95-22 and -23 to the Arenran Planning Association. l~ Safety b a r d is also reiterating Safety Recomndations P-874 ad P-90.21 to the Research and Special Programs Administration. If you i d additioid informtion, you my rall (202) 382-0672. l i e Natioid Transportation Safety Board is an kdependent Federal ageilcy with the statutoiy responsibility "to promte !xuxportation safety by conducting independent accident iiivestigatiois axlby forindating safety iqrovenlent recoimm-dations" (Public Law 93-633). Tie Safety Board is interested in any action taken as a result of its safety reco~m&tiom. Tlierefore, it would appreciate a response from you regarding action taken or coiZemplated with respect to UE. recomrnmixlatiois in this letter. Please refer to Safety Fbmnmndations P-95-20 a d - 2 1 in your reply.#
Page 66 Chairman HALL and Members HAMMERSCHMIDT and FRANCIS concurred in these ( recommendations. Ginstall By: Ghairman#
This is an NTSB safety recommendation letter. NTSB recommendations are advisory and do not themselves create binding regulatory requirements.