NTSB Safety Recommendation Letter P-95-005 through P-95-007

Page 1Official PDFMr. Fred Fowler President Texas Eastern Tmmission Corpdoii: 5400 Westheher Court Houston, Texas 770565310 About 1155 p.m on Rlluch 23, 1994, a 36inch diameter pipeline owned and operated by Texas Eastern Tra.lsmission Corporation (TEKO) ruptured catastrophically in mson Township, New Jersey, within an aspllalt plant compotmd. The force of the rupture and of natural gas escaping at a pressure of about 970 psig @oumtS per square inch gauge) excavated the soil aroud the pipe and blew gas hundreds of feet into the air, propelling pipe fragments, rocks, and debris mre than 80 feet. W~thin 1 to 2 min~rtes of the rupture, one of several possible sources ignited the escaping gas, s e e flaws u p d 400 to xx) feet in the air. Heat izdiatuig from the massive fire ignited the roofs of several building mfs in a i w b y apartment complex. Occupants, alerted to the emergency by noises from escaping gas arid rocks hitting the icofs, fled from the burning buildings. Approxirraely l,.SKI Frit residents were evacuated. Miraculously, no deaths directly resulted from the ~upture and resulting fire. Most hjuries were minor foot buns and cuts that the apartmnt residents sustained from the hot pavenmt and glass slm& as they fled the complex. h g e from the accident exceeded $25 million.' The Safety Board deteimined that a major problem in this accident was TEXUYs inability to shut off the gas flow to the rupture for 2 1/2 hours. llie burning gas contii~ued to radiate such great heat that fuefighters could not even get close enough to the bimhig apartment buiildings nearest the fileball to CBI& the blazes, let alone contain or extinguish the fires. Had TETCO llad &e capability to promptly sliut down tlie flow of gas to the rupture, firefighters could have sooner extinguislied the blazes after the pressure in the lire diminished and likely#

Page 22 could have controlled the spread of the fires to adjacent buildmgs. ?he damage in the rupture area likely would have been the same, but the damage to the surrounding residential area probably would have been substantially less. Tlie ?TTlL3 employees had no way to remotely shut down the gas flow because the co~npany’s valves were not equipped to close automatically OT be controlled remotely. TEIYX) has IX) automtic-operated valves (ACVs) and few remote-operated automatic valves (RCVs) on its 10,000-mile system. Despite the litations in TEXXs syster~b the company is in compliance with Fede~al regulations, which do not contain specific requirements for rapid detection and shutdown of failed p i p segments. l ” s Senior Vice President stated that the company is considering using RCVs to improve its ability to rapidly shut down failed pipline segmnts. He said TEiTX is not considering automatic shutdown valves h u s e it is conviLlced they are not sufficiently reliable. In its background investigation for this accident, the Safety Board reviewed pipeline operator responses to a 1989 Research and Special FYog~ams Administration (RSPA) request for comnts on the use of ACVs and RWs (Docket E-lW)” The number of valves used by each opelator ranged from 4 to 600. Because RSPA did not request specific information, most responses from opeiators did not contain suflicient information to determine whether they were cu-rently using ACVs and RCVs, how many valves they were using, how long they had used ACVs or RCVs, or on what length of piE]eline they had installed ACVs or RCVs. However, a n w r of iesponders indicated that their experience with ACVs and RCVs had been good, several cited instawes in which ACVs or RCVs sensed a pressure drop following a rupture and closed piope11y. ?he Safety Board believes that, based on current uses of ACVs and RCVs by sow gas transmission companies, the industry Ileeds to assess the risks posed to public safety if failed pipeline segments are not pionptly shut down. ACVs and RCVs should be installed where public safety risks are determined to be unreasonable. Following the accident, the Safety Board e m W the pipe fiagmnts and found that the ruptured pipeline i d been gouged by excavation equipment, such as a backhoe, at an undetermined time after it was internally inspected in 19%. Ihe safety Board subsequently looked at TETco’s inspection and monitoring program and found that although mmy c o ~ ~ p a q requirements and procedures surpass those reqtured by Federal regulations, TEKD’s surveillance procedures fail to stress that employees should pay close. attention to excavation activities within industrial locations. “0 employees are required only to document: ad follow up reports of new excavation activity. In this case, lJ3KO aerial patrollers failed to identify the on-going moving of stockpiles and the use of n7echanized excavation-w equipwnt within the asphalt plant coiipund might endanger the pipelm. Tie Safety Board also interviewed the asphalt plant etnployees and mailed questionnaixes to the aparhmnt complex residents to deteirnine whether they were aware of tlie presence of the T K O pipeline Only long-the plant employees who had witnessed the installation of tlie pipeline were aware that it crossed the plant property. All of the apartnmt residents responding to the Safety Baard survey irxiicated that they had ID knowledge of the pipeline.#

Page 33 llie a s o n accident raises questions as to whether tlie lEK0 public education program and tliose of other pipeline operators having similar programs are adequate to reach tlie ~xxessary audience. The Safety Board does not believe pipeline Operators can practicably d i s ~ n i ~ t e public education infoimtion to all occupants and employees of commercial and iixlustrial properties adjarxtilt to pipelines. Rather, it believes the notified land owners should further disseIllinate informtion about the pipeline. Apa~tmnt inanagers can provide pipeline safety infomution to terms wlien they rent their units. Owners of business properties adjacent to the pipehx can post pipeline infordon on an employee bulletin board, conduct a briefing about the pipeline in an employee safety mting, or disseminate the infonmtion to their employees in the mmer that they determine is most effective. In tlie case of this accident, such information m y have better prepared the apark~nt residents for evacuating the buildings and cautioiled plant employees about excavating or storiig materials in the area or the pipeline. The Safety Board believes that pipeline operators should advise land owners a b u t the unportar~~ of further disseminating its safety infommtion to tenants and employees who live or work on land adjacent to high-pressure pipelines. Therefore, the National Trausprtation Safety Board recommemls that the Texas Eastern Transinission corporation: Install automtic- or remte-qperated equipment on mhline valves in urban areas to provide for rapid shutdown of failed pipeline segments. (Class II, Priority Action)(P-95-5) Reqke pilots to docuxnt all patrol observations of excavation activity adjacent to your pipelines, noting s p i f i d l y excavation activities witllin iidustrial properties, and require that the pilot's report be attached or referenced in correlative repoi% docurrenting any response taken. (Class II, Priority Action)(P-95-6) Modify the inforimtion in the annual d i g s of your public education pipeline safety program to encmrage recipients to disseminate tlie pipeline safety precautions to their t e i m and employees who reside and work on property adjacent to high-pressure pipelines. (Class ZI, Eiority)(P-95-7) Also, die Safety Board issued Safety Recomi&tio~~ P-95-1 through -4 to the Research auld Spial Programs Administration, P-95-8 and -9 tothe Axrican Public Works Association, P-95-10 ad -11 to the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America, P-95-12 and -13 to the Association of Oil Pipe Lines, P-95-14 and -15 to the AmeriwiPetroleurn Institute, P-95-16 and -17 to the A ~ ~ r i a i Gas Association, P-95-18 ad -19 to the American Society of Civil Eno@xrs, P-95-20 and -21 to tlie International CitylcOUnty Management Association, and P-95-22 and -23 to the American Planning Association. llie Safety b a r d is also reiterating Safety Recoinmndations P-87-4 and P-90-21 to the Research and Special Program Administration. If you I& additional infornBtion, you may call (202) 3824672.#

Page 44 The National Transportation Safety Board is an indqendent Federal agency with the statutory responsibdity "to promte transportation safety by conducting independent accident investigations and by formulating safety inprovemnt recomndations" (Public Jaw 93-633). Vie Safety Board is interested in any action taken as a result of its safety recommendations. Therefore, it would appreciate a response from you regardmg action taken or contemplated with r e s p t to the r e c o m f i o m in this letter. Please refer to Safety Recommendations P-95-5 through -7 in your 1eply. ( ~ ~ ~ ~ a n d M e m b e r s I l A M M E R s c H M I w T a n d F R L w c I S c o n c ~ i n t h e s e recoimndations.#