P-95-008 through P-95-009
P-95-008 through P-95-009
Page 1Official PDFI3rate: FEB 7 1995 P-95-8 and -9 hk. WiUiam Beitera Executive Diector An~rican Public Works Association 106 W" 11th street Kansas City, Missouri Gl.10.5-1806 About 1155 pm. on R/farch 23, 1M, a 36-hch diameter pipelhe OWI& and opemted by Texas Eastern Transmission Corpiation ("FXO) ruptured catastrophically in Edison Township, New .Jersey, within an asplialt plant compound. The force of the rupture and of 1lahu-d gas escaping at a pressure of about 970 psig @ow& per square hxh gauge) excavated the soil arouxl the pipe and blew gas Iiu~d-eds of feet into the air, propelling pipe fragments, rocks, ad debris nlore than 800 feett. Witlin 1 to 2 minutes of the rupture, one of several possible sources ignited the escaping gas, serlding flana3s upward 400 to .K)o feet in tlie air. Heat idiatiu~g from !lie nmsive fire ignited the roofs of several building roofs in a nearby aparhnent coniplex. occUpa~$s, alerted to the emergercy by noises &om escaping gas ad rocks hitting the roofs, fled from tlie bu~~iiuig buildings. Approxui~ely 1,500 apartmiit residents were evacuated. Miraculously, IX) death directly resulted from the rupture ad resulting fire. Most injuries were ~llinor foot burns and cuts that the apartmilt residents sustainxi fro111 the hot pavement and glass shards as tliey fled the complex. Damage from tlie accident exceeded $25 million.' In tlie mly 19&, wiien TEKD was planniig to add a new pipeline, wiiicli it designated Line 20, across New .Jersey, the accident site was in a Class 2 location, Le., an itfm tllat was on Uie fringe of a tow~sliip, that was used for farming or for industrial p u p e s , and Uiat llad fewer than 20 bu~ildings iritetlded for h u i m cccupa~xy within 1 square mile. In anticipation of residential growth, the pipeline coiqny designed the liile using, as a rn~m Uie more restrictive Class 3 lmtion s&tndards. Wien TEKD built L~IE 20, tlle conpany complied fuly with New Jersey statutes tllat new higli-pressure pipeliixs be constructed away from buildi~p. However, Uie State#
Page 22 statutes had no provisions limiting the construction of buildings adjacent to pipelines. Over the i years, as local govenmnts gmted pemnnts for building cormuction m u I..~E 20, the original seImat.iori distance hetween the pipeline and structu~es was substarltialiy reduced. 'TIE Safety h d I n s previously identified the need for local ad State governrmnt agencies, which geneially have the authority to control land use and building construction, to consider tlie public safety risks presented by pipelines in b settings. Following its investigationofa March 15,1983, pipeline accident in West Odessa, Texas: in which six people died, tlie Safety Board expressed cowem about the responsibilities of plarming officials ad about govenllnent lzuxi-use policies. hi that accident, an owr/resident in a new housing development and his relative were hilling holes with an auger to plant trees when they struck and ruptured a liquid petroleum gas 0 pipeline. 'TIE escaping gas initially p l e d and vaprked, forming an explosive gas-in-air mnixture thai was ignited. TIE LPG king blown into the air by tlie pressure in die line tlleii ignited, forming a fieball hat engulfed the relative operating the auger and the resident's Iionle. llie auger operator and the fbur residents of the mbile liom were b u n d fatally; the o w r sustained serious buns and died 5 days later. The h e also tlireateixd the residents of the horn on the adjoining lot. 'REY escaped with minor bums only by breaking and fleeing through a back window in their horn. As a result of the West Odessa accident investigation, the Safety Board concluded tlBt new public policy should be develo~f to improve public safety as it relates to tlie proxinnty of pipelines to populated areas, including: Uefiiling the role of FedeIal, State, ad locat govemnmts coimrning laxi planning for land adjacent to pipelines; Placing restrictions on the use of land adjacent to pipeliues; Deteiinining what information should be conmiicated to prospective users abut adjacent pipelines; and Informing prospective users about the existence of ad potential hazards of m b y pipelines. The Board €%her ccmluded tlut crafting public policy for lard development adjacent to pipAkes would recpire extensive research and would involve ixoqxxating the views from m y interests, including the general public, pipeline operators, land developers, local, State, ad Federal govemmit agencies, and i m y others. Noting the abiity of the TmspoiTation Research Board (TRB) of tlie National Academy o f k i e m to bring diverse interests groups toge:ether. to foiidate practical public safety policy, tlie Safety Board recornrixnded &it the TRB:#
Page 33 Assess tI7e adequacy of existing public policy for surfam and subsurface use of land adjaceilt to pipelines that tmnsport hazardous conurdities to provide reasonable Dublic d e w . Based on tlle fuxlinm of the assessmnt, develop a recorture;7ded policy to coriect identified aeficiencies in current policy p-84-30). In 1988, the TRB published Rpeliiies cold Rhlic S@e@ (Speccial R e p f 219),3 which synthesized policies and practices for enhancing public safety near pipelines through damnge prevention programs, land-use ~ m e s , and emrgency preparedness programs. llie report identified m y policies and practices used to enham? public safety m pipelines, but co~luded tlnt govenmmt ad irxlustry applies tllese m u r e s unevenly. "lie report recomnended that State a x l local governments: * Enact dimage prevention statue that clarify enforcemnt responsibility, increase cmitractor liability, ad stipulate that permitting agencies n u t require, as a codition of permit approval, proof tlnt applicants for buildbig or excavation permits 1nve notified h e pipehle conpy/one-call system Roliibit construction of structures on pipeline rights-of-way and ensure access to pipelines is unobstructed. e Institute a referid and approval prcadure that requires pipe1i.e operator review of subrfjvision plans, site plans, ad variarx-s for all properties that Inve a pipeline easemnt. e Modernize land records system to e m that information abut the types of easemnts, easemnf boundaries, and holders of easenxnts by pxcA is readily awxssible to local plamrs. * Prepe, in consultation with pipeline operators and developers, planning guidelim for safely integmting pipelines easenxnts into developmnl projects ad protecting the lines during construction; inmporate tliese guidelines in coinpreliemive plans, zoning ordinances, and building cdes. e Consider building setbacks and lowdensity developnmit m trslllsniission pipeline rights-of-way in densely populated areas with high co~~~ltrations of pipeline nileage where the risks of danx@ng a pipeline my be sufficiently great, and the consequences sufficiently severe to wmnt s p i a l n m e s ; provide developnmt hnuses to coinpelsate the developer for loss of developable property.#
Page 44 Tie r p r t also included d e l / s q l e documents for damage prevention legislation, right-of-way agreements, State. legislation for subdivision plan review, guidelines for suuivision developinerits near pipeline rights-of-way, and local setback oIdimnces. After reviewing the "3 report, tlie Department of Tmqmrtation's Research and Special Programs Adninistration (RSPA) "wiiolelieartedly " supported the report's recornendation that local g o v e r m m should detemine the appropriate use of land m u pipelines and enact laws to prevent development on pipeline iights-of-way. Following the E!.dison accident, RSPA conhacted the New Jersey Institute of Tecliriology in August 1991. to perform a study on metlilods to reduce the risks and e n l m pipeline dety and enviroixnental protection with reswt to the siting and proxinity of p i p e l k to ilie pUblic and sensitive enviroments. RSPA noted that the existing population-based requiremnts, which were considered adequate for assessing risk in tlie past, proved to be inadequate in the a s o n , New Jersey accident. RSPA acknowledged the i d to reevaluate pipeline safety regulations in49 CFR Parts 192 and 195 as they related to the proximity of pipelires to populated ad environnlentally sensitive areas. RSPA noted firat land use, including population coiznbation and s u 1 . r o ~ g enviroimiit, should be corsidered in tlie evaluation. Tx contract requires tlrat tlie ilstitute: a kvelop a framwork for effective environmental and public safety requireinents in the areas of land use, sitiig, and rehabilitation and retrofitting practices; conwe this -work with existing regulatory requkeiimts ard industry practices ad recornid rxxded hprovenmts. e Assemble hyo groups consisting of no nme than seven rnemk~s to provide tecllnical assistance on factual mkrs and to give the institute feedback needed in completing the analytical requiremnts ofthe contract. One group shall tx coqmed of individuals laving pipeline engiraeering and tecllnical expertise and the other of representatives from the enviromntal c o m i t y and representatives having expertise in New Jersey land use and zoning nntteis. e Study the probability of failures that can occur on gas transmission and lazardous liquid pipelines ad idenw the factors flat cause pipelk failures. llie institute shail consider failwres tlat might occur anywliere along the pirxline conidor, but shaU concernate on failures tint occw at high iisk areas and environmentally seilsitive areas, such as urban areas and water bodies used for h m i consqtion. Tie Safety Board believes tlat the NIIT contract offers signiicant pterdal for rationally quantiftifyiig the risks posed to public safety by high-pressure pipeha inurban areas, for assessing the eff'ectivem of govermmit requirements in reducing identified risks to acceptable levels, and for identifying wiat additional actiorls my be ~xxded and by whom#
Page 55 Tlle safety Board has asked RSPA to r i d e tlle "I study widely available to l0rA and State govei-nnmits when it is conipleted. However, completion of ad dissemination of the study will not e r n e tlnt m n m n d e d actions are enacted. The Safety B0ar.d tllerefoE reviewed the objectives ad capabilities of several associations to deteniline which would be best able to hmlate tlle study results into guidam suitable for implen~ntation by local and State governnmts and to work with and eimumge them on in~leinentation. Xie nxmlxxs of the Atl~rican Public Works Association (APWA) coiipise m y engineers a d o r imlicipal plmn. Tie Safety Board r e c o g ~ k llnt through its reports and other efforts, the APWA can be insmiital hi lielping develop policies and practices on surface and subsurface use of lad adjacent to pipclines to provide reasonable public safety. Xierefore, tie National Transportation Safety Board r e c o m ~ d flat the Amiicai Public Works Association: Bvelop, in coordination with the Ainerican Society of Civil Eiginecis, the hiten~ational Cily/GmLy Manageixnt Association, ad the Amiimi Planning Association, nmkl program and statutes andlor guidelines for local ad State govermnts to iniplenmt tbe recomnxdations from die New Jersey Institute of Teclinolojg's sttidy on enhancing public safety I= high-pressure pipelines. (Class E, Priority Action)(p-95-8) Advise your Memkrs of the public safety concfins addressed in tlis accident report and urge them to iillplemnt tle improvemiit reco~mibtions in the Transportation Research Board's Repoa 219. (Class E, Priority Action)(P-95-9) Also, the Wety Board issued Safety R e c o ~ m i ~ t i o n s P-95-1 through -4 to the Research ad Special Prograns Administration, P-95-5 through -7 to the Texas Eastern Tmsmission Coipration, P-9.5-10 and -1 1 to the Interstate NaturaI Gas Association of Anmica, P-95-12 axi -13 to tile Association of Oil Pipe Lines, P-95-14 a d - 1 5 to the Arrerican Petroleuni Institute, P-95-16 and -17 to the Amrimi C s Association, P-95-18 ad -19 to the Amtiran Society of Civil Eigkeers, P-95-20 and -21 to the hiternational City/County Managemnt Association, ad P-95-22 ad -23 to the Atmican Planning Association. TIE safety h a r d is also reiterating P-87-4 ad P-90-21 to tile Research ad Special Pro-wills Miinistration. If you i d additioixd informtion, you m y CAI (202) 382-0672. Tie NatioiaI Tmqmtation safety Board is an independent Federal agemy with the statutory responsibility "to promte timpoi-tation safety by rxixiucthg hdepedeiit accident investigations and by fouidating safety improvenetit rmmndations" (pliblic Law 93-633). nie Safety Boxd is interested in m y action taken as a result of its safety reconmi&itioix. Xierefore, it would appreciate a response from you i-egarding action taken or r~nte~i~lated uitli respcl to Uie recomrxlatioils in this letter. Please refer to Safety Reconximxiations P-95-8 ad -9 in your reply.#
Page 66 Chairman HALL and Members HAMMERSCHMIDT and FRANCIS concurred in these recommendations. By:#
This is an NTSB safety recommendation letter. NTSB recommendations are advisory and do not themselves create binding regulatory requirements.