ENBRIDGE ENERGY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP — Corrective Action Order

case documentOfficial PDF320105008H_CAO_07282010.pdf#

case documentOfficial PDF320105008H_CAO_07282010_text.pdf#

case documentOfficial PDF320105008H_Restart Plan Disapproved_08102010.pdf#

case documentOfficial PDF320105008H_Restart Plan Disapproved_08102010_text.pdf#

320105008H_CAO Amendment_09222010_text.pdf, page 1Official PDFSEP 22 2010 VIA CERTIFIED MAIL AND FACSIMILE TO: (713) 653-6711 Mr. Terry McGill President Enbridge Energy Partners, L.P. 1100 Louisiana, Suite 3300 Houston, TX 77002 Re: CPF No. 3-2010-5008H Amendment to the July 28, 2010 Corrective Action Order Dear Mr. McGill: In light of your company’s waiver of a hearing, enclosed is a Amendment to the Corrective Action Order issued on July 28, 2010, as proposed in the a Notice of Proposed Amendment to the Corrective Action Order issued on September 17, 2010. Your receipt of this Amendment constitutes service of that document under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5. Please direct any questions on this matter to David Barrett, Director, Central Region, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA, at (816) 329-3800. Sincerely, Jeffery Wiese Associate Administrator For Pipeline Safety Enclosures: Amendment to the Corrective Action Order Copy of 49 C.F.R. § 190.233#

320105008H_CAO Amendment_09222010_text.pdf, page 2U. S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY WASHINGTON, DC 20590 _________________________________ ) In the Matter of ) ) Enbridge Energy Partners, L.P., ) CPF No. 3-2010-5008H ) Respondent. ) _________________________________) AMENDMENT TO THE CORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER Background and Purpose On July 28, 2010, under authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60112, the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), issued a Corrective Action Order (CAO) to Enbridge Energy Partners, L.P. (Enbridge or Respondent), finding that the continued operation of Respondent’s Line 6B extending approximately 286 miles from Griffith, Indiana to the U.S.−Canadian border would be hazardous to life, property, and the environment unless certain corrective actions were taken. PHMSA issued the July 28, 2010 CAO (Original CAO) in response to a failure on Line 6B near Marshall, Michigan that was reported by Enbridge on July 26, 2010 (Marshall Failure). The failure resulted in an estimated release of 19,500 barrels of crude oil. The spilled oil entered the Talmadge Creek and the Kalamazoo River. PHMSA initiated an investigation of the Marshall Failure which is ongoing. The Original CAO set forth preliminary findings based upon PHMSA’s initial investigation of the Marshall Failure and requires, among other things, that the line remain out-of-service until repairs under a pre-approved restart plan are completed and restart of the line is approved by the Director, Central Region, PHMSA. The CAO also imposes an ongoing 20 percent pressure reduction, requires inspections and evaluations of additional sections of the pipeline to determine if conditions similar to those associated with the Marshall Failure were likely to exist elsewhere on Line 6B, and requires the development, implementation, and completion of an integrity verification and remedial work plan before a return to full pressure operations will be permitted. 1 1 In the Matter of Enbridge Energy Partners, L.P., Corrective Action Order (CPF No. 3-2010-5008H) dated July 28, 2010 (Original CAO).#

320105008H_CAO Amendment_09222010_text.pdf, page 32 While the root cause and all contributing factors to the Marshall Failure have not yet been established by the National Transportation Safety Board, additional information about the failure and the condition of Line 6B has become available to PHMSA since the Original CAO was issued as a result of PHMSA’s ongoing investigation. This information includes a visual examination of the failed pipe section under laboratory conditions, the results of six anomaly investigation digs and repairs, and a review of previous in-line inspection results, and an extensive amount of other technical information concerning the pipeline. On September 17, 2010, based on this additional information, PHMSA issued a Notice of Proposed Amendment to the Original CAO (Notice) notifying Respondent of additional preliminary findings of the agency’s investigation and proposing that Respondent take certain additional corrective measures with respect to Line 6B. On September 21, 2010, Enbridge responded to the Notice. Enbridge did not contest the Notice, stated its intent to comply with the Notice, and waived its opportunity for a hearing. Additional Preliminary Findings The preliminary findings in the Original CAO are hereby amended by adding the following additional preliminary findings: • The timeline of discovery of the failure is as follows: 07/25/2010 5:56 PM Scheduled shutdown of Line 6B initiated by Enbridge. 07/25/2010 5:58 PM Actual time of pressure drop on pressure logs. 07/25/2010 9:32 PM First of nine 911 odor complaints in area. 07/25/2010 10:54 PM Odor investigation closed by Marshall Township Fire Dept. 07/26/2010 11:18 AM Consumers Energy reports odor to Enbridge Control Center. 07/26/2010 11:45 AM Enbridge personnel confirm leak at rupture site. 07/26/2010 11:45 AM Enbridge emergency response is initiated. 07/26/2010 1:33 PM Enbridge notifies National Response Center – Report #948903. • On June 4, 2008, Enbridge received the final report on the 2007 MFL inspections results from the tool vendor. The final report indicated a total of 140 anomalies requiring action within 180 days, of which 26 were repaired and 114 remain. • The 2009 in-line inspection using ultrasonic technology identified 250 anomalies, 35 of which were immediately repaired, and 215 remain. The remaining anomalies are between mileposts 650 and 753. • Following the removal and inspection of the failed pipe, Enbridge performed additional anomaly investigation digs at Mile Posts 611.72, 619.57, 654.42, 654.71, and 682.72. In some cases, these investigations revealed the presence of anomalies which were repaired. • On August 21, 2010, an engineering analysis of the deformation anomaly under the St. Clair River at Mile Post 751.22 performed by a third-party laboratory was provided to PHMSA.#

320105008H_CAO Amendment_09222010_text.pdf, page 43 • PHMSA secured the services of Oak Ridge National Laboratory to provide an independent review of Enbridge in-line inspection data and support for PHMSA’s review of Enbridge actions. Oak Ridge is analyzing the growth rates of certain identified anomalies. • On January 21, 2010, PHMSA issued a Warning Letter to Enbridge related to the disconnection of five hydrogen permeation internal corrosion monitors installed on Line 6B, one in January 2006, two in May 2006, and two in October 2007. Enbridge reported that the monitoring systems were disconnected due to communications/instrumentation problems. The warning noted that Enbridge was not able to prove to PHMSA that its interim measures properly managed the threat of internal corrosion. • On January 26, 2010, PHMSA issued an Advisory Bulletin reminding hazardous liquid pipeline operators of the importance of prompt and effective leak detection capability in protecting public safety and the environment. Finding of Hazardous Condition Section 60112 of Title 49, United States Code, provides for the issuance of a Corrective Action Order, including amendments, after reasonable notice and the opportunity for a hearing, requiring the operator of a pipeline determined to pose a hazard to take corrective actions to protect the public and the environment. These may include the suspended or restricted use of a pipeline facility, physical inspection, testing, repair, replacement, or other action, as appropriate. The basis for making a determination that a pipeline facility is or would be hazardous, requiring corrective action, is set forth both in the above-referenced statute and 49 C.F.R. § 190.233, a copy of which is enclosed. After evaluating the all available information on the safety of Line 6B including the foregoing additional preliminary findings, and considering the nature of the Marshall Failure, the age of the pipe involved, the manufacturer, the hazardous nature of the product transported, the pressure required for transporting such product, and the ongoing investigation to determine the root cause of the failure, I find that the continued operation of the Line 6B without additional corrective measures would be hazardous to life, property, and the environment. Accordingly, PHMSA hereby issues this Amendment to the CAO requiring the additional actions specified herein be taken to protect life, property, and the environment. The additional actions set forth in this Amendment to the CAO are in addition to the actions set forth in the Original CAO and do not suspend or eliminate the requirements of the Original CAO, unless otherwise specifically provided herein. Amendments to Required Corrective Action Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60112 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.233, Enbridge Energy Partners, L.P. is ordered to comply with this Amendment to the CAO and take the following additional corrective actions with respect Line 6B. Enbridge shall comply with the following amendments: 1. Restart Plan. Item 2 of the Original CAO is amended by adding paragraphs (D)−(F) as follows:#

320105008H_CAO Amendment_09222010_text.pdf, page 54 (D) Incorporate the actions set forth in PHMSA’s letter of August 10, 2010 including additional anomaly investigations and hydrostatic testing into the plan. 2 (E) Incorporate the actions set forth in PHMSA’s letter of September 3, 2010 into the plan. 3 (F) Enbridge must secure the services of a third-party monitor to provide monitoring during the restart process. Such monitoring shall include monitoring from the Edmonton Control Center as well as review of start-up procedures and documentation, pipe design criteria, operating parameters and procedures, process equipment, monitoring equipment, and SCADA. 2. Integrity Verification and Remedial Work Plan. Item 5 of the Original CAO is amended by adding paragraphs (G)−(J) as follows: (G) The plan must include project plans and schedules for the repair of all remaining anomalies identified for action from the 2007 and 2009 in-line inspections and identified to PHMSA on September 16, 2010 in accordance with 49 C.F.R. Part 195, but no later than 180 days of restart. Specifically: i. The 40 remaining 180-day conditions from the 2007 in-line inspection must be repaired within 180 days of restart beginning with the anomalies identified in Table 6, of the July 15, 2010, Long Term Pressure Reduction Notification. ii. The 114 remaining 180-day conditions must be repaired within 180 days of restart. (H) The plan must include project plans and schedules for the repair of all other remaining pipe anomalies identified for action in the July 15, 2010 Notification to be completed in accordance with 49 C.F.R. Part 195 but no later than 180 days of restart. (I) The plan must include the performance of both a transverse field in-line inspection capable of identifying metal loss and an ultrasonic technology in-line inspection capable of detecting cracks on Line 6B. The in-line inspections must be performed according to the following schedule: i. The in-line inspection tools must be run within 14 days of restart. ii. The tool vendor’s initial report on anomalies meeting immediate repair criteria shall be provided to PHMSA within 30 days of completion of the in-line inspections. 2 Letter from David Barrett, Director, Central Region, PHMSA to Terry McGill, President, Enbridge Energy Partners, L.P. dated August 10, 2010. 3 Letter from David Barrett, Director, Central Region, PHMSA to Shaun Kavajecz, Manager, Pipeline Safety Compliance, Enbridge Pipelines (Lakehead) LLC dated September 3, 2010.#

320105008H_CAO Amendment_09222010_text.pdf, page 65 iii. Immediate repairs as defined by 49 C.F.R. 195.452(h)(4) shall be made within 14 days of discovery regardless of whether such anomaly met a previous repair criterion. iv. The tool vendor’s final report on all anomalies shall be provided to PHMSA within 90 days of completion of the in-line inspections and anomalies requiring repair shall be repaired in accordance with 49 C.F.R. Part 195 but no later than 180 days of discovery. v. The new in-line inspections results must be integrated into results of prior tool runs to reprioritize the focus and schedule of the integrity verification and remedial work plan as necessary. (J) The plan must include project plans and a schedule for the complete replacement of the pipe in the entire St. Clair River crossing to be completed within one year of restart. Provide such plans and schedules to both PHMSA and the National Energy Board of Canada. To the extent delays arise due to obtaining required permits, the Regional Director may grant an extension of time upon written request. The actions required by this Amendment to the CAO are in addition to and do not waive any requirements that apply to Line 6B under the Original CAO or to Respondent’s pipeline system under 49 C.F.R. Parts 190 through 199, as applicable, or any other Order issued to Respondent under authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60101 et seq., or under any other provision of federal or state law. After receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA may identify other corrective actions that need to be taken. In that event, Respondent will be notified of any additional measures required and further amendment of the CAO will be considered. To the extent consistent with safety, Respondent will be afforded notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior to the imposition of any additional corrective measures. ___________________________________ __________________ Jeffrey D. Wiese Date Issued Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety#

320105008H_Notice of Proposed CAO Amendment_09172010_text.pdf, page 1Official PDFSEP 17 2010 VIA CERTIFIED MAIL AND FACSIMILE TO: (713) 653-6711 Mr. Terry McGill President Enbridge Energy Partners, L.P. 1100 Louisiana, Suite 3300 Houston, TX 77002 Re: CPF No. 3-2010-5008H Proposed Amendment to the July 28, 2010 Corrective Action Order Dear Mr. McGill: Enclosed is a Notice of Proposed Amendment to the Corrective Action Order issued on July 28, 2010, immediately following the spill of your Lakehead Line 6B in Marshall MI. It stipulates additional requirements to ensure the safety and efficacy of this pipeline upon an eventual and gradual interim restart of the line. Service is being made by certified mail and facsimile. Your receipt of this Notice constitutes service of that document under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5. The Amendment incorporates previous written communications from PHMSA regarding the requirements of any restart plan. In addition, the Amendment requires Enbridge to secure the services of a third-party monitor to provide monitoring during the restart process. With respect to the integrity verification and remedial work plan that is due on September 26, 2010, your company’s plan must include specific deadlines for repairs. Specifically, your company’s plan must include project plans and a schedule for the total replacement of the pipe in the entire St. Clair River crossing within one year of restart. We understand that your company must obtain certain permits to complete this work. We strongly urge you to proceed aggressively with permitting and replacement. In addition, PHMSA orders Enbridge to repair every already identified anomaly in Line 6B that meets the repair criteria within 180 days. These repairs should be made as soon as practical and focus on replacing portions of the line with multiple and significant colonies of anomalies. Finally, Enbridge must undertake at least two assessments of the entire Line 6B within 14 days of any restart, and take aggressive action to repair any newly identified anomalies, as required in the timeframes designated by 49 C.F.R. Part 195. PHMSA will hold your company to the terms of the Amended Corrective Action Order, including the deadlines and will propose maximum fines per penalty, per day according to federal regulations for any violations.#

320105008H_Notice of Proposed CAO Amendment_09172010_text.pdf, page 2Please direct any questions on this matter to David Barrett, Director, Central Region, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA, at (816) 329-3800. Sincerely, Jeffery Wiese Associate Administrator For Pipeline Safety Enclosures: Notice of Proposed Amendment to the Corrective Action Order Copy of 49 C.F.R. § 190.233#

320105008H_Notice of Proposed CAO Amendment_09172010_text.pdf, page 3U. S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY WASHINGTON, DC 20590 _________________________________ ) In the Matter of ) ) Enbridge Energy Partners, L.P., ) CPF No. 3-2010-5008H ) Respondent. ) _________________________________) NOTICE OF PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE CORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER Background and Purpose On July 28, 2010, under authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60112, the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), issued a Corrective Action Order (CAO) to Enbridge Energy Partners, L.P. (Enbridge or Respondent), finding that the continued operation of Respondent’s Line 6B extending approximately 286 miles from Griffith, Indiana to the U.S.−Canadian border would be hazardous to life, property, and the environment unless certain corrective actions were taken. PHMSA issued the July 28, 2010 CAO (Original CAO) in response to a failure on Line 6B near Marshall, Michigan that was reported by Enbridge on July 26, 2010 (Marshall Failure). The failure resulted in an estimated release of 19,500 barrels of crude oil. The spilled oil entered the Talmadge Creek and the Kalamazoo River. PHMSA initiated an investigation of the Marshall Failure which is ongoing. The Original CAO set forth preliminary findings based upon PHMSA’s initial investigation of the Marshall Failure and requires, among other things, that the line remain out-of-service until repairs under a pre-approved restart plan are completed and restart of the line is approved by the Director, Central Region, PHMSA. The CAO also imposes an ongoing 20 percent pressure reduction, requires inspections and evaluations of additional sections of the pipeline to determine if conditions similar to those associated with the Marshall Failure were likely to exist elsewhere on Line 6B, and requires the development, implementation, and completion of an integrity verification and remedial work plan before a return to full pressure operations will be permitted. 1 1 In the Matter of Enbridge Energy Partners, L.P., Corrective Action Order (CPF No. 3-2010-5008H) dated July 28, 2010 (Original CAO).#

320105008H_Notice of Proposed CAO Amendment_09172010_text.pdf, page 42 While the root cause and all contributing factors to the Marshall Failure have not yet been established by the National Transportation Safety Board, additional information about the failure and the condition of Line 6B has become available to PHMSA since the Original CAO was issued as a result of PHMSA’s ongoing investigation. This information includes a visual examination of the failed pipe section under laboratory conditions, the results of six anomaly investigation digs and repairs, and a review of previous in-line inspection results, and an extensive amount of other technical information concerning the pipeline. Based on this additional information, PHMSA is issuing this Notice of Proposed Amendment to the Original CAO notifying Respondent of additional preliminary findings of the agency’s investigation and proposing that Respondent take certain additional corrective measures with respect to Line 6B. Additional Preliminary Findings The preliminary findings in the Original CAO are amended by adding the following additional preliminary findings: • The timeline of discovery of the failure is as follows: 07/25/2010 5:56 PM Scheduled shutdown of Line 6B initiated by Enbridge. 07/25/2010 5:58 PM Actual time of pressure drop on pressure logs. 07/25/2010 9:32 PM First of nine 911 odor complaints in area. 07/25/2010 10:54 PM Odor investigation closed by Marshall Township Fire Dept. 07/26/2010 11:18 AM Consumers Energy reports odor to Enbridge Control Center. 07/26/2010 11:45 AM Enbridge personnel confirm leak at rupture site. 07/26/2010 11:45 AM Enbridge emergency response is initiated. 07/26/2010 1:33 PM Enbridge notifies National Response Center – Report #948903. • On June 4, 2008, Enbridge received the final report on the 2007 MFL inspections results from the tool vendor. The final report indicated a total of 140 anomalies requiring action within 180 days, of which 26 were repaired and 114 remain. • The 2009 in-line inspection using ultrasonic technology identified 250 anomalies, 35 of which were immediately repaired, and 215 remain. The remaining anomalies are between mileposts 650 and 753. • Following the removal and inspection of the failed pipe, Enbridge performed additional anomaly investigation digs at Mile Posts 611.72, 619.57, 654.42, 654.71, and 682.72. In some cases, these investigations revealed the presence of anomalies which were repaired. • On August 21, 2010, an engineering analysis of the deformation anomaly under the St. Clair River at Mile Post 751.22 performed by a third-party laboratory was provided to PHMSA. • PHMSA secured the services of Oak Ridge National Laboratory to provide an independent review of Enbridge in-line inspection data and support for PHMSA’s review#

320105008H_Notice of Proposed CAO Amendment_09172010_text.pdf, page 53 of Enbridge actions. Oak Ridge is analyzing the growth rates of certain identified anomalies. • On January 21, 2010, PHMSA issued a Warning Letter to Enbridge related to the disconnection of five hydrogen permeation internal corrosion monitors installed on Line 6B, one in January 2006, two in May 2006, and two in October 2007. Enbridge reported that the monitoring systems were disconnected due to communications/instrumentation problems. The warning noted that Enbridge was not able to prove to PHMSA that its interim measures properly managed the threat of internal corrosion. • On January 26, 2010, PHMSA issued an Advisory Bulletin reminding hazardous liquid pipeline operators of the importance of prompt and effective leak detection capability in protecting public safety and the environment. Allegation of Hazardous Condition and Right to Hearing Section 60112 of Title 49, United States Code, provides for the issuance of a Corrective Action Order, including amendments, after reasonable notice and the opportunity for a hearing, requiring the operator of a pipeline determined to pose a hazard to take corrective actions to protect the public and the environment. These may include the suspended or restricted use of a pipeline facility, physical inspection, testing, repair, replacement, or other action, as appropriate. The basis for making a determination that a pipeline facility is or would be hazardous, requiring corrective action, is set forth both in the above-referenced statute and 49 C.F.R. § 190.233, a copy of which is enclosed. After evaluating the all available information on the safety of Line 6B including the foregoing additional preliminary findings, and considering the nature of the Marshall Failure, the age of the pipe involved, the manufacturer, the hazardous nature of the product transported, the pressure required for transporting such product, and the ongoing investigation to determine the root cause of the failure, it appears that the continued operation of the Line 6B without additional corrective measures would be hazardous to life, property, and the environment. Accordingly, PHMSA hereby issues this Notice of Proposed Amendment to the CAO to notify Respondent of the agency’s intent to issue an Amendment to the CAO requiring the additional actions specified herein be taken to protect life, property, and the environment. The additional actions set forth in this Notice of Proposed Amendment to the CAO are in addition to the actions set forth in the original CAO and do not suspend or eliminate the requirements of the Original CAO, unless otherwise specifically provided herein. Response to this Notice Respondent may request a hearing on this Notice, to be held as soon as practicable, by notifying the Director, Central Region, PHMSA (Director), 901 Locust Street, Suite 462, Kansas City, MO 64106 in writing within 10 days of service of this Notice. Failure to submit such written notification waives the opportunity for a hearing and allows the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety to proceed to amend the CAO as proposed. If a hearing is requested, it will be held telephonically or in-person on a date and in a location mutually acceptable to Respondent and PHMSA.#

320105008H_Notice of Proposed CAO Amendment_09172010_text.pdf, page 64 Amendments to Required Corrective Action Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60112 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.233 and the terms of the Original CAO, PHMSA proposes to issue to Enbridge Energy Partners, L.P. this proposed amendment to the Original CAO requiring the following additional corrective actions be taken with respect Line 6B. Enbridge shall: 1. Restart Plan. Item 2 of the Original CAO is amended by adding paragraphs (D)−(F) as follows: (D) Incorporate the actions set forth in PHMSA’s letter of August 10, 2010 including additional anomaly investigations and hydrostatic testing into the plan. 2 (E) Incorporate the actions set forth in PHMSA’s letter of September 3, 2010 into the plan. 3 (F) Enbridge must secure the services of a third-party monitor to provide monitoring during the restart process. Such monitoring shall include monitoring from the Edmonton Control Center as well as review of start-up procedures and documentation, pipe design criteria, operating parameters and procedures, process equipment, monitoring equipment, and SCADA. 2. Integrity Verification and Remedial Work Plan. Item 5 of the Original CAO is amended by adding paragraphs (G)−(J) as follows: (G) The plan must include project plans and schedules for the repair of all remaining anomalies identified for action from the 2007 and 2009 in-line inspections and identified to PHMSA on September 16, 2010 in accordance with 49 C.F.R. Part 195, but no later than 180 days of restart. Specifically: i. The 40 remaining 180-day conditions from the 2007 in-line inspection must be repaired within 180 days of restart beginning with the anomalies identified in Table 6, of the July 15, 2010, Long Term Pressure Reduction Notification. ii. The 114 remaining 180-day conditions must be repaired within 180 days of restart. (H) The plan must include project plans and schedules for the repair of all other remaining pipe anomalies identified for action in the July 15, 2010 Notification to be completed in accordance with 49 C.F.R. Part 195 but no later than 180 days of restart. (I) The plan must include the performance of both a transverse field in-line inspection capable of identifying metal loss and an ultrasonic technology in-line inspection 2 Letter from David Barrett, Director, Central Region, PHMSA to Terry McGill, President, Enbridge Energy Partners, L.P. dated August 10, 2010. 3 Letter from David Barrett, Director, Central Region, PHMSA to Shaun Kavajecz, Manager, Pipeline Safety Compliance, Enbridge Pipelines (Lakehead) LLC dated September 3, 2010.#

320105008H_Notice of Proposed CAO Amendment_09172010_text.pdf, page 75 capable of detecting cracks on Line 6B. The in-line inspections must be performed according to the following schedule: i. The in-line inspection tools must be run within 14 days of restart. ii. The tool vendor’s initial report on anomalies meeting immediate repair criteria shall be provided to PHMSA within 30 days of completion of the in-line inspections. iii. Immediate repairs as defined by 49 C.F.R. 195.452(h)(4) shall be made within 14 days of discovery regardless of whether such anomaly met a previous repair criterion. iv. The tool vendor’s final report on all anomalies shall be provided to PHMSA within 90 days of completion of the in-line inspections and anomalies requiring repair shall be repaired in accordance with 49 C.F.R. Part 195 but no later than 180 days of discovery. v. The new in-line inspections results must be integrated into results of prior tool runs to reprioritize the focus and schedule of the integrity verification and remedial work plan as necessary. (J) The plan must include project plans and a schedule for the complete replacement of the pipe in the entire St. Clair River crossing to be completed within one year of restart. Provide such plans and schedules to both PHMSA and the National Energy Board of Canada. To the extent delays arise due to obtaining required permits, the Regional Director may grant an extension of time upon written request. The actions proposed by this Notice of Proposed Amendment to the CAO are in addition to and do not waive any requirements that apply to Line 6B under the Original CAO or to Respondent’s pipeline system under 49 C.F.R. Parts 190 through 199, as applicable, or any other Order issued to Respondent under authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60101 et seq., or under any other provision of federal or state law. After receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA may identify other corrective actions that need to be taken. In that event, Respondent will be notified of any additional measures required and further amendment of the CAO will be considered. To the extent consistent with safety, Respondent will be afforded notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior to the imposition of any additional corrective measures. ___________________________________ __________________ Jeffrey D. Wiese Date Issued Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety#

320105008H_Region CAO Status Report Restart Plan Disapproved_08102010_text.pdf, page 1Official PDFVIA CERTIFIED MAIL [70072680 0002 5721 4720] and FAX TO: (713) 653-6711 August 10, 2010 Mr. Terry McGill President Enbridge Energy Partners, Ltd 1100 Louisiana, Suite 3300 Houston, TX 77002 Re: CPF No. 3-2010-5008H; Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) Notice of Disapproval of Restart Plan Submitted by Enbridge Energy, L.P. (Enbridge) on August 9, 2010 Dear Mr. McGill: In response to the oil pipeline failure and spill that was reported on July 26, 2010 near Marshall, Michigan, and the Corrective Action Order issued by PHMSA on July 28, 2010, on August 9, 2010 Enbridge submitted a restart plan for Line 6B and requested approval to restart the pipeline. Having reviewed the plan and found that it does not adequately provide for the safe restart of the pipeline, PHMSA disapproves the plan and denies your request to restart the pipeline. The plan submitted on August 9, 2010 does not contain sufficient technical details or adequate steps to permit a conclusion that no immediate threats are present elsewhere on the line that require repair prior to any restart of the pipeline, even at a further reduced pressure. PHMSA will not approve any restart plan that does not include excavating and exposing additional pipe and repairing or replacing additional pipe as necessary. Based on the nature of the failure and the preliminary visual examinations PHMSA made of the failed pipe section on August 6-7, 2010, PHMSA will not approve any restart plan that does not include the following: 1. Additional Anomaly Investigations a. Determine, investigate and remediate as necessary, at least four additional anomalies in Line 6B subject to similar operating parameters as the anomaly associated with the pipeline failure. Previous ILI run data must be reviewed and integrated in light of the new information gained from this failure. Also, the#

320105008H_Region CAO Status Report Restart Plan Disapproved_08102010_text.pdf, page 2review must include focus on coincidental features from each of the individual ILI runs and features coincidental with the failure location. Defect growth rates, calculated failure pressures, proximity to pump station discharge sections, and environmental conditions (wet/dry transitions) must be considered for identifying excavation locations. b. Provide ILI vendor reports and details of all reviews to PHMSA by 5:00 pm (EDT) on August 13, 2010. c. Provide information on the anomalies reported at Mile Posts (MP) 710.74 and MP 751.22, including the nature of the defects, failure pressure calculations, and the plans for remediation for PHMSA review. 2. Pressure Test a. Perform a hydrostatic test of the following sections of 6B: MP 607 to MP 610, and MP 610 – thru the Kalamazoo River - to MP 620. b. Submit a hydrostatic test plan to PHMSA for review, including associated pressures, prior to commencement of any hydrostatic test. 3. Provide Additional Clarifications and Requested Changes a. Define what is meant by “unexpected conditions” as defined in item 1. Supplemental Monitoring and “abnormal conditions” as noted in Item 4. Supplemental Patrol of the Right-of-Way b. Provide detailed procedures related to how start-up of the pipeline will be achieved, c. Provide additional detail on the functions of the designated Line Fill coordinator, such as whether or not this will include manual calculations. d. Provide a list of all control room and leak detection model improvements (shift change, use of historical trends to determine unusual pressure signature, column separation alarms and response, other procedures, display modifications, communication plan, maintenance, etc) that have been implemented to enhance leak detection capability. e. Specify that all communication outages associated with line 6B will be eliminated before commencing start-up activities. f. Explain how discharge pressures at Stockbridge and Howell pumping stations reflect the pressure restrictions required in the Corrective Action Order. g. Explain how the representative pressures listed in Table 1 determined. h. Provide the results of any independent metallurgical analysis of the failure pipe to PHMSA as soon as results are made known, including all drafts of the report. i. Describe how the in-line inspection tool and batch pig currently located in the pipeline will be tracked and how this information will be relayed to the control room. j. Require that Shift Leads/Control Center Supervisors shall only be involved if they have had previous experience on the Line 6B operator/controller console. Submit the revised plan to my office by 5:00 pm (EDT) on August 13, 2010 electronically in Microsoft Word format. Include any supplemental actions Enbridge determines are necessary in additions to the actions described above. I will then review the revised plan. I may direct#

320105008H_Region CAO Status Report Restart Plan Disapproved_08102010_text.pdf, page 3Enbridge to make corrections or additional modifications to the plan. PHMSA reserves the right to disapprove, comment, or direct modification of any plan provision upon resubmission. Thank you for your cooperation. Sincerely, David Barrett Director, Central Region, PHMSA Cc: Shaun G. Kavajecz, Manager, Pipeline Safety Compliance, Enbridge Pipelines (Lakehead) L.L.C., 119 N 25th Street E, Superior, WI 54880#

320105008H_Closure_03202015_text.pdf, page 1Official PDFCERTIFIED MAIL – RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED March 20, 2015 Mr. Bradley F. Shamla Vice President, US Operations Enbridge Energy, LP 7701 France Avenue South, Suite 600 Edina, Minnesota 55435 CPF 3-2010-5008H Dear Mr. Shamla: On July 28, 2010, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) issued to Enbridge Energy Partners, L.P. a Corrective Action Order in the above-referenced case. This Order included a requirement to take corrective actions on your pipeline. Based on our review of the documentation you provided, it has been determined that you have complied with the terms of this Order. Accordingly, this case is now closed and no further action is contemplated with respect to the matters involved in this case. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. Sincerely, Allan C. Beshore Director, Central Region, OPS Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration cc: Mr. Andrew J. Harrington, Enbridge, Inc. Calgary, Alberta Canada Mr. Jeffrey D. Wiese, Associate Administrator of Pipeline Safety Washington, D.C.#