CCPS TRANSPORTATION, LLC — Notice of Probable Violation

party submissionOfficial PDF320215002_Operator Response to Notice_03112021.pdf#

320215002_Final Order_10122021_(18-157171S)_text.pdf, page 1Official PDFOctober 12, 2021 VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: michael.koby@enbridge.com Mr. Michael Koby Vice President, U.S. Operations Enbridge Inc. 5400 Westheimer Court Houston, Texas 77056 Re: CPF No. 3-2021-5002 Dear Mr. Koby: Enclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of violation, assesses a civil penalty of $282,900, and specifies actions that need to be taken by Enbridge Inc., to comply with the pipeline safety regulations. The penalty payment terms are set forth in the Final Order. When the civil penalty has been paid and the terms of the compliance order completed, as determined by the Director, Central Region, this enforcement action will be closed. Service of the Final Order by e-mail is effective upon the date of transmission as provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. Sincerely, Alan K. Mayberry Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety Enclosure cc: Mr. Gregory A. Ochs, Director, Central Region, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA Mr. Dave Stafford, Manager, U.S. Pipeline Compliance, Enbridge Inc., david.stafford@enbridge.com CONFIRMATION OF RECEIPT REQUESTED#

320215002_Final Order_10122021_(18-157171S)_text.pdf, page 2U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590 ____________________________________ ) In the Matter of ) ) Enbridge Inc., ) CPF No. 3-2021-5002 ) Respondent. ) ____________________________________) FINAL ORDER From March 5 to 9, April 2 to 6, May 7 to 11, May 21 to 25, June 11 to 15, and June 25 to 29, 2018, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, representatives of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), inspected the records and facilities of several subsidiaries of Enbridge Inc., (Enbridge or Respondent) namely, CCPS Transportation, LLC; Enbridge Storage (Cushing), LLC; Enbridge Storage (Patoka), LLC; and Illinois Extension Pipeline Company in Oklahoma, Kansas, Missouri, and Illinois. These facilities include two tank farms with a total of 89 tanks and approximately 1,338 miles of crude oil pipelines. As a result of the inspection, the Director, Central Region, OPS (Director), issued to Respondent, by letter dated February 10, 2021, a Notice of Probable Violation, Proposed Civil Penalty, and Proposed Compliance Order (Notice). In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the Notice proposed finding that Respondent had committed nine violations of 49 C.F.R. Part 195, proposed assessing a civil penalty of $354,100 for the alleged violations, and proposed ordering Respondent to take certain measures to correct the alleged violations. The Notice included an additional five warning items pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 190.205, which required no further action, but warned the operator to correct the probable violations or face possible future enforcement action. Enbridge responded to the Notice by letter dated March 11, 2021 (Response). Enbridge contested some of the allegations, offered additional information in response to the Notice, and requested that the proposed civil penalty be reduced. Enbridge did not request a hearing and therefore has waived its right to one.#

320215002_Final Order_10122021_(18-157171S)_text.pdf, page 3CPF No. 3-2021-5002 Page 2 FINDINGS OF VIOLATION The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. Part 195, as follows: Item 2: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.264, which states: § 195.264 Impoundment, protection against entry, normal/emergency venting or pressure/vacuum relief for aboveground breakout tanks. (a) A means must be provided for containing hazardous liquids in the event of spillage or failure of an above-ground breakout tank. (b) After October 2, 2000, compliance with paragraph (a) of this section requires the following for the aboveground breakout tanks specified: (1) For tanks built to API Spec 12F, API Std 620, and others (such as API Std 650 (or its predecessor Standard 12C)), the installation of impoundment must be in accordance with the following sections of NFPA- 30 (incorporated by reference, see § 195.3); (i) Impoundment around a breakout tank must be installed in accordance with section 22.11.2;… The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.264 by failing to provide a means for containing hazardous liquids in the event of spillage or failure of above-ground breakout tanks built to American Petroleum Institute (API) Specification 12F, API Standard 620 and others (such as API Standard 650 (or its predecessor Standard 12C)), by installing impoundments around certain breakout tanks built after October 2, 2000, at Enbridge’s Cushing Tank Farm facility. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Enbridge failed to install impoundments (i.e., intermediate dikes) in accordance with section 22.11.2 of NFPA-30, a standard promulgated by the National Fire Protection Association and incorporated by reference in 49 C.F.R. § 195.3. Enbridge did not contest this allegation of violation, the proposed civil penalty, or the proposed compliance order associated with this Item. In its Response, Enbridge indicated that it had begun work to remediate impoundment at the location and planned to complete work within six months of the Final Order. Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.264 by failing to provide a means for containing hazardous liquids in the event of spillage or failure of above-ground breakout tanks built to American Petroleum Institute (API) Specification 12F, API Standard 620 and others (such as API Standard 650 (or its predecessor Standard 12C)) at the Cushing Tank Farm. Item 3: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a), which states: § 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies. (a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies….#

320215002_Final Order_10122021_(18-157171S)_text.pdf, page 4CPF No. 3-2021-5002 Page 3 The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) by failing to follow its own manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Enbridge failed to follow its written procedure “09-03-02 Removing Water / Snow from Tank Roofs.” Step 5 of the procedure for Removing Water requires operator personnel to “[m]onitor water from bottom drain valve for visible product for at least 10 min checking drain valve every 30 min until draining is complete.” During the 2018 PHMSA field inspection, however, Enbridge representatives stated that the Cushing Tank Farm facility keeps all tank roof drains open at all times, including at night and on weekends. This practice is inconsistent with Enbridge’s procedure for Removing Water, specifically the monitoring required under Step 5. Additionally, the practice of leaving the tank roof drains open at all times, including at night, conflicts with a specific warning in the procedure that states: “Do not leave tank roof drains and firewall drains open…at night.” On May 31, 2018, in response to OPS’ inquiries about Enbridge’s practice of draining tank roofs at the Cushing Tank Farm facility, Cushing staff stated that the practice of leaving the tank roof drains open had been in place prior to Enbridge acquiring the facility. Cushing staff also stated that the procedure would only apply to instances where the roof drain valve was closed. However, there is no indication in the procedure that it was limited to instances where the roof drain valve was closed. In its Response, Enbridge acknowledged that the Cushing Tank Farm failed to comply with the procedure but asserted that the descriptive language in the Notice was incorrect because the Cushing Tank Farm operation is now in alignment with other locations and no longer leaves tank roof drains open, and at no time are both the roof drains and dike drains open at the same time. For this reason, Enbridge requested that this Item be reduced to a warning item with no civil penalty. Having considered the Response, I find the record confirms that Enbridge failed to follow the procedure. Although Enbridge has since discontinued its practice of leaving tank roof drains open at the Cushing Tank Farm, this was the practice at the location at the time of PHMSA’s inspection in 2018. Therefore, there is no basis to withdraw this item or otherwise reduce it to a warning. Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) by failing to follow its own manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities. Item 4: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a), which states: § 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies. (a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies . . . . The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) by failing to follow its own manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities.#

320215002_Final Order_10122021_(18-157171S)_text.pdf, page 5CPF No. 3-2021-5002 Page 4 Specifically, Enbridge failed to follow its procedure “03-07-03 Pressure Relief / Safety Valves,” when testing pressure safety valves (PSVs). Procedure 03-07-03 sets forth a 14-step process for inspecting and testing PSVs that PHMSA inspectors witnessed Enbridge’s technicians not properly following. Enbridge did not contest this allegation of violation or the proposed civil penalty associated with this Item. Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) by failing to follow its own manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities. Item 5: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a), which states: § 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies. (a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies . . . . The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) by failing to follow its own manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities. Specifically, Enbridge failed to follow its procedure “03-07-03 Pressure Relief / Safety Valves” when checking pressure relief set points. Step 10 of the procedure for inspecting and testing pressure relief/safety valves sets forth measures for checking pressure relief set points for the valves, which includes recording the current pressure-relief setting as “Task” on the work order and then creating a follow-up work order to document the adjustments being made. However, Enbridge did not complete these specific measures under Step 10 of the procedure by failing to document the current “as found” relief pressures in the follow-up work orders. Enbridge did not contest this allegation of violation or the proposed civil penalty associated with this Item. Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) by failing to follow its own manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities. Item 6: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.420(b), which states: § 195.420 Valve maintenance. (a) . . . . (b) Each operator shall, at intervals not exceeding 7 ½ months, but at least twice each calendar year, inspect each mainline valve to determine that it is functioning properly. The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.420(b) by failing to inspect each mainline valve at least twice each calendar year, at intervals not exceeding 7 ½ months. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Enbridge’s valve maintenance records demonstrated that seven valves had not been inspected at least twice each calendar year.#

320215002_Final Order_10122021_(18-157171S)_text.pdf, page 6CPF No. 3-2021-5002 Page 5 In its Response, Enbridge acknowledged that the required inspection interval was not met for five of the seven valves listed in the Notice. Enbridge stated “[v]alves meeting the definition of mainline valves and requiring semi-annual inspection are shaded orange on Exhibit NOPV-6, attached to this response. However, as shown in the exhibit, the two highlighted valves (TP-63- BV-1 and TP-63-CSV-12) are not shaded orange, and the required inspection frequency is three years.” For these reasons, Enbridge requested that PHMSA amend the descriptive language for this Item and reduce the civil penalty accordingly. Based on the additional information provided in the Response, and the Regional Director’s written evaluation of the response material submitted pursuant to § 190.209(b)(7), I agree that there were five, rather than seven missing mainline valve inspections, to be completed at intervals not exceeding 7 ½ months, but at least twice each calendar year, as required by § 195.420(b). Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.420(b) by failing to inspect five mainline valves at least twice each calendar year, at intervals not exceeding 7 ½ months. I withdraw the allegation that there were an additional two missed valve inspections. Item 7: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.428(a), which states: § 195.428 Overpressure safety devices and overfill protection systems. (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, each operator shall, at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year, or in the case of pipeline used to carry highly volatile liquids, at intervals not to exceed 7 ½ months, but at least twice each calendar year, inspect and test each pressure limiting device, relief valve, pressure regulator, or other item of pressure control equipment to determine that it is functioning properly, is in good mechanical condition, and is adequate from the standpoint of capacity and reliability of operation for the service in which it is used. The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.428(a) by failing to inspect each non-highly volatile liquid (HVL) overpressure safety device at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year. Specifically, Enbridge failed to conduct 12 inspections of overpressure safety devices on its system in 2016 and 2017. Enbridge did not contest this allegation of violation or the proposed civil penalty associated with this Item. Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.428(a) by failing to inspect each non-HVL overpressure safety device at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year. Item 8: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.428(a), which states: § 195.428 Overpressure safety devices and overfill protection systems.#

320215002_Final Order_10122021_(18-157171S)_text.pdf, page 7CPF No. 3-2021-5002 Page 6 (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, each operator shall, at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year, or in the case of pipeline used to carry highly volatile liquids, at intervals not to exceed 7 ½ months, but at least twice each calendar year, inspect and test each pressure limiting device, relief valve, pressure regulator, or other item of pressure control equipment to determine that it is functioning properly, is in good mechanical condition, and is adequate from the standpoint of capacity and reliability of operation for the service in which it is used. The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.428(a) by failing to determine, over a period of three years, whether 53 pressure-control devices on its non-HVL pipeline were adequate from the standpoint of capacity and reliability of operations for the service in which they were used, at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year.1 Specifically, the Notice alleged that Enbridge had missed a total of 159 inspections and tests of its overpressure safety devices to determine if they were adequate from the standpoint of capacity, and Enbridge was not able to produce any records demonstrating that it had completed such determinations. Enbridge did not contest this allegation of violation or the proposed civil penalty associated with this Item. Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.428(a) by failing to determine, over a period of three years, whether 53 pressure- control devices on its non-HVL pipeline were adequate from the standpoint of capacity and reliability of operations for the service in which they were used, at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year. Item 12: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.573(c), which states: § 195.573 What must I do to monitor external corrosion control? (a) . . . . (c) Rectifiers and other devices. You must electrically check for proper performance each device in the first column at the frequency stated in the second column. Rectifier Reverse current switch Diode Device Check frequency At least six times each calendar year, but with intervals not exceeding 2 ½ months. Interference bond whose failure would jeopardize structural protection 1 These 53 devices were different from the ones cited in Item 7. Unlike the devices cited in Item 7 where Respondent primarily missed a single inspection in either 2016 or 2017, the 53 devices cited in Item 8 all had missed capacity determinations and they were missing for consecutive years from 2016 to 2018.#

320215002_Final Order_10122021_(18-157171S)_text.pdf, page 8CPF No. 3-2021-5002 Page 7 Other interference bond At least once each calendar year, but with intervals not exceeding 15 months. The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.573(c) by failing to electrically check for proper performance of rectifiers and critical bonds at least six times each calendar year, but with intervals not exceeding 2 ½ months. The Notice alleged that as identified during the PHMSA inspection of Enbridge’s corrosion control records, 11 checks were not completed on four rectifiers and 13 checks were not completed on three critical bonds. In its Response, Enbridge accepted the violation in part, and contested the violation in part, while noting that there were mitigating factors. Additionally, Enbridge questioned the amount of the proposed civil penalty in relation to penalties to other operators for the same alleged violation. Arguments in the Response for this Item were separately addressed for “Rectifiers” and “Critical Bonds.” Rectifiers Enbridge contested a portion of Item 12, which alleged that it failed to electrically check for proper performance of rectifiers at least six times each calendar year, but with intervals not exceeding 2 ½ months. The Notice alleged that 11 checks were not completed on four rectifiers. Enbridge agreed that three of the 11 checks were not completed as alleged in the Notice, and contested eight of the missing rectifier inspections by noting in its Response: The subject rectifiers all have remote monitoring units installed on them for recording automated measurements. When the remote monitoring unit is not functioning properly, a technician is sent to the rectifier to repair the unit and obtain any voltage and amperage measurements required by the CFR. That data is then manually entered into the cathodic protection database called PCS. In this case, when the remote monitoring units were not operating properly a technician did visit the location and recorded the measurements in the logbook located at the rectifier. However, those measurements were not recorded in PCS. Having considered the information submitted, I find the information does not demonstrate that Respondent was in compliance with § 195.573(c) at the time the violations were alleged to have occurred. During PHMSA’s inspection in 2018, records collected indicated gaps between required checks on each of the four rectifiers. In particular, Exhibit M of the Violation Report contains the Enbridge Energy Rectifier Inspection Report showing the following gaps that do not comply with the 2 ½-month interval in § 195.573(c): (1) L63 MP 71.62 from December 15, 2016 to May 9, 2017; (2) Patoka MP 120 from December 30, 2016 to July 13, 2017; (3) Patoka MP 5347 from January 1, 2017 to June 28, 2017; and (4) Patoka MP 5354 from June 21, 2016 to April 19, 2017. Despite this evidence of noncompliance, Respondent contended that checks were performed at#

320215002_Final Order_10122021_(18-157171S)_text.pdf, page 9CPF No. 3-2021-5002 Page 8 requisite intervals during those gaps. For several reasons, I find Respondent has not rebutted the evidence of noncompliance. First, Respondent’s contention conflicts with its own records. The Enbridge Energy Rectifier Inspection Report demonstrates that no readings were taken during these gaps. PHMSA’s inspection occurred over a year after the checks were missed and at that time Respondent’s records still reflected that no check had been performed. There is no evidence in the record that checks took place during the gaps besides Respondent’s own assertion. Respondent provided a table of measurements purported to be from a logbook but provided no copy of the logbook and no contemporaneous records of the checks. The table provided was not contemporarily signed, dated, and does not otherwise provide any proof that the measurements were recorded at the time these checks were performed. Moreover, Respondent provided this information more than three years after PHMSA brought the noncompliance to Respondent’s attention during the inspection. Finally, as Respondent explained in its Response, its process of performing checks when a remote monitoring unit is not functioning properly, as it was in the case of all four rectifiers, involves a technician repairing the unit, taking readings, and entering the data into the cathodic protection database. Despite Respondent’s assertion that checks were performed at intervals of 2 ½ months, the evidence demonstrates Respondent never entered any data into the cathodic protection database at that time or even by the time PHMSA conducted an inspection a year later. Therefore, Respondent did not follow its process for performing checks. For these reasons, the information Enbridge provided in their Response is not sufficient to show that they performed the required checks under § 195.573. Critical Bonds The Notice alleged that Enbridge failed to electrically check for the proper performance of critical interference bonds at least six times each calendar year, but with intervals not exceeding 2 ½ months. As identified during PHMSA’s inspection of Enbridge’s corrosion control records, 13 checks were allegedly not completed on three critical bonds. Enbridge contested all 13 missing critical bond inspections by noting in its Response: Bond current measurements at MP 423.5056, MP 423.5056A and 423.5056B were incorrectly identified as “Critical” bonds in the PCS database where Enbridge records cathodic protection data. These three locations should have been identified as “Informational” bonds as they are not interference bonds between Enbridge and Magellan, but are bonds tied into a common bus bar with Magellan. These three locations are current measurements between the three Magellan structures and read for informational purposes only. Based on a review of the Response, and the Regional Director’s written evaluation of the response material submitted pursuant to § 190.209(b)(7), I find that these bonds were not critical bonds under § 195.573(c). Therefore, I withdraw from this item the 13 alleged instances of violation for a failure to check the proper performance of critical interference bonds.#

320215002_Final Order_10122021_(18-157171S)_text.pdf, page 10CPF No. 3-2021-5002 Page 9 Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.573(c) in 11 instances by failing to electrically check for proper performance of four rectifiers at least six times each calendar year, but with intervals not exceeding 2 ½ months. Further, I withdraw the 13 alleged instances of violation for a failure to check critical interference bonds. Item 14: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.581(a), which states: § 195.581 Which pipelines must I protect against atmospheric corrosion and what coating material may I use? (a) You must clean and coat each pipeline or portion of pipeline that is exposed to the atmosphere, except pipelines under paragraph (c) of this section. The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.581(a) by failing to provide protection against atmospheric corrosion by cleaning and coating each pipeline or portion of pipeline that is exposed to the atmosphere. Specifically, during the field inspection of Enbridge’s Concordia Station, the Notice alleged that PHMSA observed that the coating had dis- bonded and/or flaked at the pipe-to-soil transitions on both unit sump drain lines. Enbridge did not contest this allegation of violation or the proposed civil penalty associated with this Item. Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.581(a) by failing to provide protection against atmospheric corrosion by cleaning and coating each pipeline or portion of pipeline that is exposed to the atmosphere. These findings of violation will be considered prior offenses in any subsequent enforcement action taken against Respondent. ASSESSMENT OF PENALTY Under 49 U.S.C. § 60122, Respondent is subject to an administrative civil penalty not to exceed $200,000 per violation for each day of the violation, up to a maximum of $2,000,000 for any related series of violations.2 In determining the amount of a civil penalty under 49 U.S.C. § 60122 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.225, I must consider the following criteria: the nature, circumstances, and gravity of the violation, including adverse impact on the environment; the degree of Respondent’s culpability; the history of Respondent’s prior offenses; any effect that the penalty may have on its ability to continue doing business; the good faith of Respondent in attempting to comply with the pipeline safety regulations; and self-disclosure or actions to correct a violation prior to discovery by PHMSA. In addition, I may consider the economic benefit gained from the violation without any reduction because of subsequent damages, and such other matters as justice may require. The Notice proposed a total civil penalty of $354,100 for the violations cited above. 2 These amounts are adjusted annually for inflation. See 49 C.F.R. § 190.223.#

320215002_Final Order_10122021_(18-157171S)_text.pdf, page 11CPF No. 3-2021-5002 Page 10 Item 2: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $29,700 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.264, for failing to provide a means for containing hazardous liquids in the event of spillage or failure of above-ground breakout tanks built to API Specification 12F, API Standard 620 and others (such as API Standard 650 (or its predecessor Standard 12C)), by installing impoundments around certain breakout tanks built after October 2, 2000, at Respondent’s Cushing Tank Farm. Enbridge did not contest the violation or the proposed civil penalty. Based upon the foregoing, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $29,700 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.264. Item 3: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $19,000 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a), for failing to follow its own manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities. Enbridge requested the alleged violation be reduced to a warning, but for the reasons stated above, I rejected this request. Respondent did not otherwise provide information to mitigate the civil penalty. Based upon the foregoing, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $19,000 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a). Item 4: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $19,600 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a), for failing to follow its own manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities, by failing to properly follow the 14-step process in its procedure “03-07-03 Pressure Relief / Safety Valves.” Enbridge did not contest this allegation of violation or the proposed civil penalty associated with this Item. Based upon the foregoing, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $19,600 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a). Item 5: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $16,500 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a), for failing to follow its own manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities, for failing to complete Step 10 of its procedure “03-07-03 Pressure Relief / Safety Valves.” Enbridge did not contest this allegation of violation or the proposed civil penalty associated with this Item. Based upon the foregoing, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $16,500 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a). Item 6: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $21,000 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.420(b), for failing to inspect each mainline valve at least twice each calendar year, at intervals not exceeding 7 ½ months. As discussed in more detail above, Respondent provided additional information in its Response indicating that there were five, rather than seven missing mainline inspections, to be completed at intervals not exceeding 7 ½ months, but at least twice each calendar year, therefore reducing the instances of violation from seven to five. Based upon the foregoing, I assess Respondent a reduced civil penalty of $20,300 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.420(b). Item 7: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $22,800 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.428(a), for failing to inspect each non-HVL overpressure safety device at least once each calendar year at intervals not exceeding 15 months. Enbridge did not contest this allegation of violation or the proposed civil penalty associated with this Item. Based upon the foregoing, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $22,800 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.428(a). Item 8: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $36,200 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.#

320215002_Final Order_10122021_(18-157171S)_text.pdf, page 12CPF No. 3-2021-5002 Page 11 § 195.428(a), for failing to determine, over a period of three years, whether 53 pressure-control devices on its non-HVL pipeline were adequate from the standpoint of capacity and reliability of operation for the service in which they were used, at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year. Enbridge did not contest this allegation of violation or the proposed civil penalty associated with this Item. Based upon the foregoing, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $36,200 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.428(a). Item 12: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $170,0003 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.573(c), for failing to electrically check for proper performance of rectifiers and critical interference bonds at least six times each calendar year, but with intervals not exceeding 2 ½ months. For the reasons stated above, the penalty assessment is reduced based on the withdrawal of 13 instances, resulting in a reduction of instances of violation from 23 to 10. Respondent also noted in its Response that “the proposed penalty amount for violating this standard is not in line with penalties issued to other operators for alleged violations of the same standard, which also warrants a reduction in the penalty.” PHMSA calculates the penalty amount for the individual circumstances based on multiple factors. With regard to the nature of the violation, Item 12 was an activities violation for a failure to complete proper performance checks. With regard to circumstances, the violation was discovered by PHMSA. With regard to gravity, there were 10 instances of the violation, and the violation occurred within a high consequence area (HCA) or “could affect” HCA. With regard to culpability, Enbridge failed to comply with an applicable requirement. Lastly, there were no aggravating or mitigating factors considered for Item 12. Based upon the foregoing, I assess Respondent a reduced civil penalty of $99,500 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.573(c). Item 14: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $19,300 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.581(a), for failing to provide protection against atmospheric corrosion by cleaning and coating each pipeline or portion of pipeline that is exposed to the atmosphere. Enbridge did not contest this allegation of violation or the proposed civil penalty associated with this Item. Based upon the foregoing, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $19,300 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.581(a). In summary, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria for each of the Items cited above, I assess Respondent a total civil penalty of $282,900. Payment of the civil penalty must be made within 20 days of service. Federal regulations (49 C.F.R. § 89.21(b)(3)) require such payment to be made by wire transfer through the Federal Reserve Communications System (Fedwire), to the account of the U.S. Treasury. Detailed instructions are contained in the enclosure. Questions concerning wire transfers should be directed to: Financial Operations Division (AMK-325), Federal Aviation Administration, Mike Monroney Aeronautical Center, 6500 S MacArthur Blvd, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 79169. The Financial Operations Division telephone number is (405) 954-8845. 3 While the Notice alleged a total of 24 instances of violation, the proposed civil penalty for Item 12 was calculated based on only 23 instances of violation. The 13 instances of violation for an alleged failure to check the proper performance of critical interference bonds has been subtracted from the 23 alleged instances of violation, resulting in 10 remaining instances of violation for Item 12.#

320215002_Final Order_10122021_(18-157171S)_text.pdf, page 13CPF No. 3-2021-5002 Page 12 Failure to pay the $282,900 civil penalty will result in accrual of interest at the current annual rate in accordance with 31 U.S.C. § 3717, 31 C.F.R. § 901.9 and 49 C.F.R. § 89.23. Pursuant to those same authorities, a late penalty charge of six percent (6%) per annum will be charged if payment is not made within 110 days of service. Furthermore, failure to pay the civil penalty may result in referral of the matter to the Attorney General for appropriate action in a district court of the United States. COMPLIANCE ORDER The Notice proposed a compliance order with respect to Item 2 in the Notice for a violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.264. Under 49 U.S.C. § 60118(a), each person who engages in the transportation of hazardous liquids or who owns or operates a pipeline facility is required to comply with the applicable safety standards established under chapter 601. Pursuant to the authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60118(b) and 49 C.F.R. § 190.217, Respondent is ordered to take the following actions to ensure compliance with the pipeline safety regulations applicable to its operations: 1. With respect to the violation of § 195.264 (Item 2), Respondent must install intermediate berms in accordance with NFPA-30 for the containment areas in the Cushing Tank Farm facility identified in Item 2 of the Notice. 2. Respondent must correct these inadequacies and supply evidence of drawings and photos to the Director, Central Region, OPS, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, within six months of issuance of the Final Order. The Director may grant an extension of time to comply with any of the required items upon a written request timely submitted by the Respondent and demonstrating good cause for an extension. PHMSA requests that Respondent maintain documentation of the safety improvement costs associated with fulfilling this Compliance Order and submit the total to the Director. It is requested that these costs be reported in two categories: (1) total cost associated with preparation/revision of plans, procedures, studies and analyses; and (2) total cost associated with replacements, additions and other changes to pipeline infrastructure. Failure to comply with this Order may result in the administrative assessment of civil penalties not to exceed $200,000, as adjusted for inflation (see 49 C.F.R. § 190.223), for each violation for each day the violation continues or in referral to the Attorney General for appropriate relief in a district court of the United States. WARNING ITEMS With respect to Items 1, 9, 10, 11 and 13, the Notice alleged probable violations of Part 195, but identified them as warning items pursuant to § 190.205. The warnings were for:#

320215002_Final Order_10122021_(18-157171S)_text.pdf, page 14CPF No. 3-2021-5002 Page 13 49 C.F.R. § 195.52(a) (Item 1) ─ Respondent’s alleged failure to give notice at the earliest practicable moment, but no later than one hour after confirmed discovery, to the National Response Center following the release of approximately 10 barrels of crude oil and the shutdown of Enbridge’s Line 63, which Enbridge reported 2 hours and 10 minutes after confirmed discovery; 49 C.F.R. § 195.430(a) (Item 9) ─ Respondent’s alleged failure to perform an annual inspection of firefighting equipment at the Patoka facility in 2016, as specified by its procedures, to ensure the equipment was in proper operating condition at all times; 49 C.F.R. § 195.505(b) (Item 10) ─ Respondent’s alleged failure to follow its own written qualification program for ensuring through evaluation that individuals performing covered tasks were qualified when two individuals performed a covered task without being qualified; 49 C.F.R. § 195.567(c) (Item 11) ─ Respondent’s alleged failure to maintain seven test lead wires in a condition that would enable the operator to obtain electrical measurements to determine whether cathodic protection on the pipeline complied with § 195.571; 49 C.F.R. §§ 195.573(e) (Item 13) ─ Respondent’s alleged failure to correct deficiencies in corrosion control at seven test point locations on certain non-HCA pipeline segments, as required by § 195.401(b)(1). If OPS finds a violation of any of these items in a subsequent inspection, Respondent may be subject to future enforcement action. Under 49 C.F.R. § 190.243, Respondent may submit a Petition for Reconsideration of this Final Order to the Associate Administrator, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, East Building, 2nd Floor, Washington, DC 20590, with a copy sent to the Office of Chief Counsel, PHMSA, at the same address, no later than 20 days after receipt of service of this Final Order by Respondent. Any petition submitted must contain a statement of the issue(s) and meet all other requirements of 49 C.F.R. § 190.243. The filing of a petition automatically stays the payment of any civil penalty assessed. The other terms of the order, including corrective action, remain in effect unless the Associate Administrator, upon request, grants a stay. The terms and conditions of this Final Order are effective upon service in accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.5. October 12, 2021 ___________________________________ __________________________ Alan K. Mayberry Date Issued Associate Administrator#

320215002_Final Order_10122021_(18-157171S)_text.pdf, page 15for Pipeline Safety CPF No. 3-2021-5002 Page 14#

320215002_Closure Letter_06222022_(18-157171S)_text.pdf, page 1Official PDFVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: and jim.ramness@enbridge.com michael.koby@enbridge.com; david.stafford@enbridge.com; June 22, 2022 Michael Koby Vice President, US Pipelines Enbridge Energy, Limited Partnership 5400 Westheimer Court Houston, Texas 77056 Re: CPF 3-2021-5002 Dear Mr. Koby: On October 12, 2021, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) issued a Final Order in the above-referenced case to Enbridge Energy, Limited Partnership (Enbridge) and its subsidiaries, namely, Enbridge Storage, LLC; Enbridge Storage, LLC; CCPS Transportation, LLC; and Illinois Extension Pipeline Company,. This Order included a Civil Penalty assessment in the total amount of $354,100, as well as a Compliance Order with respect to Item 2 of the Notice requiring Enbridge, and its subsidiaries, to take specific actions to ensure compliance with the pipeline safety regulations applicable to its operations. Based on our review of the documentation provided and confirmation of payment of the civil penalty, it has been determined that Enbridge, and its subsidiaries, have complied with the terms of this Order. Accordingly, this case is now closed and no further action is contemplated with respect to the matters involved in this case. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. Sincerely, Gregory A. Ochs Director, Central Region, OPS Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration cc: Dave Stafford, david.stafford@enbridge.com Jim Ramness, jim.ramness@enbridge.com#

320215002_NOPV PCP PCO_02102021_text.pdf, page 1Official PDFNOTICE OF PROBABLE VIOLATION PROPOSED CIVIL PENALTY and PROPOSED COMPLIANCE ORDER VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: david.stafford@enbridge.com February 10, 2021 Mr. Michael Koby Vice President US Operations Enbridge Energy Inc. 5400 Westheimer Ct. Houston, Texas 77056 michael.koby@enbridge.com and CPF 3-2021-5002 Dear Mr. Koby: On March 5 to 9, April 2 to 6, May 7 to 11, May 21 to 25, June 11 to 15 and June 25 to 29, 2018, representatives of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code (U.S.C.) inspected the records and facilities of several of your subsidiaries, namely, Enbridge Storage (Cushing), LLC; Enbridge Storage (Patoka), LLC; CCPS Transportation, LLC; and Illinois Extension Pipeline Company in Oklahoma, Kansas, Missouri and Illinois. These facilities include two tank farms with a total of 89 tanks and approximately 1,338 miles of crude oil pipelines. As a result of the inspection, it is alleged that you have committed probable violations of the Pipeline Safety Regulations, Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). The items inspected and the probable violations are: 1. § 195.52 Immediate notice of certain accidents. (a) Notice requirements. At the earliest practicable moment following discovery, of a release of the hazardous liquid or carbon dioxide transported resulting in an#

320215002_NOPV PCP PCO_02102021_text.pdf, page 2event described in §195.50, but no later than one hour after confirmed discovery, the operator of the system must give notice, in accordance with paragraph (b) of this section of any failure that: . . . The PHMSA inspection revealed that Enbridge failed to give notice at the earliest practicable moment, but no later than one hour after confirmed discovery, to the National Response Center following a release of a hazardous liquid resulting in an event described in 49 C.F.R. § 195.50. Specifically, on May 2, 2017, a sump-pump overfill situation occurred, resulting in a release of approximately 10 barrels of crude oil and the shutdown of Enbridge’s Line 63 (Pakota Station) in Illinois. According to Accident Report 20170177-22368, Enbridge identified the accident at 10:22 a.m., and confirmed discovery at 10:24 a.m. when resources first arrived onsite. However, Enbridge did not give notice to the National Response Center of the accident until 12:34 p.m., which exceeded the one-hour notification requirement under § 195.52(a) by 1 hour and 10 minutes. 2. § 195.264 Impoundment, protection against entry, normal/emergency venting or pressure/vacuum relief for aboveground breakout tanks. (a) A means must be provided for containing hazardous liquids in the event of spillage or failure of an above-ground breakout tank. (b) After October 2, 2000, compliance with paragraph (a) of this section requires the following for the aboveground breakout tanks specified: (1) For tanks built to API Spec 12F, API Std 620, and others (such as API Std 650 (or its predecessor Standard 12C)), the installation of impoundment must be in accordance with the following sections of NFPA-30 (incorporated by reference, see § 195.3); (i) Impoundment around a breakout tank must be installed in accordance with section 22.11.2; . . . Enbridge failed to provide a means for containing hazardous liquids in the event of spillage or failure of above-ground breakout tanks built to American Petroleum Institute (API) Specification 12F, API Standard 620 and others (such as API Standard 650 (or its predecessor Standard 12C), by installing impoundments around certain breakout tanks built after October 2, 2000, at the company’s Cushing Tank Farm facility. Specifically, Enbridge failed to install impoundments in accordance with section 22.11.2 of NFPA-30, a standard promulgated by the National Fire Protection Association and incorporated by reference in 49 C.F.R. § 195.3. 2#

320215002_NOPV PCP PCO_02102021_text.pdf, page 3During the field inspection of the Cushing Tank Farm facility, PHMSA observed that several groups of tanks did not have intermediate berms, as required by section 22.11.2 of NFPA-30. That section provides, in relevant part: NFPA 30 – Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code 22.11.2 …. 22.11.2.6.3.5 Whenever two or more tanks storing Class I liquids, any one of which is over 150 ft (45 m) in diameter, are located in a common diked area, intermediate dikes shall be provided between adjacent tanks to hold at least 10 percent of the capacity of the tank so enclosed, not including the volume displaced by the tank. PHMSA identified several containment areas at the Cushing Tank Farm facility storing Class I liquids where there were two or more tanks, each being more than 150 feet in diameter, that lacked intermediate dikes between adjacent tanks and that could hold at least 10 percent of the tank so enclosed, not including the volume displaced by the tank. In an email to PHMSA dated March 21, 2019, Enbridge acknowledged that it had conducted a survey of the Cushing Tank Farm facility and had identified the following tanks as being non-compliant with NFPA-30 section 22.11.2. A total of 23 tanks in five containment areas failed to comply with NFPA-30 section 22.11.2, as follows: Containment Area / Tanks Year Built 1. 1036, 1037, 1038 2012 2. 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2008 3. 2235, 2236, 2237, 2243, 2244 2006 (Tanks 2235-37) & 2011 (Tanks 2243-44) 4. 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234 2007 5. 3361, 3362, 3363, 3364 2006 3. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies. (a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies. . . . Enbridge failed to follow its own manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities. Specifically, the company failed to follow its written procedure “09-03-02 Removing Water/Snow from Tank Roofs.” Step 5 of the procedure for Removing Water requires operator personnel to “[m]onitor water from bottom drain valve for visible product for at least 10 min. checking drain valve every 30 3#

320215002_NOPV PCP PCO_02102021_text.pdf, page 44. min until draining is complete.” However, this procedure does not reflect the actual practice followed in the field. During the PHMSA field inspection, Enbridge representatives stated that the Cushing Tank Farm facility keeps all tank roof drains open at all times, including at night and on weekends. This practice is inconsistent with Enbridge’s procedure for Removing Water, specifically the monitoring required under Step 5. Additionally, the practice of leaving the tank roof drains open at all times, including at night, conflicts with a specific warning in the procedure that states: “Do not leave tank roof drains and firewall drains open … at night.” On May 31, 2018, in response to OPS’ inquiries about Enbridge’s practice of draining tank roofs at the Cushing Tank Farm facility, Cushing staff stated that the practice of leaving the tank roof drains open had been in place prior to Enbridge acquiring the facility. Cushing staff also stated that the procedure would only apply to instances where the roof drain valve was closed. However, there is no indication in the procedure that it was limited to instances where the roof drain valve was closed. Therefore, Enbridge’s statements and practices demonstrate that Enbridge failed to follow its written procedure 09-03-02. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies. (a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies. This … Enbridge failed to follow its own manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities. Specifically, the company failed to follow its procedure “03-07-03 Pressure Relief / Safety Valves,” when testing pressure safety valves (PSVs). Specifically, procedure 03-07-03 sets forth a 14-step process for inspecting and testing PSVs. During PHMSA’s field inspection at the CCPS Spearhead Pipeline in Illinois from June 25 to 29, 2018, the following series of events occurred. Enbridge’s technicians failed to follow the company’s 14-step process laid out in procedure 03-07-03 during the following instances:  Step 9 was completed before step 1 – equipment was attached to the PSV before calling the control room as required in Step 1.  During Step 10, the compressed nitrogen tank valve was supposed to be slowly opened until the PSV activated. However, o The nitrogen tank valve was opened quickly so that the PSV tripped several times a second before the nitrogen tank valve closed after several seconds. 4#

320215002_NOPV PCP PCO_02102021_text.pdf, page 55. o The entire nitrogen tank was emptied so much that another tank had to be retrieved to conduct the test. o When Enbridge personnel observing the test determined that the technician’s performance was unsatisfactory, Enbridge suspended the technician as of 6/29/2018. o The technician requalified on 9/12/2018.  Technicians in Illinois failed to complete Step 11 by updating the field tags with the date of the test. The Area supervisor and five technicians that were interviewed stated that it was the practice in this location not to use field tags, despite the procedure requirements. PHMSA’s inspectors witnessed Enbridge’s technicians not properly following the 14- step procedure for testing PSVs, which demonstrates a failure to comply with § 195.402(a). §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies. (a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies. This … Enbridge failed to follow its own manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities. Specifically, the company failed to follow its written procedure “03-07-03 Pressure Relief / Safety Valves.” Step 10 of the procedure for inspecting and testing pressure relief/safety valves sets forth measures for checking pressure relief set points for the valves, which includes recording the current pressure-relief setting as “Task” on the work order and then creating a follow- up work order to document the adjustments being made. However, Enbridge did not complete these specific measures under Step 10 of the procedure. During the field inspection, PHMSA discovered that technicians were recording the setting “found / left” data in the field on a paper form, but were not updating the work order. Enbridge provided copies of the paper form for three of the five pressure-relief valves listed below. Technicians used this paper form in the field but Enbridge was unable to provide follow-up work orders, as required by the procedure. The following records lacked “found / left” pressure readings: 1. CG-159-PSV-3 – Missing the “as found” relief pressure reading from the 2016 detailed work order. 2. CG-155-PSV-1 – Missing the “as found” relief pressure reading from the 2017 detailed work order. 3. NI-55-PSV-1 – Missing the “as found” relief pressure from the 2016 detailed work order. 5#

320215002_NOPV PCP PCO_02102021_text.pdf, page 64. QT-59-PSV-1 – Missing the “as found” relief pressure from the 2017 detailed work order. By failing to document the current “as found” relief pressures in the follow-up work orders, Enbridge failed to follow its written procedure, as required by § 195.402(a). 6. §195.420 Valve maintenance. (a) . . . . (b) Each operator shall, at intervals not exceeding 7½ months, but at least twice each calendar year, inspect each mainline valve to determine that it is functioning properly. Enbridge failed to inspect each mainline valve at least twice each calendar year, at intervals not exceeding 7½ months. PHMSA’s review of Enbridge’s valve maintenance records found that the following seven valves had not been inspected at least twice each calendar year: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. TP-63-BV-1 – Missing first inspection of 2016. TP-63-CSV-12 – Missing first inspection of 2016. DT-63-SSV-1 – Missing first inspection of 2016. DT-63-SSV-2 – Missing first inspection of 2016. FB0168.17-63-V-1 – Missing first inspection of 2016. FB0168.18-63-V-1 – Missing first inspection of 2016. FH0000.03-59-V-1 – Missing first inspection of 2017. Therefore, Enbridge failed to inspect seven mainline valves, at intervals not exceeding 7½ months, but least twice each calendar, as required by § 195.420(b). 7. §195.428 Overpressure safety devices and overfill protection systems. (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, each operator shall, at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year, or in the case of pipelines used to carry highly volatile liquids, at intervals not to exceed 71∕2 months, but at least twice each calendar year, inspect and test each pressure limiting device, relief valve, pressure regulator, or other item of pressure control equipment to determine that it is functioning properly, is in good mechanical condition, and is adequate from the standpoint of capacity and reliability of operation for the service in which it is used. Enbridge failed to inspect each non-highly volatile liquid (HVL) overpressure safety device at least once each calendar year at intervals not exceeding 15 months. The 6#

320215002_NOPV PCP PCO_02102021_text.pdf, page 7following 12 overpressure safety devices were not inspected annually for a total of 12 inspections that were not conducted: 1. CG-55-PCV-1 – Missing 2016 and 2017 inspections. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. TP-203-PSV-4 – Missing 2016 inspection. TP-203-PSV-3 – Missing 2016 inspection. TP-203-PSV-2 – Missing 2016 inspection. TP-203-PSV-1 – Missing 2016 inspection. TP-202-PSV-1 – Missing 2016 inspection. TP-202-PCV-1 – Missing 2016 inspection. TP-201-PSV-1 – Missing 2016 inspection. TP-101-PSV-15C – Missing 2016 inspection. 10. TP-101-PSV-121 – Missing 2016 inspection. 11. FH0124.93-55-PT-2 – Missing inspection in calendar year 2016 (inspection on 11/13/2015 & 1/24/2017). Therefore, Enbridge failed to conduct 12 inspections of overpressure safety devices on its system in 2016 and 2017, as required by § 195.428(a). 8. §195.428 Overpressure safety devices and overfill protection systems. (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, each operator shall, at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year, or in the case of pipelines used to carry highly volatile liquids, at intervals not to exceed 71∕2 months, but at least twice each calendar year, inspect and test each pressure limiting device, relief valve, pressure regulator, or other item of pressure control equipment to determine that it is functioning properly, is in good mechanical condition, and is adequate from the standpoint of capacity and reliability of operation for the service in which it is used. Enbridge failed to determine, over a period of three years, whether 53 pressure-control devices on its non-HVL pipeline were adequate from the standpoint of capacity and reliability of operation for the service in which they were used, at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year.1 PHMSA’s review of Enbridge’s pressure-control records noted that Enbridge had not determined that the capacity was adequate for 53 overpressure safety devices as required by §195.428. Specifically, Enbridge had missed a total of 159 inspections and tests of its overpressure safety devices to determine if they were adequate from the standpoint of capacity, nor was Enbridge able to produce any records demonstrating it 1 These 53 devices were different from the ones cited above it Item 7. 7#

320215002_NOPV PCP PCO_02102021_text.pdf, page 8had completed such determinations. The 53 overpressure safety devices and 159 missing capacity inspections and tests are as follows: Pipeline facility In-service Date Spearhead Pipeline, Line 55 >5 years Number of overpressure- protection valves to be inspected per year 15 Number of missed capacity reviews Years of Missed Inspections Spearhead Pipeline, Line 59 Dec. 2014 Cushing Terminal >5 years 16 Patoka Terminal >5 years 11 SAX Nov. 2015 2 45 9 27 48 33 159 Therefore, Enbridge failed to determine whether pressure-control devices on its non- HVL pipeline were adequate from the standpoint of capacity and reliability of operation for the service in which they were used, at intervals not exceeding 15 months, as required by §195.428(a), as well as the requirements of Enbridge’s own procedure “Pressure Control Valve Capacity and Reliability Assessment.”2 2016, 2017, 2018 2016, 2017, 2018 2016, 2017, 2018 2016, 2017, 2018 6 2016, 2017, 2018 Total 53 9. §195.430 Firefighting equipment. Each operator shall maintain adequate firefighting equipment at each pump station and breakout tank area. The equipment must be— (a) In proper operating condition at all times; Enbridge failed to perform an annual inspection of firefighting equipment at the Patoka facility in 2016. Enbridge staff stated that the annual fire extinguisher inspection was not completed to their knowledge and the employees that were there at that time are no longer with Enbridge. Firefighting equipment inspections are required by NFPA-30, incorporated by reference into Part 195 at § 195.3, and Enbridge’s procedure “04-03-02 Fire Extinguishers – Inspection.” Enbridge was not able to 2 The purpose of the “Pressure Control Valve Capacity and Reliability Assessment” procedure is to “outline the process to the process to be followed for the assessment of capacity and reliability on Pressure Control Valves (PCV) as per … 49 CFR 195.428.” 8#

320215002_NOPV PCP PCO_02102021_text.pdf, page 9provide documentation demonstrating that the firefighting equipment had been inspected in 2016 to ensure it was in proper operating condition at all times. 10. §195.505 Qualification program. Each operator shall have and follow a written qualification program. The program shall include provisions to: (a) . . . . qualified; . . . . (b) Ensure through evaluation that individuals performing covered tasks are Enbridge failed to follow its own written qualification program for ensuring through evaluation that individuals performing covered tasks were qualified. Enbridge’s Regional Management reported to PHMSA that two individuals had performed covered tasks when they were not qualified per the company’s written operator qualification program. Records show that in each instance the covered task was performed by unqualified individuals only one time. 1. 2. Covered task 51, “Valves and Actuators,” was performed by an unqualified individual on 4/25/2017; the qualification had expired on 3/19/2017 and the re- qualification did not occur until 6/15/2017. Two covered tasks were performed by an individual before being qualified. First, Task 91, “Pressure Relief Valve Test,” was performed on 9/9/2016 before the qualification date of 7/7/2017. Second, Task 51, “Valves and Actuators,” was performed on 10/21/2016 before the qualification date of 2/23/2017. 11. §195.567 Which pipelines must have test leads and what must I do to install and maintain the leads? (a) . . . . (c) Maintenance. You must maintain the test lead wires in a condition that enables you to obtain electrical measurements to determine whether cathodic protection complies with §195.571. Enbridge failed to maintain test lead wires in a condition that would enable the operator to obtain electrical measurements to determine whether cathodic protection on the pipeline complied with § 195.571. A review of Enbridge’s corrosion-control records showed that the following seven test lead wires were not adequately maintained to allow testing at the required inspection cycles: 1. Line 59, MP 30.1 - No readings due to bad test lead in 2016 and 2017. 9#

320215002_NOPV PCP PCO_02102021_text.pdf, page 1012. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Line 59, MP 41.82 - No readings due to bad test lead in 2016 and 2017. Line 59, MP 256.25 - No readings due to bad test lead in 2016 and 2017. Line 59, MP 298.4 - No readings due to bad test lead in 2016 and 2017. Line 59, MP 364.17 - No readings due to bad test lead in 2016 and 2017. Line 59, MP 529.31 - No readings due to bad test lead in 2016 and 2017. Line 55, MP 487.9089 - No readings due to bad test lead in 2016 and 2017. §195.573 What must I do to monitor external corrosion control? (a) . . . . (c) Rectifiers and other devices. You must electrically check for proper performance each device in the first column at the frequency stated in the second column. Device Check frequency Rectifier Reverse current switch Diode At least six times each calendar year, but with intervals not exceeding 21∕2 months. Interference bond whose failure would jeopardize structural protection Other interference bond At least once each calendar year, but with intervals not exceeding 15 months. Enbridge failed to electrically check for proper performance of rectifiers at least six times each calendar year, at intervals not to exceed 2½ months. As identified during the PHMSA inspection of Enbridge’s corrosion- control records, 11 checks were not completed on the following 4 rectifiers: 1. 2. 3. 4. Line 63, MP 71.62 - Missing 2 readings between 12/15/2016 to 5/9/2017. Patoka Terminal, MP 120 - Missing 3 readings between 12/30/2016 to 7/13/2017. Patoka Terminal, MP 5347 - Missing 2 readings between 1/1/2017 to 6/28/2017. Patoka Terminal, MP 5354 - Missing 4 readings between 6/21/2016 to 4/19/2017. Enbridge also failed to electrically check for the proper performance of critical interference bonds at least six times each calendar year, at intervals not to exceed 2½ months. As identified during the inspection of Enbridge’s corrosion-control records, 13 checks were not completed on the following three critical bonds: 1. Line 55, MP 423.5056 - Missing the first 3 readings in 2017, and the last reading in 2017 (total of 4). 10#

320215002_NOPV PCP PCO_02102021_text.pdf, page 112. 3. Line 55, MP 423.5056A - Missing 5 readings in 2017 (only reading was on 6/26/2017) (total of 5). Line 55, MP 423.5056B - Missing 4 readings in 2017 (only readings were on 6/26/2017 and 12/4/2017) (total of 4). 13. §195.573 What must I do to monitor external corrosion control? (a) Protected pipelines. You must do the following to determine whether cathodic protection required by this subpart complies with §195.571: (1) Conduct tests on the protected pipeline at least once each calendar year, but with intervals not exceeding 15 months…. (e) Corrective action. You must correct any identified deficiency in corrosion control as required by §195.401(b). However, if the deficiency involves a pipeline in an integrity management program under §195.452, you must correct the deficiency as required by §195.452(h). and §195.401(b) General Requirements. (a) . . . (b) An operator must make repairs on its pipeline system according to the following requirements: (1) Non Integrity management repairs. Whenever an operator discovers any condition that could adversely affect the safe operation of its pipeline system, it must correct the condition within a reasonable time. However, if the condition is of such a nature that it presents an immediate hazard to persons or property, the operator may not operate the affected part of the system until it has corrected the unsafe condition. Enbridge failed to correct deficiencies in corrosion control on certain non-HCA pipeline segments, as required by § 195.573(e). Under that section, operators must correct any identified deficiencies in corrosion control as provided by § 195.401(b)(1), which states that whenever an operator discovers a condition that could adversely affect the safe operation of a non-HCA pipeline, it must correct the condition within a reasonable time. The following seven test point locations had identified deficiencies of low cathodic protection potentials for multiple surveys in a row.3 However, there is no evidence 3 Enbridge utilized the -0.850 V “instant off” criteria. 11#

320215002_NOPV PCP PCO_02102021_text.pdf, page 12that Enbridge took measures to correct the deficiencies within a reasonable amount of time or prior to conducting the next inspection required under § 195.573(a). 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Line 55, MP 266.6379 - Instant off reading on 5/14/2016 was -0.726 mV and on 6/20/2017 it was -0.597 mV. No additional readings taken in 2017. Line 55, MP 507.4760 - Instant off reading on 4/16/2016 was -0.750 mV and on 6/8/2017 it was -0.795 mV. No additional readings taken in 2017 Line 59, MP 163.090 - Instant off reading on 5/15/2016 was -0.840 mV and on 6/21/2017 it was -0.717 mV. No additional readings taken in 2017. Line 59, MP 164.0010 - Instant off reading on 7/9/2015 was -0.825 mV, on 5/16/2016 was -0.694 mV and on 6/21/2017 it was -0.565 mV. No additional readings taken in 2017. Line 59, MP 164.0040 - Instant off reading on 7/9/2015 was -0.815 mV, on 5/16/2016 was -0.646 mV and on 6/21/2017 it was -0.560 mV. No additional readings taken in 2017. Line 59, MP 435.1000 - Instant off reading on 4/15/2016 was -0.680 mV and on 6/8/2017 it was -0.708 mV. No additional readings taken in 2017. Line 59, MP 435.1300 - Instant off reading on 5/15/2016 was -0.587 mV and on 6/8/2017 it was -0.634 mV. No additional readings taken in 2017. Therefore, Enbridge failed to correct the seven identified deficiencies of low cathodic protection potentials within a reasonable time, as required by § 195.573(e). 14. §195.581 Which pipelines must I protect against atmospheric corrosion and what coating material may I use? (a) You must clean and coat each pipeline or portion of pipeline that is exposed to the atmosphere, except pipelines under paragraph (c) of this section. Enbridge failed to provide protection against atmospheric corrosion by cleaning and coating each pipeline or portion of pipeline that is exposed to the atmosphere. During the field inspection of Enbridge’s Concordia Station, PHMSA observed that the coating had dis-bonded and/or flaked at the pipe-to-soil transitions on both unit sump drain lines. These observations, which were documented with photographic evidence, show that Enbridge failed to provide protection against atmospheric corrosion on its pipeline by cleaning and coating each portion of pipeline that is exposed to the atmosphere. Proposed Civil Penalty Under 49 U.S.C. § 60122 and 49 CFR § 190.223, you are subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $218,647 per violation per day the violation persists, up to a maximum of $2,186,465 for a related series of violations. For violations occurring on or after November 27, 2018 and 12#

320215002_NOPV PCP PCO_02102021_text.pdf, page 13before July 31, 2019, the maximum penalty may not exceed $213,268 per violation per day, with a maximum penalty not to exceed $2,132,679. For violations occurring prior to November 2, 2015, the maximum penalty may not exceed $200,000 per violation per day. with a maximum penalty not to exceed $2,000,000 for a related series of violations. PHMSA has reviewed the circumstances and supporting documentation involved in the above probable violations and has recommended that you be preliminarily assessed a civil penalty of $354,100 as follows: Item number PENALTY 2 $ 29,700 3 $ 19,000 4 5 $ 19,600 $ 16,500 6 $ 21,000 7 $ 22,800 8 $ 36,200 12 $170,000 14 $ 19,300 Warning Items With respect to items 1, 9, 10, 11 and 13 we have reviewed the circumstances and supporting documents involved in this case and have decided not to conduct additional enforcement action or penalty assessment proceedings now. We advise you to promptly correct these items. Failure to do so may result in additional enforcement action. Proposed Compliance Order With respect to item 2 pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60118, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration proposes to issue a Compliance Order to Enbridge Storage (Cushing). Please refer to the Proposed Compliance Order, which is enclosed and made a part of this Notice. Response to this Notice Enclosed as part of this Notice is a document entitled Response Options for Pipeline Operators in Compliance Proceedings. Please refer to this document and note the response options. All material you submit in response to this enforcement action may be made publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with the complete original document you must provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for confidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b). 13#

320215002_NOPV PCP PCO_02102021_text.pdf, page 14Following the receipt of this Notice, you have 30 days to submit written comments, or request a hearing under 49 CFR § 190.211. If you do not respond within 30 days of receipt of this Notice, this constitutes a waiver of your right to contest the allegations in this Notice and authorizes the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety to find facts as alleged in this Notice without further notice to you and to issue a Final Order. If you are responding to this Notice, we propose that you submit your correspondence to my office within 30 days from receipt of this Notice. This period may be extended by written request for good cause. In your correspondence on this matter, please refer to CPF 3-2021-5002 and, for each document you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible. Sincerely, Gregory A. Ochs Director, Central Region, OPS Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration Enclosures: Proposed Compliance Order Response Options for Pipeline Operators in Enforcement Proceedings CC: Dave Stafford, Manager, US Pipeline Compliance, 119 N. 25th Street East, Superior, WI 54880 david.stafford@enbridge.com 14#

320215002_NOPV PCP PCO_02102021_text.pdf, page 15PROPOSED COMPLIANCE ORDER Pursuant to 49 United States Code § 60118, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) proposes to issue to Enbridge Inc. (Enbridge), in regards to its subsidiary Enbridge Storage (Cushing) LLC a Compliance Order incorporating the following remedial requirements to ensure the compliance of Enbridge with the pipeline safety regulations: 1. 2. 3. In regard to Item Number 2 of the Notice pertaining to Enbridge’s failure to follow NFPA-30 section 22.11.2 when designing tank impoundments in the Cushing Tank Farm facility and not installing intermediate berms, Enbridge must install intermediate berms in accordance with NFPA-30 for the containment areas identified in Item Number 2 of the Notice. Enbridge must correct these inadequacies within six months of issuance of a Final Order and supply evidence of drawings and photos to Gregory Ochs, Director, Central Region, OPS, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. It is requested (not mandated) that Enbridge maintain documentation of the safety improvement costs associated with fulfilling this Compliance Order and submit the total to Gregory Ochs, Director, Central Region, OPS, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. It is requested that these costs be reported in two categories: 1) total cost associated with preparation/revision of plans, procedures, studies and analyses, and 2) total cost associated with replacements, additions and other changes to pipeline infrastructure. 15#