TEXAS EASTERN TRANSMISSION, LP (SPECTRA ENERGY PARTNERS, LP) — Notice of Probable Violation

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42021034NOPV_PHC Hearing Scheduled_03212022_(20-183709)_text.pdf, page 1Official PDFMarch 21, 2022 VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: catherine.little@troutman.com and mary.mcdaniel@dot.gov Ms. Catherine D. Little, Esq. Counsel for Texas Eastern Transmission, LP Troutman Pepper, LLP 600 Peachtree Street, NE, Suite 3000 Atlanta, GA 30308 Ms. Mary McDaniel Director, Southwest Region Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 8701 South Gessner Road, Suite 630 Houston, Texas 77074 Re: Notice of Hearing, Texas Eastern Transmission, LP CPF No. 4-2021-034-NOPV Dear Ms. Little and Ms. McDaniel: In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.211, an informal hearing will be held regarding the Notice of Probable Violation, Proposed Civil Penalty, and Proposed Compliance Order issued by the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration in the above-referenced case. The hearing will take place on June 8, 2022, beginning at 8:30 a.m. Central Time. The hearing will be held via videoconference. I will provide the videoconference information prior to the hearing. At least 10 calendar days prior to the hearing (or by May 31, 2022), both parties must submit and exchange any additional written materials they intend to present at the hearing and the name and email address of each attendee. This information should be provided electronically. Materials not submitted by this date may be excluded. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. Sincerely, Larry White Presiding Official cc: Mr. William T. Yardley, Executive Vice President and President, Gas Transmission and Midstream, Texas Eastern Transmission, LP, bill.yardley@enbridge.com Ms. Melanie Lampton, Esq., Counsel, Southwest Region, Office of Pipeline Safety, melanie.lampton@dot.gov#

42021034NOPV_Final Order_02032023_(20-183709)_text.pdf, page 1Official PDFFebruary 3, 2023 VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: cynthia.hansen@enbridge.com Ms. Cynthia L. Hansen Executive Vice President and President Gas Transmission and Midstream Enbridge Inc. 915 North Eldridge Parkway Houston, Texas 77079 Re: CPF No. 4-2021-034-NOPV Dear Ms. Hansen: Enclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of violation, assesses a civil penalty of $640,300, and specifies actions that need to be taken by Texas Eastern Transmission, LP to comply with the pipeline safety regulations. The penalty payment terms are set forth in the Final Order. When the civil penalty has been paid and the terms of the compliance order completed, as determined by the Director, Southwest Region, this enforcement action will be closed. Service of the Final Order by e-mail is effective upon the date of transmission and acknowledgement of receipt as provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. Sincerely, Alan K. Mayberry Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety Enclosure (Final Order) cc: Mr. Bryan Lethcoe, Director, Southwest Region, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA Ms. Catherine Little, Esq., Counsel for Enbridge Inc., Bracewell, LLP, catherine.little@bracewell.com#

42021034NOPV_Final Order_02032023_(20-183709)_text.pdf, page 2Ms. Annie Cook, Esq., Counsel for Enbridge Inc., Bracewell, LLP, annie.cook@bracewell.com Ms. Karen Stallings, Esq., Associate General Counsel – Permitting, ROW and Operations, Enbridge Inc., karen.stallings@enbridge.com Mr. David Bryson, Senior Vice President and Chief Operations Officer, Gas Transmission and Midstream, Enbridge Inc., david.bryson@enbridge.com Mr. Nathan Atanu, Manager, Operational Compliance, Enbridge Inc., nathan.atanu@enbridge.com CONFIRMATION OF RECEIPT REQUESTED#

42021034NOPV_Final Order_02032023_(20-183709)_text.pdf, page 3U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590 ____________________________________ ) In the Matter of ) ) Texas Eastern Transmission, LP, ) CPF No. 4-2021-034-NOPV a subsidiary of Enbridge Inc., ) ) Respondent. ) ____________________________________) FINAL ORDER Following two reportable incidents that occurred on Texas Eastern Transmission, LP’s 1 (TETLP) pipeline facilities located near Danville and Hillsboro, Kentucky in August 2019 and May 2020, respectively, representatives of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code (U.S.C.), initiated an investigation and inspection of TETLP’s facilities and records. The first incident occurred on August 1, 2019, at approximately 1:23 am Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) on TETLP’s 30-inch diameter Line 15 near Danville, Kentucky. Line 15 transports natural gas from the Danville Compressor Station to the Tompkinsville Compressor Station in Kentucky (Danville incident). The line failed at mile post (MP) 423.3, resulting in the release of approximately 66 million cubic feet (MMCF) of natural gas. The release of natural gas ignited and resulted in the death of one person and the hospitalization of six others. First responders evacuated approximately 75 members of the public. The resulting fire destroyed multiple structures and burned vegetation over approximately 30 acres of land. TETLP estimated damages to exceed $19 million. On August 8, 2019, PHMSA issued a Corrective Action Order (CAO) that required TETLP to take corrective actions including a root cause analysis of the failure. 2 Approximately nine months after the Danville incident, TETLP experienced another incident on one of the pipelines subject to the CAO. On May 4, 2020, at approximately 4:36 pm EDT 1 TETLP is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Spectra Energy Partners, LP, which is, in turn, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Enbridge Inc. Enbridge Inc. website, National Gas Transmission and Midstream, available at https://www.enbridge.com/About-Us/Natural-Gas-Transmission-and-Midstream.aspx (last accessed January 17, 2023). 2 In the Matter of Texas Eastern Transmission, LP, Corrective Action Order, CPF No. 2-2019-1002H (Aug. 8, 2019).#

42021034NOPV_Final Order_02032023_(20-183709)_text.pdf, page 4TETLP experienced a second incident on its 30-inch diameter Line 10 located near Hillsboro in Fleming County, Kentucky (Hillsboro incident). Line 10, which transports natural gas from Wheelersburg Compressor Station to Owingsville Compressor Station in Kentucky, failed at MP 509.898. The failure resulted in a release of approximately 52 MMCF of natural gas, which subsequently ignited, burning a heavily wooded area on a hillside.3 TETLP estimated damages for this incident at approximately $12 million. The CAO was amended on two occasions and the amendments included preliminary findings that the cause of the girth weld failures appeared to be due to land movement and that the issue of land movement was potentially system-wide. 4 As part of its investigation of these incidents, OPS reviewed the operating history of the parallel pipelines running along TETLP’s right-of-way and inspected its operation and maintenance procedures for selected locations related to Lines 10, 15, and 25 in Mississippi, Alabama, Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. As a result of the inspections and investigations, the Director, Southwest Region, OPS (Director), issued to Respondent, by letter dated December 21, 2021, a Notice of Probable Violation, Proposed Civil Penalty, and Proposed Compliance Order (Notice). In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the Notice proposed finding that TETLP had committed two violations of 49 C.F.R. Part 192 and proposed assessing a civil penalty of $640,300 for the alleged violations. The Notice also proposed ordering Respondent to take certain measures to correct one of the alleged violations. TETLP responded to the Notice by letter dated February 21, 2022 (Response), as supplemented by material submitted on May 27, 2022 (Pre-hearing submission). Respondent contested one of the allegations and requested an informal hearing. A hearing was subsequently held on June 8, 2022, in Houston, Texas before a Presiding Official with the PHMSA Office of Chief Counsel. At the hearing, Respondent was represented by counsel. After the hearing, Respondent provided additional written material on July 18, 2022 (Post-hearing submission). On August 18, 2022, the Director provided a region recommendation (Recommendation). On September 1, 2022, Respondent submitted a Reply to the region recommendation (Reply). FINDINGS OF VIOLATION The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. Part 192, as follows: Item 1: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.613, which states: § 192.613 Continuing surveillance. (a) Each operator shall have a procedure for continuing surveillance of its facilities to determine and take appropriate action concerning changes in class location, 3 PHMSA Accident Report, Form PHMSA F 7100.2 - 20200057-33836, dated June 6, 2020. 4 In the Matter of Texas Eastern Transmission, LP, Second Amended Corrective Action Order, CPF No. 2-2019- 1002H (June 1, 2020), at 5.#

42021034NOPV_Final Order_02032023_(20-183709)_text.pdf, page 5failures, leakage history, corrosion, substantial changes in cathodic protection requirements, and other unusual operating and maintenance conditions. (b) If a segment of pipeline is determined to be in unsatisfactory condition but no immediate hazard exists, the operator shall initiate a program to recondition or phase out the segment involved, or, if the segment cannot be reconditioned or phased out, reduce the maximum allowable operating pressure in accordance with § 192.619 (a) and (b). The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.613 by failing to initiate a program to recondition, phase out, or reduce the maximum allowable operating pressure for segments of its pipeline systems subject to an unsatisfactory condition. Specifically, the Notice alleged that TETLP did not initiate such a program to address the adverse effects of geohazards.5 At the hearing, OPS laid out the relevant operating history of the pipeline system as it involved geohazards as follows: • On July 3, 1990, in Gaysport, Ohio, TETLP reported that landslide movement caused its 24-inch natural gas pipeline to fail. TETLP indicated that the pipeline was located in a major landslide area that encompassed most of the pipeline right-of-way. • On May 6, 1998, in Beallsville, Ohio, TETLP reported that forces associated with soil slippage along the hillside caused 30-inch natural gas pipeline to rupture at a girth weld. • On December 8, 2015, in Trousdale County, Tennessee, TETLP reported that a slow natural gas leak occurred on 30-inch Line 10 (MP 307.70) resulting from a crack in a girth weld caused by a lack of penetration weld defect that was subject to secondary loading from geohazards. • On January 21, 2019, in Noble County, Ohio, TETLP’s Line 10 failed at a girth weld, causing two injuries and destroying four buildings. PHMSA determined that ground movement overstressed a girth weld and caused the failure. • On May 4, 2020, near Hillsboro, Kentucky, TETLP’s Line 10 failed again, at a girth weld, causing an explosion and fire. PHMSA, NTSB, and TETLP determined that ground movement that overstressed a girth weld caused the failure.6 5 Notice, at 3. 6 Recommendation, at 3-4.#

42021034NOPV_Final Order_02032023_(20-183709)_text.pdf, page 6OPS noted that it had published an Advisory Bulletin in the Federal Register on May 2, 2019, concerning geohazards. 7 The Advisory Bulletin discussed the need for comprehensive surveillance and monitoring procedures to address geohazards including: • Identification of areas surrounding the pipeline that may be prone to large earth movement, including but not limited to slope instability, subsidence, frost heave, soil settlement, erosion, earthquakes, and other dynamic geologic conditions that may pose a safety risk; • Utilization of geotechnical engineers during the design, construction, and ongoing operations of a pipeline system to ensure that sufficient information is available to avoid or minimize the impact of earth movement on the integrity of the pipeline system; • Development of design, construction, and monitoring plans and procedures for each identified location, based on the site-specific hazards identified; and • Monitoring plans that may include identifying geodetic monitoring points (i.e., survey bench marks) to track potential ground movement; conducting stress/strain analysis utilizing in-line inspection tools equipped with Inertia Mapping Unit technology and High Resolution Deformation in-line inspection for pipe bending and denting from movement; and reducing the operating pressure temporarily or shutting-in the affected pipeline segment completely. In its Response and at the hearing, TETLP contested the allegation in the Notice, contending that PHMSA’s allegation was “divorced from the law and the facts.”8 Respondent stated that “PHMSA misapplies the regulation, mischaracterizes the record, and ignores the existence of TETLP’s geohazard procedures and the extensive work being done to address geohazards while incorporating lessons learned in the field and in the industry.”9 Respondent argued that: 49 C.F.R. § 192.613 is a performance-based regulation that requires operators to “have a procedure for continuing surveillance” for certain enumerated conditions including in relevant part, “other unusual operating and maintenance conditions.” There is no reference to the requisite specificity or comprehensiveness of the “procedure.” There is also no specific reference to geohazards or landslides, although TETLP agrees that they are captured by “other unusual operating and maintenance conditions.”10 7 Advisory Bulletin, Pipeline Safety: Potential for Damage to Pipeline Facilities Caused by Earth Movement and Other Geological Hazards, 84 Fed. Reg. at 18920-21 (May 2, 2019). 8 Post-hearing submission, at 2. 9 Id. 10 Post-hearing submission, at 3.#

42021034NOPV_Final Order_02032023_(20-183709)_text.pdf, page 7With respect to the alleged inadequacy of its procedures, Respondent argued that the lack of specifics prescribing the content of an operator’s procedures for continuing surveillance in §192.613 should mean that its failure to initiate a program to recondition, phase out, or reduce the maximum allowable operating pressure for segments of its pipeline systems subject to an unsatisfactory condition was permissible under the regulations. In other words, Respondent argued that if its procedures met the applicable requirements and did not trigger the initiation of such a program, its failure to initiate and conduct the program could not constitute non- compliance regardless of the series of operating failures that were occurring. TETLP argued that its pre-May 2020 procedures did meet the minimum standards in the regulation and provided fourteen of its Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) that TETLP stated covered geohazard management for its pipeline systems. Respondent explained that it was also taking steps in its field work in the months prior to the Hillsboro incident to address geohazards. TETLP stated that it implemented revised procedures for geohazards in May 2020 that had substantially more specificity and explained that it had been developing these revised procedures (which it called “interim” procedures) for geohazards prior to the Hillsboro incident, but they were not provided to OPS during the inspection because OPS did not ask for them. 11 Finally, Respondent argued that if the failure incidents involving geohazards constituted a basis for the need to initiate a remedial program, it would mean that PHMSA was applying a strict liability standard in this case. Respondent stated “The existence of an incident does not infer or equate to the absence of a program or actions in the field to address certain conditions. Neither the Pipeline Safety Act nor PHMSA regulations provide for strict liability because an incident occurred.”12 Having carefully considered Respondent’s arguments, I find them to be unpersuasive. With regard to the fourteen procedures that were in effect prior to the May 2020 revisions, they were not focused on geohazards and addressed several operational topics, such as integrity management, pipeline patrolling, direct assessment, in-line tool inspections, mining, right-of-way maintenance, and encroachment. Some of these procedures either applied only to High Consequence Areas, only to long-mining areas, or were general patrolling procedures not specifically covering continuing surveillance of areas prone to geohazards. Notably, the Director reviewed all fourteen of these procedures and determined that they did not provide Respondent’s personnel with effective guidance for monitoring and addressing the threat of geohazards causing an unsatisfactory condition on its pipeline. With respect to what Respondent referred to as the “most pertinent” five procedures, the Director explained that: 11 Post-hearing submission, at 8. 12 Post-hearing submission, at 12.#

42021034NOPV_Final Order_02032023_(20-183709)_text.pdf, page 8While SOP 1-6060, “Mining Subsidence and Soil Slippage” did mention geohazards, this procedure is only applicable to areas affected by longwall mining yet dozens of other geohazard sites on TETLP’s system are also not in longwall mining areas. TETLP also cited two sentences from SOP 1-5010, “Right-of-Way Maintenance,” only one of which refers to geohazards. This single sentence refers to noting evidence of “erosion, scour, subsidence, or slides,” during right-of-way patrols. A visual observation, however, cannot detect all types of hazardous land movement, nor does this procedure require any follow-up or mitigative actions for land movement such as scour, subsidence, or landslides. TETLP also cited one sentence from SOP 1-6040, “Aerial Pipeline Patrol,” in support of its argument that this was part of its geohazard procedures. It required pilots to observe and document “soil slippage” and “landslide areas” once per year. However, in practice, this procedure failed to identify geohazards. For example, TETLP personnel were aware of potential land movement prior to both incidents through an aerial patrol report but “did not feel [the slope] was enough of a concern to call Central Region Operations integrity engineers.” TETLP did not have technical criteria to determine when to report land movements or geohazards because there were no procedures with such criteria. Nor did TETLP have specific training for patrolling pilots to identify the preliminary signs of land movement or precursors to a landslide. Absent these critical geohazard procedures, TETLP personnel were forced to make arbitrary, uniformed decisions when reporting land movement and geohazards. TETLP also cited SOP 1-6010, “Pipeline Patrol and Leakage Survey Frequency Criteria,” because it references “scour, seismic activity, soil slides, [and] subsidence,” once. One reference to geohazards does render this procedure a geohazard procedure. As is the case with all fourteen SOPs, this was a general operating procedure not intended to monitor and manage geohazards. TETLP also cites its Integrity Management Program - Threat Response Guidance – Section 490 (TRDG 490), as evidence it had existing geohazard procedures. However, this procedure only applies to High Consequence Areas (HCAs), which account for only eight percent of TETLP’s pipeline facilities. Most of the identified geohazards sites were not in HCAs, and the Fleming and Noble County incidents did not occur in HCAs. A procedure#

42021034NOPV_Final Order_02032023_(20-183709)_text.pdf, page 9addressing geohazards only in HCAs does not meet the continuing surveillance requirements of § 192.613.13 The other nine SOPs are general operating procedures and do not mention geohazards. TETLP failed to identify any portion of these procedures that are relevant to managing and monitoring geohazards. In its response and at the hearing, Respondent discussed at length its efforts to work with leading technical experts and Enbridge personnel, leading a joint industry project, and its intention to further develop revised procedures in the months prior to the adoption of the revised procedures in May of 2020.14 Respondent also discussed at length various field activities it had voluntarily undertaken and how it was incorporating lessons learned.15 While Respondent certainly deserves credit for these efforts, this information does not overcome the absence of effective procedures actually being in place for geohazards along the subject pipelines for purposes of determining compliance. This conclusion is also evidenced by the NTSB report issued on May 31, 2022 which states: In 2018, Enbridge identified the rupture location as a potential geohazard. They took action to analyze the active landslide and started taking steps to mitigate the hazard before the rupture. However, Enbridge’s pre-rupture analysis estimated a girth weld tensile strain demand that was at least three times lower than post- rupture analysis later indicated. The post-rupture analysis demonstrated that in April 2018 or earlier Enbridge could have foreseen the likelihood that the tensile strain demand would exceed the strain capacity due to documented land movement at the site. 16 Moreover, even if adequate procedures has been in effect, as of the time of the May 2020 failure, the actual failure incident history of the pipelines, including the analysis of prior failures, should have played a central role in Respondent’s decisions concerning the need to initiate a program to recondition, phase out, or reduce the maximum allowable operating pressure for segments of its pipeline systems subject to an unsatisfactory condition as required by the regulations. Three major pipeline ruptures involving geohazards in a relatively short time span cannot be considered to be a satisfactory condition for a pipeline that transports hazardous products. Contrary to Respondent’s argument, this is not a matter of strict liability. The mere fact that the pipeline had one or more failures and released natural gas does not in-and-of itself constitute a violation. However, when a regulation such as §192.613 that requires certain actions in the presence of an unsatisfactory condition (such as a series of failures that involve similar causes) is allegedly 13 Recommendation, at 7-8. 14 Post-hearing submission, at 7-9. 15 Post-hearing submission, at 10. 16 NTSB, Accident Report PIR–22/01, Enbridge Inc. Natural Gas Pipeline Rupture, Hillsboro, Kentucky, May 4, 2020 (May 31, 2022), https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/PIR2201.pdf (NTSB Report).#

42021034NOPV_Final Order_02032023_(20-183709)_text.pdf, page 10violated, the fact that the failures occurred is of course a relevant fact. Therefore, nothing in this Order should be construed as the application of a strict liability standard. With regard to TETLP’s argument that it was developing “interim” procedures with substantially more specificity on geohazards, it must be recognized that only one set of procedures is in effect at any one time and the relevant procedures for purposes of determining compliance were the ones in place prior to the May 2020 revisions. For a revised procedure to be operative, it must be finalized by the appropriate company official, have an effective date, and formally replace the old procedure in the operating and maintenance manual of procedures so that all personnel know to follow it. That did not occur here. Thus, even if Respondent had provided the “interim” procedures that were under development prior to the Hillsboro incident, they would not have negated the allegation. Finally, it should be noted that if PHMSA were to adopt Respondent’s position that the application of its procedures such as they existed did not call for the initiation of a remedial program under §192.613 and thus were effectively exculpatory, it would have the perverse effect of incentivizing operators to have inordinately sparse procedures that lacked appropriate criteria and steps for taking appropriate action to address unsatisfactory conditions. Vague procedures that lack the specificity needed to accomplish the purpose of the underlying regulations can impede an operator from taking needed action even when repeated failure incidents manifestly indicate such a need. This would be entirely at odds with the purpose and intent of the Pipeline Safety Act and the Part 192 regulations issued thereunder. Respondent did not demonstrate that it had initiated a program to recondition, phase out, or reduce the maximum allowable operating pressure for segments of its pipeline systems subject to an unsatisfactory condition prior to the issuance of the Notice as required by the plain language of §192.613. Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence and the legal issues presented, I find that a preponderance of the evidence shows that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.613 by failing to initiate a program to recondition, phase out, or reduce the maximum allowable operating pressure for segments of its pipeline systems subject to an unsatisfactory condition, specifically the adverse effects of geohazards. Item 2: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.705(a), which states: § 192.705 Transmission lines: Patrolling. (a) Each operator shall have a patrol program to observe surface conditions on and adjacent to the transmission line right-of-way for indications of leaks, construction activity, and other factors affecting safety and operation. The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.705(a) by failing to patrol in order to observe the surface conditions on and adjacent to its transmission line rights-of-way for indications of leaks, construction activity, and other factors affecting safety and operation. Specifically, the Notice alleged that TETLP failed to maintain its rights-of-way to allow for the observation of surface conditions on and adjacent to the transmission line rights-of-way when#

42021034NOPV_Final Order_02032023_(20-183709)_text.pdf, page 11viewed via aerial patrols. Respondent did not contest this allegation of violation. Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.705(a) by failing to patrol in order to observe the surface conditions on and adjacent to its transmission line rights-of-way for indications of leaks, construction activity, and other factors affecting safety and operation. These findings of violation will be considered prior offenses in any subsequent enforcement action taken against Respondent. ASSESSMENT OF PENALTY Under 49 U.S.C. § 60122, Respondent is subject to an administrative civil penalty not to exceed $200,000 per violation for each day of the violation, up to a maximum of $2,000,000 for any related series of violations.17 In determining the amount of a civil penalty under 49 U.S.C. § 60122 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.225, I must consider the following criteria: the nature, circumstances, and gravity of the violation, including adverse impact on the environment; the degree of Respondent’s culpability; the history of Respondent’s prior offenses; any effect that the penalty may have on its ability to continue doing business; the good faith of Respondent in attempting to comply with the pipeline safety regulations; and self-disclosure or actions to correct a violation prior to discovery by PHMSA. In addition, I may consider the economic benefit gained from the violation without any reduction because of subsequent damages, and such other matters as justice may require. The Notice proposed a total civil penalty of $640,300 for the violations cited above. Item 1: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $552,900 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R. § 192.613, for failing to initiate a program to recondition, phase out, or reduce the maximum allowable operating pressure for segments of its pipeline systems subject to an unsatisfactory condition. Respondent argued that the proposed civil penalty amount in the Notice should be reduced or eliminated. With respect to the nature, circumstances, gravity, and culpability factors, one of Respondent’s witnesses maintained that there was no causal link between the alleged violation and the Hillsboro incident in Fleming County, Kentucky.18 As discussed during the hearing, however, TETLP determined there was an increase in strain demand at the Fleming County site, a known landslide location in September 2019 based on June 2019 inertial measurement unit (IMU) strain data, yet TETLP concluded that urgent action was not required and opted to wait for warmer weather to address the issue.19 While TETLP was 17 These amounts are adjusted annually for inflation. See 49 C.F.R. § 190.223 for adjusted amounts. 18 Post-hearing submission, at 14. 19 Transcript, at 62-63.#

42021034NOPV_Final Order_02032023_(20-183709)_text.pdf, page 12waiting to take action, it experienced the Hillsboro incident due to geohazards on May 4, 2020, at the very location previously identified as unsatisfactory in September 2019. As OPS pointed out, this second pipeline failure that occurred is expressly the risk § 192.613 is designed to prevent. As to good faith, Respondent argued that the Company was undertaking good faith efforts to comply with the minimal performance-based regulation, in the absence of express regulatory requirements, prior enforcement, and industry standards on geohazard management. Notably, the NTSB identified the probable cause of the Hillsboro incident as TETLP’s “analysis of an active landslide that did not fully address uncertainties associated with pipeline defects, landslide movement, and corresponding pipeline response.”20 Such a finding is consistent with the culpability level reflected in the proposed penalty amount and the circumstances do not justify a good faith credit. It should also be noted that none of the penalty consideration factors reflected in the proposed civil penalty amount in the Notice reflected any heightened level of egregiousness or deliberate decision not to comply. Regarding “other matters as justice may require,” TETLP cited the work it did with experts to address its programs and procedures, to implement those changes in the field, and leading the joint industry program to establish an industry standard to management geohazards. These efforts, however, are not circumstances beyond the operator’s control that prevented compliance with this important regulation and do not implicate this factor. I find that the record supports the civil penalty amount proposed in the Notice. Respondent presented no information that would warrant a reduction in the civil penalty proposed in the Notice for this item. Based upon the foregoing, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $552,900 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 192.613. Item 2: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $87,400 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R. § 192.705(a), for failing to patrol in order to observe the surface conditions on and adjacent to its transmission line rights-of-way for indications of leaks, construction activity, and other factors affecting safety and operation. With regard to the nature, circumstances, and gravity of this violation, observing surface conditions to address any potential right-of-way encroachments is a key part of safely operating a pipeline. With respect to the culpability and good faith factors, the Notice did not reflect any heightened level of egregiousness or deliberate decision not to comply and I find that the record supports the civil penalty amount proposed in the Notice. Respondent presented no information that would warrant a reduction in the civil penalty proposed in the Notice for this item. Accordingly, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $87,400 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 192.705. In summary, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria for each of the Items cited above, I assess Respondent a total civil penalty of $640,300. Payment of the civil penalty must be made within 20 days after receipt of this Final Order. Federal regulations (49 C.F.R. § 89.21(b)(3)) require such payment to be made by wire transfer through the Federal Reserve Communications System (Fedwire), to the account of the U.S. Treasury. Detailed instructions are contained in the enclosure. Questions concerning wire transfers should be directed to: Financial Operations Division (AMK-325), Federal Aviation 20 NTSB Report, at 6.#

42021034NOPV_Final Order_02032023_(20-183709)_text.pdf, page 13Administration, Mike Monroney Aeronautical Center, 6500 S MacArthur Blvd, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 79169. The Financial Operations Division telephone number is (405) 954-8845. Failure to pay the civil penalty will result in accrual of interest at the current annual rate in accordance with 31 U.S.C. § 3717, 31 C.F.R. § 901.9 and 49 C.F.R. § 89.23. Pursuant to those same authorities, a late penalty charge of six percent (6%) per annum will be charged if payment is not made within 110 days of service. Furthermore, failure to pay the civil penalty may result in referral of the matter to the Attorney General for appropriate action in a district court of the United States. COMPLIANCE ORDER The Notice proposed a compliance order with respect to Item 2 in the Notice for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 192.705(a). Under 49 U.S.C. § 60118(a), each person who engages in the transportation of gas or who owns or operates a pipeline facility is required to comply with the applicable safety standards established under chapter 601. With regard to the violation of §192.705(a) (Item 2), Respondent argued the compliance terms should be withdrawn/modified. [Summarize and address Respondent’s argument.] For the above reasons, the Compliance Order is not withdrawn/modified as set forth below. Pursuant to the authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60118(b) and 49 C.F.R. § 190.217, Respondent is ordered to take the following actions to ensure compliance with the pipeline safety regulations applicable to its operations: 1. With respect to the violation of § 192.705(a) (Item 2) pertaining to TETLP’s failure to patrol in order to observe the surface conditions on and adjacent to its transmission line rights-of-way for indications of leaks, construction activities, and other factors affecting safety and operation, TETLP must: (a) Review right-of-way maintenance programs, to include personnel training across the TETLP system, to ensure surface conditions are maintained in a manner appropriate for observations during patrols. The review must examine instances that may have obstructed personnel in past maintenance efforts; and (b) Develop and implement a program to identify and address locations of the TETLP system that impede personnel from observing the surface conditions on and adjacent to the right-of-way for indications of ground movement, indications of leaks, or other factors that may affect the safe operation of the pipeline. The program must define timeframes to complete all planned implementation. 2. TETLP must submit the review and written program required by this Compliance Order to Mary L. McDaniel, Director, Southwest Region, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration within 45 days of receipt of this Order.#

42021034NOPV_Final Order_02032023_(20-183709)_text.pdf, page 14The Director may grant an extension of time to comply with any of the required items upon a written request timely submitted by the Respondent and demonstrating good cause for an extension. PHMSA requests that Respondent maintain documentation of the safety improvement costs associated with fulfilling this Compliance Order and submit the total to the Director. It is requested that these costs be reported in two categories: (1) total cost associated with preparation/revision of plans, procedures, studies and analyses; and (2) total cost associated with replacements, additions and other changes to pipeline infrastructure. Failure to comply with this Order may result in the administrative assessment of civil penalties not to exceed $200,000, as adjusted for inflation (see 49 C.F.R. § 190.223), for each violation for each day the violation continues or in referral to the Attorney General for appropriate relief in a district court of the United States. Under 49 C.F.R. § 190.243, Respondent may submit a Petition for Reconsideration of this Final Order to the Associate Administrator, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, East Building, 2nd Floor, Washington, DC 20590, with a copy sent to the Office of Chief Counsel, PHMSA, at the same address. The written petition must be received no later than 20 days after receipt of the Final Order by Respondent. Any petition submitted must contain a statement of the issue(s) and meet all other requirements of 49 C.F.R. § 190.243. The filing of a petition automatically stays the payment of any civil penalty assessed. The other terms of the order, including corrective action, remain in effect unless the Associate Administrator, upon request, grants a stay. The terms and conditions of this Final Order are effective upon service in accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.5. February 3, 2023 ___________________________________ __________________________ Alan K. Mayberry Date Issued Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety#

42021034NOPV_Op Resp to Notice and Req for Hearing and Stmnt of Issues (Part 2)_02212022_(20-183709).pdf, page 1Official PDFBefore the U.S. Department of Transportation Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration Office of Pipeline Safety Washington, D.C. In the Matter of ) ) CPF No. 4-2021-034-NOPV Texas Eastern Transmission, LP ) Notice of Probable Violation ) ) Respondent. ) ____________________________________) Request for Hearing, Statement of Issues, and Response to NOPV I. Introduction The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA or the Agency) issued a Notice of Probable Violation (NOPV), proposed civil penalty, and proposed compliance order to Texas Eastern Transmission, LP (TETLP or the Company) on December 21, 2021. TETLP is a subsidiary of Spectra Energy Partners LP, which is a wholly owned subsidiary of Enbridge Inc. (Enbridge). The NOPV alleged two (2) violations of the Part 192 regulations under 49 C.F.R. §§ 192.613 (continuing surveillance) and 192.705 (patrolling), proposed a total civil penalty of $640,300 for both items, and proposed a compliance order associated with one (1) of the allegations. PHMSA extended the time to respond to the NOPV to February 21, 2022 and therefore this response is timely. The NOPV was issued following an investigation regarding two (2) reportable pipeline incidents on the TETLP system that occurred on August 1, 2019 near Danville, Kentucky on Line 15 and on May 4, 2020 in Fleming County near Hillsboro, Kentucky on Line 10. TETLP is committed to ensuring pipeline safety, continual improvement, and working with PHMSA toward those goals. Toward that end, TETLP has cooperated with PHMSA and other agencies in responding to and investigating the incidents, including the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), and the Company continues to incorporate relevant lessons learned. As part of this overall commitment, TETLP is filing this response to request an in-person hearing to address the factual and legal issues in NOPV Item 1 under 49 C.F.R. § 192.613 and the associated proposed civil penalty of $552,900 pursuant to 49 C.F.R. §§ 190.208 and 190.211. In the spirit of cooperation and without admission of law or fact, TETLP is not contesting NOPV Item 2 or the associated proposed compliance order. At a hearing, TETLP will be represented by inhouse counsel as well as outside counsel with Troutman Pepper.#

42021034NOPV_Op Resp to Notice and Req for Hearing and Stmnt of Issues (Part 2)_02212022_(20-183709).pdf, page 2II. Background Recent pipeline incidents have highlighted the threat of land movement to pipelines, particularly in certain portions of the eastern United States. Given that certain of its subsidiary pipeline systems are located in eastern Appalachia, Enbridge (and TETLP) have been actively working to identify and manage the threat of geohazards for some time. During the time period relevant to PHMSA’s NOPV, TETLP was implementing a framework of fourteen (14) standard operating procedures (SOPs) with provisions applicable to the identification and evaluation of geohazards. In 2018, Enbridge (and TETLP) engaged a third party geohazard expert (BGC Engineering USA, Inc.) to assist in developing a geohazard site inventory, conducting field inspections, and other data gathering activities along relevant portions of its system. With the goal of continuous learning and improvement, these efforts were intensified and expanded to address lessons learned from a January 21, 2019 land movement incident in Noble County, Ohio, on the TETLP pipeline system. After the Noble County incident, Enbridge (and TETLP) actively worked to develop a more robust program and approach with dedicated procedures related to the management of geohazards, which included a gap analysis and focus on the analysis of strain and risk classification of geohazard sites as well as mitigation measures. In addition to its work on programmatic changes, TETLP was, with the assistance of additional third party experts in LiDAR (LASEN), geohazards (BGC, Geosyntec), and strain (SSD, Inc.): (1) actively collecting and integrating additional geohazard data, (2) refining tiered risk classification criteria, (3) performing field visits and site assessments based on that data, (4) installing strain gauges and other monitoring instruments, and (5) mitigating appropriate identified geohazard sites on its system based on the information available at the time. To assist with leading the geohazard program, further development of new procedures, and field work, TETLP secunded a geoscientist from BGC from April 2019 to December 2019, until such time as the Company could hire a qualified Geohazard Program Supervisor. By the end of 2019, TETLP had conducted 777 field inspections on Lines 10, 15, and 25 to assess geohazard risks and implemented strain mitigation where warranted. Specific to the Fleming County incident site, TETLP had in 2018 identified the geohazard risk through the process of assessing its system for geohazard threats. Shortly after the Noble County incident, TETLP completed helicopter flyovers of its entire system, including the Fleming County geohazard site in January 2019, which did not identify any immediate issues of concern. In June 2019, TETLP performed an in-line inspection with an inertial measurement unit tool to analyze and compare the historical strain data related to the site. The following month, in July 2019, TETLP performed a field visit and ground inspection of the geohazard site and observed right of way erosion control work being performed at the site but was not aware of the exact nature or magnitude of the work done. The inspection and subsequent assessment of strain demand confirmed TETLP’s approach of continued monitoring and plan for future stress relief. When additional strain growth was identified on September 23, 2019, TETLP performed an assessment of the available data in October 2019 which confirmed there was no urgent action required and affirmed the approach of continued monitoring and planned installation of site instrumentation in 2020. As a follow-up in February 2020, TETLP convened a multidisciplinary meeting with various subject matter experts, including BGC, regarding the Fleming County incident site and to determine the scope of work of the planned instrumentation and mitigation. After that meeting, BGC was collecting more information to inform and finalize the scope of mitigation work at the 2#

42021034NOPV_Op Resp to Notice and Req for Hearing and Stmnt of Issues (Part 2)_02212022_(20-183709).pdf, page 3site, which included the installation of strain gauges and drainage measures that would provide additional information about the site. Recognizing the need to develop industry best practices to manage landslide hazards and driven by lessons learned from the Noble County incident, Enbridge (and TETLP) initiated a joint industry project (JIP) through the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA) in February 2019.1 From the outset, Enbridge (including TETLP) has been a lead sponsor and key participant in the JIP effort focused on the development of guidance and a framework for operators to use in the development and implementation of landslide hazard management programs. The JIP issued internal guidelines in April 2020, which were further refined and published for the pipeline industry in August 2020. On September 4, 2019, TETLP decided to adopt and adapt where appropriate the geohazard program utilized by Enbridge’s Liquids Pipeline business unit, in lieu of other procedures that were in development. TETLP met with PHMSA and the Ohio Public Utilities Commission in October 2019 to provide an update on the Noble County incident lessons learned, which included discussion of the new geohazard management program and providing the new procedures for review and comment. With PHMSA’s feedback from that meeting, TETLP worked to finalize and publish its new procedures, a majority of which the Company was already implementing in the field, on May 4, 2020, the same day of the Fleming County, Kentucky incident. At this time, Enbridge, and TETLP through Enbridge, was also actively engaged in finalizing the JIP industry guidelines for management of landslide hazards. III. Response to NOPV Item 1 (49 C.F.R. § 192.613) A. PHMSA Allegation § 192.613 Continuing surveillance. (a) Each operator shall have a procedure for continuing surveillance of its facilities to determine and take appropriate action concerning changes in class location, failures, leakage history, corrosion, substantial changes in cathodic protection requirements, and other unusual operating and maintenance conditions. (b) If a segment of pipeline is determined to be in unsatisfactory condition but no immediate hazard exists, the operator shall initiate a program to recondition or phase out the segment involved, or, if the segment cannot be reconditioned or phased out, reduce the maximum allowable operating pressure in accordance with § 192.619 (a) and (b). TETLP failed to initiate a program to recondition, phase out, or reduce the maximum allowable operating pressure for segments of its pipeline systems subject to an unsatisfactory condition, specifically the adverse effects of geohazards. TETLP 1 These efforts were preceded by benchmarking and a JIP through INGAA which identified the need for more specific management of geohazards. 3#

42021034NOPV_Op Resp to Notice and Req for Hearing and Stmnt of Issues (Part 2)_02212022_(20-183709).pdf, page 4operates pipelines in areas across the United States that are subject to geohazards. During the inspection, PHMSA examined TETLP’s methodology for managing its unusual operating conditions specific to the danger geohazards posed to over 2,000 miles of TETLP’s pipeline system from the gulf coastal plains of Mississippi, northeast to the Appalachian range in Pennsylvania. PHMSA’s examination of TETLP’s methodology revealed that prior to the May 4, 2020 incident, TETLP had not developed a program, to include comprehensive written procedures, for continuing surveillance of the pipeline system concerning other unusual operating and maintenance conditions relevant to geohazards. Upon request, TETLP provided several procedures that, according to TETLP, together served as its Standard Operating Procedure intended to cover and address geohazard management for its pipeline systems. These were a combination of legacy procedures that were in affect prior to the May 4, 2020 incident and current procedures. However, whether considered individually or collectively, PHMSA found the 14 procedures presented at the time of the inspection failed to provide personnel with adequate guidance for detection, monitoring for changes, and appropriate actions needed to mitigate the hazardous effects from the ongoing threat of geohazards. Additionally, PHMSA’s examination revealed that TETLP had been aware that a significant portion of its pipeline system was susceptible to the adverse effects of geohazards. For example, TETLP experienced an in-service failure on Line 10 located in Noble County, Ohio, in January 2019, due to a landslide. The investigation into this January 2019 failure found several deficient areas in the management of geohazards leading up to the failure. This incident occurred prior to the two incidents that are the subject of the Second Amended CAO (CPF 2-2019-1002H). In 2018, TETLP identified the eventual site of the Fleming County, Kentucky failure as having a higher probability of being affected by a landslide. Therefore, despite having this knowledge of the impact of geohazards on its pipeline, TETLP continued to operate its pipelines without initiating a program to recondition, phase out, or reduce the maximum allowable operating pressure for segments of its pipeline systems subject to the geohazards, which resulted in a second serious incident on May 4, 2020. B. TETLP Response TETLP believes that NOPV Item 1 should be withdrawn as a matter of fact and law. TETLP had procedures in place during the relevant time period to address the threat of geohazards on its system based on available information and discretion provided under 49 C.F.R. § 192.613. In keeping with the goal of continual improvement, TETLP was in the process of developing new dedicated procedures and a more robust program to incorporate lessons learned across the system and in light of the Noble County incident, in coordination with PHMSA and third party experts. Further, TETLP was moving forward with implementation of lessons learned before it finalized and formally published its new procedures. Specifically, the Company was actively addressing the threat of geohazards on its system and the Fleming County site, through data collection and integration, field assessments, monitoring, and mitigation where appropriate based on the available information. Through all of these actions, TETLP was in compliance with 49 C.F.R. § 192.613 4#

42021034NOPV_Op Resp to Notice and Req for Hearing and Stmnt of Issues (Part 2)_02212022_(20-183709).pdf, page 5and the recommendations included in the only PHMSA guidance provided to date related to the threat of geohazards. IV. Statement of Issues A. Whether based on the facts and applicable law, PHMSA has met its burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that TETLP did not comply with 49 C.F.R. § 192.613 for the period of time in question (June 20, 2019 to May 4, 2020). 1. Whether TETLP had a procedure for continuing surveillance of the pipeline system concerning other unusual operating and maintenance conditions relevant to geohazards. 2. Whether TETLP had initiated a program to recondition, phase out, or reduce the maximum allowable operating pressure for segments of its pipeline systems subject to the effects of geohazards. B. Whether NOPV Item 1 is consistent the Agency’s goal of continuous learning and improvement. C. Whether PHMSA provided due process and fair notice, as required by the U.S. Constitution and the Administrative Procedure Act, in issuing an alleged violation of 49 C.F.R. § 192.613 based on the facts and the applicable law. D. Whether the Pipeline Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. § 60101 et seq., authorizes a finding of liability simply because an incident occurred. E. Whether the proposed civil penalty of $552,900 associated with NOPV Item 1 should be withdrawn or reduced to accurately reflect the statutory and regulatory penalty assessment criteria required under 49 U.S.C. § 60122(b) and 49 C.F.R. § 190.225. V. Summary and Request for Relief For all of the reasons identified above, and in consideration of other matters as justice may require, TETLP respectfully requests that NOPV Item 1 and the associated penalty be withdrawn, or significantly reduced. In advance of the requested hearing, and pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 190.209, TETLP requests a copy of the complete case file in this matter to the extent there are any documents in addition to the Pipeline Safety Violation Report, related exhibits, and the Proposed Civil Penalty Calculation Worksheet which have already been provided to TETLP upon its previous request. 5#

42021034NOPV_Op Resp to Notice and Req for Hearing and Stmnt of Issues (Part 2)_02212022_(20-183709).pdf, page 6Respectfully submitted, _____________________ Troutman Pepper, LLP Catherine Little, Esq. Annie Cook, Esq. 600 Peachtree Street NE, Suite 3000 Atlanta, GA 30308 (404) 885-3000 Catherine.Little@troutman.com Annie.Cook@troutman.com Texas Eastern Transmission, LP Karen Stallings, Esq. Associate General Counsel - Permitting, ROW and Operations Enbridge Inc. (713) 627-4817 Karen.Stallings@enbridge.com Date: February 21, 2022 6#

42021034NOPV_Closure Letter_05302024_(20-183709)_text.pdf, page 1Official PDFVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: cynthia.hansen@enbridge.com May 30, 2024 Ms. Cynthia L. Hansen Executive Vice President and President Gas Transmission and Midstream Enbridge Inc. 915 North Eldridge Parkway Houston, TX 77079 CPF 4-2021-034-NOPV Dear Ms. Hansen: On February 3, 2023, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) issued to Enbridge Inc., a Final Order in the above-referenced case. This Order included a Compliance Order and Civil Penalty assessment. Based on our review of the documentation you provided and confirmation of payment of the civil penalty, it has been determined that you have complied with the terms of this Order. Accordingly, this case is now closed and no further action is contemplated with respect to the matters involved in this case. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. Sincerely, Bryan Lethcoe Director, Southwest Region, Office of Pipeline Safety Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration cc: Ms. Catherine Little, Esq., Counsel for Enbridge Inc., Bracewell, LLP, catherine.little@bracewell.com Ms. Karen Stallings, Esq., Associate General Counsel – Permitting, ROW and Operations, Enbridge Inc., karen.stallings@enbridge.com Mr. David Bryson, Senior Vice President and Chief Operations Officer, Gas Transmission and Midstream, Enbridge Inc., david.bryson@enbridge.com Mr. Nathan Atanu, Manager, Operational Compliance, Enbridge Inc., nathan.atanu@enbridge.com#

42021034NOPV_Closure Letter_05302024_(20-183709)_text.pdf, page 2Mr. Garrett Wilkie, Director Operational Excellence, Enbridge Inc., garrett.wilkie@enbridge.com Mr. Gregory Ochs, Director Central Region, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, gregory.ochs@dot.gov Mr. James Urisko, Director Southern Region, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, james.urisko@dot.gov#

42021034NOPV_Op Resp to Notice and Req for Hearing and Stmnt of Issues (Part 1)_02212022_(20-183709).pdf, page 1Official PDFCENBRIDGE 5400 Westheimer Court Enbridge Houston, Texas 77056 By Electronic Mail February 21, 2022 Ms. Mary McDaniel Director, Southwest Region U.S. Department of Transportation Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 8701 S. Gessner Road, Suite 630 Houston, Texas 77074 Re: Texas Eastern Transmission, LP Notice of Probable Violation, Proposed Civil Penalty, and Proposed Compliance Order, CPF 4-2021-034-NOPV Request for Settlement Conference and Hearing Dear Ms. McDaniel: Texas Eastern Transmission, LP, a subsidiary of Spectra Energy Partners LP (TETLP or the Company, which is a wholly owned subsidiary of Enbridge Inc. (Enbridge) shares the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration's (PHMSA) desire to ensure public safety and to enhance pipeline system integrity. Consistent with that commitment, the Company has cooperated with PHMSA and other agencies in responding to and investigating two (2) reportable pipeline incidents that occurred on TETLP's Line 15 near Danville, Kentucky on August 1, 2019 and on TETLP's Line 10 in Fleming County near Hillsboro, Kentucky on May 4, 2020. This includes coordination with the National Transportation Safety Board on its investigations of the incidents, implementation of the Second Amended Corrective Action Order issued by PHMSA, and continued implementation of improvements based on lessons learned from the incidents. As you know, PHMSA investigated and inspected TETLP's facilities and records following the incidents and issued the above referenced Notice of Probable Violation (NOPV), Proposed Civil Penalty, and Proposed Compliance Order (PCO) to TETLP on December 21, 2021. The NOPV alleges two (2) violations of the Part 192 regulations under 49 C.F.R. §§ 192.613 regarding continuing surveillance (NOPV Item 1) and 192.705 regarding patrolling (NOPV Item 2), and includes a proposed total civil penalty of $640,300 for both items and a PCO for NOPV Item 2. With this letter and pursuant to the Pipeline Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. § 60117(b)(1)(B), TETLP respectfully requests the opportunity to convene an informal settlement meeting with PHMSA to discuss the issues of fact and law raised by NOPV Item 1 and the proposed civil penalty of $552,900. In advance of those discussions, and without admission, the Company elects not to contest Item 2 of the NOPV or the associated proposed civil penalty of $87,400 and PCO obligation. In the event that the parties are unable to resolve the issues and in order to preserve TETLP's rights, the Company is timely filing the attached request for a hearing and statement of issues for NOPV Item 1, including the associated proposed civil penalty pursuant to 49 C.F.R. $S 190.208 and 190.211.#

42021034NOPV_Op Resp to Notice and Req for Hearing and Stmnt of Issues (Part 1)_02212022_(20-183709).pdf, page 2CPF 4-2021-034-NOPV Page 2 February 21, 2022 TETLP respectfully requests that PHMSA refrain from scheduling a hearing in order to provide the parties with sufficient time to attempt to resolve these issues. Thank you for your consideration of this request for a settlement meeting and request for hearing, and for your cooperation in response to these incidents. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. Sincerely, Thomas V. Wooden, Jr. Vice President, GTM Engineering and Asset Management Texas Eastern Transmission, LP cc: William T. Yardley, Executive Vice President and President Gas Transmission and Midstream, Enbridge Inc. David Bryson, Senior Vice President, Chief Commercial Officer, Gas Transmission & Midstream, Enbridge Inc. Michele Harradence, Senior Vice President and Chief Operations Officer, Gas Transmission & Midstream, Enbridge Inc. Andy Drake, Vice President, Gas Transmission & Midstream, Enbridge Kurt Baraniecki, Director, Pipeline Integrity, Enbridge Inc. Garrett Wilkie, Director, Operational Excellence, Enbridge Inc. Nathan Atanu, Manager, Operational Compliance, Enbridge Inc. Karen Stallings, Esq., Associate General Counsel, Enbridge Inc. Annie Cook, Esq., Troutman Pepper Catherine Little, Esq., Troutman Pepper#