Failure Report-CCPS Transportation, LLC 12/14/12

Page 1Official PDFDOT US Department of Transportation PHMSA Pipelines and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration OPS Office of Pipeline Safety Southwest Region Principal Investigator Gene Roberson Region Director R. M. Seeley Date of Report 07/16/2013 Subject Failure Investigation Report – Enbridge Pipeline – Sump Pump Discharge Flex Hose Failure Operator, Location, & Consequences Date of Failure 12/14/2012 Commodity Released Hazardous Liquid (Crude Oil) City/County & State Wynona, Osage County, Oklahoma OPID & Operator Name 32080 CCPS Transportation, LLC Unit # & Unit Name 74179 Spearhead Pipeline SMART Activity # 142160 Milepost / Location Pershing Pump Station Type of Failure Equipment Failure - Flex Hose Failure on Sump Pump Discharge Resulting in the Release of Crude Oil. Fatalities None Injuries None Description of area impacted Rural pump station site. Property Damage $157,000#

Page 2Failure Investigation Report – CCPS Transportation, LLC – Sump Pump Hose Failure 12/14/2012 Executive Summary At approximately 8:30 a.m. Central Standard Time (CST) on December 14, 2012, CCPS Transportation, LLC (Enbridge) identified a release of crude oil within their Pershing Pump Station in Osage County, Oklahoma, in the area of the sump pump. Enbridge notified the National Response Center of the crude oil release on Friday, December 14, 2012, at 10:21 a.m. CST. PHMSA responded to the site to conduct an investigation. Technicians performed maintenance on the high level set on Thursday, December 13, 2012, and upon completion left the sump pump in automatic mode to reduce the level in the sump. Controllers monitoring the sump indicated it had shut off upon reaching the low level set as expected. The investigation identified the source of the release to be the flex hose fitting between the sump pump and the pipeline. Enbridge activated their Oil Pollution Act (OPA) plan to clean up the site. The spill affected approximately a 20–by-20-foot area in the site. No local emergency personnel responded to the scene. There were no injuries, road closures, or resident evacuations associated with this accident. The station operations were not affected by the release. Figure 1 Flex Hose Installation Page 2 of 6#

Page 3Failure Investigation Report – CCPS Transportation, LLC – Sump Pump Hose Failure 12/14/2012 System Details CCPS Transportation, LLC is a subsidiary of Enbridge Pipeline. The Pershing Station is a part of the Spearhead pipeline system. Spearhead is a 650-mile, 24-inch-diameter pipeline system that runs from Flannigan, Illinois, to Cushing, Oklahoma. It is connected to Enbridge’s mainline system in Flannigan, Illinois, and its primary function is transporting Canadian crude to Cushing, Oklahoma. The Southwest Region has regulatory responsibility for the 88-mile section from the Kansas border to Cushing, Oklahoma. The Pershing Station is an unmanned station located in Osage County, Oklahoma. Figure 2 Site During Cleanup The failure occurred in a stainless-steel flex hose fitting within the station. Pershing Station was not affected by the release, and pipeline operation continued as normal. No previous failures were noted in the station. Pipe Specifications No pipe failed during this event. A flex hose was found to have failed on the discharge line of the sump injection pump. The flex hose was a certified ANSI 600 fitting. Enbridge installed the flexible hose in 2009 with the intent to isolate injection pump vibrations from the main line when reinjecting crude from the sump back into the pipeline. Events Leading up to the Failure The Enbridge Spearhead pipeline was operating normally at the time of the accident and continued to operate normally as the release did not affect the pipeline. On December 13, 2012, station technicians performed work on the high level switch associated with the station sump. Upon completion of their duties, they activated the switch to confirm it was operational. They confirmed that it was operating correctly and left the injection pump running to empty the sump. Dispatchers then confirmed the Page 3 of 6#

Page 4Failure Investigation Report – CCPS Transportation, LLC – Sump Pump Hose Failure 12/14/2012 injection pump shut down upon the sump reaching its low level switch. This was considered a normal operation, and no personnel were required to be on site. When the technician returned to the station on Friday, December 14, 2012, crude oil was observed affecting an approximately 20–by-20-foot area on the ground in the station around the injection pump. The investigation indicated the release had been from the flex hose located on the pump* discharge. The volume of product in sump between the high level and low level switches is 38 barrels. *Pump only reinjects crude oil from the station sump back into the pipeline. Enbridge reported the release to the National Response Center at approximately 10:21 a.m. CST on December 14, 2012 (See Appendix A). Emergency Response Enbridge isolated the Pershing Station sump and activated their OPA plan. No pooling crude oil was observed as site clean up began. No local emergency and fire personnel responded to the scene. Due to the remoteness of the station, no roads were closed, and no residents were evacuated. All of the release remained within the station site. Summary of Return-to-Service Following the emergency response, Enbridge locked out the station sump. The pipeline was not affected and remained in service. The sump pump and all related piping was removed to allow soil removal for clean up. The flex hose was sent to a lab for analysis to determine the cause of failure. After soil removal was complete, the site was filled with new soil, the soil was compacted, and a new foundation was constructed to facilitate the re-installation of the pump and piping. Enbridge chose to install hard piping in the place of the flex hose. Investigation Details At approximately 10:21 a.m. CST, December 14, 2012, Enbridge reported a release of crude oil to the National Response Center due to a ruptured flex hose at Enbridge’s Pershing Station in Osage County, Oklahoma. The station was built in 2009 to increase delivery capacities of their Spearhead pipeline to Cushing, Oklahoma. PHMSA’s Southwest Region received the incident notification and made plans to have an investigator on site. The investigator arrived on site at 8:00 a.m. on December 18. The spill clean up was in progress with all of the area piping disassembled and the failed flex hose in the station shop being readied for shipment to a metallurgical lab for analysis. The investigator requested sump drawings and material documentation, and reviewed construction records available on-site. Because of the hose design, the area of failure was not visible for viewing on-site. The operator’s written report can be seen in Appendix B. The failed flex hose was a certified ANSI 600 fitting. The pipeline has an MOP of 1440 psig and was operating at 354 psig at the time of failure. The PHMSA investigator was able to view the site with the Page 4 of 6#

Page 5Failure Investigation Report – CCPS Transportation, LLC – Sump Pump Hose Failure 12/14/2012 operator. No cause for failure was apparent from a visual examination. Photos of the failed flex hose can be seen in Appendix C. Figure 3 Failed Hose Figure 4 Failed Hose with SS Wrap Removed The operator replaced two hoses (failed hose and another) downstream of the injection pump with hard pipe prior to returning the sump to service. The failed flex hose was sent to a metallurgical lab for testing. Page 5 of 6#

Page 6Failure Investigation Report – CCPS Transportation, LLC – Sump Pump Hose Failure 12/14/2012 Metallurgical Analysis The flex hose was sent to an Edmonton, AB, Canada metallurgical lab for analysis (Appendix C). The analysis concluded:  The cause of the leak was the formation of a transverse crack along an internal convolution in approximately the middle of the hose’s length.  The failure mechanism was fatigue, and the failure cause was likely vibrations on the component resulting in high bending stresses on the convolutions.  The uneven formation of the convolutions (with sharply bent internal convolutions) was likely a contributing factor in the failure.  No evidence was found to suggest that material/microstructure was a factor in the failure. Mechanical Analysis There was no mechanical analysis to be made. Conclusion The failure occurred in a flex hose. Per the metallurgical analysis, the cause of the leak was the formation of a transverse crack along an internal convolution of the hose. The failure mechanism was fatigue, and the failure cause was likely vibrations on the component resulting in high bending stresses on the convolutions. The operator chose to remove the fitting to eliminate additional releases or spills of crude oil from their system. Appendices A Telephonics Notice Report – NRC # 1033226 B Operator Accident Report – ODES # 20130007 C Operator Failure Investigation Page 6 of 6#

Page 7APPENDIX A#

Page 8TeleDetail Page 1 of 2 •PHMSA Materials Safety Pipeline & Hazardous HMIS-> INCIDENTS->TELEPHONICS Administration (Version 4.0.0 PROD) Rules of Behavior Home Logout Menu NRC Number: [Return to Search] Call Date: 12/14/2012 1033226 Call Time: 11:21:06 Caller Intormation First Name: DAVID Company Name: ENBRIDGE PIPELINE Last Name: [HODGINS Address: [21979 N 1500 E RD City: PONTIAC State: Country: Phone 1: USA ZIp: Confidential: Organization Type: [PRIVAT 9182851132 Phone 2: 61784 • Yes No •No Rosponso Is caller the spiller? @Yes ONo CINo Response First Name: [DAVID Discharger Information Last Name: HODGINS Company Name: ENBRIDGE PIPELINE Address: 21979 N 1500 E RD City: Phone 1: Country: USA [PONTIAC State: IL [9182851132 Zip: Phone 2: 61764 Organization Type: [PRIVA] State: OK Spill Information County: OSAGE Nearest City: Lecation (WYNONA Zip Code: 21443 STATE RD 99 Spill Date: Incident Type DTG Type: /12/14/2012 (mm/dd/yyy) ALL <- Select DTG Type -> Spill Time: [08:30:00 1(24hh:mm:ss) Description Reported incident Type PIPELINE FAILED AND DISCHARGED 1620 GALLONS OF CRUDE OIL ONTO THE SOIL. CALLER STATED THAT THEY HAVE A PUMPING STATION AND THE SUMP PUMP DISCHARGE LINE Material / Chris Name Materials Involved OIL: CRUDE Chris Code DIL Total Qty. 11620 GALLON(S) Water Qty. Additional Medium Information: Medium Type: < Select Medium Type (GROUND Injuries: Fatalites: mhtml:file://C:\Users\Cynthia.Lewis\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Inter... 7/22/2013#

Page 9TeleDetail Page 2 of2 Evacuations: D Yes l2l No D Unknown No. of Evacuations: Damages: D Yes rg] No D Unknown Damage Amount: Federal Agency Notified: D Y6G D No rg) Unhnown Other Agency Notified: D Yes D No @ Unknown State Agency Notified: D Yp~, D No @ Unknown Remedial Actions COLLECT THE SOIL AND DISPOSE OF IT PROPERLY . Additjonal Info ~ Degrees:. Minutes: Seconds: Quadrant: ~ Degrees: . Distance from City: Section: Range: Minutes: Seconds: Quadrant: Direction: Township: Milepost: [---------------·- []Rescinded Comments (max 250 characters) <<Previous 1..1 of 1 mhtml :file:/ /C:\ U sers\Cynthia.Lewis\AppData \Local\Microsoft\ Windows\ Temporary Inter.. . 7/22/2013#

Page 10APPENDIX B#

Page 11NOTICE: This report is required by 49 CFR Part 195. Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to OMB NO: 2137-0047 exceed $100,000 for each violation for each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil EXPIRATION DATE: 01/31/2014 penalty shall not exceed $1,000,000 as provided in 49 USC 60122. 0 U.S Department of Transportation Original Report 01/11/2013 Date: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration No. 20 130007- 17553 -------------------------- _(DOT Use On_lyl_ ACCIDENT REPORT • HAZARDOUS LIQUID PIPELINE SYSTEMS A federal agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, nor shall a person be subject to a penalty for failure to comply with a collection of information subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that collection of information displays a current valid OMB Control Number. The OMB Control Number for this information collection Is 2137-0047. Public reporting for this collection of information is estimated to be approximately 10 hours per response (5 hours for a small release), including the time for reviewing instructions, gathering the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. All responses to this collection of information are mandatory. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to: Information Collection Clearance Officer, PHMSA, Office of Pipeline Safetv (PHP-30) 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, Washington, D.C. 20590. INSTRUCTIONS I Important: Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin. They clarify the information requested and provide specific examples. If you do not have a copy of the instructions, you can obtain one from the PHMSA Pipeline Safety Community Web Page at lltw l/11!11(11( a.llmli<~. aQt >J.Q'doiatzliatz. PART A· KEY REPORT INFORMATION Report Type: (select all that apply) Original: I Supplemental : I Final: J Yes J Yes Last Revision Date: 03/15/201 3 1. Operator's OPS-issued Operator Identification Number (OPID): 32080 2. Name of Operator CCPS TRANSPORTATION , LLC 3. Add ress of OPerator: 3a. Street Address 1100 LOU ISIANA, SUITE 3300 3b. City HOUSTON 3c. State Texas 3d. Zip Code 77002 4. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of the Accident: 12/14/2012 08:30 5. Location of Accident: Latitude: 35.59243 Lonqitude: -96.30796 6. National Response Center Report Number (if applicable): 1033226 7. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of initial telephonic report to the 12/14/201 2 10:21 National Response Center (if applicable): 8. Commodity released: (select only one, based on predominant Crude Oil volum e released) - SPecifv Commodity Subtype: - If "Other" Subtype, Describe: - If Biofuei/Aiternative Fuel and Commod ity Subtype is Ethanol Blend , then % Ethanol Blend: %: - If Biofuel/Aiternative Fuel and Commodity Subtype is Biodiesel, then Biodiesel Blend (e.g. B2, B20, B1 00): B 9. Estimated volume of commodity released unintentiona lly (Barrels): 10. Estimated volume of intentional and/or controlled release/blowdown (Barrels): 11. Estimated volume of commodity recovered (Barrels): 12. Were there fatalities? No - If Yes, specify the number in each cateqorv: 12a. Operator employees 12b. Contractor emplovees workinq for the Operator 12c. Non-Operator emerqency responders 12d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT associated with this OPerator 12e. General public 12f. Total fatalities (sum of above) 13. Were there iniuries reou irinq inpatient hospitalization? No - If Yes, specify the number in each cateoorv: 13a. Operator employees 13b. Contractor employees wo rking for the Operator 13c. Non-Operator emerqency responders 38.50 38. 50 Form PHMSA F 7000.1 (Rev. 12-2012)#

Page 1213d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT associated with this Operator 13e. General public 13f. Total injuries (sum of above) 14. Was the pipeline/facility shut down due to the Accident? -If No, Explain: No M/L and Sta are operating. Sump will be emptied manually until repair complete. - If Yes, complete Questions 14a and 14b: (use local time, 24-hr clock) 14a. Local time and date of shutdown : 14b. Local time pipeline/facility restarted: - Still shut down? (* Supplemental Report Required) 15. Did the commodity ignite? 16. Did the commodity explode? No No 17. Number of general public evacuated: 0 18. Time sequence (use local time, 24-hour clock): 18a. Local time Operator identifi ed Accident: 18b. Local time Operator resources arrived on site: 12/14/201 2 08:30 I 12/14/201 2 08:30 PART B- ADDITIONAL LOCATION INFORMATION 1. Was the origin of Accident onshore? I Yes If Yes, Complete Questions (2- 12) If No, Complete Questions (1 3- 15) - If Onshore: 2. State: Oklahoma 3. Zip Code: 74084 4. City Wynona 5. County or Pari sh Oasaqe 6. Operator-designated location: Survey Station No. Specify: Reinjection L 7. Pipeline/Facility name: CCPS Transportation 8. Segment name/ID: L 55 Pershing Station 9. Was Accident on Federal land , other than the Outer Continental Shelf No (OCS)? 10. Location of Accident: 11. Area of Accident (as found): Totally contained on Operator-controlled property Aboveground Typical aboveground facility piping or appurtenance Specify: - If Other, Describe: Depth-of-Cover (in): No 12. Did Accident occur in a crossing? - If Yes, specify below: - If Bridge crossing- Cased/ Uncased: - If Railroad crossing - Cased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled - If Road crossing- Cased/ Uncased/ Bored/d rilled - If Water crossing - Cased/ Uncased - Name of body of water, if commonly known: - Approx. water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident: - Select: - If Offshore: 13. Approximate water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident: 14. Origin of Accident: - In State waters- Specify: -State: -Area: - Block/Tract #: - Nearest County/Parish: -On the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) - Specify: - Area: -Block#: 15. Area of Accident: PART C- ADDITIONAL FACILITY INFORMATION 1. Is the pipeline or facility: 2. Part of system involved in Accident: - If Onshore Breakout Tank or Storage Vessel, Including Attached Appurtenances, specify: Interstate Onshore Pump/Meter Station Equipment and Piping Form PHMSA F 7000. 1 (Rev. 12-201 2)#

Page 133. Item involved in Accident: - If Pipe, specifv: 3a. Nominal diameter of pipe (in): 3b. Wall thickness (in): 3c. SMYS (Specified Minimum Yield Strength) of pipe (psi): 3d. PiPe specification: 3e. Pipe Seam , specify: - If Other, Describe: 3f. PiPe manufacturer: 3g. Year of manufacture: 3h. Pipeline coating type at point of Accident, specify: - If Other, Describe: - If Weld, including heat-affected zone, specify: - If Other, Describe: - If Valve, specify: - If Mainline, specify: - If Other, Describe: 3i. Manufactured by: 3i. Year of manufacture: - If Tank/Vessel, specify: - If Other- Describe: - If Other, describe: 4. Year item involved in Accident was installed: 5. Material involved in Accident: - If Material other than Carbon Steel, specify: 6. Type of Accident Involved: - If Mechanical Puncture- Specify Approx. size: Other Flex Hose 2009 Material other than Carbon Steel Stainless Steel Rupture - If Leak- Select Tvpe: - If Rupture - Select Orientation: in . (axial) by in. (circumferential) - If Other, Describe: - If Other, Describe: Approx. size: in . (widest opening) bv in. (length circumferentially or axially) Other - If Other - Describe: PART D- ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife imPact: No 1a. If Yes, sPecifY all that apply: - Fish/aquatic - Birds - Terrestrial 2. Soil contamination: Yes 3. Long term impact assessment performed or planned: No 4. Anticipated remediation: No 4a. If Yes, sPecifv all that apply: -Surface water - Groundwater -Soil -Vegetation -Wildlife 5. Water contamination: No Sa. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Ocean/Seawater -Surface - Groundwater - Drinking water: (Select one or both) - Private Well - Public Water Intake 5b. Estimated amount released in or reaching water (Barrels): 5c. Name of body of water, if commonly known: 6. At the location of this Accident, had the pipeline segment or facility been identified as one that "could affect" a High Consequence Area No (HCA) as determined in the Operator's Integrity Management Program? 7. Did the released commod ity reach or occur in one or more High No Conseauence Area (HCA)? ?a. If Yes, specify HCA tvpe(s): (Select all that applv! - Commercially Navigable Waterway: Form PHMSA F 7000.1 (Rev. 12-2012)#

Page 14Was this HCA identified in the "could affect" determination for this Accident site in the Operator's lntearitv Management Program? - Hiah Population Area: Was this HCA identified in the "could affect" determination for th is Accident site in the Operator's Integrity Manaqement Proaram? - Other Populated Area Was this HCA identified in the "cou ld affect" determination for this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity Management Proqram? - Unusually Sensitive Area (USA)- Drinkinq Water Was this HCA identified in the "could affect" determination for this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity Manaaement Proaram? - Unusually Sensitive Area (USA)- Ecological Was this HCA identified in the "could affect" determination for this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity Manaqement Proaram? B. Estimated Property Damaqe: Ba. Estimated cost of public and non-Operator private property $ 0 damaae Bb. Estimated cost of commodity lost $ 7,000 Be. Estimated cost of Operator's property damaqe & repairs $ 40,000 Bd. Estimated cost of Operator's emergency response $ 50,000 Be. Estimated cost of Operator's environmental remediation $ 60,000 Bf. Estimated other costs $ 0 Describe: Ba. Total estimated property damaae (sum of above) $ 157,000 PARTE- ADDITIONAL OPERATING INFORMATION 1. Estimated pressure at the point and time of the Accident (psig): 2. Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) at the point and time of the Accident (psig): 3. Describe the pressure on the system or facility relating to the Accident (psig): 4. Not including pressu re reductions required by PHMSA regulations (such as for repairs and pipe movement), was the system or facility relating to the Accident operating under an established pressure restriction with pressure limits below those normally allowed by the MOP? 354.00 1,440.00 Pressure did not exceed MOP No - If Yes, Complete 4.a and 4.b below: 4a. Did the pressure exceed this established pressure restriction? 4b. Was this pressure restri ction mandated by PH MSA or the State? 5. Was "Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites" OR "Offshore Pipeline, Including Riser and Riser Bend" selected in PART C, Question No 2? - If Yes- (Complete 5a.- 5e. below) 5a. Type of upstream valve used to initially isolate release source: 5b. Type of downstream valve used to initially isolate release source: 5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft): 5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal insPection tools? - If No, Which physica l features limit tool accommodation? select all that apply) - Changes in line pipe diameter - Presence of unsuitable mainline valves - Tiqht or mitered pipe bends - Other passage restrictions (i. e. unbarred tee's, projectinq instrumentation, etc. ) - Extra thick pipe wall (applicable only for magnetic flux leakage internal inspection tools) -Other - - If Other, Describe: 5e. For this pipeline, are there operational factors which significantly complicate the execution of an internal inspection tool run? - If Yes, Which operational factors complicate execution? (select all that applv) Form PHMSA F 7000.1 (Rev. 12-2012)#

Page 15- Excessive debris or scale, wax, or other wa ll buildup - Low operating pressure(s) - Low flow or absence of flow - Incompatible commodity - Other- - If Other, Describe: 5f. Function of PiPeline system: 6. Was a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)-based svstem in Place on the pipeline or facility involved in the Accident? If Yes - > 20% SMYS Regulated Trunklinerrransmission Yes 6a. Was it operating at the time of the Accident? 6b. Was it fu lly functional at the time of the Accident? 6c. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calcu lations) assist with the detection of the Accident? 6d. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with the confirmation of the Accident? 7. Was a CPM leak detection system in place on the pipeline or faci lity involved in the Accident? -If Yes: ?a. Was it operatinq at the time of the Accident? ?b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Accident? ?c. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as alarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with the detection of the Accident? ?d. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as alarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume ca lculations) assist with the confirmation of the Accid ent? 8. How was the Accident initially identified for the Operator? - If Other, Specify: 8a. If "Controller", "Local Operating Personnel", including contractors", "Air Patrol" , or "Guard Patrol by Operator or its contractor" is selected in Question 8, specify the following: Yes Yes No No No Local Operating Personnel, including contractors Operator employee No, the Operator did not find that an investigation of the 9. Was an investigation initiated into whether or not the controller(s) or controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary control room issues were the cause of or a contributing factor to the due to: (provide an explanation for why the Operator did not Accident? investigate) - If No, the Operator did not find that an investigation of the The facility would have appeard to be operating normally to controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: forovide an exolanation for why the operator did not investigate) a controller. -If Yes, specify investigation result(s): (select all that aoo/y) - Investigation reviewed work schedule rotations, continuous hours of service (while working for the Operator), and other factors associated with fatigue - Investigation did NOT review work schedule rotations, continuous hours of service (while working for the Operator), and other factors associated with fatigue Provide an explanation for why not: - lnvestiaation identified no control room issues - Investigation identified no controller issues - Investigation identified incorrect controller action or controller error - Investigation identified that fatigue may have affected the controller(s) involved or impacted the involved controller(s) response - Investigation identified incorrect procedures - Investigation identified incorrect control room equipment operation - Investigation identified maintenance activities that affected control room operations, procedures, and/or controller response - Investigation identified areas other than those above: Describe: PART F - DRUG & ALCOHOL TESTING INFORMATION 1. As a result of this Accident, were any Operator employees tested under the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requ irements of DOT's Drua & Alcohol Testina reau lations? - If Yes: 1a. Specify how many were tested: No Form PHMSA F 7000.1 (Rev. 12-2012)#

Page 161 b. Specify how many failed: 2. As a result of this Accident, were any Operator contractor employees tested under the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of DOT's Drua & Alcohol Testing regulations? - If Yes: 2a. Specify how many were tested: 2b. Specify how many failed: No PART G- APPARENT CAUSE Select only one box from PART Gin shaded column on left representing the APPARENT Cause of the Accident, and answer the questions on the right. Describe secondary, contributing or root causes of the Accident in the narrative (PART H). Apparent Cause: G6 - Equipment Failure G1 • Corrosion Failure -only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column External Corrosion: Internal Corrosion: -If External Corrosion: 1. Results of visual examination: I - If Other, Describe: 2. Type of corrosion: (select all that aoolv) - Galvanic - Atmospheric - Stray Current - Microbiological - Selective Seam -Other: - If Other, Describe: 3. The type(s) of corrosion selected in Question 2 is based on the fo ll owin~:r (select all that apply) - Field examination - Determined by metalluraical analvsis -Other: - If Other, Describe: 4. Was the failed item buried under the ground? - If Yes : 0 4a. Was failed item considered to be under cathod ic protection at the time of the Accident? If Yes- Year protection started : 4b. Was shielding, tenting, or disbanding of coating evident at the Point of the Accident? 4c. Has one or more Cathodic Protection Survey been conducted at the point of the Accident? If "Yes, CP Annual Survey"- Most recent year conducted: If "Yes, Close Interval Survey"- Most recent year conducted: If "Yes, Other CP Survey" - Most recent year conducted: - If No: 4d. Was the failed item externally coated or painted? 5. Was there observable damage to the coating or paint in the vicinity of the corrosion? - If Internal Corrosion: 6. Resu lts of visual examination: -Other: 7. Tvpe of corrosion (select all that aoolv): - - Corrosive Commodity -Water drop-out/Acid - Microbiolooical - Erosion - Other: - If Other, Describe: 8. The cause(s) of corrosion selected in Question 7 is based on the following (select all that apply): - - Field examination - Determined by metalluraical analvsis -Other: - If Other, Describe: 9. Location of corrosion (select all that aoolv): - - Low ooint in oipe -Elbow Form PHMSA F 7000.1 (Rev. 12-2012)#

Page 17-Other: - If Other, Describe: 10. Was the commodity treated with corrosion inhibitors or biocides? 11 . Was the interior coated or lined with protective coatinq ? 12. Were cleaning/dewatering pigs (or other operations) routinely utilized? 13. Were corrosion coupons routinely utilized? Complete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the "Item Involved in Accident" (from PART C, Question 3) is TankNessel. 14. List the year of the most rece nt inspections: 14a. API Std 653 Out-of-Service Inspection - No Out-of-Service Inspection completed 14b. API Std 653 In-Service Inspection - No in-Service Inspection com pleted Complete the following If any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the "Item Involved in Accident" (from PART C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld. 15. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the Accident? 15a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: - - Maqnetic Flux Leakaqe Tool Most recent year: - Ultrasonic Most recent year: - Geometry Most recent year: - Caliper Most recent year: - Crack Most recent year: - Hard Spot Most recent year: - Combination Tool Most recent year: -Transverse Field/Triaxial Most recent year: -Other Most recent year: Describe: 16. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted since original construction at the point of the Accident? If Yes- Most recent year tested: I Test pressure: I 17. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on this seqment? I -If Yes, and an investiqative diq was conducted at the point of the Accident:: Most recent year cond ucted: - If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a diq site: Most recent year conducted: I 18. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the point of the Accident since January 1, 2002? 18a. If Yes, for each examination conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most recent year the examination was conducted: - Radioqraphy Most recent year conducted: - Guided Wave Ultrasonic Most recent year conducted : - Handheld Ultrasonic Tool Most recent year conducted: - Wet Magnetic Particle Test Most recent year conducted: - Dry Magnetic Particle Test Most recent year conducted: - Other Most recent year conducted: Describe: G2 • Natural Force Damage - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-handed column Natural Force Damage- Sub-Cause: I -If Earth Movement NOT due to Heavy Rains/Floods: Form PHMSA F 7000.1 (Rev. 12-2012)#

Page 181. Specify: I - If Other, Describe: I · If Heavv Rains/Floods: 2. Specify: - If Other, Describe: -If Liqhtninq: 3. Specify: -If Temperature: 4. Specify: - If Other, Describe: ·If Hiah Winds: u ·If Other Natural Force Damage: 5. Describe: Complete the following if any Natural Force Damage sub-cause is selected. 6. Were the natural forces causing the Accident generated in conjunction with an extreme weather event? 6a. If Yes, specify: (select all that app/v) - Hurricane - Trooical Storm - Tornado -Other - If Other, Describe: G3 • Excavation Damage · only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column Excavation Damage - Sub-Cause: · If Excavation Damage by Operator (First Party): • If Excavation Dama1:1e bv Operator's Contractor (Second Party): ·If Excavation Damage by Third Party: ·If Previous Damage due to Excavation Activitv: Complete Questions 1·5 ONLY IF the "Item Involved in Accident" (from PART C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld. 1. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the Accident? 1a. If Yes, for each tool used, select tvoe of internal inspection tool and indicate most recentyear run: - - Maonetic Flux Leakaoe Most recent yea r conducted: - Ultrasonic Most recent year conducted: - Geometry Most recent year conducted: - Caliper Most recent year conducted: - Crack Most recent year conducted: - Hard Spot Most recent year conducted: - Combination Tool Most recent yea r conducted: - Transverse Field/Triaxial Most recent yea r conducted: -Other Most recent yea r conducted: Describe: 2. Do you have reason to believe that the internal inspection was completed BEFORE the damage was sustained? 3. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted since orioinal construction at the ooint of the Accident? - If Yes: Most recent year tested: Test pressure (psiol: 4. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on the pipeline seoment? - If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident: Most recent year conducted: -If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site: Form PHMSA F 7000.1 (Rev. 12-2012)#

Page 19Most recent year conducted: 5. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the point of the Accident since January 1, 2002? Sa. If Yes, for each examination , conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destru ctive examination and indicate most recent year the examination was conducted: - Radioaraphy Most recent year conducted: - Guided Wave Ultrasonic Most recent year conducted: - Handheld Ultrasonic Tool Most recent year cond ucted: -Wet Maqnetic Particle Test Most recent year conducted: -Dry Magnetic Particle Test Most recent year conducted: -Other Most recent year conducted: Describe: Complete the following if Excavation Damage by Third Party is selected as the sub-cause. 6. Did the operator get prior notification of the excavation activity? 6a. If Yes, Notification received from : (select all that apply)- - One-Call System -Excavator - Contractor - Landowner Complete the following mandatory CGA-DIRT Program questions if any Excavation Damage sub-cause is selected. 7. Do you want PHMSA to upload the following information to CGA- DIRT (www.cqa-dirt.com)? 8. Right-of-Way where event occurred: (select all that apply) - - Public - If "Public", Specify: -Private - If "Private", Specify: - Pipeline Property/Easement - Power/Transmission Line - Railroad - Dedicated Public Utility Easement - Federal Land - Data not collected - Unknown/Other 9. Type of excavator: 10. Type of excavation equipment: 11. Type of work performed: 12. Was the One-Call Center notified? 12a. If Yes, specify ticket number: 12b. If this is a State where more than a single One-Call Center exists, list the name of the One-Call Center notified: 13. Type of Locator: 14. Were facility locate marks visible in the area of excavation ? 15. Were facilities marked correctly? 16. Did the damaqe cause an interruption in service? 16a. If Yes, specify duration of the interruption (hours) 17. Description of the CGA-DIRT Root Cause (select only the one predominant first level CGA-0/RT Root Cause and then, where available as a choice, the one predominant second level CGA-0 /RT Root Cause as well): Root Cause: - If One-Call Notification Practices Not Sufficient, specify: - If Locating Practices Not Sufficient, specify: - If Excavation Practices Not Sufficient, specify: - If Other/None of the Above, explain: G4 -Other Outside Force Damage - only one sub-cause can be selected from the shaded left-hand column Other Outside Force Damage - Sub-Cause: -If Nearby Industrial Man-made or Other Fire/Explosion as Primary Cause of Incident: -If Damaae bv Car Truck or Other Motorized Vehicle/Eaulpment NOT Enaaaed In Excavation: 1. Vehicle/Equipment operated by: - If Damage by Boats Barges Drilling Rigs or Other Maritime Equipment or Vessels Set Adrift or Which Have Otherwise Lost Form PHMSA F 7000.1 (Rev. 12-2012)#

Page 20Their MoorinQ: 2. Select one or more of the followinQ IF an extreme weather event was a factor: - Hurricane - Tropical Storm - Tornado - Heavy Rains/Flood -Other - If Other, Describe: -If Routine or Normal Fishing or Other Maritime Activity NOT En!!aaed In Excavation: -If Electrical Arcin!l from Other Equipment or Facility: ·If Previous Mechanical Damage NOT Related to Excavation: Complete Questions 3-7 ONLY IF the "Item Involved in Accident" (from PART C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld. 3. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the Accident? 3a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year ru n: - Magnetic Flux Leakage Most recent year conducted: - Ultrasonic Most recent year conducted: - Geometry Most recent year conducted: -Caliper Most recent year conducted: - Crack Most recent year conducted: - Hard Spot Most recent vear conducted: -Combination Tool Most recent year conducted: -Transverse Field/Triaxial Most recent year conducted: - Other Most recent year conducted: Describe: 4. Do you have reason to believe that the internal inspection was completed BEFORE the damaQe was sustained? 5. Has one or more hydrates! or other pressure test been conducted since oriQinal construction at the point of the Accident? - If Yes: Most recent year tested: Test pressure (psig): 6. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on the pipeline segment? - If Yes, and an investiQative diQ was conducted at the point of the Accident: Most recent year conducted: I - If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a diQ site: Most recent year conducted: I 7. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the point of the Accident since January 1, 2002? 7a. If Yes, for each examination conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most recent year the examination was conducted: - Radiography Most recent year conducted: - Guided Wave Ultrasonic Most recent year conducted: - Handheld Ultrasonic Tool Most recent year conducted: -Wet Magnetic Particle Test Most recent year conducted: -Dry MaQnetic Particle Test Most recent year conducted : -Other Most recent year conducted : Describe: • If Intentional Damage: 8. Specify: I - If Other, Describe: I - If Other Outside Force Damage: Form PHMSA F 7000.1 (Rev. 12-2012)#

Page 219. Describe: GS ·Material Failure of Pipe or Weld -only one sub-cause can be selected from the shaded left-hand column Use this section to report material failures ONLY IF the "Item Involved in Accident" (from PART C, Question 3) is "Pipe" or "Weld." Material Failure of Pipe or Weld -Sub-Cause: 1. The sub-cause selected below is based on the following : (select all that apply) - Field Examination - Determined by Metallurgical Analysis - Other Analysis - If "Other Analysis", Describe: - Sub-cause is Tentative or Suspected; Still Under Investigation (Supplemental Report requ ired) ·If Construction Installation or Fabrication-related: 2. List contributing factors : (select all that apply) - Fatique or Vibration-related Specify: - If Other, Describe: - Mechanical Stress: - Other - If Other, Describe: ·If Oriainal Manufacturing-related (NOT airth weld or other welds formed in the fieldl: 2. List contributing factors: (select all that apply) -Fatigue or Vibration-related: Specify: - If Other, Describe: - Mechanical Stress: -Other - If Other, Describe: ·If Environmental Crackina-related: 3. Specify: I - Other- Describe: I Complete the following if any Material Failure of Pipe or Weld sub-cause is selected. 4. Additional factors: (select all that apply): - Dent -Gouge -Pipe Bend -Arc Burn -Crack - Lack of Fusion - Lamination -Buckle - Wrinkle - Misalignment - Burnt Steel -Other: - If Other, Describe: 5. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the Accident? Sa. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: - Magnetic Flux Leakage Most recent year run: - Ultrasonic Most recent year run : - Geometrv Most recent year run: -Caliper Most recent year run: -Crack Most recent year run : - Hard Spot Most recent year run : -Combination Tool Most recent year run : - Transverse Field/Triaxial Most recent year run : -Other Form PHMSA F 7000.1 (Rev. 12-2012)#

Page 22Most recent vea r run: Describe: 6. Has one or more hydrates! or other pressure test been conducted since oriqinal construction at the Point of the Accident? - If Yes: Most recent year tested: Test pressure (psig): 7. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on the pipeline seqment? - If Yes, and an investiqative diq was conducted at the point of the Accident- Most recent year conducted : - If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a diq site - Most recent year conducted: 8. Has one or more non-destructive examination(s) been conducted at the point of the Accident since January 1, 2002? 8a. If Yes, for each examination conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most recent vear the examination was conducted: - - Radioqraphy Most recent year conducted: - Guided Wave Ultrasonic Most recent vear conducted: - Handheld Ultrasonic Tool Most recent year conducted: -Wet Maqnetic Particle Test Most recent vear conducted: - Dry Magnetic Particle Test Most recent year conducted: - Other Most recent vear conducted: Describe: G6- Equipment Failure - only one sub-cause can be selected from the shaded left-hand column Equipment Failure - Sub-Cause: • If Malfunction of Control/Relief Equipment: 1. Specify: (select all that apply) - - Control Valve - Instru mentation - SCADA - Communications - Block Valve - Check Valve - Relief Valve - Power Failure - Stopple/Control Fitting - ESD System Failure - Other Other Equipment Failure -- - If Other- Describe: ·If Pump or Pump-related Equipment: 2. Specify: - If Other- Describe: ·If Threaded Connection/Coupling Failure: 3. Specify: - If Other- Describe: ·If Non-threaded Connection Failure: 4. Specify: - If Other- Describe: -If Defective or Loose Tubina or Fittina: ·If Failure of Equipment Body (except Pump), Tank Plate or other Material: ·If Other Equipment Failure: 5. Describe: Crack in 2" stainless steel braided flex hose. Complete the following if any Equipment Failure sub-cause is selected. 6. Add itional factors that contributed to the equipment failure: (select all that apply) - Excessive vibration Yes - Overpressurization - No support or loss of support Form PHMSA F 7000.1 (Rev. 12-2012)#

Page 23- Manufacturing defect - Loss of electricity - Improper installation Yes - Mismatched items (different manufacturer for tubing and tubing fittings) - Dissimilar metals - Breakdown of soft goods due to compatibility issues with transported commodity -Valve vau lt or valve can contributed to the release - Alarm/status failure - Misalignment -Thermal stress - Other - If Other, Describe: G7 • Incorrect Operation - only one sub-cause can be selected from the shaded left-hand column Incorrect Operation -Sub-Cause: Damage by Operator or Operator's Contractor NOT Related to Excavation and NOT due to Motorized Vehicle/Equipment Damage No Tank, Vessel, or Sump/Separator Allowed or Caused to Overfill or Overflow No 1. Specify: - If Other, Describe: Valve Left or Placed in Wrong Position, but NOT Resulting in a Tank, Vessel, or Sump/Separator Overflow or Facility Overpressure No Pipeline or Equipment Overpressured No Equipment Not Installed Properly No Wrong Equipment Specified or Installed No Other Incorrect Operation No 2. Describe: Complete the following if any Incorrect Operation sub-cause Is selected. 3. Was this Accident related to (select all that apply) : - - Inadequate procedure - No procedure established - Failure to follow procedure -Other: - If Other, Describe: 4. What category type was the activity that ca used the Accident? 5. Was the task(s) that led to the Accident identified as a covered task in your Operator Qualification Program? 5a. If Yes, were the individuals performing the task(s) qualified for the task(s)? GS • Other Accident Cause - only one sub-cause can be selected from the shaded left-hand column -- Other Accident Cause - Sub-Cause: -If Miscellaneous: 1. Describe: • If Unknown: 2. Specify: PART H - NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCIDENT On December 14, at approximately 08:30, the local maintenance technician for Pershing Station (an unmanned station) discovered oil on the ground near the sump pump. Initial observations at th e time indicated th at a section of the flex hose on the discharge side of the pump had failed. Form PHMSA F 7000.1 (Rev. 12-2012)#

Page 24On Tuesday December 11, the high-high level switch was replaced. The sump tank was filled to test the newly replaced switch. The technician worked with the ECC to make sure that the switch was working properly, which included observation of the tank being able to empty back into the mainline. The sump level was at approximately 40' when the technician left the Pershing Station and informed the ECC to notify him if the pump did not shut off within the hour. The technician did not receive a call from the ECC . It is thought that the flexible hose failed as the sump pump was pumping the tank from the 40' to 16' level. The failed portion of pipe is in the process of being repaired. The contaminated soil has been removed from the leak site. The cause is still under investigation and will be determined when the failure analysis from the metallurgical lab is completed. Update March 13, 2013 The total amount of contaminated soil removed from the leak site was approximately 307 cubic yards. All repairs have been completed and the sump system has been placed in service. The failed flex hose was sent to a metallurgical lab for examination. The results of that examination revealed the immediate cause of the failure to be fatigue cracking. This examination was considered as part of the failure analysis, which concluded that improper installation of the hose was the main contributory cause of the failure. I File Full Name I I I PART I· PREPARER AND AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE Preparer's Name Stacy Saine Preoarer's Title Compliance A ssistant Preoarer's T elephone Number 71 5-394-1530 Preparer's E-m ail Address stacy.soine@lenbridge.com Preparer's Facsimile Num ber 715-394-1425 A uthorized Sianature's Name David Stafford Authorized Sianature Title Manaqer US Pipeline Compliance Authorized Sia nature Telephone Number 715-394-1567 Authorized Sia nature Email david. stafford@_ en briclg_e. com Date 03/15/201 3 Form PHMSA F 7000.1 (Rev. 12-201 2)#

Page 25Appendix C Enbridge Failure Investigation Analysis This document is on file at PHMSA#