Failure Report- Enterprise Operating Products 12/23/09

Page 1Official PDFMemorandum u. S. Department of Transportation Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration Date: To: R.M. Seeley, Southwest Region Director From: Kim Nguyen, General Engineer ~ ~ SUbject: Incident Report - Enterprise Products Operating LLC Operator Number 31618, Unit Number 60534 Accident Location: Port Bolivar Galveston, TX Date ofAccident: December 23,2009, NRC Number: 926954 SMART Activity # 128212103 sep~,20l0 Summary: On December 23, 2009, at approximately 7: 15 am, the Galveston City Fire Department (GFD) was notified by a citizen of crude oil spraying up to 15 feet in the air at the Enterprise Products Operating LLC (Enterprise) Bolivar station in Bolivar, TX which is part of the Enterprise (EPCO) Cameron Highway Oil Pipeline System (CHOPS) crude oil transmission system. GFD arrived at the accident site at 7:30 am. The Galveston County Sheriff Department promptly notified Enterprise of the release at approximately 7:48 am. Enterprise instructed GFD not to close any valves. At approximately 8: 1 0 am, Enterprise started shutting off crude oil from High Island A5 platform going to Bolivar station, and isolated the CHOPS system segment A5. There was no fire or explosion as a result of the accident, and an estimated 120 bbls crude oil were released to the environment (110 bbls crude oil were recovered via a vacuum truck). There was impact to the public as crude oil sheen was discovered on State Road (SR) 87 (adjacent to the Bolivar Station) causing traffic safety issues, and SR 87 was closed to the public by the Galveston County Sheriff Department (GCSD) from approximately 9:00 AM to 11 :00 PM on December 23, 2009. There was impact to the environment as a result of the crude oil release, and crude oil recovery and soil remediation was completed on December 25, 2009. The nearest residential area to the accident site is ~ mile away. The cause of the crude oil release was determined to be the failure ofcap screws in a pressure switch, PSH-ll 003, due to hydrogen assisted cracking promoted by galvanic corrosion. -1#

Page 2During Enterprise’s response to the accident, three Enterprise field operation specialists from Sabine Pass, Port Arthur, and Texas City, TX were dispatched to the accident site on the morning of December 23, 2009. Upon arriving at approximately 9:00 AM, they closed ¾ inch (V-11003) Whitley ball valve, located on top of the 24-inch pipeline, that was used to isolate the failed pressure switch, and the release of crude oil into the environment was stopped. The release was estimated to have been active from approximately 7:00 AM to 9:00 AM on December 23, 2009. Enterprise established an on-site incident commander in coordination with GFD and GCSD, and T&T Marines Salvages was contracted to provide response clean-up and remediation services. The failed cap screws from the pressure switch and associated components were transported to the Stress Engineering Services Inc. (SES) laboratory for metallurgical analysis. The Bolivar station resumed operation at approximately 6:00 pm on December 24, 2009 without incident. T&T Marines Salvages completed crude oil recovery and soil remediation on December 25, 2009. Background: Over the last five years, Enterprise has experienced 1 accident (in 2008) on this PHMSA Inspection Unit 60534. The cause of this accident was due to Hurricane Ike storm surge causing a major washout of concrete supports under the pipeline resulting in a crack on a weld of a 2 inch pipe nipple which allowed crude oil to be released to the environment (2 bbls). System Description: PHMSA Inspection Unit 60534 includes the CHOPS offshore crude oil pipeline system which is designed for transportation of approximately 650,000 b/d of crude oil. CHOPS consists of approximately 237 miles of 30" offshore pipeline and approximately 138 miles of dual 24" pipeline. The 30" pipeline originates at the Ship Shoal (SS) 332B platform crosses Garden Banks (GB) 72 platform and terminates at the CHOPS High Island (HI) A5 platform. Departing the HI A5 platform are two 24" pipelines, with onshore destinations of Port Neches, TX and Texas City, TX respectively. The Port Neches 'leg' is approximately 68 miles in length, and the Texas City 'leg' is approximately 69 miles in length. CHOPS has a MOP of 2160 psig from SS332B to the onshore spec break platforms (HI A5), the MOP reduces to 1250 psig, the meters have a MOP of 275 psig. The Bolivar Station where the accident occurred is a midpoint meter station in the 24-inch pipeline as the crude oil is transported on shore and onto the Texas City terminus. Findings: The SES metallurgy evaluation report concluded that the cause of failed cap screws in the pressure switch was due to hydrogen assisted cracking. The high hardness (Rockwell C 43) of the steel that the failed cap screws were manufactured from probably played a significant role in the cracking process. The metallurgy laboratory analysis also indicated that the housing of the failed switch had been fabricated of type 316 stainless steel (16-18% Chromium, 10-14% Nickel), and the failed switch had been fabricated of stainless steel containing approximately 13% chromium. -2-#

Page 3Conclusions: The metallurgy laboratory analysis also concluded that the presence of solutions containing zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted. The origin of zinc salts are not identified during the investigation. As a result of the accident investigation, EPCO implemented the following preventive measures on the CHOPS system: • Replaced the failed pressure switch (ITT Neodyne, model 122P88CC6448) with a different pressure switch manufactured by Custom Control Sensors, model 646GZE. This model has been widely used at the facility and proven to be reliable. Enterprise has had no problems in the field with this model, to date. • Installed excess flow valves between the ¾” Whitley isolation ball valve and PSL-11004 and PSH-11003 to prevent overflow As a result of the accident investigation, EPCO implemented the following mitigative measures on the CHOPS system: • Verified the Bolivar Station product containment alarm operated as designed • Verified with the Liquid Control Center that the lightning and video cameras for the CHOPS system operated as designed • Verified that the monitoring of pipeline pressures and pressure switches in the Liquid Control Center operated as designed • Emphasized the importance of the monitoring system (video camera and ATMOS leak detection) with the onshore measurement technicians and the Liquid Control Center. Appendices: Appendix A – NRC # 926954 Appendix B – PHMSA 7000-1 Form Appendix C– Enterprise Bolivar Station P&ID and Replaced Pressure Switch Specifications Appendix D– Accident Time Line Appendix E– Metallurgical Evaluation Report Appendix F – Post-Accident Photos -3-#

Page 4Appendix A NRC # 926954 -4.#

Page 5Page 1 of 2 NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER 1-800-424-8802 *** For Public Use *** Information released to a third party shall comply with any applicable federal and/or state Freedom of Information and Privacy Laws Incident Report # 926954 INCIDENT DESCRIPTION *Report taken at 09:38 on 23-DEC-09 Incident Type: PIPELINE Incident Cause: UNKNOWN Affected Area: The incident was discovered on 23-DEC-09 at 08:00 local time. Affected Medium: LAND ONTO THE GROUND ____________________________________________________________________________ SUSPECTED RESPONSIBLE PARTY Organization: ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS HOUSTON, TX 77002 Type of Organization: PRIVATE ENTERPRISE ____________________________________________________________________________ INCIDENT LOCATION CAMERON HWY PIPELINE County: CHAMBERS BOLIVAR PENINSULA City: GALVESTON State: TX ____________________________________________________________________________ RELEASED MATERIAL(S) CHRIS Code: OIL Official Material Name: OIL: CRUDE Also Known As: Qty Released: 0 UNKNOWN AMOUNT ____________________________________________________________________________ DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT CALLER STATED THERE IS A SPILL OF MATERIALS FROM A 24 INCH STEEL TRANSMISSION PIPELINE DUE TO UNKNOWN CAUSES. NO WATERWAYS IMPACTED BUT A HIGHWAY WAS CLOSED. ____________________________________________________________________________ INCIDENT DETAILS Pipeline Type: TRANSMISSION DOT Regulated: YES Pipeline Above/Below Ground: ABOVE Exposed or Under Water: NO Pipeline Covered: UNKNOWN ____________________________________________________________________________ DAMAGES Fire Involved: NO Fire Extinguished: UNKNOWN INJURIES: NO Hospitalized: Empl/Crew: Passenger: FATALITIES: NO Empl/Crew: Passenger: Occupant: EVACUATIONS: NO Who Evacuated: Radius/Area: Damages: NO Length of Direction of Closure Type Description of Closure Closure Closure Air: N Road: Y HIGHWAY 87 .8 E/W Waterway: N Major Artery: Y Track: N Passengers Transferred: NO Environmental Impact: UNKNOWN http://www.nrc.uscg.mil/reports/rwservlet?standard web+inc _ _ seq=926954 12/14/2010#

Page 6Page 2 of 2 Media Interest: NONE Community Impact due to Material: ____________________________________________________________________________ REMEDIAL ACTIONS CALLER STATED THEY HAVE TECHNICIANS EN ROUTE. Release Secured: YES Release Rate: Estimated Release Duration: ____________________________________________________________________________ WEATHER Weather: OVERCAST, 55ºF ____________________________________________________________________________ ADDITIONAL AGENCIES NOTIFIED Federal: NONE State/Local: TRRC State/Local On Scene: State Agency Number: NONE COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPT ____________________________________________________________________________ NOTIFICATIONS BY NRC USCG ICC (ICC ONI) 23-DEC-09 09:47 DOT CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTER (MAIN OFFICE) 23-DEC-09 09:47 U.S. EPA VI (MAIN OFFICE) 23-DEC-09 09:49 FLD INTEL SUPPORT TEAM PORT ARTHUR (FIST COMMAND CENTER) 23-DEC-09 09:47 FLD INTEL SUPPORT TEAM PORT ARTHUR (FIELD UNIT) 23-DEC-09 09:47 JFO-LA (COMMAND CENTER) 23-DEC-09 09:47 NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE COORD CTR (MAIN OFFICE) 23-DEC-09 09:47 NOAA RPTS FOR TX (MAIN OFFICE) 23-DEC-09 09:47 NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER HQ (MAIN OFFICE) 23-DEC-09 09:48 HOMELAND SEC COORDINATION CENTER (MAIN OFFICE) 23-DEC-09 09:47 PIPELINE & HAZMAT SAFETY ADMIN (OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY (AUTO)) 23-DEC-09 09:47 SECTOR HOUSTON-GALVESTON (COMMAND CENTER) 23-DEC-09 09:50 TCEQ (MAIN OFFICE) 23-DEC-09 09:47 TX GENERAL LAND OFFICE (MAIN OFFICE) 23-DEC-09 09:47 TX GENERAL LAND OFFICE (TXGLO REGION 1) 23-DEC-09 09:47 TX GENERAL LAND OFFICE (TXGLO REGION 2) 23-DEC-09 09:47 TEXAS STATE OPERATIONS CENTER (COMMAND CENTER) 23-DEC-09 09:47 ____________________________________________________________________________ ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALLER DID NOT HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. ___________________________________________________________________________ *** END INCIDENT REPORT # 926954 *** http://www.nrc.uscg.mil/reports/rwservlet?standard web+inc _ _ seq=926954 12/14/2010#

Page 7Appendix B PHMSA 7000-1 Form -5-#

Page 8NOTICE: This report is required by 49 CFR Part 195. Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to exceed $25,000 for each violation for each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil penalty shall not exceed $500,000 as provided in 49 USC 60122 Form Approved OMB No. 2137-0047 U.S. Department of Transportation Research and Special Programs Administration ACCIDENT REPORT – HAZARDOUS LIQUID PIPELINE SYSTEMS Report Date No. (DOT Use Only) INSTRUCTIONS Important: Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin. They clarify the information requested and provide specific examples. If you do not have a copy of the instructions, you can obtain one from the Office Of Pipeline Safety Web Page at http://ops.dot.gov. PART A – GENERAL REPORT INFORMATION Original Report Supplemental Report Final Report 1. a. Operator's OPS 5-digit Identification Number (if known) / ____________/ 2. b. If Operator does not own the pipeline, enter Owner’s OPS 5-digit Identification Number (if known) / ___ / c. Name of Operator ______________________________________________________________________________________ d. Operator street address _______________________________________________________________________________ e. Operator address ______________________________________________________________________________________ City, County, State and Zip Code IMPORTANT: IF THE SPILL IS SMALL, THAT IS, THE AMOUNT IS AT LEAST 5 GALLONS BUT IS LESS THAN 5 BARRELS, COMPLETE THIS PAGE ONLY, UNLESS THE SPILL IS TO WATER AS DESCRIBED IN 49 CFR §195.52(A)(4) OR IS OTHERWISE REPORTABLE UNDER §195.50 AS REVISED IN CY 2001. 2. Time and date of the accident / / / / / / / / hr. month day year 3. Location of accident (If offshore, do not complete a through d. See Part C.1) a. Latitude: _____ Longitude: __________ (if not available, see instructions for how to provide specific location) b. _________________________________________________ City, and County or Parish c. _________________________________________________ State and Zip Code d. Mile post/valve station or survey station no. (whichever gives more accurate location) _________________________________ 4. Telephone report / / / / / / / / NRC Report Number month day year 5. Losses (Estimated) Public/Community Losses reimbursed by operator: Public/private property damage $_______________ Cost of emergency response phase $_______________ Cost of environmental remediation $_______________ Other Costs $_______________ (describe) _____________________________________ Operator Losses: Value of product lost $_______________ Value of operator property damage $_______________ Other Costs $_______________ (describe) _____________________________________ Total Costs $_______________ 6. Commodity Spilled Yes No (If Yes, complete Parts a through c where applicable) a. Name of commodity spilled ___________________________ b. Classification of commodity spilled: HVLs /other flammable or toxic fluid which is a gas at ambient conditions CO2 or other non-flammable, non-toxic fluid which is a gas at ambient conditions Gasoline, diesel, fuel oil or other petroleum product which is a liquid at ambient conditions Crude oil c. Estimated amount of commodity involved : Barrels Gallons (check only if spill is less than one barrel) Amounts: Spilled : ____________ Recovered: ____________ CAUSES FOR SMALL SPILLS ONLY (5 gallons to under 5 barrels) : (For large spills [5 barrels or greater] see Part H) Corrosion Natural Forces Excavation Damage Other Outside Force Damage Material and/or Weld Failures Equipment Incorrect Operation Other PART B – PREPARER AND AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE (type or print) Preparer's Name and Title Preparer's E-mail Address Area Code and Telephone Number Area Code and Facsimile Number Authorized Signature (type or print) Name and Title Date Area Code and Telephone Number Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 1 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile#

Page 9PART C – ORIGIN OF THE ACCIDENT (Check all that apply) 1. Additional location information a. Line segment name or ID _______________________ b. Accident on Federal land other than Outer Continental Shelf Yes No c. Is pipeline interstate? Yes No Offshore: Yes No (complete d if offshore) d. Area ___________________ Block # ______________ State / / or Outer Continental Shelf 2. Location of system involved (check all that apply) Operator’s Property Pipeline Right of Way High Consequence Area (HCA)? Describe HCA____________________________________ 3. Part of system involved in accident Above Ground Storage Tank Cavern or other below ground storage facility Pump/meter station; terminal/tank farm piping and equipment, including sumps Other Specify: _________________________________ Onshore pipeline, including valve sites Offshore pipeline, including platforms If failure occurred on Pipeline, complete items a - g: 4. Failure occurred on Body of Pipe Pipe Seam Scraper Trap Pump Sump Joint Component Valve Metering Facility Repair Sleeve Welded Fitting Bolted Fitting Girth Weld Other (specify) Year the component that failed was installed: / / 5. Maximum operating pressure (MOP) a. Estimated pressure at point and time of accident: ____ PSIG b. MOP at time of accident: ___________PSIG c. Did an overpressurization occur relating to the accident? Yes No a. Type of leak or rupture Leak: Pinhole Connection Failure (complete sec. H5) Puncture, diameter (inches) _________ Rupture: Circumferential – Separation Longitudinal – Tear/Crack, length (inches) __________ Propagation Length, total, both sides (feet) _________ N/A Other _______________________________ b.Type of block valve used for isolation of immediate section: Upstream: Manual Automatic Remote Control Check Valve Downstream: Manual Automatic Remote Control Check Valve c. Length of segment isolated _______ ft d. Distance between valves _______ ft e. Is segment configured for internal inspection tools? Yes No f. Had there been an in-line inspection device run at the point of failure? Yes No Don’t Know Not Possible due to physical constraints in the system g. If Yes, type of device run (check all that apply) High Resolution Magnetic Flux tool Year run: ______ Low Resolution Magnetic Flux tool Year run: ______ UT tool Year run: ______ Geometry tool Year run: ______ Caliper tool Year run: ______ Crack tool Year run: ______ Hard Spot tool Year run: ______ Other tool Year run: ______ PART D – MATERIAL SPECIFICATION PART E – ENVIRONMENT 1. Nominal pipe size (NPS) / / in. 2. Wall thickness / / in. 3. Specification SMYS / / 4. Seam type 5. Valve type 6. Manufactured by in year / / 1. Area of accident In open ditch Under pavement Above ground Underground Under water Inside/under building Other ____________ 2. Depth of cover: inches PART F – CONSEQUENCES 1. Consequences (check and complete all that apply) a. Fatalities Injuries c. Product ignited Yes No d. Explosion Yes No Number of operator employees: _______ _______ e. Evacuation (general public only) / / people Contractor employees working for operator: _______ _______ Reason for Evacuation: General public: _______ _______ Precautionary by company Totals: _______ _______ Evacuation required or initiated by public official b. Was pipeline/segment shutdown due to leak? Yes No f. Elapsed time until area was made safe: If Yes, how long? ______ days ______ hours _____ minutes / / hr. / / min. 2. Environmental Impact a. Wildlife Impact: Fish/aquatic Yes No e. Water Contamination: Yes No (If Yes, provide the following) Birds Yes No Amount in water _________ barrels Terrestrial Yes No Ocean/Seawater No Yes b. Soil Contamination Yes No Surface No Yes If Yes, estimated number of cubic yards: _________ Groundwater No Yes c. Long term impact assessment performed: Yes No Drinking water No Yes (If Yes, check below.) d. Anticipated remediation Yes No Private well Public water intake If Yes, check all that apply: Surface water Groundwater Soil Vegetation Wildlife Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) OPS Data Facsimile Page 2 of 4#

Page 10PART G – LEAK DETECTION INFORMATION 1. Computer based leak detection capability in place? 2. Was the release initially detected by? (check one): Yes No CPM/SCADA-based system with leak detection Static shut-in test or other pressure or leak test Local operating personnel, procedures or equipment Remote operating personnel, including controllers Air patrol or ground surveillance A third party Other (specify) _________________ 3. Estimated leak duration days ____ hours ____ PART H – APPARENT CAUSE Important: There are 25 numbered causes in this Part H. Check the box corresponding to the primary cause of the accident. Check one circle in each of the supplemental categories corresponding to the cause you indicate. See the instructions for guidance. H1 – CORROSION 1. External Corrosion 2. Internal Corrosion (Complete items a – e where applicable.) b. Visual Examination Localized Pitting General Corrosion Other ____________________ a. Pipe Coating c. Cause of Corrosion Bare Galvanic Atmospheric Coated Stray Current Microbiological Cathodic Protection Disrupted Stress Corrosion Cracking Selective Seam Corrosion Other ____________________ d. Was corroded part of pipeline considered to be under cathodic protection prior to discovering accident? No Yes, Year Protection Started: / / e. Was pipe previously damaged in the area of corrosion? No Yes => Estimated time prior to accident: / / years / / months Unknown H2 – NATURAL FORCES 3. Earth Movement => Earthquake Subsidence Landslide Other 4. Lightning 5. Heavy Rains/Floods => Washouts Flotation Mudslide Scouring Other 6. Temperature => Thermal stress Frost heave Frozen components Other 7. High Winds H3 – EXCAVATION DAMAGE 8. Operator Excavation Damage (including their contractors/Not Third Party) 9. Third Party (complete a-f) a. Excavator group General Public Government Excavator other than Operator/subcontractor b. Type: Road Work Pipeline Water Electric Sewer Phone/Cable Landowner-not farming related Farming Railroad Other liquid or gas transmission pipeline operator or their contractor Nautical Operations Other ________ c. Excavation was: Open Trench Sub-strata (boring, directional drilling, etc…) d. Excavation was an ongoing activity (Month or longer) Yes No e. Did operator get prior notification of excavation activity? If Yes, Date of last contact /_________/ Yes; Date received: / / mo. / / day / ______/ yr. No Notification received from: One Call System Excavator Contractor Landowner f. Was pipeline marked as result of location request for excavation? No i. Temporary markings: Flags Stakes Paint ii. Permanent markings: iii. Marks were (check one) : Accurate Not Accurate iv. Were marks made within required time? Yes No H4 – OTHER OUTSIDE FORCE DAMAGE 10. Fire/Explosion as primary cause of failure => Fire/Explosion cause: Man made Natural 11. Car, truck or other vehicle not relating to excavation activity damaging pipe 12. Rupture of Previously Damaged Pipe 13. Vandalism Yes (If Yes, check applicable items i - iv) Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 3 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile#

Page 11H5 – MATERIAL AND/OR WELD FAILURES Material 14. Body of Pipe => Dent Gouge Bend Arc Burn Other 15. Component => Valve Fitting Vessel Extruded Outlet Other 16. Joint => Gasket O-Ring Threads Other Weld 17. Butt => Pipe Fabrication Other 18. Fillet => Branch Hot Tap Fitting Repair Sleeve Other 19. Pipe Seam => LF ERW DSAW Seamless Flash Weld HF ERW SAW Spiral Other Complete a-g if you indicate any cause in part H5. a. Type of failure: Construction Defect => Poor Workmanship Procedure not followed Poor Construction Procedures Material Defect b. Was failure due to pipe damage sustained in transportation to the construction or fabrication site? Yes No c. Was part which leaked pressure tested before accident occurred? Yes, complete d-g No d. Date of test: / / yr. / / mo. / / day e. Test medium: Water Inert Gas Other f. Time held at test pressure: / / hr. g. Estimated test pressure at point of accident: PSIG H6 – EQUIPMENT 20. Malfunction of Control/Relief Equipment => Control valve Instrumentation SCADA Communications Block valve Relief valve Power failure Other 21. Threads Stripped, Broken Pipe Coupling => Nipples Valve Threads Dresser Couplings Other 22. Seal Failure => Gasket O-Ring Seal/Pump Packing Other H7 – INCORRECT OPERATION 23. Incorrect Operation a. Type: Inadequate Procedures Inadequate Safety Practices Failure to Follow Procedures Other _______________________________________ b. Number of employees involved who failed a post-accident test: drug test: / / alcohol test /_________/ H8 – OTHER 24. Miscellaneous, describe: 25. Unknown Investigation Complete Still Under Investigation (submit a supplemental report when investigation is complete) PART I – NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE EVENT (Attach additional sheets as necessary) Form RSPA F 7000-1 (01-2001 ) Page 4 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile#

Page 12Appendix C Port Bolivar Galveston station P&ID & Product Specification for the Pressure Switch that failed allowing crude oil to be released -6-#

Page 13, , , , l, , - 1 -, 1 , - ­ - - 1 1 1 ' I 1 1 1 1 1 , I 1 ' i#

Page 14WI(:)E f:lANGE "PRE$URE EXTERNAl.. ADJUSTMENT DIAPHRAGM VAOUUM SSTPORr INsrJU.IJlDON DRAWING 1~1{t]: . .: . .1. L _ _•. • .B7 - - r , . -4.250646GZE I "2.12 18" FREE LEADS r---' . ELECTRICAL - ----r---- CONNECTION I I I 112-14 NPT B.O ' MAX .265 DIA. MTGHOLES 646GZEl (2 PLACES) 3.35 " ADJ. SCREW ~ ~;,r-.~ MAX I '" , I RANGE SCALE 1- , ~ =r2.BO ~ PRESSURE PORT - 2.25 ­ SQ MAX 1/2-14 NPT SHIPPING Wf. APPIlOX. 56 OZ. 3.30 11587 GRAMSI • _. . -,- MAX .----t--''':'''.;"I:.. . __ I 1P I I 'I. ..25 (TYPP .r:: OP~RAnNG AND ORD~RING DArA: PRESSURE SWITCHES 1/2" STAINLESS STEEL • PRESSURE PORT & MODEL 646GZE POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM Welted 316 SST Parts Iton Po~imide Max Proof Adiu.loble Sel-Paint RonRe Approx. Sy'. (Te.t) On Incr. On Deer. Dead- Press. Pre.... Pre... Pre... bond p,i p,1 p,i p,1 p.i MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std. OPOT "M' 500 750 1.2-16 .4-15.2 .8 3000 5000 8-75 3-70 5 3000 5000 20-150 8-138 12 3000 5000 50-375 22-347 28 3000 5000 330-1000 265-935 65 3000 5000 950-2300 775-2125 175 646(;1101 646GZEMI 646GZE2 646GZEM2 646GZEII 646GZEMll 646GZE3 646GZEM3 646GZE5 646GZEM5 646GZE7 646GZEM7 Press.•4 to 5000 psi Vae. 1.0 to 28.5" Hg SERIES: 646GZE 646GZE-7011 646VZE Standard Features: • U.L. I CSA Explosion Proof: Div. 1, 2 • NEMA: 4,7,9, 13 • Fire Resistant Steel Body AMBIENT TEMP. RANGE -30· to 160' F -34" to 71" C Options Code: "F" Ethylene Propylene O-ring "Y" EECS Certified to EXsIIT5 "700B" Gold Contacts "7030" Gold Contacts wjSST Diaphragm "7044" Monel Pori and Diaphragm "7045 " Hastelloy Port and Diaphragm "7065" TeRan Wire wjSST Diaphragm PRESSURE SWITCHES 1/2N STAINLESS STEEL MODEL 646GZE-7011 • PRESSURE PORT & DIAPHRAGM Wettoo 316 SST Parts Viton 500 750 1.4-16 .4-15 1 3000 5000 10-75 3-68 7 3000 SOOO 20-1 SO 6-136 14 3000 5000 50-375 16-347 34 3000 SOOO 330-1000 250-920 BO 3000 5000 950-2300 750-2100 200 SOOO 7S00 2100-3400 1820-3120 280 5000 7500 3200-5000 2720-4S20 480 646GZEI-7011 646GZEMI-7011 646GZE2-7011 646GZEM2-7011 646GZEII-7011 646GZEMII-7011 646GZE3-7011 646GZEM3-7011 646GZES-70I I 646GZEM5-7011 646GZE7-7011 646GZEM7-7011 646GZE9- 7011 646GZEM9-7011 646GZE10-701 64 6GZEM10-701 VACUUM SWITCHES 1/2" STAINLESS STEEL MODEL 646VZE • PRESSURE PORT & POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM Welted 316 SST Parts Po~imide ton Max Proof Ad·u.loble Se/-Polnt Ranoe Approx. Sy• . (Te,t) On Incr. On Deer. DeadPres.s. Pre... Vacuum Vacuum bond psi p.i In. Hg In. Hg In . Hg MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std. DPDT'M" 150 250 3.5-28.5 1.0- 26.0 64 6VZEI 646VZEMI i.~ IUCTRICJU CHARACTERISTICS. RATING OF SWITCH ELEMENT AMPERES VOLTS SPOT DPDT "M" Re• . Re• . 125 AC - 50(60 Hz 15 5 250 AC - SO/60 Hz 15 5 1480 AC - 50(60 Hz 15 - SCH.MATIC AND WIRING CO"" SPDT-Slondard DPDT "M" P COLOR OF lfA;JS COlOI! OF lfA;JS P RED NIC RED NICI IIROWN C UOWN Cl;J BLUE N/O =:-t BLUE N101 -e--J GREEN ----jl~ BlACl( NIC2 YELLOW C2 PURPLE N/02:J GREEN ----1)1 INC10SUR./C.III'IPlCATlONS. Div. 1 explolion-proof and hermetically .ooled el",,!rlcal a ....mbly Part No. 17-51 (17-73 for ~MW model option), li.led by both Unde".,riter'il Loborotorle., tnc. (File No. E32961) and CSA Telting Laboratorle. (File No. 22921) for ha..,rdou. tocatlon., cia.. 1, Group. A, II" C, and D; Cia.. 2 Group. E, F , and O. ModeI646GZEMl hOI an appro"lmale dead band of .9 p.1. HOW ro ORD~RI Specify model number, add desired "options" listing letter codes first followed by numbers: Custom Control Sensors, Inc.· 21111 Plummer Street, Chatsworth, CA 91311· Tel: (818)341·4610· Fax: (818)709-0426 e-mail: switchnel@ccsdualsnap.com· htlp:llwww.ccsdualsnap.com 12:> D .4 .5#

Page 15Appendix D Accident Time Line -7-#

Page 16Timeline Information for Enterprise Bolivar Station Crude Oil release on December 23,2009 - NRC#926954 December 23.2009 07:02 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received Bolivar containment alarm from the Bolivar Station. 07:48 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received a call from Lynette with Galveston Co. sheriff's department reporting a broken oil pipeline at Port Bolivar. 07:49 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Bruce Ousley (EPCO) and connected him to Lynette at Galveston Co. sheriff's department. 07:55 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Billy at Sunoco to see if they can take oil and notified Gilbert Rivera Jr. 08:00 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) requested Adam to head to Bolivar, he can make it quicker than Bruce. 08:05 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) verified oil mist at Bolivar on camera and spoke with Buster Bergeron. 08:07 AM CST - Philip (EPCO) notified Jeff Myers (as he responded). 0807 AM CST - TRRC Representative (Randy Vaughn) contacted John Jewett (EPCO) regarding a possible Crude Oil Leak on Bolivar Peninsula. 08:10AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called John at AS and requested he start shutting oil off going to Bolivar and stack back to GB72 and called Mike at SS332 to divert all he could away from CHOPS. 08:11 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Lucy at Shell control to get her to go to max rate on Seajack. 08:20 AM CST - Philip notified Greg Chapman (EPCO). 08:21 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) started BYPASSING CHOPS oil to Sunoco. 08:23 AM CST - AS system blocked off to Bolivar Station. 08:28 AM CST - John Jewett with EPCO pipeline compliance called to verify leak and said they would make all agency notifications. 08:39 AM CST - Philip contacted the Galveston Co. on site command center (Herbert Franklin, Incident Commander), and it was verified the oil spray had stopped. 09:00 AM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is closed to the Public as a result of the crude oil release. Three EPCO Field Operation Specialists arrived at the Bolivar Station. They closed % inch (V-11 003) Whitney ball valve, located on top of the 24 inch-line, that is used to isolate the failed pressure switch PSH-11 003 to stop the product release to the environment. 09:08 AM CST (and again at 09:14 AM CST) - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by Frank Groves - TRRC Oil & Gas Div., Region 3 regarding accident 09:18 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by EPA representative - Mark Hays 09:23 AM CST - John Jewett contacted Victor Lopez - PHMSA SW Region, regarding accident#

Page 1709:38 AM CST - NRC contacted, reference number 926954 at 09:38 a.m. 10:05 AM CST - Bruce Ousley reports TNT Marine is on the way to clean up released crude oil. Bruce reports all oil outside the containment area is from spray. 10:30 AM CST - TNT Marine arrives to clean up released crude oil, and following meeting initiate response at 12:30 PM CST. The clean-up response efforts will continue until the afternoon of December 25, 2009 when the spill response and clean-up efforts are declared to be finished . 11 :00 AM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) contacts John Jewett regarding accident and establishes logistics for on-site investigation. 02:00 PM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) arrive on-site to initiate investigation. 11 :00 PM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is re-opened to the Public. December 24, 2009 05:00 PM CST - Coby Goos (EPCO) contacts Kim Nguyen to notify PHMSA that the Bolivar Station is being re-activated, and the CHOPS Crude Oil System is restarting. December 25, 2009 12:00 PM CST -The clean-up response efforts are declared to be finished. Other Miscellaneous Notifications and Contacts Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) contacted Texas emergency response center which covers TRRC, TGLO and TCEQ. Incident number is 20094041. John Jewett contacted Home Land Security this morning. NRC #926954.Talked to Kevin Lee#

Page 18Appendix E Metallurgical Evaluation Report -8#

Page 1913800 Westfair East Drive, Houston, Texas 77041-1101 Phone: (281) 955-2900 Fax: (281) 955-2638 Website: www.stress.com an employee-owned company HOUSTON • CINCINNATI • NEW OR LEANS • BATON ROUGE February 2, 2010 SENIOR PRINCIPALS President Joe A. Fowler, Ph.D., P .E. Senior Vice President W . Thomas Asbill, P.E. Vice PresldenlS Ronald O. Young. Ph.D., P.E. Clinton A. Haynes Jack E. Miller, P.E. J. Randy Long. P.E. Charles A. Miller, P.E PRINCIPALS James W. Alben, P.E . Christopher Alexander. Ph. O. Ck 1ud!o Allavillo. Corp . LIII Mnrk A. Bennen. P.E. Kenneth K. Shalla. Ph.D. Richard S. Boswell, P.E. ABllk 8oubenider. Ph.D.. P .E. Helen Cl'lan, C.P.A. John F. Chappell. P.E. Kimberly O. Flesner, P.E. S. Allen FOl(, P.E. Greg Gillie, P.E. David L Garrell, Ph.D. Andreas T. Kalsounas. P .E. Tell)l M. Lechinger Christopher Malice, Ph.D., P.E. Harbindsr Pardal. Ph. D. Thomas L. Power, Ph.D., P.E. George R. Ross, Ph.D., P.E. Ram6n I. San Pedro. P.E. Teri Shackelford Mellhew J. Stahl. D. E:ng ., P.E. David A. Tekamp, P.E Kurt D.Vandervort. Ph.D., P.E. Kenneth A. Waeber, P.E. Raben E. Wink Bobby W . Wright P.E. Jay Z. Yuan. Ph.D .. P.E. SENIOR ASSOCIATESI STAFF CONSULTANTS GlennA. Aucoin, P.!· . Richard C Blel, P.I J. Kirk Brownlee. P.E:. Michael J. EffenbOl ger. P.E. Michael W. Guillol, Ph.D .• P.E. DaVid P. Huey, P.E. Daniel KrZYWicki, P.E., CSP Kennelh R. Riggs. Ph.D., P.E. SENIOR ASSOCIATES Paul Angher. P E. Roger D. Cordes. Ph.D .. P E. Donnie W. Curinglon Nrlpendu DUlla, Ph .D .. P.E. Steven A. Garcia Mark E. Hamilton Breit A. Hormberg W,llram A. Mil:cr . P.E. John M. Moore Ronald A. Morrison, P.E . DaVid F. Renzi Blian S. Royer, PE Mohmod Samman, Ph .D ., P.E. Danicl A. Pitts, P.E. Leo Vega STAFF CONSULTANTS Ray A. Ayers. Ph.D., P.E. Mark Banel. P.E. Clinton H. (Clint) Brill. P.E. Charles Buscemi Paul Oowdican, P.E. Joe W . Frey, P E. SCOII Harding. Ph.D., P.E . SIeve Haysen. Ph.D .. P.E. Joe Kintz, P. E. Sleven Kinyon, Ph.D. Paul J. Kovach, P.E. Aon Scrrvner Jackie E. Smilh, P E. ASSOCIATES Juhan Bedoya Lyle E. Breau x. P.F . James Brewer . P.F Napoleon F. Douglas. Jr. Kenny T. Farrow, Ph .D. Kar en Lucio Olhp A. f\,\amar, Ph.D. Scot T. McNeill. Ph.O. Salhish Remamoorlhy Chad Seercy, Ph.D. Awn Sreeranganalhan Lance Staudacher Kevin Wang, Ph.D., P.E Mr. Joe Sobilo PN 1251102 Enterprise Products Company 1100 Louisiana P.O. Box 4735 Houston, TX 77002 Re: Failure of Cap Screws in Switch Subject: Results of Metallurgical Evaluation Introduction Enterprise Products Company (EPCO) re" cently experienced a failure in an electrical switch on one of their offshore facilities in the Gulf of Mexico. Four small cap screws holding the top cover on the switch apparently failed during service, exposing the internals of the switch. Following the failure, EPCO retained Stress Engineering Services (SES) to examine and test samples from the switch and to assist in determining the most likely cause(s) for the observed failure. The failed switch was thus shipped to the SES facility in Houston, Texas where the SES evaluation was performed. Discussion A view of the failed switch is presented in Photograph 1 (in Appendix A). A closer view of the cap that separated from the remainder of the switch is shown in Photograph 2. The end of one of the four screws that failed during the incident is just visible in Photograph 2 and is marked by the arrow in the photograph. Closer views of the ends of the broken screws are presented in Photographs 3 and 4. The outer ends of all the broken screws were apparently lost during the incident. The screw at the upper left in Photograph 4 was arbitrarily designated as screw # 1 by SES. Screw # 2 was at the upper right, screw # 3 was at the lower right and screw # 4 was at the lower left in the photograph. Screw # 1 had what appeared to be a coating of a foreign substance on its fracture surface, while the fracture surfaces of the other three screws were very clean and appeared to be essentially identical. The ends of screws # 1 and # 3 were thus removed from the body of the switch for more detailed examination of their fracture surfaces. In view of their similarity to screw # 3, screws # 2 and # 4 were not examined in detail.#

Page 20Mr. Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2, 2010 The compositions of the screws and the body of the switch into which they had been threaded were examined using the x-ray spectrometer (EDS) attachment of SES's scanning electron microscope (SEM). An SEM-EDS scan gives a semi-quantitative analysis of the chemical elements present in the small portion of the sample surface excited by the electron beam of the SEM. The measured compositions of the screws # 1 and # 3 are presented in Scans I and II in Appendix B. The analyses indicated that the screws had been fabricated of stainless steel containing approximately 13 % chromium. The composition of the housing in which the screws had been located during use is presented in Scan III. The analysis of the housing showed that it had apparently been fabricated of a Type 316, austenitic stainless steel. Also presented in Appendix B (Scan IV) is the composition of the foreign substance found on the as-received fracture surface of screw # 1. As shown in scan IV, the foreign substance appeared to consist primarily of zinc, carbon, and oxygen. It thus appeared that the foreign substance may have consisted of zinc carbonate. On the other hand, it should be noted that the foreign substance contained low concentrations of iron and chromium and thus did not appear to have been a corrosion product. Corrosion of the underlying screw would probably have produced a layer of mixed iron and chromium oxides on the screw surface. Cross sections were taken through both of the screws for metallurgical structural evaluations. The structures of the screws are shown in Photographs 5 and 6. The structures appeared to consist of tempered martensite and the structures of the two screws were essentially identical. The cross sections used to produce Photographs 5 and 6 were also used for hardness measurements. The hardness measurements showed that the screws were uniform in hardness across their cross sections. The measured hardness values ranged from Rockwell C 40.8 to Rockwell C 44.4. The average hardness of screw # 1 was Rockwell C 43.0 and the average hardness of screw # 3 was Rockwell C 42.7. The fracture surfaces of screws # 1 and # 3 were also examined using the SEM. Prior to this examination, the foreign material on screw # 1 was removed ultrasonically using a non-corrosive commercially available cleaning solution. The as-received fracture surface on screw # 3 was clean and required no cleaning. The fracture surfaces on screws # 1 and # 3 are shown in Photographs 7 and 8, respectively. As can be seen the fracture surfaces appeared to be identical. The fracture surfaces both had the "rock candy" texture that is typical of hydrogen stress cracking that has occurred along prior austenitic grain boundaries in a quenched and tempered steel structure. Stress Engineering Services, Inc. 2 PN 1251102#

Page 21Mr. Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2, 2010 The similarity of the clean fractures on screws # 2, # 3, and # 4 plus the similarity of the fracture surface structures shown in Photographs 7 and 8 indicate that all of the failed attachment screws apparently failed primarily due to hydrogen stress cracking. The lack of any significant corrosion damage on the cleaned face of screw # 1 indicates that corrosion due to the presence of the zinc carbonate deposit apparently played little, if any, direct role in the fracture of screw # 1. Conclusions Based upon the results of our testing and analysis, we have developed the following observations and/or conclusions: 1. SEM analysis of the fracture surfaces on the screws confirmed that the fractures had occurred by way of hydrogen assisted cracking. 2. The high hardness (Rockwell C 43) of the attachment screws probably played a significant role in the cracking process. 3. The zinc rich deposits found on screw # 1 apparently did not produce significant weight loss corrosion of the screw. 4. On the other hand, the presence of solutions contalOlng zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant Type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted. Thank you for allowing us to have been of assistance to you in performing this evaluation. If you have any questions concerning the test results or opinions presented in this report, please feel free to contact us at your earliest convenience. K~'PE Staff Metallurgist Stress Engineering Services, Inc. Stress Engineering Services, Inc. 3 PN 1251102#

Page 22Mr. Joe Sobi!o Enterprise Products Company February 2, 2010 Appendix A Photographs Stress Engineering Services, Inc. 4 PN 1251102#

Page 23Mr. Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2, 2010 Photo 1: The failed switch supplied for this investigation. The failure occurred at the right end of the switch, as shown in this photograph. Photo 2: A closer view of the failure location. One of the failed screws is just visible in this view and is marked with the arrow. Stress Engineering Services, Inc. 5 PN 1251102#

Page 24Mr. Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2, 2010 Photo 3: A view of the outer ends of all the failed screws. Photo 4: A closer view of the fracture faces on the screws. Screw # 1 is the upper left, screw # 2 is at the upper right, screw # 3 is at the lower right and screw # 4 is at the lower left in the photograph. Stress Engineering Services, Inc . 6 PN 1251102#

Page 25Mr. Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2, 2010 500 11m Photo 5: A view of the microstructure in screw # 1. 500 flm Photo 6: A view of the microstructure in screw # 3. The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel. Stress Engineering Services, Inc. 7 PN 1251102#

Page 26Mr. Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2, 2010 SEM MAG: 1.00 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(m/d/y): 01/08110 arowe stress Engineering Services, Inc. " , Photo 7: The fracture surface on screw #1 following ultrasonic cleaning. The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking. SEM MAG: 1.00 kx • Date(m/d/y): 01/08110 arowe Stress Engineering Services, Inc. " Photo 8: The fraclure surface found on screw # 3. The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7. Stress Engineering Services, Inc. 8 PN 1251102#

Page 27Mr. Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2,2010 Appendix B SEM-EDS Test Results Stress Engineering Services, Inc. 9 PN 1251102#

Page 28Mr. Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2, 2010 Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8, 2010 SCAN I c:1 ,ecra:dllgenesisl,genmaps.spc OS·.jan-2{lHl15:54:,14 Bolt #1 Base me:tal LSecs : 4]1 9 Fe Kellt 7.5 Fe Cr Fe rli Mo Mill Si Cr I '~ i' rH 1.0.0. 2.00. 3.0.0. 4..(){l 5.001 6.00 7.00 8 .. 0.0 Energy- keV 9.00 ---­ - Elemellf Wt% --- At% SiK 00.36 00.70 MoL 00.58 00.34 CrK 13.12 13.95 MnK 00.44 00.44 FeK 84.44 83.57 NiK 01.06 01.00 Matrix Correction ZAF D Stress Engineering Services, Inc. 10 PN 1251102#

Page 29Mr. Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2, 2010 Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8, 2010 SCAN II P:l,12511{)O JOBS\12511o.0 J OBS1,1251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJ.spc OS-Jan-2010 Bo.lt #3 Bas e Metal LSecs : 99 2:3.7 Fe 13. 14.2 KC 9,5 n Fe Cr Fe Si o 1.00 4.{)O s..no · 6.. {lO 1.: 00 8 .00 9t.{) 0 Energy- keV -­ - - - Element WI% At% SiK 00.47 00.92 CrK 13.36 14.14 MnK 00.38 00.38 FeK 85.79 84.56 Matrix Correction ZAF Stress Engineering Services, Inc. 11 PN 1251102#

Page 30Mr. Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2, 2010 Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8, 2010 SCAN III c: (edax321 .genesis1.genm,aps.spc OS--Jan-201O 17:23:50 Switch cap oase metal LSe>cs: 122 Fe 17..2 12.9 I{C n Cr n Fe 4.3 Ni Mn Cr Fe ~Ji 0.0 1 ..00 ------- - Element Wt% At% SiK 01.05 02.07 MoL 02.69 01.55 CrK 17.44 18.60 MnK 01.46 01.47 FeK 67.43 66.93 NiK. 09.93 09.38 Matrix Correction ZAF Stress Engineering Services, Inc. 12 PN 1251102#

Page 31Mr. Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2, 2010 Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8, 2010 SCAN IV c:\edax32"ig enes i s l,gen maps.s pc 08-Jan,..2U<1 {) 15:59:22: Bolt #1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs :99 15.4Zn 12.3o 9.3 Kent 6.2 - Zn 3.1 ­ C ZI11 0.0 s Fe Si Mn AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr jfn ..4.. ~Mg ....... .II. £ ... 1.00 2:.00 3.00 4 ,,{)o< s.uos.no 7.00 8.CO 9.00 1Q.00 H ,,,{) 0 Energy- keV I Eleme;;t - CK OK MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK Matrix ~Vt% 18.19 25.40 00.42 00.30 00.35 00.76 00.60 01.38 00.16 07.41 45.03 Correction ~ 37.56 39.37 00.43 00.27 00.31 00.59 00.37 00.66 00.07 03.29 17.08 ZAP Stress Engineering Services, Inc. 13 PN 1251102#

Page 32Appendix F Post-Accident Photos -9-#

Page 33Figure 1 – Photographs taken on December 23, 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil. Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view, and it was the road closed as a result of the release. -10-#

Page 34-11-#

Page 35Figure 2 – Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located. The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs, and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E. -12-#