U.S. DOT/RSPA - Environmental Assessment - Proposed Rulemaking - High Consequence Areas for Gas Transmission Pipelines

Page 1DRAFT Research and Special Programs Administration U.S. Department of Transportation Environmental Assessment Proposed Rulemaking High Consequence Areas for Gas Transmission Pipelines Docket: RSPA-00-7666#

Page 2DRAFT Table of Contents Preliminary Finding of No Significant Impact A. Purpose and Need for Action A. 1 A.2 A.3 A.4 Recent RSPA Pipeline Safety and Environmental Protection Programs Legislative History and National Transportation Safety Board Recommendations Interactions with Industry, Other Agencies, and Stakeholders Future RSPA Integrity Management Initiatives B. Description of Proposed Action C. A1 tern a tives Considered D. Affected Environment E. E. 1 Environmental Consequences of Proposed Action and Alternatives Environmental Impact of Proposed Integrity Management Rule E.2 Environmental Impacts of the Alternatives E.2.1 E.2.2 Take No Action Define HCAs as Class 3 and Class 4 Areas E.2.3 Define HCAs according to the Definition of High Population Areas from 9195.450 F. Environmental Justice Considerations G . Information Made Available to States, Local Governments, and Individuals H. List of Agencies and Persons Consulted I. Conclusion .. 11 ... 111 1 1 3 5 8 8 10 11 12 13 16 16 16 16 17 17 19 19#

Page 3DRAFT Preliminary Finding of No Significant Impact This Environmental Assessment is prepared in accordance with section 102(2)(c) of the National Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. Section 4332), the Council on Environmental Quality regulations (40 CFR Sections 1500-1 508), and Department of Transportation Order 561 0.1 c, Procedures for Considering Environmental Impacts. It was prepared to assist in the agency’s planning and decision-making. This document concisely describes the Research and Special Programs Administration’s (RSPA) proposed rulemaking to define high consequence areas for gas transmission pipelines. This Environmental Assessment also addresses the need for the proposed action, the alternative definitions considered, the environment affected by this action, the consequences to the environment of the proposed action and the alternatives, and a list of the agencies and organizations consulted. This Environmental Assessment provides sufficient evidence to determine that the provisions of the proposed rule are expected to have no significant impact on the environment. ... 111#

Page 4DRAFT A. Purpose and Need for Action The Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) believes that pipeline safety regulations address the most important risks to the nation’s pipelines, and have served the industry and the nation well. The gas pipeline industry has a good safety record compared to other modes of transportation. However, pipeline incidents still occur and, on rare occasions, result in serious consequences. Continued improvement in safety and environmental performance is still RSPA’s highest objective. RSPA believes that safety programs based only on compliance with the regulations can result in a piecemeal approach to identifying and controlling risks, sometimes neglecting the interrelationships among failure causes and the benefits of coordinated risk control activities. Having operators implement more systematic and integrated approaches to assure pipeline integrity in areas where pipeline incidents have the greatest potential consequences to people and property offers the greatest opportunity to better control risks and improve industry’s performance. Pipeline operators also have strong incentives to ensure the integrity of their pipelines. Ensuring integrity has obvious positive safety and environmental benefits. In addition, operators seek to avoid the lost product and unscheduled downtime for repairs following a major incident, which can significantly impact the company’s financial performance and its ability to satisfy customer commitments. Operators cannot afford to have these critical transportation assets out of service for lengthy periods of time in today’s competitive business environment. In addition, the damage to the company’s public image and reputation, as well as the legal implications of serious incidents, can pose an even broader and longer term negative impact on the company’s business operations. For these and other reasons, some pipeline operators have implemented and are continuing to improve more systematic safety and environmental management processes, focusing on areas where incidents have the greatest potential impact. A. 1 Recent RSPA Pipeline Safetv and Environmental Protection Programs To better understand and promote more comprehensive and integrated approaches to safety and environmental protection, RSPA created the Risk Management Demonstration Program and the System Integrity Inspection (SII) Pilot Program. These programs encourage and evaluate operator-developed safety and environmental management processes that incorporate operator- and pipeline-specific information and data to identify, assess, and address pipeline risks. These programs are helping RSPA’s Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) refine its regulatory oversight processes. These programs help to ensure that pipeline operators have effective processes in place to identify the most important risks to the public and the environment, and to develop and implement cost-effective preventive and mitigative actions to manage these risks. Many of these initiatives have validated the importance of focusing resources and establishing higher levels of protection in areas where a pipeline failure could have significant consequences. 1#

Page 5DRAFT Through the Risk Management Demonstration Program and the System Integrity Inspection Pilot Program, OPS has improved its understanding of pipeline operator integrity management systems and activities. This experience has shown that some gas pipeline operators have formalized management systems to identify and address the most significant integrity threats to their pipeline systems. In the Risk Management Program, participants perform systematic and comprehensive risk assessments to identify the specific nature and location of the most significant risks posed by operation of their pipeline system. An essential feature of these risk assessments is the integration of information from many diverse sources to fully understand the integrity threats at specific locations on the pipeline. Environmental consequences and the impact on nearby populations are explicitly considered in these risk assessments. Through formal, risk- based decision making processes, these companies use the risk assessment results to identify projects and activities that address potential system integrity threats, thereby helping to prevent pipeline failures. The risk management process also examines the consequences of potential releases and explores opportunities to minimize the environmental and public safety and health impacts should a failure occur. These investigative risk management programs, and the preventive and mitigative risk control activities that evolve from them, supplement the minimum regulatory requirements established in 49 CFR 192 to protect the public and the environment. The System Integrity Inspection Program is focused on developing a more integrity-based approach to OPS inspections. Instead of using a solely compliance-based approach, OPS is focusing the inspection process on an operator’s integrity management processes and activities. By working with the operator, OPS is able to understand and influence the methods and approaches used to assess pipeline integrity, and the approaches to integrating integrity assessment data with other pipeline specific information to identify the most significant integrity threats to the system. Specifically, OPS has observed how operators examine internal inspection data in conjunction with other surveillance and operating data, expected population growth, land use, construction activity along the pipeline, and other information relevant to assuring the integrity of the pipeline in high population areas and in environmentally sensitive areas. Through this interaction OPS is acquiring a broader understanding and a greater confidence that effective programs are in place to address the most significant risks. Similar to the Risk Management Program, the SI1 Program is emphasizing how operators evaluate their system condition and its risks, and use this information to make sound integrity management decisions. While these two programs only involve a limited number of operators, OPS discussions with other companies in industry forums and working groups has indicated that formal integrity management programs are becoming more common. OPS found that many companies are developing more sophisticated and mature integrity management systems and diagnostic tools. OPS believes the next step is to require all operators to develop and follow at least minimum level integrity management programs focused on areas of significant potential consequences from pipeline incidents. 2#

Page 6DRAFT A.2 Legislative Histow and National Transportation Safety Board Recommendations Congress has directed DOT to consider several initiatives that could improve safety and environmental protection, especially in locations where pipeline failures might have significant impacts to human health and safety and the environment. Specifically Congress has directed DOT to: 0 Prescribe standards establishing criteria for identifying gas pipeline facilities located in high-density population areas, and hazardous liquid pipelines that cross waters where a substantial likelihood of commercial navigation exists, are located in high-density population area, or are located in an area unusually sensitive to environmental damage (USA) [49 U.S.C. 0 60109(a)(2)]. 0 Prescribe additional standards requiring the periodic inspection of pipelines in US As and in high-density population areas. The regulations are to prescribe when an instrumented internal inspection device, or similarly effective inspection method, should be used to inspect the pipeline [49 U.S.C. 0 60102(f)(2)]. 0 Survey and assess the effectiveness of emergency flow restricting devices (EFRDs) and other procedures, systems, and equipment used to detect and locate hazardous liquid pipeline ruptures and to prescribe regulations on the circumstances under which an operator of a hazardous liquid pipeline facility must use an EFRD or such other procedure, system, or equipment [49 U.S.C. 3 60102(j)]. 0 Survey and assess the effectiveness of remotely controlled valves to shut off the flow of natural gas in the event of a rupture and determine whether the use of remotely controlled valves is technically and economically feasible and would reduce the risks associated with a rupture, and, if the use of valves is feasible and would reduce risks, to prescribe standards for the use of these valves, including requirements for their use in densely populated areas [49 U.S.C. 3 601026)(3)]. In addition to these Congressional directives, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has made several recommendations addressing improved protection for high population and environmentally sensitive areas. These recommendations include: 0 Requiring periodic testing and inspection to identify corrosion and other time-dependent pipeline damage. 0 Establishing criteria to determine appropriate intervals for inspections and tests, including safe service intervals between pressure testing. 3#

Page 7DRAFT e Determining hazards to public safety from electric resistance welded (ERW) pipe and establishing standards for leak detection systems. e Establishing requirements for installing automatic or remote-operated mainline valves on high-pressure lines in urban and environmentally sensitive areas to provide for rapid shutdown of failed pipeline segments. RSPA has initiated several programs and activities in response to these legislative mandates and NTSB recommendations. As summarized in Section A. 1 , the Risk Management and SI1 Pilot Programs have provided an understanding of how these issues can be effectively addressed within the context of a comprehensive and systematic integrity management program that considers the total spectrum of risks from pipeline operation, including those risks in locations where the consequences to public health and safety and the environment may be elevated. RSPA has also undertaken a rigorous and thorough process for developing the criteria to define USAs. This multi-year process involved numerous interactions with other Federal and State agencies, representatives of the hazardous liquid pipeline industry, environmental organizations, and other stakeholders. RSPA published for public comment proposed criteria to define USAs on December 30, 1999 (64 FR 73464). Numerous public comments were received on the proposed criteria (available in Docket # 99-5455). The proposed USA criteria were also pilot tested to confirm that the proposed USA definition can be used to identi% and locate unusually sensitive drinking water and ecological resources using available data from government agencies and environmental organizations. The pilot test identified USAs in Texas, California, and Louisiana - states with a large number of hazardous liquid pipelines, as well as considerable drinking water and ecological resources. The results of the pilot test, as well as the criteria in the proposed USA definition, were reviewed by a team of nationally recognized experts on drinking water and ecological resources. In late 2000, RSPA completed its evaluation of the feedback fi-om the technical peer review, public comments, and the pilot test results. After extensive consultation with other Federal agencies, a final rule defining USAs was issued on December 21,2000 (65 FR 80530). RSPA has performed an evaluation of the potential benefits of EFRDs in limiting the volume of product released following a hazardous liquid pipeline failure. The results were published in "Emergency Flow Restricting Devices Study" in 1991 (available in Docket # PS-133). This study recommended that OPS seek public input on the placement of EFRDs in urban areas, at water crossings, at other critical areas affected by commodity release, and in areas in close proximity to the public outside of urban areas. This study also concluded that remote control and check valves are the only effective EFRDs. 4#

Page 8DRAFT In January 1994, RSPA issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) (59 FR 2802) to solicit data from the public through a series of questions primarily concerning the performance of leak detection equipment and location of EFRDs. A public workshop was held in October 1995 to further address the issues associated with requiring EFRDs. These forums raised important concerns about the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of these mitigative features. It was suggested that the need for EFRDs should evolve from an integrated evaluation of the site-specific conditions and risks facing a particular pipeline location. This evaluation would include assessing the effectiveness of the existing preventive and mitigative activities, as well as considering the need for additional preventive or mitigative risk control activities. Especially when considering mitigative actions like EFRDs, the environmental sensitivity of the location is an important factor that must be considered to make the best overall risk reduction decisions. Thus, RSPA deferred proposing regulations requiring EFRD installation until USAs were defined. RSPA believes that the experience obtained through the Risk Management Demonstration Program, the SI1 Pilot Program, the USA definition process, and other initiatives has provided a foundation for moving forward with a rule that addresses these Congressional mandates and NTSB recommendations in a comprehensive and integrated manner. A.3 Interaction with Industry. Other Agencies. and Stakeholders On October 21, 1999, RSPA issued a Notice (64 FR 56725) announcing a public meeting to discuss the need for additional regulations for natural gas and hazardous liquid transmission lines in high population areas, commercially navigable waters, and areas of the environment that are unusually sensitive to the environment damage. Areas fitting one or more of these three criteria were referred to as “high consequence areas” or HCAs. The October 2 1, 1999 Notice included a conceptual approach to providing improved protection in high consequence areas, and solicited feedback on a number of specific questions relative to this approach. In the Notice, RSPA stated that any process for protecting high consequence areas should include: Pipeline-specific assessments in determining the need for additional preventive and mi ti gat ive activities; An assessment approach that considers all risk factors and risk reduction activities in an integrated manner; and Increased assurance that high consequence areas are being protected. The public meeting was held on November 18 and 19, 1999, in Hemdon, Virginia. The primary discussion topics included: the key elements of an effective integrity management program, the 5#

Page 9DRAFT extent to which operators now have integrity management programs, and how to validate the effectiveness of such programs. In addition, RSPA obtained feedback and input on a broad array of integrity management issues, including: 0 How to characterize and define high consequence areas, Key elements of operator integrity management programs, 0 Types of information that should be integrated to assure pipeline integrity; and 0 OPS review of integrity management programs, including what elements to review and in spec t . A synopsis of the feedback obtained at this meeting, as well as complete transcripts of the formal presentations are available in the Docket and on the OPS home page at http://ops.dot.gov. On December 22, 1999, RSPA issued a Notice in the Federal Register (64 FR 71 7 13) announcing an extension of the public comment period to January 17,2000. The availability of a new electronic discussion forum was announced to allow interested parties to express their views on integrity management program issues and the need for improved protection in high consequence areas. The December 22, 1999 Notice also referenced a draft conceptual model for assuring pipeline integrity in high consequence areas, and solicited comments on the draft approach. RSPA received comments from several organizations and individuals. These are available in the Docket (RSPA 99-6355), and are summarized in the preamble of the NPRM announcing the proposed rule (65 FR 21695) that resulted. Following the public meeting, OPS hosted a number of smaller meetings and conference calls to make sure the broadest range of comments and information were considered in drafting the NPRM. Discussion items included the areas that should be considered high consequence areas, reasonable milestones for completing benchmark testing, developing industry standards to support a rule, how a rule should acknowledge differences between the gas and liquid pipeline industries as well as among individual operators, and how best to involve affected communities. These topics were discussed with Interstate Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA) representatives on January 12, American Petroleum Institute (API) representatives on January 13, National Association of Pipeline Safety Representatives (NAPSR) on January 14, February 15, and March 3, public interest representatives on January 19 and February 29, and NTSB on February 8. Minutes from each of these sessions are in the Docket. OPS also initiated dialog with industry and various public interest representatives to explore approaches to improve communication between OPS, pipeline operators, and the communities in 6#

Page 10DRAFT which pipeline facilities are located. Initial discussions have focused on strengthening the liaison between public officials and pipeline companies, testing the usefulness of pipeline data provided to public officials, and developing concepts for restructuring the respective roles of federal, state, and local officials, emphasizing the distinction between participation and communication. Meetings were conducted on February 28 and 29,2000 to begin addressing the multi-faceted communication issue. After considering the feedback from the public meeting, comments to the Docket, and experience in the Risk Management and SI1 programs, RSPA elected to implement integrity management requirements for the pipeline industry in several steps. In the first rulemaking, OPS focused on the hazardous liquid industry operators with 500 or more miles of pipeline. A final rule for integrity management for these pipeline operators was published on December 1,2000 (65 FR 75378). This rule applies to pipelines that can affect high consequence areas (HCAs). HCAs for hazardous liquid pipelines are defined in the rule as populated areas, USAs, and commercially navigable waterways. RSPA next proposed a similar rule covering integrity management for hazardous liquid operators with fewer than 500 miles of pipeline (66 FR 15821; March 21,2001). RSPA received a small number of public comments on the NPRM. After reviewing this input, as well as discussions with other Federal agencies, RSPA decided that the same requirements for protection of high consequence areas and the development of integrity management programs should apply to all hazardous liquid pipeline operators. RSPA is completing resolution of comments on the proposed rule and expects to issue a final rule in late 2001. RSPA is now beginning rulemaking for integrity management for operators of gas transmission pipelines. The first proposed rule covers the definition of high consequence areas (HCAs). Future rulemaking will cover the integrity management requirements for gas transmission pipelines that affect the defined HCAs. OPS has been meeting with representatives of the gas pipeline industry, research institutions, State pipeline safety agencies and public interest groups, to gather the information needed to propose an integrity management program (IMP) rulemaking pertaining to gas operators. Since January 2000, OPS has held nine meetings with State agencies, representatives of the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA), the American Gas Association (AGA), Battelle Memorial Institute, the Gas Technology Institute (GTI), Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Company, and operators covered under 49 CFR Part 192. (See DOT Docket No. 7666 for summaries of the meetings.) OPS also has met separately with Western States Land Commissioners, National Governors Association, National League of Cities, National Council of State Legislators, Environmental Defense Fund, Public Interest Reform Group, and Working Group on Communities Right-To-Know. 7#

Page 11DRAFT On February 12 -14,2001, OPS held a public meeting in Arlington, VA, on integrity management in high consequence areas for natural gas pipelines and enhanced communications regarding hazardous liquid and gas pipelines. At this meeting, reports on the status of industry and govemment activities to maintain and improve the integrity of gas pipelines were featured and meeting attendees participated in in-depth discussions on the integrity of gas pipelines. The reports can be found in the DOT docket (#7666) and the OPS web site under InitiativesPipeline Integrity Management P r o g r d G a s Transmission Operators Rule. At the meeting, industry and state repregentatives and members of the public presented their perspectives on a number of issues related to integrity management, including considerations for defining HCAs affected by gas pipelines. Presentations from the public meeting may be viewed on the OPS web site under InitiativesPipeline Integrity Management ProgradGas Transmission Operators Rule. A Notice was published in the Federal Register on June 27,2001 (66 FR 343 18) requesting further information and clarification and inviting hrther public comment on integrity management concepts as they relate to gas pipelines. The Notice also announced the establishment of an electronic public discussion forum for gas pipeline integrity management issues on OPS’s internet home page. In this notice, OPS invited comment on seven elements it considered important to include in the integrity management rule and hypotheses related to these elements. The first of the seven elements was the definition of HCAs. OPS received numerous comments on the issues related to the definition of HCAs, which are included in the docket along with the transcript of the electronic discussion forum. These comments were taken into consideration in development of the HCA definition included in this proposed rule. In addition to the proposed rules RSPA has issued and plans to issue addressing integrity assurance in high consequence areas, there are many other Federal, state, and local government regulations in place to protect sensitive resources. These include regulations to protect drinking water resources, threatened and endangered species, critical habitats for various species, and spawning areas. Areas have been created and designated to protect and maintain aquatic life, wildlife, and various other natural and water resources. Permits, environmental assessments, and consultations with resource experts are required by various Federal, state, and local agencies before a pipeline can be installed or construction to modify or repair an existing line can take place. RSPA’s existing and planned future regulations complement and enhance these other Federal, state, and local government regulations on sensitive drinking water or ecological resources. A.4 Future RSPA Integrity Management Initiatives RSPA plans to propose rules on pipeline integrity management for interstate and intrastate natural gas operators in the near future. The specific requirements of those rules and the 8#

Page 12DRAFT environmental impacts associated with those requirements will be considered in the rulemaking process. B. Description of Proposed Action RSPA proposes to add a new section to 49 CFR 192 defining high consequence areas (HCAs) for gas transmission pipelines. The proposed definition of a HCA is: W Any Class 3 area as specified in $192.5(b)(3)(i) and $192.5(b)(3)(ii) (Note: limits apply as specified in $192.5(c)) W Any Class 4 area as specified in $192.5(b)(4) (Note: limits apply as specified in 4 1 92.5(c)) 0 Any area out to 660 feet where there are hospitals, schools, day-care centers, retirement homes, prisons or other hard to evacuate places occupied by 20 or more persons, W Any area beyond 660 feet out to 1000 feet where there are hospitals, schools, day-care centers, retirement homes, prisons or other hard to evacuate places occupied by 20 or more persons, where the pipeline is greater than 30 inches in diameter and operates at a maximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP) of 1000 psig or greater. W Any area out to 660 feet (or out to 1000 feet where the pipeline is greater than 30 inches in diameter and operates at MAOP of 1000 psig) where people congregate (such as beaches, recreational facilities, campgrounds, museums, etc.) that are occupied by 20 or more persons at least 50 days in any 12 month period. (The days need not be consecutive.) Class 3 locations have 46 or more buildings intended for human occupancy within an area that extends 220 yards on either side of the centerline of any continuous one mile length of pipeline, or are areas where the pipeline lies within 100 yards of either a building or small, well-defined outside area (such as a playground, recreation area, outdoor theater, or other place of public assembly) that is occupied by 20 or more persons on at least 5 days a week for 10 weeks in any 12 month period. Class 4 locations are any class location unit where buildings with four or more stories above ground are prevalent (e.g., large office buildings). The proposed rule imposes no requirement for action by gas pipeline operators. Future rulemaking will define the requirements for gas pipeline operator integrity management programs for those pipeline segments covered by HCAs as defined here. Although the specific provisions of integrity management requirements are not yet defined, it is expected that these provisions will include the following elements beyond the operator definition of HCAs: 9#

Page 13. DRAFT 1. Identification and evaluation of the threats to pipeline integrity in each HCA. 2. Selection of assessment technologies best suited to effectively determine the susceptibility of failure of each pipe segment that could affect a HCA. 3. Determination of time fiames to conduct a baseline integrity assessment and to make any needed repair, using a graded approach under which priorities for assessment and repair are set according to risk. 4. Identification and implementation of additional preventive and mitigative measures appropriate to manage significant threats. 5 . Continual evaluation and reassessment at the specified interval of each pipeline segment that could affect a HCA using a risk-based approach. The evaluation considers the information the operator has about the entire pipeline to determine what might be relevant to the pipeline segment. 6. Monitoring the effectiveness of the management process designed to provide additional assurance of integrity in areas where the consequences of potential pipeline accidents are greatest. C. Alternatives Considered RSPA considered alternatives in the decision process that led to the proposed HCA definition given in Section B above. These alternatives are summarized below: 1. Take No Action. In this alternative, RSPA would rely on the existing regulatory requirements to provide protection for high consequence areas. No additional definition of HCAs would be performed in anticipation of new rules for integrity management by gas pipelixie operators. By selecting this alternative, RSPA would not be responsive to the Congressional mandates to consider internal inspection and other protective measures for high population areas (see Section A.2). 2. Define HCAs as any Class 3 o c l a s s 4 Area. In this alternative, new requirements on operators of gas pipelines for integrity management would be confined to those pipeline segments adjacent to Class 3 or Class 4 areas. An HCA would be defined as: Any Class 3 area as specified in 0 192.5@)(3)(i) and 0 192S(b)(3)(ii) Any Class 4 area as specified in $192.5(b)(4) (Note: limits apply as specified in 10#

Page 14DRAFT This option uses the first two parts of the proposed definition of HCAs, but excludes hard to evacuate locations such as hospitals, schools, day-care centers, retirement homes, and prisons. It also excludes areas where people congregate that are 660- 1000 feet away from pipelines exceeding 30 inches in diameter and 1000 psig MAOP. This alternative definition would result in new requirements for integrity management programs potentially being applied to fewer miles of gas pipeline. This would occur, for example, if a pipeline segment were adjacent to hard to evacuate facilities, but not within a Class 3 or Class 4 area. 3. Define HCAs according to the definition of high population areas from 6195.450 The HCAs for hazardous liquid pipeline integrity management in 49 CFR 195.450 include “high population areas.” 49 CFR 195.450 defines a high population area as “...an urbanized area, as defined and delineated by the U.S. Census Bureau, that contains 50,000 or more people and has a population density of at least 1,000 people per square mile.” Under this alternative, HCAs for gas pipeline integrity management would use the Census Bureau definition of “high population areas.” This would capture pipelines within the boundaries of larger towns and cities. Such pipelines have the possibility of being situated near areas of high population density and residential or other development. Under this definition, therefore, HCAs would capture many areas where gas pipeline failures could have high consequences. Some of the areas included within the HCA definition under this alternative, however, would not necessarily be areas of high population density or heavy development, because the boundaries of the high population areas defined by the Census Bureau might include some areas of low population density, even though the overall average population density within the boundaries of the areas exceeds 1,000 per square mile. Also, some Class 3 or Class 4 areas may be excluded by this alternative, if the Class 3 or Class 4 locations do not lie within the boundaries of Census Bureau units defined as high population areas. Although, this alternative definition of HCAs would likely include many of the same high population density areas as the proposed definition, RSPA believes the proposed definition has certain features that make it superior. By using the class location scheme contained in 49 CFR 192.5 to identify HCAs, gas pipeline operators utilize information they are already required to obtain and maintain regarding the degree of development and population density near pipelines. Including Class 3 and Class 4 locations as HCAs ensures that areas of high population density and high degrees of development are included, focusing on the specific conditions in the vicinity of pipeline in the zone where pipeline accidents might have an impact, rather than within the boundaries of an area that has an overall high population density. In addition, the proposed definition would specifically include hard to evacuate areas and areas where people congregate, while this alternative would not. 11#

Page 15DRAFT D. Affected Environment The purpose of the proposed rule is to define high consequence areas (HCAs) that may be affected by gas pipelines throughout the United States. The intent is that future rules will define requirements for integrity management on pipeline segments that might affect those HCAs. Thus, the areas of the environment potentially impacted by the rule are those that fall within the proposed HCA definition given in Section B above. After they are initially established, high consequence areas will be updated on a periodic basis to incorporate new information and data. For example, as communities and populations grow, the extent of Class 3 locations (as defined in 9 192S(b)(3)(i) and 9 192S(b)(3)(ii)) may expand. If so, the operator will need to apply any integrity management requirements to the expanded HCA. The frequency at which these updates will be necessary has not been determined. In addition to the HCAs, the provisions of the proposed rule will also impact areas of the environment outside of HCAs. For example, it is expected that some operators will elect to use internal inspection devices to fulfill integrity assessment and management requirements. Due to economic and operational considerations, the launchers and receivers used to insert and remove internal inspection devices are typically located at compressor stations, which can be many miles apart. Even though a high consequence area may exist for only a short distance along the line, because of the location of inspection device launchers and receivers, operators will likely inspect the entire compressor station-to-compressor station segment of the line. Thus, in addition to the information about the condition of the line in a high consequence area, the operator will obtain integrity data about a much larger segment of pipe. Any significant threats identified in these additional areas will also be remediated, thus providing additional protection for the regions adjacent to high consequence areas. E. Environmental Consequences of Proposed Action and Alternatives This section describes the expected impact to the environment of the proposed definition of high consequence areas (Section E. 1) and the alternatives (Section E.2). Gas transmission pipelines transport pressurized natural gas, which is lighter than air and flammable. If released as a result of a pipeline leak or rupture, natural gas can potentially ignite, causing fires or explosions. Industry experience demonstrates that environmental consequences of pipeline rupture-initiated fires are almost always limited to localized damage to the vegetation and animal life immediately adjacent to the failure site. A review of recent ruptures for one pipeline operator showed that the area impacted by fire is less than seven acres. It is possible that a rupture occurring in a heavily forested area in the dry season could result in a forest fire, 12#

Page 16DRAFT which would have a more extensive impact on wildlife and vegetation. However, the likelihood of such an occurrence is believed to be very low. Other than localized vegetation damage in the event of a fire or explosion, there are no significant environmental impacts from natural gas pipeline leaks or ruptures. Unlike hazardous liquid pipelines, ruptures of gas pipelines would not result in releases to bodies of surface water or impact groundwater. This rule proposes a definition of high consequence areas (HCAs) to be applied to integrity management requirements for natural gas transmission pipelines. These requirements will be proposed in upcoming rulemaking. OPS is now considering which integrity management approaches are most appropriate for the protection of the HCAs defined in this rule (see Section B). Because the actions to be required of pipeline operators have not yet been specified, the precise environmental consequences of the rule on the HCAs and other areas cannot be assessed. OPS’s intent for new requirements for integrity management is to reduce the likelihood of pipeline failures in the vicinity of HCAs. The reduction of pipeline failures will reduce the impacts of pipelines on the environment in HCAs and nearby, but because of the limited extent of environmental impacts of releases from gas pipelines, this reduction in environmental risk is expected to be small. E. 1 Environmental Consequences of Proposed Action As presented in the June 27,2001 Notice on gas pipeline integrity management (66 FR 343 1 S), the rules under consideration consist of seven elements. The first element, definition of HCAs, is the proposed action covered here. The other six elements (See Section B) encompass the additional actions pipeline operators will take for those pipeline segments that could potentially impact HCAs. This section considers the potential general environmental effects of actions that may be taken under OPS’s proposed approaches for gas integrity management requirements: 1. Identification and evaluation of the threats to pipeline integrity in each HCA. This element encompasses comprehensive and integrated analysis of threats to HCAs from pipelines in the vicinity. Pipeline operators would be required to assess and evaluate risk factors. RSPA believes such analysis is a prerequisite for definition of optimal integrity management programs and actions that protect HCAs. Consequently, it is expected that operator performance of this analysis will lead to more effective protection of HCAs and reduce risks to the environment within HCAs and adjacent areas from potential pipeline integrity failures. 2. Selection of assessment technologies best suited to effectively determine the susceptibility of failure of each pipe segment that could affect a HCA. 13#

Page 173. 4. DRAFT Operators will be required to perform a baseline assessment of pipeline integrity along all segments that can affect HCAs. The baseline assessment is necessary to determine which pipeline segments need to be repaired in order to maintain pipeline integrity. This will better protect the environment in the HCA and adjacent areas. Different assessment technologies will be more effective and practical, depending on the characteristics of the pipeline and the surrounding area. Some of the choices in technology (e.g., in line inspection, pressure testing) have minor environmental impacts associated with their use, but these are more than offset by the positive effects of increased prevention of pipeline failures assured by an effective baseline integrity assessment and repair of discovered problems, These issues are treated in depth in the Environmental Assessment (Docket # 99-6355) prepared for the Liquid Pipeline Integrity Management Rule (65 FR 75378). Determination of time frames to conduct a baseline integrity assessment and to make any needed repair, using a graded approach under which priorities for assessment and repair are set according to risk. Actions performed by operators under this element ensure that the baseline assessment and associated repairs of different pipeline segments are carried out so that the highest potential for line failure and consequence is addressed first. Potential harmful effects on the environment from pipe failure are addressed according to the level of risk associated with each pipeline segment that can impact a HCA. Identification and implementation of additional preventive and mitigative measures appropriate to manage significant threats. In conducting an evaluation of preventive and mitigative measures, operators will be expected to examine the entire range of threats to pipeline integrity in HCAs, integrating information from all applicable and available sources, including applicable experience along the entire pipeline. The objective of this evaluation is to identify location-specific conditions that might pose significant risks in HCAs, and support improved decisions to protect these areas. Operators will be expected to identify the major risks in high consequence areas, prioritize these risks, and consider what actions might be warranted to address the most important risks. As part of this evaluation, RSPA expects operators to critically evaluate the effectiveness of their existing prevention and mitigation measures. Actions that operators might evaluate under this element of their integrity management program include damage prevention practices, better monitoring of cathodic protection, establishing shorter inspection intervals, and installing Remote Control Valves (FSVs) or Automatic Shut-Off Valves (ASVs), The evaluation of these measures, along with implementation of those found to be important to preventing pipeline failures that 14#

Page 18DRAFT 5. 6. affecting HCAs, will result in additional protection of the environment in the HCAs and adjacent areas. Continual evaluation and reassessment at the specified interval of each pipeline segment that could affect a HCA using a risk-based approach. The evaluation considers the information the operator has about the entire piDeline to determine what might be relevant to the pipeline segment. Under this element, operators will be required to follow up the baseline integrity assessment (see element 2 above) with periodic reassessment of pipeline integrity for the same segments that were part of the baseline assessment. The time interval between reassessments of each segment is to be established based on the risk of failure of the segment. The intent of the reassessments is to maintain integrity of pipeline segments and maintain protection of the HCAs. Continued protection of pipeline integrity will result in continued improved prevention of failures which could impact the environment in the HCAs and adjacent areas. As stated for element 2 above, some of the assessment technologies that operators might employ in the reassessment have minor negative environmental impacts, but OPS considers these much lower than the positive effects of continued protection of pipelines and repair of any threats to integrity. A thorough discussion of this issue is included in the Environmental Assessment (Docket # 99-6355) prepared for the Liquid Pipeline Integrity Management Rule (65 FR 75378). Monitoring the effectiveness of the management process designed to provide additional assurance of integrity in areas where the consequences of potential pipeline accidents are greatest. This element will require operators to evaluate the effectiveness of their integrity management program through performance measurement. This evaluation will assure that the program is continually effective in managing and reducing risk in high consequence areas. OPS review of inspection results, integrity analysis, and consideration of additional preventive and mitigative actions will provide added assurance that a thorough evaluation has been conducted and operators have implemented an appropriately strong program to protect the environment in high consequence areas. As a result of this evaluation, some operators may elect to implement additional risk control activities to enhance protection for high consequence areas. Additional preventive or mitigative actions will evolve from the operator’s analysis of the risks in specific high consequence areas. As such, they will be operator- and site-specific. The existing pipeline safety regulations already protect high consequence areas. Additional rules 15#

Page 19DRAFT for integrity management of gas pipelines near HCAs provide additional protection because of the potential for higher impacts in these areas from pipeline failure. Some operators recognize the importance of preventing accidents in these areas and have programs and activities that extend beyond the regulations to provide additional protection. For this reason, it is expected that some operators may determine that a number of their high consequence areas already have adequate protection, and that further actions would not produce the demonstrable benefits. Summarv of Expected Environmental ImDacts for the ProDosed Rule In summary, the combined impacts of the initial baseline integrity assessment (e.g., using pressure testing or internal inspection), the subsequent periodic assessments, the integrated and continuous evaluation of line integrity, additional preventive and mitigative measures that may be implemented in high consequence areas, and performance measurement of the integrity management program will result in positive environmental impacts. The number of incidents and consequences from failures in high consequence areas are likely to be reduced. However, from a national perspective, the impact is not expected to be significant for the pipeline operators covered in the rule, primarily because of the limited environmental impact from such incidents and the existing activities already being performed by some gas pipeline operators to protect pipeline integrity near HCAs. Based on this analysis, RSPA has determined that the proposed definition of high consequence areas and expected new requirements in 49 CFR 192 to validate pipeline integrity in high consequence areas for gas pipeline operators will not have a significant environmental impact. E.2 Environmental Impacts of the Alternatives E.2.1 Take No Action. Under the “no action’’ alternative, RSPA would not issue any rule defining HCAs. Consequently, there would be no basis for fiture additional requirements for operators to take action to protect the integrity of gas pipelines in high consequence areas, encompassing the elements given in Section B above. It is expected that existing pipeline operator integrity management activities (both those required by Part 192, and those the operators perform voluntarily), as well as OPS oversight, would continue. This alternative would have essentially no impact on the environment. The benefits from increased integrity testing and inspection, more formal and integrated approaches to integrity management, and OPS oversight of operator integrity management plans that are expected to be required for high consequence areas defined under the proposed rule would not be realized under this alternative. E.2.2 Define HCAs as Class 3 and Class 4 areas 16#

Page 20DRAFT Under this altemative, only the first two parts of the proposed HCA definition would be adopted. The effects of this alternative would be identical to the effects of the proposed HCA definition in Class 3 and Class 4 areas. In those areas covered by the last two parts of the proposed HCA definition (Le., areas containing hard to evacuate facilities or places where people congregate), this alternative would have no effect. Thus, the net positive effects on the environment of requirements for integrity management would potentially be realized for fewer segments of gas pipeline than under the proposed rule for defining HCAs. A lower level of positive environmental impacts is to be realized by this alternative than by the proposed rule. Because the environmental effects of the proposed rule are not considered significant (see Section E. 1 above), the effects of this alternative are also not considered significant. E.2.3 f i 0 Under this alternative, Census Bureau definition of “high population areas” would be used to define HCAs for integrity management. As stated above in Section C, this alternative HCA definition would likely cover many of the same areas covered by the proposed definition. However, this alternative would not necessarily include all developed areas near gas pipelines encompassed by Class 3 and Class 4 areas and might include areas that do not have a high density of buildings intended for human occupancy. Also, this alternative may not include hard to evacuate facilities or areas where people congregate, if such areas are outside the boundaries of Census Bureau high population areas. The net positive environmental effects of requirements for gas pipeline operator integrity management programs would be realized for those areas defined as HCAs under this alternative. Because HCAs under this alternative do not necessarily coincide with HCAs under the proposed rule, these effects are not likely to be identical to the effects under the proposed rule. Some areas that would be designated as HCAs under this alternative would not be designated HCAs under the proposed rule. Similarly, some areas that would be designated as HCAs under the proposed rule would not be designated as HCAs under this alternative. The overall difference between the net effect under this alternative and the net effect under the proposed rule cannot be ascertained precisely. Both are expected to realize net positive effects, but in neither case are the effects expected to be significant. F. Environmental Justice Considerations In accordance with Executive Order 12898 (Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority and Low-Income Populations), RSPA has considered the effects on minority and low-income populations of the provisions of this rule. The testing and other integrity management activities required by this rule will enhance safety and environmental protection for high consequence areas. The rule applies to all high consequence areas nation-wide, and does 17#

Page 21DRAFT not specifically target any communities. Additional protection afforded populated areas will benefit all citizens in proximity to gas pipelines, regardless of their economic or minority status. Any additional protection of ecological resources may provide some indirect benefits to communities in proximity to such resources, in addition to the national and global benefits. However, these benefits will be realized regardless of a community’s economic or minority status. Therefore, the action does not have disproportionately high or adverse health or environmental effects on any minority or low-income populations near gas pipeline facilities. G. Information Made Available to States, Local Governments, and Individuals RSPA has made the following documents publicly available, and incorporates them by reference into this environmental assessment: Tipeline Safety: Pipeline Integrity Management in High Consequence Areas (Gas Transmission Pipelines),” Notice of Request for Comments, 66 FR 343 18, June 27,2001. “Pipeline Safety: Pipeline Integrity Management in High Consequence Areas (Hazardous Liquid Operators With Less Than 500 Miles of Pipelines),” Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 66 FR 1582 1, March 2 1 , 2001. ‘‘Pipeline Safety: Areas Unusually Sensitive to Environmental Damage,” Final Rule, 65 FR 80530, December 21,2000. “Pipeline Safety: Pipeline Integrity Management in High Consequence Areas,” Final Rule, 65 FR 75378, December 1, 2000. “Environmental Assessment: Final Rule Pipeline Integrity Management in High Consequence Areas for Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Operators Operating 500 or More Miles of Pipe,” Docket: RSPA 99-6355, November 13,2000. “Pipeline Safety: Pipeline Integrity Management in High Consequence Areas,” Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 65 FR 21695, April 24,2000. “Environmental Assessment: Proposed Rulemaking Pipeline Integrity Management in High Consequence Areas for Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Operators Operating 500 or More Miles of Pipe,” Docket: RSPA 99-6355, April 2000. “Pipeline Safety: Areas Unusually Sensitive to Environmental Damage,” Notice of 18#

Page 22DRAFT Proposed Rulemaking, 64 FR 73464, December 30, 1999. . “Pipeline Safety: Enhanced Safety and Environmental Protection for Gas Transmission and Hazardous Liquid Pipelines in High-Consequence Areas,” Notice Extending Comment Period and Establishing Electronic Public Discussion Forum, 64 FR 7171 3, December 22, 1999. “Environmental Assessment: Proposed Definition of Areas Unusually Sensitive to Environmental Damage (USAs),” Docket RSPA 99-5455, December 1999. . “Pipeline Safety: Enhanced Safety and Environmental Protection for Gas Transmission and Hazardous Liquid Pipelines in High Consequence Areas,” 64 FR 56725, October 21 , 1999. 0 “Areas Unusually Sensitive to Environmental Damage,” Notice of Initiating Pilot Testing, 64 FR 38173, July 15, 1999. H. List of Agencies and Persons Consulted During the process of developing the integrity management rule, RSPA interacted and consulted with numerous organizations. These participants included: Interstate Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA) American Gas Association (AGA) Battelle Memorial Institute Gas Technology Institute (GTQ Western States Land Commissioners National Governors Association National League of Cities National Council of State Legislators Environmental Defense Fund Public Interest Reform Group 19#

Page 23DRAFT S Working Group on Communities Right-To-Know I. Conclusion Gas pipeline failures that impact human health or the environment occur infrequently. Nonetheless, RSPA believes additional assurance of system integrity is important for high consequence areas (HCAs). The proposed rule covers the first step in providing this assurance, through the definition of HCAs that will be subject to integrity management requirements. This Environmental Assessment has considered the impacts of the provisions in the rule, and determined that a reduction in the risk associated with pipelines operating in high consequence areas should be expected. However, because the environmental consequences of gas pipeline failures are limited and some pipeline operators covered by this rule are already performing or planning to perform several of the activities that are expected to be performed under integrity management rulemaking, the impact is expected to be small. Therefore, RSPA has concluded that the definition of HCAs for gas pipeline integrity management will not have a significant environmental impact. 20#