NTSB Safety Recommendation P-00-019

NTSB safety recommendation P-00-019.

THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE LACLEDE GAS COMPANY: REQUIRE THAT YOUR EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAMS PARTICIPATE IN PORT CONTINGENCY PLAN DRILL EXERCISES INVOLVING PERMANENTLY MOORED VESSELS THAT ARE SUPPLIED WITH NATURAL GAS.

Priority: CLASS II

Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action

Issued Date: 2000-09-27

Adopted Date: 2000-09-08

Overall Date Closed: 2001-03-26

Synopsis: About 1950 on April 4, 1998, a tow of the M/V Anne Holly, comprising 12 loaded and 2 empty barges, which was traveling northbound on the Mississippi River through the St. Louis Harbor, struck the Missouri-side pier of the center span of the Eads Bridge. Eight barges broke away from the tow and drifted back through the Missouri span. Three of these barges drifted toward the President Casino on the Admiral (Admiral), a permanently moored vessel (PMV) below the bridge on the Missouri side of the river. The drifting barges struck the moored Admiral, causing 8 of its 10 mooring lines to break. No deaths resulted from the accident; 50 people were examined for minor injuries. Of those examined, 16 were sent to local hospitals for further treatment. Damages were estimated at $11 million.

Ntsbnumber: DCA98MM027

Report Number: MAR-00-01

Addressee Name: Laclede Gas Company

Addressee Status: Closed - Acceptable Action

Addressee Date Closed: 2001-03-26

Addressee Organization Type: P-Private Industry

Communication Date: 2000-12-20

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: Letter Mail Controlled 12/28/2000 11:08:41 AM MC# 2001822: Laclede intends to fully comply with this recommendation. A request has been made td the U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Office, St. Louis Harbor, to involve Laclede Gas Company in any such exercises planned in the future. Laclede will dedicate whatever resources necessary to participate in these exercises. Laclede would also like to respond briefly to several additional comments that were contained in your discussion of Safety Recommendation, P-00-19, as well as in the NTSB Marine Accident R.eport on the ramming and near breakaway of the President Casino on the Admiral in the St. Louis Harbor on April 4, 1998. (the Report). At page 68 of the Report, it states that, “. . .the flow from the Admiral’s ruptured natural gas supply line was not secured in a timely manner, and such a delay could be hazardous should such an incident recur.” While Laclede fully recognizes the potential danger that can be presented by a ruptured gas line, we trust that this statement was not intended to imply that Laclede permitted a hazardous situation to exist on the night of the incident. As you may know, a main valve was located and readily accessible on the west side of the floodwall just south of Poplar Street. This valve would have provided a means for a very quick shut-off had an unsafe condition developed. Indeed, consistent with Company procedures that emphasize thle protection of our employees and the public, I can assure you that Laclede’s emergency responders would not have hesitated to immediately close this valve if conditions at the scene had warranted such action. However, because the gas from the line was being fully vented to the air and dissipated by the winds away from all occupied areas, it was determined that an immediate hazard did not exist. Under such circumstances, Company personnel determined that it was both appropriate and safe to spend the time required to shut down the supply line that had been ruptured before initiating action to close the main valve. By sequencing its actions in this manner, the Company was able to avoid an introduction of water into its gas distribution system that would have otherwise occurred had the main valve at the floodwall been shut off first and, in the process, prevent a prolonged interruption of service to a number of customers along the Riverfront. More importantly, the Company was able to accomplish this objective without at any time compromising public safety. I also believe it is important to add some context to the Report’s statement that “ . . .the designers of this system should have considered that a facility set so close to the river might be difficult to access, depending on the river level” and that Laclede’s distribution system had a “design weakness”. The natural gas distribution system along the St. Louis riverfront was, in fact, designed to take into account the potential existence of high water conditions. Among these design considerations were; the decision to place the meters on the permanently moored vessel’s (PMV) in order to keep1 them out of high waters; the installation of multiple shutoff valves for each gas supply line, the construction of accessible regulator pits for the installation of extended regulator vent piping during high water; and the location of the main valve described above which is protected from high water by a flood wall, As previously discussed, this system design for the riverfront facilities, with its placement of the main valve in an area not affected by high waters, would have permitted an immediate shutdown of the system if such action had been required. Notwithstanding these clarifications, I want to point out that, as a result of this accident, Laclede has further enhanced its natural gas distribution system serving PMV’s by providing for each service a more accessible means to operate valves in the event of high water and the installation, when practical, of automatic shutoff devices that would automatically close in the event of a rupture. I hope this letter clarifies for you both the safety considerations which prompted the actions taken by Laclede ‘s response personnel on the night of the accident as well as our continuing commitment to refine and enhance our ability to respond to such extraordinary situations in the future. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions or comments regarding the matters addressed in this letter.

Addressee Organization Type: P-Private Industry

Communication Date: 2001-03-26

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: The Safety Board is pleased to note that Laclede Gas Company intends to fully comply with this recommendation and has requested tlaat the U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Office, St. Louis, involve Laclede Gas Company in any such exercises planned in the future. Laclede has indicated that it will dedicate whatever resources necessary to participate in these exercises. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation P-00-1 9 is ‘classified “Closed-Acceptable Action.” We would like to reply to the additional comments you made in your December 20,2000, response. You asked if our report language was intended to imply that, by failing to secure the flow of gas from the supply line in a timely fashion, Laclede permitted a hazardous situation to exist on the night of the accident. We did not intend to make such an assertion. As we stated on page 68 of the report, “The delay in this instance did not have serious consequences, but a future incident involving release of gas could have far more unfortunate results.” We are sure that Laclede would agree that failure to secure a ruptured gas line could, under different circumstances resulting from a future incident, pose a very serious safety hazard. You also provided new information in your letter indicating that Laclede could have, but chose not to, shut off a main valve by a floodwall that night because Laclede personnel at the scene judged the safety threat posed by the release to be minimal, and because closing this main valve would have caused a prolonged interruption of service and introduced water into the gas distribution system. We were unaware of Laclede’s internal deliberations on this matter and might have considered them in the report had they been communicated to us before the report was drafted, reviewed, and published. At the !3afety Board’s public hearing on July 23, 1998, Laclede’s Mr. Hofer testified “There is a third valve but it[‘s] down on the -- below the wall and, obviously, that one was not accessible, either.” On October 29, 1998, the Safety Board sent Mr. Hofer a letter, which invited him to make corrections and to provide any additional comments he believed were appropriate to his testimony. In any case, the Safety Board .maintains, as we stated on page 67 of the report, that “. . .one of the first priorities in any situation during which natural gas is released should be to curtail the escape of the product.” In this situation, Ad~niral patrons indicated that they experienced some panic and confusion. Patrons expressed concerns about the smell of natural gas and the fact that patrons were allowed to continue smoking. Exiting the vessel was a problem. The quickest way to curtail the escape of gas would have been by shutting the flow upstream of the break in the service line to the AdmimI by use of automatic shutoff devices. The next quickest way of curtailing the flow of gas Twould have been by closing the valve within the regulator pit. The Safety Board believes that Laclede would have quickly closed the valve within the regulator pit had it not been flooded and inaccessible. We respectfully maintain that the circumstances validate our position that locating the valve in an area prone to flooding that would make it inaccessible would indeed constitute a design weakness. Thank you for your prompt response to the recommendation and your commitment to pipeline safety.