NTSB Safety Recommendation P-07-001

NTSB safety recommendation P-07-001.

The National Transportation Safety Board makes the following safety recommendation to the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration: Provide a summary of the lessons learned from the Bergenfield, New Jersey, accident to recipients of emergency planning and response grants.

Priority: CLASS II

Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action

Issued Date: 2007-06-07

Adopted Date: 2007-05-01

Overall Date Closed: 2008-03-17

Synopsis: On December 13, 2005, at 9:26 a.m., an apartment building exploded in Bergenfield, New Jersey, after natural gas migrated into the building from a damaged pipeline. Safety Board investigators found a break in a 1 1/4-inch steel natural gas distribution service line that was operating at 11 1/2 pounds per square inch, gauge. The break occurred at an underground threaded tee connection downstream from where excavators were removing an oil tank that was buried under the asphalt parking lot adjacent to the building. The break occurred, under the parking lot, about 7 feet 4 inches from the building’s wall. Three residents of the apartment building were killed. Four residents and a tank removal worker were injured and transported to hospitals.

Probable Cause: The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the December 13, 2005, natural gas explosion and fire in Bergenfield, New Jersey, was the failure of the American Tank Service Company to adequately protect the natural gas service line from shifting soil during excavation, which resulted in damage to the service line and the release and migration of natural gas into the apartment building. Contributing to the accident was the failure of the Public Service Electric and Gas Company to conduct effective oversight of the excavation activities adjacent to the gas service line and to be prepared to promptly shut off the flow of natural gas after the service line was damaged. Contributing to the casualties in the accident was the failure of the Bergenfield Fire Department to evacuate the apartment building despite the strong evidence of a natural gas leak and the potential for gas to migrate into the building.

Ntsbnumber: DCA06MP001

Report Number: PAB-07-01

Addressee Name: PHMSA

Addressee Status: Closed - Acceptable Action

Addressee Date Closed: 2008-03-17

Addressee Acronym: PHMSA

Addressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government

Communication Date: 2007-06-29

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: Letter Mail Controlled 7/9/2007 1:52:55 PM MC# 2070333: This is an interim response to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Safety Recommendation emerging from the December 13, 2005 natural gas explosion in Bergenfield, New Jersey. The NTSB recommended the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) provide a summary of the lessons learned from the accident to recipients of emergency planning and response grants (NTSB Safety Recommendation P-07- 1). On December 13, 2005, a Public Service Electric and Gas Cbmpany (PSEG) natural gas service line separated at a fitting. Natural gas from the service line migrated into an apartment building. resulting in an explosion and fire that killed three people and injured four others. Our pipeline safety staff in Trenton, New Jersey responded to the incident and worked with NTSB in its investigation. The NTSB investigation determined the probable cause of the incident as the failure of the American Tank Service Company to adequately protect the natural gas service line from shifting soil during excavation, which resulted in damage to the service line and the release and migration of natural gas into the apartment building. Furthermore, NTSB determined that PSEG‘s excavation oversight was ineffective and that the company failed to promptly stop the flow of natural gas after the service line was damaged. Last, the Bergenfield Fire Department failed to evacuate the apartment building despite the strong evidence of a natural gas leak and the potential for gas to migrate into the building. PHMSA takes NTSB’s recommendation very seriously and is working diligently to address it. We are working with the National Association of State Fire Marshals (NASFM) to assemble those facts pertinent to response and recovery and to determine if it is appropriate for NASFM to issue an Advisory Bulletin to the first responder community. We will review NASFM’s and DOT’S joint Pipeline Emergencies training program to identify and implement any necessary updates in the response curriculum. We also,are working with the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities to extract the lessons learned from this incident. After completing these efforts, PHMSA intends to pass along any useful information and advice, both to regulated entities and recipients of emergency planning and response grants. I will update you on the status of these initiatives in fall 2007.

Addressee Acronym: PHMSA

Addressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government

Communication Date: 2008-03-17

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: The Safety Board has reviewed Ms. Gerard’s overview of PHMSA’s action to implement this recommendation. The Board notes that PHMSA worked with the National Association of State Fire Marshals (NASFM) to develop an advisory bulletin for the fire service and that the bulletin includes the lessons learned from the Bergenfield accident. In addition, NASFM developed a gas line break scenario demonstrating the appropriate response to a natural gas leak, PHMSA posted a link to the advisory bulletin and scenario on the Emergency Officials page of PHMSA’s Pipeline Safety Stakeholder Communications Web site, and NASFM posted the advisory bulletin and scenario on two Web sites: that of the Partnership for Excellence in Pipeline Safety and that of the Pipeline Emergencies Program. The Board further notes that on September 5, 2007, PHMSA emailed the Advisory Bulletin and scenario to the recipients of the agency’s emergency planning and response grants in 34 States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, and several Tribal governments. Because these actions satisfy the recommendation, Safety Recommendation P-07-1 is classified Closed Acceptable Action.

Addressee Acronym: PHMSA

Addressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government

Communication Date: 2007-09-17

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: The Safety Board has reviewed Ms. Girard’s overview of PHMSA’s intended course of action to implement this recommendation. The Board notes that PHMSA is working with the National Association of State Fire Marshals (NASFM) to assemble those facts pertinent to response and recovery and to determine whether it is appropriate for NASFM to issue an Advisory Bulletin to the first responder community; that PHMSA will review NASFM’s and the Department of Transportation’s joint Pipeline Emergencies training program to identify and implement any necessary updates in the response curriculum; and that PHMSA is working with the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities to extract the lessons learned from this incident. Ms. Girard further advised that after completing these efforts, PHMSA would disseminate any useful information and advice, both to regulated entities and recipients of emergency planning and response grants. Accordingly, pending completion of the efforts outlined in Ms. Girard’s letter, Safety Recommendation P-07-1 is classified Open Acceptable Response. The Board would appreciate receiving periodic updates on the status of the efforts discussed above.

Addressee Acronym: PHMSA

Addressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government

Communication Date: 2007-11-20

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: Letter Mail Controlled 11/23/2007 10:42:19 AM MC# 2070690: PHMSA partnered with the National Association of State Fire Marshals (NASFM) to develop the enclosed Advisory Bulletin for the fire service, which includes the lessons learned from the Bergenfield accident. NASFM also developed the enclosed gas line break scenario demonstrating the appropriate response to a natural gas leak. PHMSA has posted a link to the Advisory Bulletin and scenario on the Emergency Officials page of the PHMSA Pipeline Safety Stakeholder Communications web site (http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/EmergencyOfficials.htm). NASFM has posted the Advisory Bulletin and scenario on its web page (http://www.firemarshals.org), the Partnership for Excellence in Pipeline Safety web page (http://www.safe pipelines.org), and the Pipeline Emergencies Program web page at (http ://ww.pipelineemergencies.com. On September 5, PHMSA e-mailed the Advisory Bulletin and scenario to the recipients of PHMSA's emergency planning and response grants in 34 States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, and several Tribal governments.