NTSB Safety Recommendation Letter P-07-001

Page 1Official PDFNational Transportation Safety Board Washington, D.C. 20594 Safety Recommendation Date: June 7, 2007 In reply refer to: P-07-01 Vice Admiral Thomas J. Barrett Administrator Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration U.S. Department of Transportation 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE East Building, Second Floor (PH) Washington, DC 20590 _____________________________________________________________________________ On December 13, 2005, at 9:26 a.m., an apartment building exploded in Bergenfield, New Jersey, after natural gas migrated into the building from a damaged pipeline. Safety Board investigators found a break in a 1 1/4-inch steel natural gas distribution service line that was operating at 11 1/2 pounds per square inch, gauge. The break occurred at an underground threaded tee connection downstream from where excavators were removing an oil tank that was buried under the asphalt parking lot adjacent to the building. The break occurred, under the parking lot, about 7 feet 4 inches from the building’s wall. Three residents of the apartment building were killed. Four residents and a tank removal worker were injured and transported to hospitals.1 The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the probable cause of the December 13, 2005, natural gas explosion and fire in Bergenfield, New Jersey, was the failure of the American Tank Service Company to adequately protect the natural gas service line from shifting soil during excavation, which resulted in damage to the service line and the release and migration of natural gas into the apartment building. Contributing to the accident was the failure of the Public Service Electric and Gas Company to conduct effective oversight of the excavation activities adjacent to the gas service line and to be prepared to promptly shut off the flow of natural gas after the service line was damaged. Contributing to the casualties in the accident was the failure of the Bergenfield Fire Department to evacuate the apartment building despite the strong evidence of a natural gas leak and the potential for gas to migrate into the building. 1 For additional information, see Natural Gas Service Line Break and Subsequent Explosion and Fire, Bergenfield, New Jersey, December 13, 2005, Pipeline Accident Brief NTSB/PAB-07/01 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 2007). 7773A#

Page 22 The Bergenfield Police and Fire Departments arrived on scene about 8:54 a.m. in response to a report of a gas line leak. Within a few minutes, they controlled the site by limiting access. The fire chief directed that the Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSE&G) be notified of the incident. About 9:22 a.m., a PSE&G service technician arrived on scene. The technician attempted to close the curb valve to shut off the gas, but he was unable to apply enough force to close it. In a postaccident interview, the service technician said that as he approached the building to investigate the gas leak, an American Tank Service Company (American Tank) crewmember told him to not get too close to the trench because it had already collapsed. The service technician said that he had seen a piece of asphalt that had fallen into the trench. The service technician, using a portable gas detector, detected a positive gas reading just inside the boiler room doorway of the apartment building. He started moving away from the building as it exploded at 9:26 a.m. The fire chief and a fire official said that they did not hear a leak or smell gas at the excavation; however, the fire chief knew a gas leak had been reported. The Safety Board believes that the circumstances of this accident should have prompted actions to determine whether natural gas could be accumulating in the building and to evacuate people from the building. Had the evacuation promptly commenced at this time, there would have been significant time to evacuate the residents and crewmembers. Therefore, it is possible that all of the residents could have been safely evacuated, and the American Tank crew could have moved away from the area before the explosion. According to the fire chief, the Bergenfield Fire Department does not have written procedures for natural gas incidents, and it relies heavily on the assistance of the PSE&G in determining whether to evacuate a structure. However, as seen in this accident, a PSE&G crew will likely not arrive at the scene of a gas leak as quickly as emergency responders. Therefore, the Safety Board concludes that emergency responders need to be prepared to rapidly assess situations involving natural gas leaks and to determine whether prompt excavations are warranted. The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration can play a vital role in disseminating information regarding the importance of establishing and implementing emergency response procedures. Therefore, the National Transportation Safety Board makes the following safety recommendation to the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration: Provide a summary of the lessons learned from the Bergenfield, New Jersey, accident to recipients of emergency planning and response grants. (P-07-1)#

Page 33 The Safety Board also issued safety recommendations to the New Jersey Department of Community Affairs, the Borough of Bergenfield, the American Tank Service Company, the Public Service Electric and Gas Company, and the International Association of Fire Chiefs. In your response to the recommendation in this letter, please refer to Safety Recommendation P-07-1. If you need additional information, you may call (202) 314-6177. Chairman ROSENKER, Vice Chairman SUMWALT, and Members HERSMAN, HIGGINS, and CHEALANDER concurred in this recommendation. [Original Signed] By: Mark V. Rosenker Chairman#