P-78-009 through P-78-011
P-78-009 through P-78-011
Page 1Official PDFe -?Y NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD WASHINGTON, D.C. ISSUED: Februazy 8, 1978 ---_--__-_^-_______-_______________I____- Forwarded to: M r . L. D. Santman Director Materials Transportation Bureau Department of Transportation Washington, D.C. 20590 S ETY OMMENC QN(S) P-78-9 through P-78-11 A t 4:30 a.m., e . d . t . , on J u l y 20, 1977, a 12-inch propane p i p e l i n e , owned by t h e Consolidated Gas Supply Corporation, ruptured near t h e t o m of Ruff Creek, Pennsylvania. The l i q u i d , under 450-psig pressure, escaped from the pipeline, vaporized, and propane vapors s e t t l e d l i k e a fog over the bottom of a v a l l e y . &/ About 6 a.m., two men i n a pickup truck entered the propane cloud; t h e truck s t a l l e d and t h e propane gas ignited when a n attempt was made to r e s t a r t t h e truck. A f l a s h f i r e , approximately 100 yards wide, followed a streambed located along the bottom of t h e v a l l e y and burned everything i n i t s path f o r a distance of 1 m i l e . The flames were over 100 f e e t high a t t h e point of t h e rupture and burned f o r 1 4 hours u n t i l t h e remaining propane l i q u i d i n t h e p i p e l i n e could be i s o l a t e d i n t h e p i p e l i n e by the use of valves and stopples. A s a r e s u l t of t h i s accident, t h e 2 persons i n t h e truck were k i l l e d , t h e t r u c k was destroyed, 57 head of c a t t l e were k i l l e d , overhead power and telephone l i n e s were destroyed, a hay s t o r a g e shed containing 450 b a l e s of hay w a s burned, 1,800 b a r r e l s of propane burned, and a meadow and wooded a r e a 1 mile long by 100 yards wide was burned. - 1/ For more d e t a i l e d information about t h i s accident, read "Pipeline Accident Report -- Consolidated Gas Supply Corporation, Propane P i p e l i n e Rupture and F i r e , Ruff Creek, Pennsylvania, J u l y 20, 1977" (NTSB-PAR-78-1). 2260#
Page 2- 2 - In t h e p a s t 9 years l i q u e f i e d petroleum gas ( your O f f i c e of P i p e l i n e Safety Operations (OPSO) a s being involved in less than 10 percent of t h e reported l i q u i d petroleum p i p e l i n e a c c i d e The alarming s t a t i s t i c s are t h a t these LPG accidents caused 66 percen of a l l of t h e f a t a l i t i e s , 48 percent of a11 of t h percent of a l l of t h e property damage. The Safety Board has o f t e n commented on t h e i n and h a s c a l l e d f o r many amendments. More s t r i n g e n t to assure t h e s a f e t r a n s p o r t a t i o n of LPG. From meetings with OPSO o its progress i n implementing our many recommendatio the publishing of the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking is imminent I n a d d i t i o n to expediting t h e LPG rulemaking, operators t o conduct public education on the p a r t i c u l a r hazards of and how to r e p o r t an emergency. In t h i s accident, although signs i d e n t i f y i n g t h e p i p e l i n e as a propane c a r r i e r were placed a t a road crossing within 100 f e e t of the rupture, t h e public and emergency response personnel did not know what t o do and how company even though its telephone number was c l e a r 1 With the shortage of n a t u r a l gas, some companies may w i s h t o convert t h e i r gas p i p e l i n e s i n t o l i q u e f i e d petroleum gas p i p e l i n e stress-corrosion cracking of t h i s p i p e l i n e was not discovered by t e s t i n g , including h y d r o s t a t i c t e s t i n g a t high pressure, when t h p i p e l i n e was converted t o propane service. However, 7 years l a t p i p e l i n e f a i l e d a t an operating pressure t h a t was less than one- the h y d r o s t a t i c t e s t pressure. Therefore, t h e National Transportation Safety Board recommend t h e Materials Transportation Bureau of the U. S. D Expedite the publishing of the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on regulations f o r the s a f e transp p i p e l i n e s of l i q u e f i e d petroleum gases (LPG). a comprehensive s e c t i o n on the communications r e q u i r e f o r t h e s a f e operation of LPG pipelines. (Class 11, P r i o r i t y Action)(P-78-9) Include i n proposed regulations a s e c t i o n s i m i l a r t o emergency plan s e c t i o n of t h e n a t u r a l gas cod t h a t w i l l r e q u i r e operators to provide information to pe who l i v e o r work within 220 yards of a propan and up t o 1 mile i f located downhill of a LPG about t h e p a r t i c u l a r hazards of LPG and how to contac emergency response personnel. (Class 111, Longer Term Action) (P-78-10)#
Page 3- 3 - Include i n proposed 49 CFR 195 regulations, provisions f o r checking n a t u r a l gas p i p e l i n e s t h a t a r e being converted t o l i q u e f i e d petroleum gas (LPG) s e r v i c e f o r stress-corrosion cracking. (Class 111, Longer Term Action)(P-78-11) McADAMS, HOGUE and K I N G , Members, concurred i n the above recommendations. BAILEY, Acting Chairman, d i d not p a r t i c i p a t e . By: Kay Bailey Acting Chairman 2260#
This is an NTSB safety recommendation letter. NTSB recommendations are advisory and do not themselves create binding regulatory requirements.