NTSB Safety Recommendation Letter P-80-026 through P-80-030

Page 1Official PDFp-156 NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD WASHINGTON, D.C. ISSUED: May 7, 1980 Forwarded to: Mr. Howard Dugoff Administrator Research and Special Programs Administration SAFETY RECOMMENDATION (S) Washington, D.C. 20590 P-80-26 through -30 natural gas (LNG) vapors destroyed a transformer building at the reception facility of About 3:35 a.m., e.d.t., on October 6, 1979, an explosion caused by liquefied the Columbia LNG Corporation, Cove Point, Maryland, Odorless liquefied natural gas leaked through an inadequately tightened LNG pump seal, vaporized, passed through approximately 210 ft of underground electrical conduit and entered the substation building. One person was killed, and one person was seriously injured. Damage to the facility was estimated at about $3 million. 1/ LNG facility were safety analysis performed. The Safety Board first recommended the At no time during the planning, design, or construction phases of the Cove Point study pointed out that safety analysis".. need not be a highly complicated task." The use of safety analysis to the natural gas industry in 1972 in a special study. 2/ The study noted that by using safety analysis techniques to identify and evaluate system hazards, management would be able to make knowledgeable decisions about which hazards to eliminate, which hazards to control, and the degree of residual risks it was accepting. The safety problem posed by a failed pump seal leaking LNG into the 1 not are my IN aching mic he only ary my is ten a l identify and eliminate or control system hazards through all phases of a facility's life 1/ For more detailed information read "Pipeline Accident Report-Columbia LNG Corporation, Explosion and Fire, Cove Point, Maryland, October 6, 1979" (NTSB-PAR-80-2). 2/ For more detailed information read "Special Study-A Systematic Approach to Pipeline Safety, May 25, 1972" (NTSB-PSS-72-1). 2763A#

Page 2The Cove Point LNG facility was equipped wit (CGls). CGIs provide the facility's process area w vaporized LNG leaks by instrument. The 105J pumph located inside about 25 ft above t h e pump CGI. The CGIs in the 1055 pumphouse were operat however, the alarm did not activate even though lar into the pumphouse. If a CGI had been installed in th detected the LNG vapors and activated the alarm in t The United States Coast Guard (USCG) and the M (MTB) are responsible for promulgating and enforcing irnport/export facilities. The USCG is responsible fo traffic; fire preventionlprotection equipme facility; security of the facility; and all matters per to the last manifold or valve before the LNG storage facility site, selection, and all other matters pertai fire protection and security, beyond the last mani tank. At the time of the accident, no Federal regulations existed facilities. The Safety Board is aware that both agencies are i promulgat ing regulations. Title 49 CFR 192.12 requires that LNG facilities be desi modified, and repaired in accordance with the Standard for the Production, Storage, and Han Standard No. 59A). NFPA annually publishes compilations of the codes, standards, recommend laws. The codes are "purely advisory" according to the NFPA; how used as a "basis" for good practices by regulators and insurers. The Safety Board believes that although the NFPA Fire Code upon which regulations can be developed, the codes by themsel insure the safety of LNG facilities. The Safety NFPA Fire Codes as regulations in other accide problem does not lie with the fire codes themsel regulators, despite NFPA's admonitions in the each code that they are "advisory.11 Therefore promulgate comprehensive regulations which wi The Safety Board is also concerned about t h e absence of the qualifications and insuring the competenc There are numerous occupations which utilize controller and may affect the health and that positions, such as the cargo officer on an and demonstrated competence by examin comprehensive training criteria would establi be modified or improved, as required. Witho competency, there can be no assurance that LNG co necessary to safely operate LNG facilities. Cert For more detailed information read "Mar and Explosion with Loss of Life at Greenville, Missi (NTSB-MAR-78-2) and ISpecial Investigat Delivery Fire and Explosion" (NTSB-HZM-78-1).#

Page 3on satisfactory completion of an examination, other LNG reception facilities with similar s as Cove Point. Therefore, the National mmends that the Research and Special Programs ently promulgated Part 193, implement regulations establish- standards for liquefied natural gas (LNG) regulations should include, but not be limited to, safety ing specifications, inspection, fire prevention/protection, tions, and siting. (Class 11, Priority Action) (P-80-26) uildings and similar enclosures within LNG facilities fitted with an effective means for detecting ting company personnel. (Class 11, Priority Action) program for LNG facilities to ensure that they maintained in a safe condition and comply w i t h (Class II, Priority Action) (P-80-28) analysis for the design of LNG facilities. (Class 11, for licensing or certificating individuals designated to am should include a comprehensive written ence of such personnel. (Class II, Priority#